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Abstract 
The global discourse on people-centered development appeals for a normative dimension in 
donor policies. As a major donor organization, the European Union (EU) presents itself as a 
normative actor on the global stage. However, it is often criticized for lacking normative 
practice. This dissertation addresses this criticism and assesses the EU’s normative policy 
coherence for development by examining norm implementation across development and trade 
policies. The guiding research questions are the following: Are the EU’s development and trade 
policies coherent in implementing norms; and if not, why are they incoherent? 
Normative policy coherence for development is defined as the coherent implementation of EU 
norms (democracy, freedom, gender equality, good governance, human rights, justice, liberty, 
non-discrimination, peace, rule of law, solidarity and sustainability) across development and 
non-development policies. A case study of EU development and trade policies addressing 
Vietnam is used to illustrate normative policy coherence for development in the transition 
phase from an EU-Vietnam donor-recipient relationship to a mutual trade relationship. 
This research contributes to existing literature on policy coherence for development, public 
policy, normative power Europe and regionalism through the in-depth analysis of normativity 
in EU policy implementation. It examines EU normative power in the EU-Vietnam relationship 
with particular focus on normative policy coherence and places this relationship in the context 
of EU-ASEAN relations. 
A qualitative methodology is utilized in this dissertation is supported by the case study design 
within which the congruence method has been used for the analysis. The data set is comprised 
of European Union policy documents and semi-structured interviews conducted by the author 
in Brussels, Belgium, and Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, which were coded and 
analyzed in Atlas.ti. 
The results show that normative policy coherence for development is undermined for 
several reasons. First, in policy implementation, norms are seen as a political matter and 
not as a development or trade matter. In contrast to policy guidelines, which are infused by 
normative commitments such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
subsequent implementation stages do not correspond to this commitment. Second, policy 
networks, which could function as an opportunity for cooperation and coherence, are split 
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by sector, which reinforces the divide between political, developmental and economic matters 
and in doing so they undermine normative policy coherence. Third, the EU’s relations with 
ASEAN do not directly undermine EU-Vietnam relations and, therefore, normative coherence 
in policies addressed at Vietnam is only indirectly affected by EU interests in ASEAN. 
Causes of normative incoherence in EU policy implementation can be linked to the 
institutional divide between political and technical matters, which are reinforced by sectoral 
divisions in the delegations abroad. 
 
KEY WORDS: Policy Coherence for Development; Normative Coherence; Development-
Trade Nexus, EU Foreign Policies 
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Introduction 
The paradigmatic shift towards transformative development in recent years calls for a 
normative approach to development. Transformative development goes beyond traditional 
technical aid and aims to make changes to achieve a better future for all. Most visibly, the 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) depict ongoing global efforts to 
implement this normative approach. In line with this norm driven development approach, 
normative policy coherence for development (NPCD) provides a conceptual and analytical lens 
supportive of transformative development. NPCD is defined as the coherent implementation of 
a given set of norms across the development and non-development policies. It is both a 
fundamental element of the notion of “transformative development”, which is based on policy 
coherence for development in the Sustainable Development Agenda, and an indicator of the 
contested nature of development, which has been criticized as a policy goal by many observers 
(see Thede, 2013). Ensuring the implementation of norms such as human rights, gender 
equality or freedom across development and non-development policies, which could otherwise 
undermine transformative development efforts, is crucial to prioritizing the “transformative” 
nature of development strategies so that they remain people-focused. Scholars such as Koff 
and Maganda (2016) have criticized the implementation of policy coherence for development 
(PCD) strategies by international organizations because they promote “development” without 
necessarily fostering the ethics and values that should accompany such strategies. NPCD 
addresses this need and consequently it reconciles some of the values promoted by alternative 
development strategies (human rights, ecological balance, etc.) with mainstream international 
development agendas. This dissertation aims to connect PCD, which has gained momentum in 
international fora since the 1990s, and the normative shift in the global development agenda, 
which has been introduced by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and spurred by the subsequent Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As one of the major 
development actors, the European Union (EU) carries great responsibility towards this 
normative development agenda. The official development assistance (ODA) of the EU 
institutions and its member states make it the largest donor on a global scale and, therefore, a 
crucial actor in transformative development. 
How has this normative evolution translated into the EU’s development policies? How 
normatively coherent are the EU’s development and trade policies? These questions will be 
addressed in this dissertation, because as one of the major players in development and in trade, 
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the EU has the potential to not only reduce transaction costs and increase aid effectiveness, but 
also to set an example as a normative actor. This thesis examines the EU’s normative coherence 
across development and trade policies directed at Vietnam, a lower-middle income country, 
which is experiencing the EU’s transition to a non-aid relationship, in order to identify causes 
of incoherence in the process of norm implementation. This exercise is relevant not only to 
identify gaps in normative policy coherence in practical terms, but also to add to the literature 
on PCD and European Foreign Policy Analysis. Policy implementation per se lacks attention 
in the literature, despite its importance in the policy process. Implementation is one of the key 
phases of a policy cycle without which a policy would remain merely a document. Since the 
aim of a new policy is to make changes to existing legislation, non-implementation would be 
a failure of this policy. Similarly, the normative dimension of policy implementation is a crucial 
step towards translating the normative shift in global development rhetoric into concrete 
measures. 
Incoherence, in turn, can lead to one policy undermining the potential outcomes of the other or 
negatively effecting its outcomes. A prominent example for this incident is the agriculture-
development trade-off in the EU. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides subsidies 
to European farmers, which enables them to compete unfairly in developing countries’ markets. 
Due to the presence of subsidies, prices for European produce are lower than those of local 
farmers, which has a negative impact on local economies and the lives of individuals. While 
the CAP supports European farmers at the cost of negatively impacting economies abroad, 
development policies aim to achieve the opposite in exactly those countries where negative 
consequences are most evident (Matthews, 2008). Arguably, the incoherence has been reduced 
due to some CAP reforms, but incoherence remains (Matthews, 2008). Normative incoherence 
can occur when policies are not formulated, adopted and implemented with a normative 
dimension in mind. According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU is committed to norms, such as 
democracy, freedom, gender equality, good governance, human rights, justice, liberty, non-
discrimination, peace, rule of law, solidarity and sustainability, and additionally, is committed 
to promote those norms in its external relations. If those norms are promoted, i.e. implemented, 
in one policy arena but not in another, it is possible that the “non-normative” policy will 
significantly undermine the “normative” policy. In the era of norm-infused transformative 
development, development policies are understood as the normative policy, whereas 
agricultural, financial or trade policies are non-normative. 
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The next section of this introduction presents three key questions that contextualize NPCD and 
the EU’s position in the development arena: What is development? Development for whom? 
How can normative development be implemented? When the term development is utilized in 
this dissertation, it refers to EU growth-centered definitions, which shape donor-recipient 
relations. Acknowledging the substantial criticism voiced over this approach and efforts to 
promote alternatives to this kind of development (see following sub-sections), this Eurocentric 
terminology is utilized here, because the study assesses the normative coherence of EU 
development based on the EU’s declared commitment to its own proclaimed norms. This 
commitment takes place within the European approach and, therefore, adopting this perspective 
is considered the most suitable for the purpose of this dissertation. 
This is followed by a brief introduction to the critical perspectives of development, such as 
post-developmentalism, and to the development-trade nexus.  Finally, my motivation for this 
study in terms of academic, political and personal relevance and the structure of the dissertation 
are presented. 
i. Key Questions of Development 
a) What is development? 
NPCD is strongly rooted in the normative understanding of development, but historically the 
approach to development has not always been normative. The concept of development has 
changed and in order to respond to “What is development?”, it is helpful to have a look at the 
historical evolution of the understanding of development. This section briefly outlines the 
historical evolution of the Western perception of development and the gradual inclusion of 
values/norms as well as the occurrence of policy coherence for development, because 
development has not always been seen as an individual’s entitlement to social, economic and 
environmental progress as it is today (Fukuda-Parr, 2014; Sen, 1999). 
For this research, three major phases of Western development approaches are worthwhile 
distinguishing. The first phase can be called the “technical development phase”, also called 
Keynesian Consensus phase (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010), which lasted from the end of the 
Second World War until the 1980s. The second phase can be called the “transitional 
development phase”, or Washington Consensus phase (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010), which 
lasted from the 1980s until 2000. Despite the prominence of the Washington Consensus, the 
1980s and 1990s are a transition phase between the technical and “normative development 
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phase” starting in the 2000s, because of the publication of the Brundtland report in 1987, which 
introduced sustainable development for the first time and voiced a rhetorical shift in the 
development paradigm, and the organization of international sustainable development summits 
such as the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit, the first World Water Forum in Marrakesh in 
1997, etc. Sustainable development has been implemented effectively since the emergence of 
the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, which marks the start of the “normative 
development phase” providing the discursive frame for this dissertation. 
Technical Development Phase 
The 1950s were shaped by the reconstruction of Europe and decolonization in Asia and Africa. 
While the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later World Bank) 
supported the rebuilding of Europe after the Second World War, decolonization movements 
fought for independence from the European colonizers. Under the auspices of modernization, 
economic growth and nation-building were the underlying rationales of development to be 
brought to the newly independent states (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010). Modernization theories 
claimed the modern industrial society to be a benchmark for development and, consequently, 
only an industrial society was considered a developed society. During this time, democratic 
values were introduced for the first time as a norm for development to ensure for the former 
colonies to evolve into sovereign democratic states. 
During the 1960s, the focus shifted to a vision of modernization with mass consumption as the 
final goal of development. A prominent interpretation are the five stages of economic 
growth (Rostow, 1960) that lead to a modern society of mass consumption, which claims 
that all societies need to pass through five subsequent stages of development to reach the final 
stage of mass consumption which is deemed the desired outcome. The first stage is that of 
“traditional societies” in which the economy is based on agriculture, power is in the hands 
of landowners and enlightenment has not taken place yet. This is followed by the 
“preconditions for take-off” stage in which industrial production begins mainly on the 
coastlines, as, for example, in Great Britain before the Industrial Revolution. The third stage 
is the “take-off” stage where economic growth is supported by appropriate infrastructure, 
technology and high employment rates. After this stage, the “drive towards maturity” is 
the next phase a country passes through. During this time, technological advancement 
spreads throughout the country and the country develops the skills to be self-sufficient and 
economic growth continues. The final stage is the one of “high mass consumption”. The 
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economy shifts from industrial manufacturing to the services industry with the majority of jobs 
in urbanized areas, offices as the main space for employment, and people as consumers. Only 
those societies that have reached the final stage can be considered modern or developed. 
From a geographical point of view, modernization was centered in Europe and decreased with 
distance from Europe. Traditional societies outside of Europe would take a long time to develop, 
i.e. to pass through the stages of economic growth, because innovations and new technology 
would not reach those places easily. This assumption of the West being an example of 
development to be used universally has been the underlying rationale for development 
policies for many decades. During that time, the World Bank shifted its focus from 
reconstructed Europe to development of the poorest countries and to eradicating poverty 
(World Bank, 2018). 
A critical school of thinkers emerged in response to this Western development paradigm 
questioning the West’s ambitions to modernize “Third World” countries arguing that 
developing countries would remain dependent on Western economies. Despite intellectual 
disagreements among dependency theory scholars, a common viewpoint contended the 
desirability of economic growth and capital accumulation in developing countries, however 
not in the form of second-rate economies functioning in the shadow of Western nations (Smith, 
1979). 
During the 1970s, the ongoing process of decolonization of former European colonies entailed 
the creation of the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group of countries under the Lomé I 
convention signed in 1975, and the associated aid for trade agenda (EEC, 1976). The ACP 
group was formed as a group of states to receive aid targeted at economic and social 
development in the ACP countries, whilst gaining open access to the European market. While 
the EU addressed structural changes to foster economic growth in the ACP countries, the World 
Bank applied a “basic-needs” approach that shifted the focus away from the trickle-down effect 
that was assumed earlier. The trickle-down logic assumed that economic gains in the upper 
classes would at some point seep into lower classes. In contrast to that, the World Bank provided 
loans to support projects aimed directly at the people in need to enable their participation in the 
economic system (Peet & Hartwick, 2009). As a consequence of this lending mechanism for 
economic growth and integration, many developing countries accumulated high debts during 
this phase. Even though the World Bank adopted a people-centered approach, economic 
development remained the primary objective of development and, again, a critical movement 
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occurred questioning mainstream development efforts and calling for alternative development. 
Alternative development thinking brought social development and community development to 
the forefront. Contrary to dependency arguments, which do not question economic 
development per se, alternative development is the umbrella term for alternative models of 
development such as anti-capitalism, feminism or ecological thinking highlighting the 
centrality of people and bottom-up initiatives (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010). 
Transitional Development Phase 
With the onset of the 1980s, a new paradigm was introduced in the development rhetoric 
leading to the transition into the normative development phase. The rhetoric in development 
circled around gender equality, individual freedoms, and democratic norms as a paradigm shift 
occurred with the UNDP’s approach of human development, which stood in stark contrast with 
the World Bank’s neo-liberal aspirations of development coupled with economic growth and 
market liberalization (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010). The UNDP promoted development as 
enlarging people’s choices and creating an environment in which people can pursue those 
choices, and in doing so going beyond income and growth aggregates as the determining 
indicators for development. Following this rhetoric, the first Human Development Report 
including the Human Development Index as a measure for human development was published 
by the UNDP in 1990 (UNDP, 1990). 
Another normative effort by the United Nations was the Brundtland Report published by the 
UN body World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. This report 
emphasized the necessity to connect environmental sustainability and development: 
“Development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental resource base; the 
environment cannot be protected when growth leaves out of account the costs of environmental 
destruction. These problems cannot be treated separately by fragmented institutions and 
policies. They are linked in a complex system of cause and effect” (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987). 
In contrast to these normative ambitions, the World Bank turned to neo-liberal policies 
counteracting low economic growth presumed to result from high protectionism of the markets 
and inefficient administrative systems. Thus, previous Keynesian traditions of state-led 
development were questioned, and market-led development became the norm, which were 
institutionalized in the “Washington Consensus” in 1989. The Washington Consensus 
conferred a set of policy instruments and conditions based on market-led growth, which were 
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utilized by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in their relations with developing 
countries. Labor market reforms along with wage reduction were expected from the borrowers 
to meet the neo-liberalist conditions. Another criterion was the reduction of government 
spending, which resulted in governments cutting down social expenses. By the end of the 1990s 
it became clear, however, that the Washington Consensus reforms had not met the expectations 
of enhancing growth and that countries which had maintained a certain level of protection 
actually managed to grow (Peet & Hartwick, 2009). 
The 1980s and 1990s were a phase of conflict between rhetorical normative debates in 
development and discussions around future-oriented human development based on capacitation 
on the one hand, and neo-liberal development practices on the other hand. In addition to the 
debates around Western mainstream development practices, proponents of alternative 
development and post-development continued criticizing the pursuit of the Western 
dominance over development which arguably leads to homogenization, economic 
prioritization and environmental destruction (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010). While alternative 
development criticized the operational aspects of development, post-development rejected 
the development approach as a whole. 
Normative Development Phase 
Efforts towards normative development practices remained technical until the United Nations 
took on the role as a leader in the global development arena. In 2000, the United Nations member 
states jointly issued a declaration to combat extreme poverty until 2015. The so-called 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) aimed at collectively eradicating poverty around the 
world with the particular focus on the most vulnerable by introducing seven development goals 
to be achieved by 2015: (1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (2) achieve universal 
primary education, (3) promote gender equality and empower women, (4) reduce child 
mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases, (7) 
ensure environmental sustainability, (8) global partnership for development (United Nations, 
n.d.). This vision was a revolutionary approach to development as it was the first political 
commitment by all UN member states to jointly combat poverty and poverty related issues such 
as health concerns, human rights and environmental sustainability. With this set of seven 
MDGs, the rhetorical debates around sustainable development and future oriented development 
aimed at improving individual’s lives was finally put into practice 13 years after the Brundtland 
report on sustainability. With the UN becoming a major development platform, the conditions 
8 
 
for development aid changed. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the UN’s 
body in charge of advocating for the implementation of the Millennium Agenda does not 
operate as a funding body by providing loans, as the World Bank, but relies on advocacy, 
reporting and sharing best practices to achieve poverty eradication (Peet & Hartwick, 2009). 
Policy implementation, however, remains at the nation state level. 
While the UN advocated for inclusive development, several developed nation states deliberated 
about conditions for debt relief for developing countries at the G8 (Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) summit in 2005. “[T]he G8 
version of structural adjustment disguises an imperialism of expertise in the wondrous garb of 
world humanity’s most generous impulse, the elimination of global poverty” (Peet & Hartwick, 
2009, p.98). In other words, the G8 countries set the economic and financial rules for the 
developing states to earn their debt relief. Notwithstanding the UN’s turn away from the 
strictly economic dimension of development towards a human rights approach, the biggest 
donor countries persisted on the ideals of privatization and economic growth. Globally, this 
period can be recognized as a  “normative development phase”, but as norm implementation 
remains a challenge, normative research such as the one presented in this dissertation is 
indispensable. 
In conjunction with these contradictions between the UN approach and the G8 approach, the 
EU evolved into a leading development actor in the global arena and with that revived the 
academic discussion around the EU being a normative power in international relations 
(Forsberg, 2011; Manners, 2002; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007). Proponents of the normative 
power Europe concept argue that due to the EU’s historical development based on shared 
values such as democracy and peace, the EU has evolved into a new form of political system 
and utilizes its success to shape what is “normal” in international affairs (Manners, 2002). The 
ability to shape what is considered normal defines normative power Europe. This ability is also 
relevant in international development as the EU increased its development budget and 
simultaneously gained greater recognition as a legitimate international actor. 
By 2015, the final year of the MDGs, a new set of global development goals was introduced to 
keep up the momentum of relative success in terms of  extreme poverty eradication, primary 
school enrollment and child mortality reduction; but challenges remain in the areas of gender 
equality, wealth inequality and environmental protection (United Nations, 2015a). Despite 
these mixed results, a new set of highly ambitions goals have been set for the period 2016 to 
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2030. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) currently provide the framework for 
international development aiming to improve individuals’ lives through partnership. With the 
SDGs, the rhetoric in international relations has started to shift away from the donor-recipient 
terminology to a language of mutual responsibility. The SDGs have a strong focus on 
transformative development, for which the UN declared 17 goals in order to achieve lasting 
well-being for individuals and societies in developing countries: 1) No poverty, 2) zero hunger, 
3) good health and well-being, 4) quality education, 5) gender equality, 6) clean water and 
sanitation, 7) affordable and clean energy, 8) decent work and economic growth, 9) industry, 
innovation and infrastructure, 10) reduced inequalities, 11) sustainable cities and communities, 
12) responsible consumption and production, 13) climate action, 14) life below water, 15) life 
on land, 16) peace, justice and strong institutions, 17) partnerships for the goals (United 
Nations, 2015b). Through this approach, the developing countries have been placed at the 
center of development cooperation incorporating their needs and their aspirations. 
“Ownership” of development cooperation has become an important issue on the global 
development agenda, and additionally, donor countries need to ensure that their development 
and non-development policies do not conflict each other. In order to endorse the 2030 Agenda, 
non-development policies such as trade, migration or finance policies should not undermine 
efforts of transformative development. 
To support this transformative approach, the EU institutions have adopted a new joint statement 
for development entitled “The New European Consensus on Development – Our World, Our 
Dignity, Our Future” (European Union, 2017). This new consensus highlights the EU’s support 
for the SDGs, acknowledges the interrelation between people, the environment, economic 
growth, and incorporates normative aspirations: “The EU and its Member States will promote 
the universal values of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights for all, 
because they are preconditions for sustainable development and stability, across the full range 
of partnerships and instruments in all situations and in all countries, including through 
development action” (European Union, 2017, p.32). The EU emphasizes an integrated 
approach to development upholding everyone’s dignity, largely overlapping with the UN’s 
approach in this phase of development, which arguably can be traced back to the EU’s recently 
gained leadership in norm entrepreneurship at the global level (Murray, 2015). 
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Table 1: Historical Overview of Development Theories, Norm Representation 
Period 
Development 
Theory 
Key 
Concepts 
Global 
Development 
Norms 
EU 
development 
Technical 
Development 
(Keynesian 
Consensus) 
1950s 
- 
1960s 
Modernization 
Dependency 
Growth; 
consumption; 
Capital 
Accumulation 
Democracy; 
Nation-
Building 
Decolonization 
1970s 
Alternative 
Development 
Human 
Flourishing 
Economic 
Growth; 
Basic needs 
ACP 
Transitional 
Development 
(Washington 
Consensus) 
1980s 
- 
1990s 
Neo-
liberalism 
Liberalization; 
Privatization; 
Structural 
Reforms 
Economic 
Growth 
Transition 
towards norm 
infused 
development 
Human 
development  
Capacitation; 
Freedom of 
Choice 
Individual 
Freedoms; 
Equality 
Post-
development 
Authoritarian 
Engineering 
Anti-
capitalism; 
Environment 
Development 
as Freedom 
Capacitation 
Good 
governance; 
Pluralism; 
Accountability; 
Rule of law 
Normative 
Development 
2000 
– 
2015  
International 
development 
Poverty 
eradication; 
Debt relief; 
Sustainable 
Development 
Human rights; 
Rule of law; 
Peace/Security; 
Democracy 
Normative 
power 
2016 
– 
2030 
Sustainable 
Development  
Partnership; 
Mutual 
responsibility 
Dignity; 
Partnership; 
Integrated 
development 
Source: author’s compilation based on aggregation from Nederveen Pieterse, 2010; Peet & Hartwick, 2009 
 
Table 1 illustrates the historical evolution of the global development agenda and the related 
normative discussion as described above. This overview shows how the understanding of 
development and the main actors in development have changed from technical development 
driven by the World Bank and European states that had to face decolonization to normative 
development driven by the United Nations and the European Union. Along with the historical 
paradigm shift of development, the addressees of development have changed with states as the 
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main target up until the 2000s and individuals being the main targets since the introduction 
of the Millennium Development Goals. 
It is important to note that “development” is a contested paradigm, as indicated above, 
especially because many observers contend that global strategies do not sufficiently or 
effectively integrate ethical or normative considerations. Critical positions towards the 
overriding development discourses presented here which challenge these major development 
paradigms, are described in section ii below. 
b) Development for whom? 
The above discussion about development reflects deeper considerations about more 
fundamental questions: Development of whom? Development by whom? Development for 
whom? These are relevant questions, because the dynamic between donor and recipient 
responds to the discourse about who or what needs to be developed, under what conditions, and 
who determines those parameters. Challenging the neo-liberal approach to development, Peet 
& Hartwick (2009) rightly ask: “Whose interest does it serve? Who are these free individuals, 
and what does freedom mean in this ideological system?” While the modalities changed from 
state intervention to market liberalization, the prime objective in the 1950s to 1980s remained 
economic growth, which emphasizes the importance of the preceding questions. 
Since the 1980s, alternative approaches to development have gained prominence and it has 
become more intricate to draw a line between mainstream development and proposed 
alternatives as they have partially merged over time. Human development and development as 
freedom are two approaches to development that strongly emphasize the centrality of the 
individual human being arguing for individuals’ rights to be offered equal choices to determine 
their own lives and shape them according to their wishes. Human development can be seen as 
the predecessor to development as freedom. Human development experienced a surge in 
popularity in the 1980s and 1990s with the UN’s new approach to people-centered 
development. Both, the UN and the World Bank put their emphasis on individuals as the main 
recipients of development efforts. 
In the late 1990s, Development as Freedom was coined by Amartya Sen (1999), the Nobel 
laureate in Economics. Interestingly, the development as freedom approach diverted from the 
strictly economic understanding of development to include a person’s political and social 
capabilities in addition to their economic standing. Development, in that sense, aims to improve 
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a person’s life by changing their political or cultural environment to create better chances for 
individuals to pursue the life they would like to pursue. Poverty, in the development as freedom 
understanding, does not only entail the lack of financial means but also the subsequent 
deprivation of opportunities that financially privileged people do enjoy. Poverty deprives 
people of nutritious food, adequate housing, health services and education, and assumedly as a 
result, they do not lead the life they would have chosen under different conditions. Poverty is 
not only seen as an average measure of national wealth or economic standing, but as a factor 
to limit someone’s life choices. 
“Unfreedom” (Sen, 1999, pp.15) is what limits persons from their free choices, and which takes 
shape in form of poverty, famines, political conflict, discrimination, etc. This conceptualization 
applies to poorer as well as to richer societies, in which the relatively wealthier have better 
access to health or education services and simultaneously more influence on political decisions 
through lobby groups or as shareholders in the national industry. Culture is also understood as 
a factor that might limit a person’s capacity to choose their life paths freely. Only a few decades 
ago, in Western Europe, women were considered housewives whose job it was to raise children, 
keep the household in order and take care of the elderly. The cultural mindset at the time 
considered the man to be the only financial provider for the family. Nowadays, despite 
prevailing inequalities, opportunities for men and women have changed in many European 
countries where it has become acceptable that women and men share family and work tasks. 
Whether these choices are economically the most efficient or the most profitable for the 
national economy is a different matter and of minor concern in the development as freedom 
approach. Limiting capacities due to cultural behavior might be an easier solution, because 
people’s lives are predetermined and fit into a nation’s growth strategy, however, from an 
individualistic perspective, it might not be the person’s preferred choice. Taking the example 
of women in the labor market, a different picture can be seen in Vietnam, for example. Women 
in Vietnam generally work and need to take care of the family. Both, men and women, have 
their daily job, but while men often go out with their colleagues after work, women need to 
take care of the household and the children. Often, the man is in charge of the family finances, 
which means that the woman earns her salary, but the man decides what is being done with that 
income. In Eastern Europe, it was considered normal that men and women work under the 
former Communist regime but having equal work opportunities does not represent the entire 
picture. Rather, culture determines the roles of men and women beyond earning a salary, such 
as responsibilities in the household or decisions about spending. These issues are mostly not 
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represented in the economic figures, which in turn highlights the importance of the normative 
development approach. 
Democracy plays a significant role in development as freedom, because it contributes to a 
pluralist representation of people. Democracy allows for freedom of expression, multiple 
parties and competing opinions, which encourages decision-takers to find suitable 
compromises. In addition, democracy is usually closely linked with respect for human rights, 
separation of power between the governing institutions, independent courts ensuring fair trials, 
and preventing the concentration of power by a ruling minority. Authoritarian regimes, in 
contrast, tend to create systems in which a selected group benefits from the system but in which 
the majority of people are not entitled to make their own choices or are not capable to make 
those choices because of unfreedoms created by the regime. Democracy alone, however, does 
not create development as freedom. It is a political system that fosters plurality, but social, 
cultural, economic or environmental factors still influence peoples’ lives and, hence, need to 
be considered. Each aspect, e.g. poverty, culture or democracy, contributes to the approach of 
development as freedom, but addressed separately they do not suffice to create freedom. 
Unfreedom has many forms and needs to be addressed in all those forms. Normative 
considerations are fundamental for this shift toward person-centered development, which is 
addressed in the following sub-section. 
As mentioned in the historical overview, in the 1980s and 1990s norm implementation 
remained problematic. The development paradigm has started to shift and along with it the 
main recipients of development. Normative aspirations have become more visible in 
mainstream international development over the last decades in response to alternative 
approaches such as human development, but despite these adjustments implementing 
normative development effectively remained – and still remains – a major challenge. Ironically, 
while the global development discourse becomes more idealistic regarding development goals, 
such as reducing inequalities, the standard measurement for development seems to remain 
based solely on economic terms. The World Bank uses measures of gross national income 
(GNI) to determine whether a country falls within the low-income, middle-income or high-
income category. These categories are a representation of the countries average wealth but fail 
to represent its distribution among the citizens. Nonetheless, these categories are used by 
donors to justify their aid allocation. As a consequence of Vietnam having been classified as a 
middle-income country, donors have started to phase out their aid and often relocate to 
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neighboring Laos. This is not to say that Laos does not deserve the support, rather to point out 
that – despite large income gaps and political restraints, i.e. challenges to development – the 
mere aggregation of macro-economic indicators suffices for a donor to leave a country. In terms 
of development as freedom – or providing individuals with their own capacity to determine 
their livelihood – the GNI standard to determine aid allocation is quite counterproductive. 
Again, this statement needs to be put into perspective as the donors anticipate a phase-out 
period and redirect their relations with Vietnam, but they also cut major financial channels that 
could otherwise have been utilized to encourage individual capacity development. 
As the present and the previous sub-sections have shown, the political commitment to 
normative development and to people-centered development still meets challenges of 
implementation. A new tool to support the norm-based development agenda is normative 
policy coherence for development. 
c) How to implement normative development? 
The notion “normative development” captures different approaches to development such as 
human development, development as freedom, sustainable development or transformative 
development. Normative policy coherence for development (NPCD) is a tool that can be 
utilized in either approach. NPCD evolved from the initial concept of policy coherence for 
development (PCD), which was introduced by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1991 to call for 
greater aid effectiveness (Forster & Stokke, 1999; Siitonen, 2016). The DAC is a group of 30 
developed countries that cooperate on international development. One of the initiatives to 
strengthen these countries’ development efforts was the emphasis on policy coherence (OECD, 
2006). Since then, the OECD has contributed to the advancement of PCD by publishing reports 
and peer reviews and, recently, by adjusting to the new development paradigm by focusing on 
policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) (OECD, 2017a). 
Policy coherence in the general sense is defined as the absence of contradictions. In terms of 
internal coherence, policy outcomes would coincide with the anticipated goals and objectives, 
and the tools for implementation support the achievement of these goals. Policy coherence for 
development emphasizes the primacy of development, which implies not only that 
development policies should be coherent in themselves, but other policies are to contribute to 
development. 
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The term horizontal coherence describes coherence between development and non-
development policies. While there are different types of PCD, such as coherence between 
donors’ and recipients’ policies or between policies by various international organizations, I 
would like to point out the particular case of horizontal coherence as it reflects contradicting 
facets of one actor representing different interests depending on the policy sector. Many 
scholars have rightly pointed out how the European Union’s agricultural policies, fisheries 
policies and trade policies are incoherent with its development policies (Matthews, 2008; 
Stocchetti, 2013). These studies, however, strongly focus on PCD as a goal to be achieved 
instead of a tool to support the final goal of development. In this research, I argue that the 
technical approach to PCD is not sufficient to achieve normative development, such as 
development as freedom. Development as freedom reflects on individuals and their ability to 
choose their life paths, it points out that issues such as education and political participation 
need to be addressed in concert with poverty eradication. Development as freedom incorporates 
a normative dimension that attributes rights to the individual and addresses the systemic 
burdens on individuals. Taking on the normative development approach, PCD is not merely a 
technical approach, but a tool to support the normative dimension of development. 
For analytical purposes, in this study, PCD is viewed as a goal to be achieved, notwithstanding 
the importance of political will to implement PCD and subsequently strengthen development 
processes and limit unfreedoms. Normative PCD addresses exactly these unfreedoms, or rather, 
the failure to create freedom. Development as freedom is a holistic approach, which needs to 
go beyond mere development policies if it is meant to induce long-lasting change. Put 
differently, if development policies are the sole trajectory to reduce unfreedoms, ending 
development cooperation will end development as freedom and consequently development 
cooperation efforts will lose their impact giving way to economic or other strategic interests. 
Normative coherence as a concept claims that the development as freedom approach, i.e. the 
normative agenda, the factors that enhance capabilities, need to be continuously addressed in 
other policies as well to ensure that each person can determine their own life. 
NPCD reflects the intertwined nature between norms and PCD and is understood as the 
implementation of norms across an actor’s various policy arenas. For this research, the focus 
lies on EU norms and their implementation in the EU’s development and trade policies. 
Recent studies of EU PCD have strongly focused on the institutional dimension of PCD and 
less on the normative dimension (Carbone, 2007; Carbone & Keijzer, 2016; Orbie, 2007; 
16 
 
Stocchetti, 2016). Building on these studies, this dissertation assesses the normative dimension 
in the EU’s development and trade nexus. Of course, these normative debates are linked to the 
very understanding of “development” which is a contested term. This is explored in the 
following section. 
ii. Critical Review of Development 
When talking about policy coherence for development and the role of European norms in 
development (and non-development) policies, we should not forget to consider the multitude 
of criticism that is voiced against the Western approach of development and against 
undermining non-Western traditions as alternatives to the global capitalist system. PCD is 
inherently embedded in the Western tradition of development understood as progress, 
modernization and economic growth. 
Historically speaking, the relationship between the so-called Global North and the Global 
South has been characterized by the North’s domination over the South, particularly since the 
15th century. Inequalities have been identified which are not only present within development 
relationships but some would argue that they are perpetuated by the same development 
cooperation system that purports to address them (see Thede, 2013). The Marxist strand of the 
literature on development, for example, explains the colonial phase in the evolution towards 
development in terms of core-periphery dichotomies, in which the periphery plays the producer 
role of raw materials to supply manufacturing and consumption in the core (Frank, 1967; 
Hoogvelt, 1997). This was arguably one of the reasons for imperialist advances, particularly in 
the phase between 1875 and 1914, as capitalism requires geographical expansion due to 
growing consumption and the consequent need for increased production. 
Following the two Worlds Wars, power relationships were realigned between the colonial 
powers and the United States as an emerging global power. Critics (see James, 1997) argue 
that the mainstream development approach described above, led by organizations such as the 
United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, follows this pattern, 
thus underlining the need for alternative visions of development. To highlight the multitude of 
perspectives and diverse positions towards development, such as the discourse argument, 
which claims that powerful actors determine problems that then can be addressed under the 
cloak of development, a brief overview of the main approaches and concepts is provided here. 
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a) Criticisms of Development 
Early Criticism 
One of the early critics of development was Frantz Fanon (1963), who assessed the relationship 
between the colonizer and the colonized in the process of decolonization. “Decolonization is 
the meeting of two forces, opposed to each other by their very nature, which in fact owe their 
originality to that sort of substantification which results from and is nourished by the situation 
in the colonies. Their first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together—
that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler—was carried on by dint of a great array 
of bayonets and cannons. The settler and the native are old acquaintances. In fact, the settler is 
right when he speaks of knowing ‘them’ well. For it is the settler who has brought the native 
into existence and who perpetuates his existence” (Fanon, 1963, p.36). Decolonization is a 
process of resistance against the external powers over a territory and social unit as a response 
to the colonization process, which shaped the dichotomy between the submissive, poor native 
and the rich, dominant foreigner. Along with ridding the territory of external actors, 
decolonization also involved the creation of a new identity disconnected from the dichotomous 
classification of colonizer and colonized, which lastly resulted in the formation of new nation 
states. In this struggle, some “spoilt children of yesterday’s colonialism and of today’s national 
governments” (Fanon, 1963, p.48), however, used their positions for personal enrichment 
through trade relations with the colonizers by supplying agricultural produce serving the 
demand in the Europe. 
Another perspective is offered by Frank (1967), who contends that underdevelopment is a 
necessary product of capitalism. Frank builds on the core-periphery argument by introducing 
the examples of Chile and Brazil as the satellite states of Spain and Portugal. This model shows 
a close connection between the “metropolis” and the “satellite”, which in turn acts as a 
metropolis with its own respective satellites. As a consequence, all metropolises and satellites 
are connected through a web of economic, political, social and cultural ties in which the 
metropolis holds the monopoly over its satellites and misuses this position for its own benefits 
(Frank, 1967). Generally, early critics of development focused on the era of colonization and 
decolonization with the argument of continuous dominance of the developed states over the 
former colonies. Since the 1970s, the so-called second neo-colonial phase or post-imperialist 
phase emerged (Hoogvelt, 1997). 
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Post-development 
Post-development, as part of “post” literature, such as post-modernism or post-capitalism, 
expresses, generally speaking, a detachment from Western thoughts and traditions (Hoogvelt, 
1997). Several authors have contributed to the discussion of post-development, which 
encompasses a variety of facets. Some have taken a more advocacy-based approach (Esteva & 
Prakash, 1998; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1998; Rist, 2008), while others have followed a more 
academic strand (Escobar, 1995). 
Post-development is characterized by the critique of development, however, it does not offer 
alternatives to development (Demaria & Kothari, 2017). Most prominently, Wolfgang Sachs, 
Arturo Escobar, Gilbert Rist, Gustavo Esteva, Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree have 
brought forward ideas of post-development (Escobar, 1995; Esteva & Prakash, 1998; Rahnema 
& Bawtree, 1998; Rist, 2008; Sachs, 1992). All argue that development should not be the 
central theme for societies any longer, as has been the case with the development approach: 
“Across the world this is resulting in the resurfacing of ancient worldviews with current 
relevance, or new frameworks and visions that present systemic alternatives for human and 
planetary well-being. It is also forcing the decolonization of knowledge systems and 
epistemologies, breaking down many of the dualisms that Western patriarchal paradigms have 
engendered, such as between humans and nature” (Demaria & Kothari, 2017). 
It becomes evident that post-development is related to post-capitalism, post-growth and post-
patriarchy, which will be further discussed in the sub-section below entitled “Alternatives to 
development”. Contrary, development efforts such as sustainable development and green 
economy are embedded in the traditional growth-based, capitalist development model, which 
is being criticized. The 2030 Agenda calls for a transformation of our world (United Nations, 
2015b), but lacks transformative elements such as highlighting culture and ethics, overcoming 
the rule of private capital, adhering to the biophysical limits of the earth, or creating a new form 
of democratic global governance beyond nation-states (Demaria & Kothari, 2017). 
Development Defined by the Rich 
One primary strand of literature highlights the problematic of development as defined by the 
rich Western cultures, both as a discourse as well as in terms of implementation (Escobar, 1998; 
Illich, 1998; Rist, 2008; H. Weber, 2004).  
The term underdevelopment, and related to this the term development, was introduced by 
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Truman in 1949 referring to suffering of people in underdeveloped countries, which need to be 
helped out of their undesired situation with the support of the United Nations (Rist, 2008). With 
this statement, the term development was turned from something changing into something that 
can be changed (Rist, 2008, p.73). 
Regarding discourse, one important aspect is the awareness of relationships between the actors 
in the system. “To understand development as a discourse, one must look not at the elements 
themselves but at the system of relations established among them” (Escobar, 1998, p.87). The 
discourse and the relationships are interlinked and influence each other. Progress and 
industrialization are defined as the routes towards modernization, i.e. consumption and 
materialism, and as such, the Western states can function as the model for the Global South. 
The development discourse shapes the relationship between the richer and poorer countries by 
defining the richer countries as modern and civilized, while the poorer countries need to be 
supported in the quest for modernization (Rist, 2008). 
A particular feature is the creation of “problems” to be solved by Western states. These 
problems are formulated by international organizations or driving powers in the global arena. 
“Development proceeded by creating ‘abnormalities’ (such as the ‘illiterate’, the 
‘underdeveloped’, the ‘malnourished’, ‘small farmers’, or ‘landless peasants’), which it would 
later treat and reform” (Escobar, 1998, p.88). This form of problematization creates an 
unbalanced power relationship in which the “treated” are dependent on financial support from 
the “prescribers” who had labeled something as a problem to begin with. Not only do 
international organizations and global powers define the problems that development ought to 
solve, but they also shape the solutions according to their political preferences. Other 
discourses such as communism, for example, influenced the development discourse as the anti-
communist attitude spurred the advancement of individualism and private property not only in 
the Western societies but also as desired models for developing countries (Escobar, 1998). 
Consequently, modernization was linked to ethnic groups adopting the “right” set of norms, 
i.e. European/Western norms (Escobar, 1998) within the context of the Cold War. 
Despite the prevailing position that development improves lives of people and creates a better 
world for everyone, “[t]he most important exclusion, however, was and continues to be, what 
development was supposed to be all about: people. Development was – and continues to be for 
the most part – a top-down, ethnocentric and technocratic approach, which treated people and 
cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of 
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‘progress’” (Escobar, 1998, p.91). Instead of focusing on people, development is measured in 
terms of average schooling years or average income as is the standard procedure in Western 
countries. 
Arguably, these measures show solely one side of the coin, namely improvements of the criteria 
for progress, but leaves out the negative effects on the society as a whole. “Each car which 
Brazil puts on the road denies fifty people good transportation by bus. Each merchandized 
refrigerator reduces the chance of building a community freezer. […] Each dollar spent on 
schooling means more privileges for the few at the cost of many; at best it increases the number 
of those who, before dropping out, have been taught that those who stay longer have earned 
the right to more power, wealth and prestige. What such schooling does is to teach the schooled 
the superiority of the better schooled” (Illich, 1998, p.96). Thus, the Western approach to 
development and the global development discourse do not take into account culture, local 
traditions, or any form of living that falls outside the “developed” understanding of a modern 
life based on economic growth, individualism, and consumption. 
Development as Planned Poverty 
Closely linked to the Western definition of development and modernization is the argument of 
developing countries being kept dependent on the developed countries. Targeted measures such 
as training doctors in the United States to be sent back to their home country opens 
opportunities for a selected few, but does not solve major causes of disease such as unsafe 
drinking water (Illich, 1998). Weber (2004) argues that the use of the “third world” or 
developing countries provides a tool for creating and maintaining a system of global capitalism 
and inequality. By focusing on the World Bank, the WTO and IMF, she contends the political 
utility of the third world, in which international development reinforces inequality and the third 
world serves as a political argument to shape international organization/architecture (H. Weber, 
2004). Conceptually, the Third World is closely connected to underdevelopment and the 
problematizations arising from this underdevelopment and its historical origins during the time 
of the Cold War. “The political utility of the Third World then rested with reference to the 
political space (and opportunities) its (ideological) appropriation enabled for strategies of 
governance in global politics” (H. Weber, 2004, p.192). 
Development as a Religion 
Another feature of criticism of development emphasizes the religious character development 
has taken on. Similar to a belief system, development cannot be argued with as such, while the 
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way it is practiced is debatable (Rist, 2008). Taking the example of Truman’s speech, Rist 
shows how the wording resembles that of religious salvation with identifying problematic 
behavior and offering a path out of misery if people act according to a certain prescription (Rist, 
2008, p.77). 
These different fields of literature correctly highlight the power relationships that characterize 
the global development agenda. Like all international politics, development strategies reflect 
imbalances that exist in global affairs. These criticisms correctly note that development 
cooperation strategies are often incoherent by definition, because they are undermined by 
international asymmetries. (Adherents to these approaches rightly ask: “How can cooperation 
exist amongst such evident inequality?”)  This begs the question: what alternative notions of 
development can address this situation? These alternatives are presented in the following sub-
section. 
b) Alternatives to Development 
The SDGS are closely connected with transformative development (Koff, 2017a; Siitonen, 
2016). Critics, however, claim that alternatives to development are needed to truly transform 
the world; an adaptation of development does not suffice due to the continuing presence of 
those inequalities highlighted in the previous sub-section. Any alternatives to development 
“should be transformative alternatives to the currently dominant processes of globalized 
development, including its structural roots in modernity, capitalism, state domination, [and] 
patriarchy […]” (Demaria & Kothari, 2017, p.2589). A range of alternatives have evolved 
recently, the most prominent of which are degrowth, ecofeminism and buen vivir. 
These alternatives have developed in concert with the different varieties of development, which 
express developmental pluralism but do have their roots in modernity, such as sustainable, 
human, local, or endogenous development (Gudynas, 2016). The varieties of development have 
emerged with a strong criticism of the mainstream but adapted to the growth-centered vision 
over time. Along the varieties of development, disputes between these varieties take shape in 
form of instrumental discussions, the suitability of a given variety of development, and 
arguments for alternatives to development (Gudynas, 2016). 
Degrowth 
One prominent example is the concept of post-growth or degrowth, which promotes the 
decentralization of growth from economic and social practices (Demaria & Kothari, 2017). 
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This is rooted in the growing awareness of planetary boundaries and the subsequent limits to 
growth, which goes contrary to the traditional economics rationale (Thomson, 2011). Both 
degrowth and buen vivir, which is laid out below, reject growth as the main objective of 
development, bringing the focus to the quality of life rather than the quantity of possessions 
(Gudynas, 2011; Thomson, 2011). Escobar (2015) assesses the relationship between degrowth 
and post-development coming to the conclusion that there are a range of similarities, such as 
the desire for radical social transformation, critical stance towards growth as the central point 
for society, doubts about the capitalist and liberal economy to further degrowth or post-
development, environmental justice and the support for local autonomy, but also a few major 
differences between the two approaches. One difference is the tradition of thought: degrowth 
scholars have their roots in bio-economics, whereas post-colonialism takes a prominent 
position for post-developmentalists. Another difference is in the practice, which is more 
scholarly driven for degrowth and more activist driven for post-development (Escobar, 2015). 
Ecofeminism 
The ecofeminist critique argues that ecological crisis is inevitable under the Eurocentric 
patriarchal culture which aims at dominating nature and dominating women (Salleh, 2017). 
Ecofeminist scholars argue for the unique agency of women, which is in contrast to mainstream 
development  (Salleh, 2017). Another concern is the embeddedness of the green movement in 
the existing patriarchic capitalist structure and the reliance on science in the environmentalist 
movement. These concerns neither reflect the role of women appropriately, nor do they object 
to the destruction of livelihood sufficiently (Salleh, 2017). Regarding the former, ecofeminism 
resembles post-patriarchy. Post-patriarchy is understood as “challenging the primacy of 
masculinist approaches to political leadership, moral authority, social privilege and control of 
property” (Demaria & Kothari, 2017, p.2598). However, ecofeminism adds an ecological 
dimension, emphasizes nonviolence, and suggests a move away from Eurocentrism. “To 
ecofeminists, all ecologism appears light-green, partial and particularistic” (Salleh, 2017, p.35). 
While critics argue that feminism is a matter of internal affairs bound to the circumstances of 
the political system, ecofeminists argue for the global dimension of both ecological concerns 
and women’s exploitation as issues crossing over national borders. 
Buen Vivir 
Much literature has emerged on buen vivir as a critical response to development and an 
alternative way of understanding social, cultural and environmental relations, mainly in Latin 
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American contexts (Lalander, 2016; Ranta, 2016). Buen vivir, or vivir bien, can be understood 
as “living well”, focusing on good life, and originated from social movements in Latin America 
(Gudynas, 2011).  In Bolivia and Ecuador, these terms have meanwhile also be adopted at the 
governmental level (Gudynas, 2011; Ranta, 2016, 2018). In the struggle of decolonization, 
indigenous groups have shaped their own form of self-governance, which is outside the realm 
of Western nation state conceptions. These forms of “vivir bien”, commonly called buen vivir, 
offer an alternative to the mainstream development models by moving beyond neo-liberal 
globalization (Gudynas, 2011; Ranta, 2018). “They are a reaction against the conventional 
domination of utilitarian values, particularly expressed in the reductionism of life to economic 
values and the subsequent commoditization of almost everything” (Gudynas, 2011, p.445). 
While there is a wide conceptional range within the buen vivir approach, two main aspects are 
shared among the buen vivir proponents: first, it is an open criticism to Western development, 
and second, it offers an alternative to Eurocentric capitalism as its roots are in indigenous 
traditions (Gudynas, 2011). As mentioned above, the charts and statistical figures take into 
account exclusively the Western approach to development, which is measured in terms of 
consumption patterns, and disregards any other features that are valuable for non-Western 
societies. Proponents of the Buen Vivir movement highlight the importance of non-material 
aspects, but instead emphasis the quality of life within a community and in harmony with nature 
(Gudynas, 2011). Cohabitation is indeed one of the major themes within the idea of buen vivir. 
Similar to post-development, buen vivir “represent[s] a radical deconstruction of the cultural 
base of development, its legitimating discourse, its application and institutional framework” 
(Gudynas, 2011, p.422). This is largely due to its indigenous origin, in which concepts like 
progress and development were not present (Gudynas, 2011). Two well-known approaches to 
buen vivir are the Ecuadorian sumak kawsay and the Bolivian suma qamaña (Lalander, 2016; 
Ranta, 2018; Thomson, 2011). 
c) Development Critique and NPCD 
It is important to understand that the European version of development is not a universal truth. 
Even though the major development actors largely align their efforts and agree on the 
discourse, and this dissertation addresses the Western approach to development, there are 
critical and alternative movements to growth-based development as the previous discussion 
shows. 
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Normative policy coherence for development, though, engages with the traditional approach to 
development due to at least two considerations. First, the “D” refers to the EU development 
policies, which are an adaptation of the traditional Western model. The traditional Western 
model of development is, as presented earlier, an approach focused on growth in a capitalist 
globalized world. Rather than propose alternatives to this model, this dissertation engages it as 
the dominant paradigm in global development debates and discusses the need to infuse this 
paradigm with ethical foundations based on core liberal democratic norms. Second, the “N” 
refers specifically to European norms, which largely disregard any other forms of social 
organization, even though a clear definition of European norms is lacking. The EU does refer 
to European norms in its treaties but does not provide an explanation of what they constitute in 
particular. For example, equality is promoted by the EU in terms of equal job opportunities, 
equal access to education, health care, but all within the Western understanding of employment, 
education and health care. In terms of employment, a nine-to-five position under a legal work 
contract is just one example for standardized employment in Europe. Similarly, children are 
expected to attend public or publicly recognized private schools for a minimum amount of 
years to attain a certificate that shows that these children have passed through the system. 
Alternative schooling or alternative medicines are disregarded. Thus, while equality can 
generally be seen as a positive attribute in terms of hitherto marginalized groups, the way in 
which it is promoted reflects the growth-focused approach to development and, therefore, 
limits the space in which non-capitalist societies can strive. For this reason, normative values 
are more effectively expressed and implemented with the dominant system of development 
cooperation. Section one above has already shown how this system has evolved from a 
technocratic one to a system based on transformative change. Norms, such as those expressed 
in these alternative development narratives, can be implemented by the system through the 
mechanism of normative coherence for development. 
On a positive note, development efforts have made lives longer, brought more clean water to 
people, and decreased the mortality at birth rate (United Nations, 2015a). On the other hand, 
this progress report ignores the potential causes that led to this situation in the first place. 
Furthermore, development can be utilized as a tool for rich countries to exercise power over 
poorer countries. If poor countries want to be part of the globalization process, part of the game 
of international competition, financial speculation and ever-growing economies, they need to 
adhere to the rules of the rich. Given that the rules are made by the rich, the probability of poor 
countries getting out of this ambiguous situation is low. 
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There are also cases that fall into a grey area between development as something positive or 
something negative. In cases where a woman was able to leave the abusive household because 
she got the opportunity to be employed and, therefore, independent from her husband, it is a 
form of victory over an unfortunate situation. On the other hand, one must ask what economic 
opportunities await liberated women when they exit gendered hierarchical family and social 
situations. Current global markets do not necessarily provide opportunities to vulnerable 
populations who cannot be considered economically competitive due to blocked access to 
higher education or other resources. Another example is the urbanization caused by the 
constant need for higher education and better employment opportunities that are primarily 
provided in cities or other conglomerations. On the one hand, the majority of people have an 
income and are able to afford a living, on the other hand, cities are overcrowded, housing prices 
skyrocket and competition for jobs is high enough for employers to make employment 
conditions (salary, benefits, allowances, holidays…) unfavorable for the employee. 
For these reasons, this dissertation addresses normative coherence for development. It not only 
contends that core norms must be infused into and implemented by development cooperation 
strategies, but it also examines the ways in which non-development policy arenas undermine 
these norms. Specifically, the dissertation investigates normative coherence for development 
in terms of the transition between development and trade. This is the focus of the following 
section. 
iii. The Development-Trade Nexus 
Development and trade are interconnected policy areas based on the assumption that trade 
fosters economic growth and economic growth leads to better living conditions. This 
relationship is recognized both in the development and in the trade sphere: while the aid 
for trade agenda comprises initiatives to support trade, which are brought forward by the 
development actors, trade actors realize that developing states require a slower transition into 
incorporating the liberal rules and allow for flexibility in implementing the agreements. 
One of the proclaimed principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the global leader in 
trade rules, is encouraging development and economic reform. For developing countries, this 
means that they get more flexibility in implementing WTO agreements. During the last 
completed round of negotiations, the Uruguay round which lasted from 1986 until 1994, the 
WTO was formally established, and 123 nation states joined the negotiations. In 2001, the 
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Doha Round was launched, which is also called the Doha Development Round, because it 
aims to further support trading opportunities for developing countries (WTO, 2018d). Thus, 
the topic of development seems to play a role in the trade arena as well, but developing 
countries are nevertheless expected to comply to the agreements based on flexible 
arrangements: “But the agreements did give them transition periods to adjust to the more 
unfamiliar and, perhaps, difficult WTO provisions — particularly so for the poorest, “least-
developed” countries” (WTO, 2018c). This approach to development put economic growth 
and free trade at the center but does not incorporate other factors of development such as 
the normative side. The WTO also promotes aid for trade and recognizes the role of trade in 
the pursuit of the 2030 Agenda (as summarized in the SDGs). Since 2007, joint reports on aid 
for trade have been published by the WTO and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The latest joint report entitled “Promoting Trade, Inclusiveness and 
Connectivity for Sustainable Development” highlights how trade connectivity, i.e. a country’s 
access to the global trade market, is beneficial for development and the current sustainable 
development agenda (WTO/OECD, 2017). Interestingly, the OECD, which has brought policy 
coherence for development onto the development agenda and supports the transformative 
development approach of the UN 2030 Agenda, supports the strongly trade-based approach to 
development, which is pursued by the WTO. These evolutions give the impression that the 
connection between development and trade is recognized but unbalanced towards trade 
interests. 
Similar to the development and trade “games” taking place in international relations, 
academic discussions with a normative dimension in the analysis of EU development policies 
remains limited (Koff, 2017b; Koff & Maganda, 2016). Several studies of the development-
trade nexus address the EU’s internal conflicts between the different EU institutions (Büntrup, 
2007; Carbone, 2007; Stocchetti, 2013, 2016). Finding the appropriate balance between 
protectionism and liberalization is a frequent issue that is being addressed in the WTO 
rounds on trade and development. In particular, developed countries still protect their own 
markets in the sectors of agriculture, textiles or clothing, which are crucial sectors for 
developing countries. Despite the liberalization rhetoric, protective measures are kept and as a 
result the trading system disadvantages developing countries (Stocchetti, 2016). This is also 
the case for the EU, which is a strong supporter of trade liberalization, but noticeably hesitant 
in opening up its agricultural market. This division reflects internal divides within the European 
Commission: DG Trade tends to support trade liberalization whereas DG Agriculture favors 
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protectionism. For example, agricultural products such as rice, bananas and sugar are produced 
within the EU market (taken into account some member states’ overseas territories) and 
consequently opening up the market to international imports would harm the producers on 
the EU market (Carbone, 2007; Orbie, 2007). Not opening up the market, on the other hand, 
disadvantages developing countries and as a result slows down their economic development. A 
trade-off occurs between the EU’s internal and external interests. 
iv. Motivation for this Study and Aspired Impacts 
The motivation for this study has various roots. First, the author’s experience with 
development cooperation in Vietnam prior to this study led to the current research focus. The 
Master’s thesis explored normative policy coherence for development within the EU’s 
development sector. Fieldwork in Vietnam in winter 2013-2014 revealed, however, that 
development policy reflects just one of the pillars the EU-VN relationship is based on. 
Consequently, normative coherence with the sole focus on development does not reflect the 
EU’s more complex relationship with Vietnam. The Master’s thesis on normative coherence 
for development in the development sector offered an inspiring starting point and led to the 
expansion of NPCD research and to the inclusion of trade policy into the study. 
My goal as an academic is primarily to contribute to the existing literature on PCD. While 
other strands of literature will be touched upon as described in the literature review in chapter 
one, this research foremost adds to existing normative PCD debates (Koff, 2017a, 2017b; Koff 
& Maganda, 2016) by applying this normative layer to policy implementation practices. 
Hitherto, discussions around the type of, and the classification of, PCD mostly occurred along 
structural lines, i.e. political decision-making structures (Carbone, 2008; Forster & Stokke, 
1999; Hoebink, 1999b; Picciotto, 2005). While the exact terminologies vary, three main types 
of PCD can be distinguished. Internal coherence is understood as coherence within the EU’s 
development policies. Horizontal coherence refers to an actor’s coherence between different 
policy sectors, such as coherence between the EUs development and trade policies or the EU’s 
development and agricultural policies (Carbone, 2008; Carbone & Keijzer, 2016; Hoebink, 
1999b). Resulting from the EU’s complex governance structure, competences for policy-
making are distributed across the EU institutions and the EU member states. This can lead to 
vertical policy incoherence between MS policies and EU policies for development. Based on 
this structural division, normative policy coherence for development adds another layer to 
the conceptualization. It draws on the understanding of PCD as a means to achieve an 
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overarching goal, i.e. as a process, not an outcome, and, therefore, the different typologies of 
PCD offer different lenses through which to analyze the implementation of PCD. The 
normative dimension adds the understanding of the SDGs as normative goals calling for gender 
equality, sustainability, responsibility and peace. From this point of view, the current sustainable 
development agenda of the United Nations provides the framework for action for all countries 
across all policy sectors. All UN members have committed to achieving the extensive and 
highly ambitious SDGs by 2030, for which PCD can be used as a tool. Normative PCD reflects 
a mind-set and a political willingness towards the SDGs, i.e. an actor’s political commitment 
and corresponding actions demonstrate its factual commitment to norms within the 
development sector, across policy sectors, and across levels of governance. While the SDGs 
can be understood as norms themselves, and thus, normative PCD could be understood as 
simply reflecting commitment to the SDGs, this is not the case here. The SDGs provide the 
framework in which actors set their own norms that can both, support or undermine the SDGs. 
With regard to the EU in particular, normative policy coherence for development comprises a 
second normative aspect: the values and principles of the EU. Taking the EU as an example, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, human rights, peace, liberty and solidarity, are 
some of the EU guiding principles as set out in the Lisbon Treaty. As such, these principles 
shape, to varying degrees, EU policies from political rhetoric to actual policy implementation. 
Adhering to those principles across several or all levels of PCD would represent normative 
policy coherence for development. The SDGs, in contrast, are a set of goals to be achieved 
that shape the global arena in which the EU acts. 
As the reader might have noticed by now, this dissertation is a strongly normative study. 
European norm promotion is a very contentious topic among development researchers, 
practitioners, activists, and from my perspective criticism is indeed necessary given Europe’s 
colonial legacy with many of its partner countries. However, I would like to point out that this 
study focuses on normative policy coherence for development rather than on criticism towards 
EU norm promotion or criticism towards EU development cooperation per se. Stepping away 
from the academic discussion for the moment, my personal aspiration for this dissertation is to 
identify gaps in the policy cycle (problem definition / decision taking / implementation / 
evaluation) in order to identify and, therefore, address various incoherences. In addition to the 
EU’s self-proclaimed commitment to norms, I consider norms as the benchmark to achieve 
fair, just and inclusive development. It is beyond my position to propose appropriate measures 
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to fill those gaps, but raising awareness is a first starting point without which some gaps might 
not be noticed. To phrase it in policy cycle terms, I would like to contribute to the problem 
definition. In the European Commission, policies are evaluated based on the impact on other 
policies at the policy formulation stage. While this is a useful technique to address anticipated 
impairments but stop before the implementation stage and, therefore, does not follow up on 
how potentially coherence policies are implemented in practice. Furthermore, this procedure 
only addresses PCD as a technical measure that needs to be adhered to and not as a tool to 
further the EU’s normative background. 
From a political point of view, this study feeds into the ongoing activities in the development 
and trade framework. Particularly, aid for trade is used as a tool to link those two arenas. 
While promoted by the WTO, the implementation remains with the nation states and funding 
comes from the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget. Thus, the aid for trade 
efforts are largely a development undertaking, but aid for trade efforts only reflect a small 
percentage of the entire ODA budget. Furthermore, development initiatives in the trade sector 
are reduced to flexibility and preferential tariffs. As a result, both arenas are mostly 
disconnected despite the recognition that trade and development policies can be mutually 
reinforcing. Thus, this study aims to bring the two policy arenas closer together to enhance the 
positive effects on the developing countries. 
v. Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is structured along two major parts, the technical part (i.e. theory, methods, 
and concepts) and the empirical part (i.e. data analysis and evaluation), followed by the final 
conclusions.  
The technical part (chapters one, two and three) provide the theoretical, methodological and 
conceptual framework for this study. In chapter one, “Research Questions and Literature 
Review”, the guiding research questions are presented against a brief elaboration of existing 
literature. The examination of Are the EU’s development and trade policies coherent from a 
normative perspective? and Why might the EU’s development and trade policies be incoherent 
regarding the implementation of its core norms? throughout this dissertation adds to existing 
literature on PCD, EU foreign policy analysis and regionalism. 
The second chapter deals with methodological concerns regarding case studies as a research 
design, data collection and data analysis. The case study addresses coherence between EU 
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policies using the example of EU-Vietnam relations. For this purpose, semi-structured 
interviews with EU officials have been conducted in 2015 and 2016 in Brussels, Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City. These interviews, together with selected policy documents (for an exhaustive 
list see appendix 1 & 3), form the data set, which was analyzed using qualitative coding 
methods as described more extensively in chapter two. 
In chapter three, normative policy coherence is discussed giving its origin as a concept during 
the 1990s. The current conceptualization for this research evolved from the initially vague term 
to horizontal coherence, i.e. coherence between aid and non-aid policies, with regard to the 
implementation of norms. 
This is followed by the empirical part (chapters four, five and six), which addresses four stages 
of policy implementation identified by the author: policy guidelines, policy formulation, policy 
implementation I and policy implementation II. This empirical part examines the relationship 
between the European Union and Vietnam drawing on policy documents and interviews as 
described above and in more detail in chapter two. 
Chapter four addresses the legislative dimension of normative policy coherence, which 
corresponds to the policy guidelines and policy formulation stages of policy implementation. 
This dimension is the political level, i.e. the level of formal commitments. Legislation, such as 
the EU Treaties and the Consensus on Development, lay the down the written commitment to 
norms and development, which are one indicator to identify normative policy coherence for 
development. Through the analysis of policy documents, this chapter shows that the written 
commitment is in EU global as well as EU-Vietnam specific documents is strong, but partly 
incoherent. Sustainable development, for example, is represented across all four policy 
implementation stages, whereas liberty is not mentioned at either stage (for a more detailed 
overview see table 12 in chapter four). 
Chapter five adds to the legislative analysis by addressing the EU’s policy implementation 
stages I and II. The examination of normative policy coherence for development in the form of 
policy networks among EU officials sheds light on policy practices. Policy networks are a 
platform for communication and consequently have the potential to influence coherence 
through sharing or withholding information. This chapter shows that the role of policy 
networks in NPCD is dependent on the type and goal of the network. Sectoral networks, such 
as the development network and the trade network, are largely disconnected from each other, 
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which in turn undermines coherence between the sectors. In contrast to the legislative 
dimension, this practice-oriented dimension is not strongly infused by EU norms. 
Chapter six deals with the EU’s interests in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), because these interests are linked to its interests in Vietnam and, therefore, shape 
EU-Vietnam policies. The analysis shows that EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism does not strongly 
influence EU-Vietnam normative policy coherence through Vietnam’s membership in 
ASEAN. However, it shows that the EU’s economic interests in the region take priority over 
normative matters and consequently, from the EU’s perspective, Vietnam can serve as an entry 
point to the ASEAN market. 
The conclusion shows how the expected results and actual outcomes diverge. Under the 
framework of sustainable development, the EU was expected to act as a normative actor in 
development. The results indicate that the EU promotes norms in its policy guidelines, but lack 
implementation in the development sector. Furthermore, it was expected that the EU does not 
promote norms in trade relations, which would lead to normative policy incoherence. Indeed, 
the results highlights that norms are not promoted in the trade sector. However, incoherence is 
not primarily a result of the divergence between development and trade policies, but instead 
between the diplomatic sectors (political relations) and the technical sectors such as 
development and trade. Last, the analysis of inter-regionalism shows that the links between 
EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism and EU-Vietnam bilateralism are weak but are driven by 
economic interests. This dissertation builds on existing literature on regionalism, policy 
networks, and policy coherence for development, and contributes through an implementation-
focused approach based on actor interviews. 
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Chapter 1: Research Questions and 
Literature Review 
This chapter outlines the choice of research questions that guide this analysis and the fields of 
literature to which the dissertation hopes to contribute. This is followed by a brief outline of 
the development-trade transition in Vietnam, which serves as the case study to narrow down the 
policy analysis of normative policy coherence for development in EU policies. 
1.1 RESEARCH FOCUS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Since the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has committed itself legally to 
making policies more coherent on a horizontal level, i.e. across the EU policies, and on a 
vertical level, i.e. between EU and EU member state policies. Regardless of coherence 
initiatives or commitments to coherence, it is argued that perfect coherence can neither be 
achieved in theory nor in practice (Ashoff, 2005, p.3). Obstacles to policy coherence are 
manifold: the scope of a policy, national and international organizational structures, the 
number and type of actors involved in the policy formulation and implementation process, 
the spill-over effects of other policies on development policies, independent implementing 
agencies, or the lack of information can hinder policy coherence (Hydén, 1999). 
Hoebink (1999b) identifies several causes of incoherence that are EU specific. First, given the 
large number of private and public stakeholders and their variety of interests, as well as 
political parties in the EU, perfect coherence is hardly achievable. Second, the governing body 
is split into several institutions, the European Commission, the Councils, and the European 
Parliament, which in turn are separated into units and departments. At an institutional level, 
the Commission, the Councils and the Parliament have their own agendas, and additionally, 
their internal institutional structure complicates communication and finding compromises. 
These structural arrangements allow for a large number of competing actors and agendas. 
For example, within the Commission, DG DEVCO (Directorate-General for Development 
Cooperation), DG TRADE (Directorate-General for Trade) and DG AGRI (Directorate-
General for Agriculture and Rural Development) tend to be in contradicting positions in terms 
of protecting the EU’s internal market with DG TRADE favoring openness, DG AGRI favoring 
protection of agricultural production and DG DEVCO favoring support of farmers in third 
countries (Carbone, 2007; Hydén, 1999; Orbie, 2007). Third, it is often hard to predict all 
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effects and side effects of a given policy and, therefore, unintended outcomes might occur 
(Hoebink, 1999b; Hydén, 1999), which is not only an intricacy for the European Union but are 
a general feature of policy-making. 
Figure 1 below gives an overview of causes of incoherence along the autonomy dimension and 
the intention dimension (Hydén, 1999). The autonomy dimension separates causes into actor-
driven or structure-driven, whereas the intention dimension makes a distinction between 
intentional and unintentional causes of incoherence. According to this divide, “divergent 
interests” and “institutional arrangements” are both intentional, whereas the former is actor 
driven and the latter structure driven. Divergent interests may occur when specific groups or 
individuals exercise interests that do not correspond with the original policy and, therefore, aim 
to divert the policy. Institutional arrangements, on the other hand, is a structural organization 
to divide tasks within an institution but also across EU member states, which carry the 
individual responsibility to implement policies. Unintentional causes of incoherence are the 
“lack of information”, which is actor related, and “unintentional rivalry” which is a structural 
cause. Lack of information is a general concern when designing policies because hardly ever 
can everything be known (Hoebink, 1999b; Hydén, 1999). As a result, the outcome of a policy 
might differ from the original intention. Last, conflicts over resources can lead to unintentional 
rivalries between departments. These conflicts are different from conflicts of interests as they 
are not expected to occur, but might arise because of certain circumstances, such as budgetary 
arrangements. 
Figure 1: Causes of Internal Incoherence 
Source: Hydén (1999) 
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Despite the above mentioned obstacles, improving policy coherence should nevertheless 
remain a political goal as it not only increases efficiency and decreases costs (Ashoff, 2005, 
p.11), but can also create legitimacy and credibility when politicians can show their success in 
achieving political goals (Hydén, 1999). While incoherence between the EU’s development, 
trade and agricultural policies has already been discussed widely, the role of norms in those 
discussions are notably limited (see for example: Hoebink, 1999a; Morrissey, 2006). On the 
other hand, the EU’s normative dimension is considered in wider international relation debates 
about the EU’s civilian power (Duchêne, 1972; Maull, 1990) or normative power (Manners, 
2002, 2006), which argue that the EU lacks military power because it does not have a European 
army, but instead has other prerogatives it can use in international relations. 
These two issues, PCD on the one hand and Normative Power Europe (NPE) on the other, seem 
to progress alongside each other, but have not been sufficiently integrated in existing literature 
yet. Merging these two ideas is based on the argument that the EU is striving for both policy 
coherence and norm promotion, but evidence for this kind of coherence in practice remains 
quite limited. To fill this gap, two main research questions guide this study. 
Are the EU’s development and trade policies coherent in implementing norms; 
and if not, why are they incoherent? 
These two questions will be addressed throughout the empirical chapters four to six and are the 
cross-cutting themes for this dissertation. NPCD will be assessed along the policy 
implementation continuum, which leads from vague policy guidelines to precise projects, and 
it will be put into a regional context that reflects EU-ASEAN relations. Put differently, this 
research examines what factors might influence normative policy coherence for development. 
Hydén (1999) has presented four causes of incoherence that he relates to internal coherence, 
i.e. coherence between intended goals and actual outcomes. Lack of information, institutional 
arrangements, unintentional rivalry and divergent interests are the four causes that were singled 
out. Because these causes are extrapolated from internal coherence and not horizontal 
coherence between two external policies, these causes need to be adapted to the logic of 
horizontal coherence (see figure 2). In addition to actor driven conflicts of interests, conflicts 
can also occur due to institutional structures in horizontal policy relations. Development 
actors are expected to support development initiative whereas trade actors are expected 
to support trade initiative. Each sector has its own interests, which can conflict with each other. 
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As a result, lack of information can also be intentional and structural rather than only actor-
driven and unintentional. Institutional divides are generally intended divides but the resulting 
incoherences can be intended as well as unintended. Therefore, institutional arrangements can 
be placed in both quadrants along the structural dimension. Unintended rivalry remains in the 
section of unintended and structural causes, because unexpected competition over budgets can 
also occur between two policies. 
Figure 2: Causes of Horizontal Incoherence 
  Autonomy  
  
Actor  
Interests Information 
 
Intention Intentional Unintentional    
Institutions 
Interests 
Information 
Rivalry 
Institutions    
Structure  
Source: author’s adaptation from Hydén (1999) 
Taking this classification on incoherence as presented in figure 2, all four factors form a part 
of this research: lack of information, institutional arrangements, diverging interests, and 
unintentional rivalry. Whether the EU is normatively coherent across policy sectors relates to 
diverging interests and institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements and consequent 
diverging interests between the development and trade sector are two factors around which 
some sub-questions have been formulated in order to support the analysis of normative policy 
coherence for development. According to the European Consensus on Development, EU 
development aid should promote rights, norms and values. In part one of the joint declaration, 
the Parliament, Council and Commission state: “We reaffirm that development is a central 
goal by itself; and that sustainable development includes good governance, human rights and 
political, economic, social and environmental aspects” (European Union, 2006). As there is no 
major trade-off, e.g. between financial gains and norms, to be found that could limit the 
inclusion of norms in development policies, the first sub-question is: 
Does the EU represent itself as a normative power in the development sector? 
In contrast to development aid, trade policies evolve around the idea of economic gains, 
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highlighting the divergent interests. Whereas the previous sub-question is based on the 
idea that the EU is not tied to binding international agreements that might reduce its capacity 
for shaping development policies according to the EU’s normative guidelines, the next sub-
question addresses an adverse argumentation for trade policies. The underlying assumption 
arises from the idea that financial or economic benefits are able to overpower normative 
intentions and, thus, the EU faces obstacles to promoting norms in trade policies. With 164 
members, the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2018b) is the leading international institution 
to set trade standards and rules for all its members, such as the standardized classification of 
goods –  which was initially created by the World Customs Organization but used as the de 
facto standard based on the high number of WTO members which adhered to this classification 
(WTO, 2018e) –  and tariffs to be applied to those goods. This means that the EU is limited in 
its leverage in trade negotiations, because it is tied to the international arrangements linked to 
WTO membership. As a member of the WTO, the EU is bound to find compromises that 
respect WTO regulations and support the WTO’s approach to development, which is 
essentially the implementation of free trade (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010, p.188), and include its 
normative basis. Due to these limitations in the multilateral arena, the EU might show less 
support for the promotion of norms and rights. The second sub-question, therefore, is: 
Does the EU represent itself as a normative power in the trade sector? 
This dissertation strongly focuses on the EU’s self-representation and policy implementation; 
whether or not the EU is successful in being a normative power and whether it can influence 
other actors by setting norms, are issues that fall outside the scope of this study. 
Policy implementation on the ground corresponds to the institutional arrangements and 
diverging interests represented in legislative provisions. On the one hand, norm promotion 
and the EU’s use of normative power shape the development sector, as provided by the 
commitment to normative development. On the other hand, different factors determine the 
negotiations in trade relations. Research suggests that policy networks reinforce existing state 
structures in which the government is separated into various departments with competing 
interests (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992, p.163), which implies that the distinction between 
development and trade also persists on the ground. For EU external affairs, the reinforcement 
logic would suggest that policy networks emphasize the structural division between 
development and trade. Thus, because of the systematic organization of staff into sectors, 
development and trade representatives are likely to remain in their own area of expertise and 
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create networks within their sector, which would make exchange between the different policy 
areas rather limited. Consequently, the third sub-question is as follows: 
Why might existing policy networks limit normative coherence between development and trade 
policies? 
These three sub-questions aim to further elaborate on the issues brought forward by Hydén 
(1999). First, he addressed the causes of incoherence as described above, which will guide the 
identification of gaps in the policy implementation. Furthermore, Hydén asks whether 
coherence is meant to satisfy the public, the client or the implementing organization. In this 
study, I will predominantly take the perspective of the implementing organization, i.e. the EU 
and its member states.  The Commission is the executing agency for trade, whereas it shares 
competences with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the member states in 
implementing international development cooperation. The European Parliament is actively 
involved in policy-making, in particular when human rights issues are at stake, but because of 
its legislative (and not executive role), it does not take a primary role in policy implementation. 
The client perspective, the perspective of the recipient country or trading partner, is 
acknowledged during the policy formulation phase, which is in this case represented by the 
negotiations of comprehensive bilateral agreements.  An extensive study of these negotiations 
is not included in this dissertation, but the finalized agreements form part of the analysis, which 
anyhow focuses on policy implementation rather than formulation. In line with this focus on 
implementation, the perspective of the public is not included in this study. Both the public and 
the client perspective are relevant considerations in the policy cycle but are left for further 
studies provided the restricted scope of this dissertation. 
A pertinent consideration, however, is Vietnam’s role in the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN’s importance for the EU. Since the 1950s, relations between 
the EU and ASEAN have strengthened and the EU perceives ASEAN as a strong strategic 
partner for the future (see EU Mission to ASEAN, 2016). Most recently, the EU and ASEAN 
have unsuccessfully undertaken negotiations for a regional trade agreement between the two 
economic blocs. Since then, the EU has started bilateral negotiations with individual ASEAN 
member states showing first results with the Singapore and Vietnam free trade agreements. 
Hence, another factor that is likely to contribute to the normative incoherence between 
development and trade policies is the overall interest in the South East Asian region. 
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Do EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations affect normative policy coherence between 
development and trade in bilateral relations with Vietnam and if so, how? 
Throughout this dissertation, normative policy coherence for development is understood as 
the horizontal coherence between aid and non-aid policies, vertical coherence between the EU 
and its member states, and multilateral coherence between the EU and ASEAN, always with 
regard to EU norms. Although each EU member state has its own development policies, in this 
study the term EU development cooperation only addresses policies under the auspices of the 
EU Commission directorate-general for International Cooperation and Development DG 
DEVCO. The term development cooperation will be used interchangeably with development 
aid, international development or aid policy. 
EU norms are not explicitly defined by the European Union. References to various concepts 
such as principles, norms or values are made in the EU treaties and other legislative texts. By 
analyzing key EU policy documents such as the EU Treaties and the Consensus for 
Development, I have defined a set of norms to represent ‘EU norms’ in this research, which 
are democracy, freedom, gender equality, good governance, human rights, justice, liberty, non-
discrimination, peace, rule of law, solidarity and sustainable development (for more details see 
chapter three). If not explicitly mentioned, ‘European norms’ are understood as EU norms and, 
thus, both terms will be used. 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND ORIGINALITY OF THIS 
STUDY 
With this study, I aim to further knowledge based on four innovations: (1) adding to existing 
PCD literature, (2) applying the intention-autonomy model to a case at hand, and (3) combining 
different fields of literature, and (4) studying policy representatives in the recipient country. 
Each innovation will be presented in detail in the following sections. 
1.2.1 Adding to PCD Literature 
A broad body of scholarship on PCD has emerged in recent years highlighting its 
burgeoning centrality on the global development agendas (Siitonen, 2016). As previously 
mentioned, the PCD approach does not take on a critical stance towards development per se 
but addresses development policies and practices. 
Initially PCD was brought up as a policy tool to improve aid effectiveness of the DAC donors 
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(Forster & Stokke, 1999), but since then growing interest in PCD in academia has led to critical 
research on PCD. Different types of policy coherence were identified in order to conceptualize 
the political terminology and to identify its relevance in policy-making (Forster & Stokke, 
1999; Hoebink, 1999b). Research on implementing PCD has mostly focused on disputes at the 
EU level, either between the EU institutions (the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers), or between the member states and the EU (Carbone 
& Keijzer, 2016; Hoebink, 1999a, 1999b). Other case studies have focused on PCD in 
individual member states such as the Czech Republic (Horký, 2010), Denmark (Nyberg 
Sørensen, 2016), Germany (Ashoff, 1999), the Netherlands (Hoebink, 1999a) and Sweden 
(Danielson, 1999). 
In addition to the institutional levels of implementation, other PCD studies have addressed 
specific policy sectors (see for example Koff, 2017b; Matthews, 2008; Nyberg Sørensen, 2016; 
Orbie, 2007; Siles-Brügge, 2014). Incoherence between the EU’s development and agricultural 
policies remains a relevant research topic despite political efforts to improve policy coherence 
(Matthews, 2008). PCD studies on development and migration have regained momentum since 
the outbreak of political debates around the so-called “migrant crisis” in Europe (Koff, 2017b; 
Nyberg Sørensen, 2016). Research on PCD in the development and trade nexus has also 
advanced, particularly focusing on the Everything But Arms initiative (EBA) (see Büntrup, 
2007; Carbone, 2007; Orbie & Faber, 2007). The EBA is an initiative to offer duty-free and 
quota-free access for least developed countries to the European market and is consequently 
seen as an important example for improved coherence in the European Union; however, it was 
criticized for not enhancing economic development as exports to the European Union have 
increased only slightly (Orbie & Faber, 2007). Even more so, Siles-Brügge (2014) argues that 
the EU’s policy reforms in the developmental trade agenda are not to the mere benefit of 
developing countries but also a strategic step for the EU to improve its economic leverage. 
 
As can be seen, a broad corpus of PCD literature exists already, but few of these studies have 
addressed the normative dimension of PCD (Koff & Maganda, 2016) or the implementation 
stage in the third country. Regarding the former, the primary objective is to inspire a normative 
discussion in the PCD debate, which has for now strongly focused on the institutional 
dimension of PCD. Regarding the latter, another contribution this research makes is the study 
of norm implementation, which adds to the existing knowledge of policy coherence for 
development (PCD), which in turn has largely focused on the internal coherence of policies or 
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internal reasons for horizontal incoherence. 
1.2.2 Applying the Intention-Autonomy Model to a Case 
By applying the intention-autonomy model (Hydén, 1999) to a specific case, I intend to 
contribute to the knowledge about causes of incoherence. Since its publication in 1999, this 
model has not been used widely, despite its applicability to public policy analysis. It offers a 
suitable starting point to categorize causes of incoherence, which can subsequently be assessed 
on a case-to-case basis, as is done here. The model was adapted to fit the analysis of external 
policies more precisely, as is shown above. From an academic perspective, the adaptation of 
the model and its application to EU foreign policies is a novelty in itself, but from a more 
pragmatic point of view, the identification of causes of incoherence in a real-life setting can be 
used to prevent future incoherence. 
Other studies of causes of policy incoherence have brought forward different dimensions, such 
as the area of societal and political norms, the area of political decision-making, the area of 
policy formulation and coordination, and the conceptual area, within which several causes of 
incoherence are listed (Ashoff, 2005). In the political decision-making area, for example, 
diverging interests in a government is one of the causes of incoherence. In a democratic, 
pluralistic state this is a natural phenomenon, and as such it is one of the causes of incoherence. 
More complex decision-making due to globalization and divergent interests at the EU level are 
other examples in the political decision-making area. Information shortages is one of the causes 
of incoherence in the policy formulation and coordination area. Some of these causes of 
incoherence can be placed in the intention-autonomy continuum relatively easily. Diverging 
interests in a nation state and diverging interests at the EU level would fall into the intentional- 
structural quadrant at the bottom left. Information shortages would fall into the unintentional-
actor quadrant in the top right corner. More complex decision-making due to globalizations is 
a cause, which cannot be put easily into one of the categories, because it comprises several 
factors. More complexity means more institutions and within those institutions more actors. It 
also means that more divergent interests are at stake. Globalization implies that national 
decisions can affect third countries more rapidly (Ashoff, 2005), and, arguably, not all effects 
are known, which leads to incomplete information. Thus, one cause of incoherence can 
comprise several aspects that would fall into different categories in the intention-autonomy 
model. 
Re-classification of causes, e.g. from Ashoff’s areas to Hydén’s model, is not intended. 
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However, the above examples highlight the suitability of the autonomy-intention model as it 
does not undermine thematically driven causes such as presented in the “areas model” but 
applies a more structured logic for categorizing them. Therefore, the “areas model” is not used 
as the model for classification/categorization; instead, the intention-autonomy model is used in 
this study to categorize causes of incoherence. 
Overall, this two-dimensional approach to classifying causes of incoherence is a suitable 
model, which is used in this study with the aim to contribute to a better understanding of causes 
of policy incoherence by applying it to a concrete case, i.e. the development and trade nexus in 
EU-Vietnam relations. 
1.2.3 Combining Fields of Literature 
The third contributions this study aims to make is combining the academic fields of European 
foreign policy, policy communities and regionalism in order to strive towards a more complete 
understanding of policy coherence for development. 
Literature on regionalism shows the various forms of defining regionalism based on the 
conceptualization of a region. A region can be understood as a social construct, as a 
geographical area or an institutional arrangement. Europe, for example, has different 
boundaries according to the lens through which a region is defined. As a geographical area, 
the continent Europe has clear borders, as a social construct discussions around Turkey make 
the definition of Europe as a region more disputed, and based on the institutional arrangements 
Europe could be seen as the European Union (28 member states), the European Economic Area 
(EU + Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway1) or the Council of Europe (47 countries), for 
example. Thus, depending on the type of definitional lens chosen, a region comprises different 
characteristics. Corresponding to the understanding that a region is situated between the 
national and the global level (Börzel & Risse, 2016), region is defined here as a group of nation 
states that have institutionalized their cooperation to various degrees, such as the EU and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This study follows the regionalism trend 
that places the EU at the center of regionalism studies. 
Since the end of the Cold War, regionalism has seen a boost, both politically and academically 
(Börzel, 2016; Börzel & Risse, 2016), out of which several types of regionalism arose. 
                                                          
 
1 Information based on the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement, 
last consulted February 21, 2018 
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Hardacre & Smith (2014) have coined the term “complex inter-regionalism”, which highlights 
a region’s multitude of inter-regional relations, particularly in the case of the EU. Inter-regional 
relations between regions vary depending on the institutionalization of a region, some relations 
being more institutionalized than others, or on the sectors for cooperation. The relationship 
between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) notably depicts 
this type of regionalism. In this case, both regions have a clearly defined social, geographical 
and institutional setting. 
Trans-regional relations are relations between an institutionalized region and a group of 
countries in a “broader intercontinental framework” (Hardacre & Smith, 2014, p.92), such as 
the EU’s relations with several Asian countries in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). ASEM 
is a forum in which 53 participating actors (28 EU member states, 10 ASEAN member states, 
Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, 
Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia, the European Union, and the ASEAN Secretariat) 
meet on a biennial basis on political, economic and social matters2. Definitional precision of 
regions, inter-regionalism or trans-regionalism, however, seems to be lacking in the political 
arena. It is stated, for example, that ASEM creates cooperation between two regions and that it 
is a framework for cooperation between Europe and Asia  (ASEM, 2016, emphasis added). 
Whereas geographically speaking Australia and New Zealand are considered neither Asian nor 
European countries, they are still included in the ASEM framework. Despite inter-
regionalism brought forward in ASEM documents, the trans-regional conceptualization 
seems to be more fit to this framework. 
In addition to the distinction between inter-regionalism and trans-regionalism, intra-
regionalism is another type of regionalism, which refers to regional integration within a 
given region (Doidge, 2014). Asymmetric regionalism is understood as asymmetric internal 
relations in which some states are strong economic entities and others weaker developing 
regions (Baert, Scaramagli, & Söderbaum, 2014; Beeson, 2010). In other words, asymmetric 
regionalism can be defined as regional integration between economically strongly diverse 
countries. Elsewhere the term bilateral asymmetric relations is used to describe the relationship 
between a region and a nation state, i.e. between the EU and individual countries (Camroux, 
2010). Because both cases include a region as an actor, the terms asymmetric inter-regionalism 
                                                          
 
2 Information based on ASEM InfoBoard http://www.aseminfoboard.org/about , last consulted February 21, 2018 
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will be used in this research to describe the relationship between two regions that show 
economic discrepancies.  
Some scholars contend that states are the main drivers of regionalism and institution-building 
is the main goal (Acharya, 2016; Börzel, 2016; Börzel & Risse, 2016; Söderbaum, 2016). 
Consequently, regionalism is considered a top-down approach, whereas regionalization is a 
bottom-up approach. From this perspective, regionalization, in contrast to regionalism, relates 
to economic, social, political or cultural processes between societies, i.e. non-state actors, 
which can lead to regionalism in terms of institution-building (Börzel & Risse, 2016). Neither 
of these two approaches can fully explain the EU’s regional behavior, which is why 
integrating the European Foreign Policy literature is useful for arriving at a more complete 
understanding. 
Research on European foreign policy (EFP) comprises a variety of academic traditions, but 
with foreign policies as a shared thematic interest (Jørgensen, Aarstad, Drieskens, Laatikainen, 
& Tonra, 2015). International relations, European studies and foreign policy analysis are three 
prominent traditions in EFP research (Jørgensen et al., 2015). A relevant concept in EFP 
research is Normative Power Europe (NPE), which is defined as the EU being able “to shape 
what is normal” (Manners, 2002). Proponents of the Normative Power Europe concept attribute 
a normative behavior to the EU, which influences other actors in the global arena. In contrast 
to defining the EU as a civilian power (Bull, 1982; Duchêne, 1972), which assumes that the 
EU is a state-like entity, the NPE approach offers an approach that moves away from this 
traditional practice in political science to argue that the EU’s creation and institutional structure 
are the deciding factors for its normative power: “the most important factor shaping the 
international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners, 2002, 
p.252). Critics question the “what it is” argument, i.e. the sufficiency of the EU’s creation and 
institutional structure to make it a normative power. It is widely accepted that the EU is 
different from the United States, for example, which is considered a more traditional power, 
but why this is the case remains disputed (Diez, 2005; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007). Kagan 
(2003) attributes the differences between the types of power to the actors’ capabilities. 
Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007) argue that NPE is closely connected to European identity 
formation vis-à-vis the United States. They show that despite the EU’s discrepancy between 
rhetorical actions and actual behavior, the EU’s normative power does not seem to be 
negatively affected, because its identity narrative creates credibility (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 
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2007). Other conceptual contributions suggest embedding the NPE concept in the hegemony 
framework which would emphasize the power dimension in contrast to the normative 
dimension in NPE debates (Diez, 2013). Normative power as hegemony fits into the EFP 
approach as a conceptual tool to understand EU foreign politics outside the traditional interest 
vs. norms divide (Diez, 2013). Empirical studies have examined the NPE concept in, for 
example, the EU’s approach to trade agreements in which the EU has opted to promote labor 
standards referencing ILO conventions (Orbie, 2011). 
These normative views have been challenged since its conceptual emergence in 2002. 
Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002) portray the image of an “EU-topia”. In contrast to the “what it 
is” understanding of the EU, EUtopia is a reference to the EU’s utopian narrative which does 
not correspond to the legitimacy crisis it is in. Thus, while NPE scholars argue that the EU’s 
normative power arises from “what it is”, critics claim that what is being projected is not “what 
it is” but an “EU-topia” (Nicolaïdis & Howse, 2002). Another challenge to the NPE argument 
arises from the EU’s prioritization of economic interests over normative aspirations. A study 
of recent reforms in the EU’s trade rules concerning the least developed countries suggests that 
the EU subordinates developing countries’ needs to its own commercial interests (Siles-
Brügge, 2014). As a result, it is argued that a political economy approach would be more 
suitable to understand the EU’s political behavior than the NPE rationale (Siles-Brügge, 2014). 
While not challenging the NPE concept as such, Pace (2007) examines the relationship between 
the EU’s role on cases of conflict and its global perception. By assessing six elements of 
constructing NPE (content, process, agents, environment, mechanisms and goals), she 
concludes that cases in which the EU is not able to construct normative power reflect 
negatively on its role as a normative power in the global arena (Pace, 2007). 
This study combines conceptual aspects from the regionalism literature, which discusses 
the conceptual aspects of regions and regionalism more detailed than the EFP literature, and 
behavioral aspects from the EFP literature. Conceptually, the EU comprises all three lenses of 
a regional definition, because it has established institutions, geographical borders, and is built 
on shared values3 and the desire for peace. Behaviorally, regionalism is understood as EU-
driven, instead of state-driven, and as an integral part of the EU’s global agenda instead of a 
separate institution-building agenda. Similar to the top-down approach brought forward in IR 
                                                          
 
3 See Preamble to the Treaty on the European Union after Lisbon 
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theory, regionalism here is understood as a top-down approach but driven by the EU institutions 
and not by individual member states. The EU-Vietnam relationship is an example of 
asymmetric regionalism, which coexists with the EU-ASEAN relationship that represents 
(asymmetric) inter-regionalism. Thus, this study feeds into the “complex inter-regionalism” 
discussion and adds to it by theoretically incorporating the EFP, PCD and public policy debates 
and applying the theories to a case study. 
To complement EFP research, policy communities offer a link between the political discussions 
at the higher levels of policy-making and policy implementation. Policy community literature 
falls within the scope of public policy, but in contrast to EFP theory it focuses primarily on 
policy-making (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). Definitions of policy communities and policy 
networks still reflect unclear perceptions of the concepts. While some argue that communities 
and networks are two separate categories, others claim that communities are a sub-group of 
networks (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). Whether due to the lack or because of the lack of a 
common definition of policy networks, this concept is applied to various fields of study, which 
in turn emphasized its utility/usefulness in the policy related analyses. In global public policy, 
transnational policy communities are used to examine the actors involved in public policy-
making at the global level (Stone, 2008). With the emergence of the global political arena, 
political decisions are not only taken at the national level anymore. Therefore, the policy 
community concept is applied to the global level in the framework of the public policy cycle 
(problem definition or agenda-setting, decision-making, policy implementation, monitoring or 
evaluation) (Jann & Wegrich, 2007; Stone, 2008). The transnational policy community is the 
umbrella term for transnational executive networks, international civil servants and 
transnational policy professionals (Stone, 2008). 
In international relations, policy networks are seen as modes of collaboration, coordination, 
exercising influence or international governance (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, & Montgomery, 
2009). Network analysis challenges the conventional view of power by introducing network 
power, which is based on social power, leverage and exit. Social power, leverage and exit are 
three aspects of a network defining a network’s integrity and an actor’s position (an 
individual’s position, government’s position, or organization’s position) towards this network 
(Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). Social power refers to an actor’s access to resources and 
information within the network, or in other terms, their social power within the network. 
Leverage or brokerage is another aspect influencing network power. An actor’s exclusive ties 
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to an otherwise disconnected actor brings additional leverage to the network. Last, exit refers 
to an actor’s ability to leave the network. This can be used as bargaining power within the 
network mostly by actors that are less interconnected with the network (Hafner-Burton et al., 
2009). 
With regard to policy coherence, research suggests that diverse issues and interests within one 
policy area lead to less coherence  (May, Sapotichne, & Workman, 2006). This is particularly 
the case in policy domains such as demographic policy domains, which comprise family, 
children or women’s policies, whereas regional policies such as urban and rural policies show 
greater issues focus and less diverse interests which result in comparatively greater coherence. 
In cases in which policy networks are characterized by diverging issues and interests greater 
policy incoherence can be expected (May et al., 2006). 
 
These three fields of literature are rarely combined in academia. Using the threefold 
literature background in order to assess normative policy coherence for development is a novel 
contribution to academic discussions around PCD. 
1.2.4 New Data Set 
Not only does the theoretical extension of norms and the multi-faceted literature add to the 
study of PCD, but also the interview data gathered and analyzed for this dissertation 
represents a novelty. Written documents such as the EU treaties, political reports, 
communications, minutes of meetings, correspondence between key actors, and reports by 
European NGOs have proven to be a useful source for the PCD study (Carbone & Keijzer, 
2016; Hoebink, 1999b; Hydén, 1999). Public interviews are used occasionally (see Hoebink, 
1999a). Interviews with Commission officials and European External Action Service officials 
are sometimes used for PCD studies (Keukeleire & Raube, 2013), but remain rare. Research 
on European norms comprises interviews with European Commission officials, member state 
officials and NGO representatives (Elgström, 2000). Even scarcer is the inclusion of 
representatives in the recipient country. Hoang and Sicurelli (2017), for example, have used 
interviews with stakeholders in Brussels and Vietnam in their analysis of trade agreements 
between the EU, Vietnam and Singapore. However, in the field of PCD and normative policy 
coherence for development, the use of interviews as primary data, and particularly interviews 
with actors in the recipient/partner country, is nominal. One of the originalities of this study 
is, therefore, the data set. 
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This study draws on interviews that were conducted in the European Commission and the 
European External Action Service in Brussels and in the EU and member state delegations 
in the recipient country Vietnam. The majority of interviews was conducted in Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City. More details on the data collection is given in the methodological chapter 
(chapter two). This data adds to the understanding of PCD, because it includes the 
representatives on the ground in addition to the Commission staff in Brussels. Thus, whereas 
most studies focus on the political “ivory tower”, this study adds the implementation level 
of policies by drawing the focus on the European political representatives abroad. 
The following chapter provides an overview of all methodological choices.  
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
The present chapter provides an overview of the methodological choices for this dissertation 
in the first section, and a presentation of Vietnam as an empirical case in the second section. 
Regarding methodological choices, the first sub-section shows that a case study is a suitable 
research design for this research. A congruence method is applied to highlight connections 
between various factors determined to assess normative policy coherence for development. 
This is followed by a detailed presentation of data collection (policy documents and interviews 
with relevant actors in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam and Brussels, Belgium) and data 
analysis with Atlas.ti. Sub-section four explains the procedure with which Vietnam was chosen 
as an empirical case. The last sub-section presents ethical considerations related to this study. 
In the second section, the relationship between the EU and Vietnam is described to show 
Vietnam’s economic evolutions and the EU’s subsequent phasing out of development aid. 
2.1 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
2.1.1 Case Study Method 
This study aims to combine nomothetic and idiographic tendencies to make generalized 
statements based on a case-specific relationship. While the EU-Vietnam relationship serves as 
the case specific context, wider generalizations can be made about the EU’s policy coherence 
and external relations in general. 
Layer 1: Case Study 
The normative policy coherence for development in EU policies is the case of this study. This 
case is used to get a better understanding of how policy implementation reflects normative 
coherence. Policy implementation is split into political commitment, policy networks and 
regional interests, and, hence, those three factors’ relation to normative coherence. While this 
case study provides in-depth knowledge about the case at hand, some generalizations will 
be made about EU foreign policies and its role as a regional actor. While the development 
and trade policies under consideration for normative coherence are case-specific to EU-
Vietnam relations, it is not unlikely that the EU would pursue similar development and trade 
strategies with other middle-income countries that show similar development processes to 
Vietnam’s development. However, the extent to which the EU is successful in norm promotion, 
i.e. the extent to which the partner country accepts those norms, is largely determined by the 
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partner country’s social, historical and cultural context and the consequent openness to non-
local norms. 
In methodological terms, this study is conducted as a case study, but in wider theoretical debates 
it can be placed in the study of EU foreign policies and as such feed into wider debates about 
EU policy strategies. In recent years, a shift has taken place from the traditional positivist 
model of hypothesis testing and modelling towards realist research in terms of analyzing 
causality between variables instead of co-variance (Gerring, 2007). Co-variance testing is 
usually done in studies with large numbers of cases, which remain on the surface of each case, 
whereas causality and in-depth analysis are characteristics for case studies. Despite the 
increasing application of case studies as a research design, skepticism towards this design 
remains, which is mainly due to the uncertainty of methodology that comes with case study 
research. Case study methods are often not clearly defined in contrast to large-N quantitative 
methods. “Even among its defenders there is confusion over the virtues and vices of this 
ambiguous research design” (Gerring, 2007, p.7). While a case study can have different 
characteristics, such as the qualitative analysis, the thickness of the case, the use of a particular 
kind of evidence (e.g. interviews), the study’s position in a real life context, a diffuse boundary 
between concepts and reality, multiple sources of evidence, using a single observation or a 
single phenomenon, individually, these characteristics do not form the definition of a case 
study in general. None of these terms defines a case study per se but attributes a characteristic 
to a case study. To overcome some of this lack of clarity, I will lay out the main characteristics 
of the case study design at hand. 
1. Small Number of Cases 
Case studies can be composed of one case that is represented by one observation or by 
multiple within-case observations. In political science, the unit of observation often tends to 
be the nation state. Within the nation state, several observations can be made, but these would 
not form different cases but are within-case observations. Similarly, in this research, the EU is 
the unit of observation. Within the EU, there are different institutions and the member states, 
but together they form the EU. Thus, this research is a case study with various within-case 
observations. 
2. Clear Boundaries 
“A case may be created out of any phenomenon so long as it has identifiable boundaries and 
comprises the primary objects of an inference” (Gerring, 2007, p.19). The phenomenon of this 
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research is normative policy coherence for development. For the study of this phenomenon, 
clear boundaries are important to define the width of the case study on a temporal dimension 
or a spatial dimension. Spatial boundaries can be the borders of a country, and temporal 
boundaries a time frame in which a certain phenomenon has occurred. Here, the spatial 
boundaries are regional on two levels. First, the EU’s spatial boundaries are its external borders. 
Second, because its external policies travel outside of the EU’s borders, the second spatial 
boundary relates to the recipient of those policies, which is the ASEAN region and particularly 
Vietnam. The temporal boundaries are limited to the 1992-2017 period. 1992 was chosen as 
the starting point for analysis, because in this year the Maastricht Treaty was implemented, 
which was the first EU Treaty to incorporate policy coherence in its legislation (Hoebink, 
1999b). The end point 2017 was chosen for pragmatic reasons in terms of allowing the 
researcher to take sufficient time to assess the data without constant changes in legislation as 
can occur, for example, during the ratification process of the EU-Vietnam free trade 
agreement4, but also because the PhD project was limited to a four-year period. 
3. Within-case Variation 
Case studies typically focus on within-case or cross-case variation, which can in turn either 
vary or not vary over time. Within one case, the spatial variation within the case combined 
with the temporal variation results in a synchronic & diachronic single-case study (Gerring, 
2007). As already stated above, this study is a case study of a phenomenon (NPCD), with one 
unit of observation (one case) but with within-case and temporal variation. Temporal variation 
is used in the analysis of the EU’s political commitment in which policy documents before the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (1992-2008) and after the Lisbon Treaty (2009-2017) are 
analyzed. Spatial variation is not used here as all documents are EU documents. Spatial 
variation, but not temporal variation, is used in the analysis of policy networks and regional 
interests. Strictly speaking, temporal variation occurs in the analysis of all three factors, 
because no document and no interviews were undertaken or published at the same time and 
thus temporal variation in inevitable, but because it is not the decisive characteristic for the 
analysis of policy networks and regional interests. 
4. Thickness 
The shift away from quantitative large-N analysis to small-N studies comes with the interest in 
                                                          
 
4 Status as of April 2019: the agreement is under legal review. Source:  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/vietnam/ , last consulted on June 19, 2018 
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understanding one specific case in detail (Gerring, 2007). “[C]ase studies are characterized by 
their thickness, defined as multiple and diverse observations per case […]” (Blatter & Blume, 
2008, p.317). These observations can be either across a small number of cases or within a case 
(spatial and temporal dimension), as already stated above. The variation in evidence and 
observations, in-depth knowledge about the case, is a particular feature of a case study, which 
comes with a trade-off between in-depth insights and generalizability. The idea of a case study 
arises from the intention to gather more knowledge about a case or a small number of cases and 
not to understand general patterns or behavior. Thus, by conducting a case study a choice of 
thickness over generalization is made. On the contrary, a large-N, cross-case analysis aims at 
broader knowledge that is not tied to a specific case but shares insights that are applicable 
to other cases (Gerring, 2007). Because of the high number of cases, detailing every case is 
usually unfeasible and, therefore, the depth of individual cases cannot be explored. 
 
The case study design is an appropriate research design for this study, because normative 
policy coherence for development is a complex concept, which requires in-depth knowledge 
of the policy implementation cycle. Academic endeavors of normative policy coherence 
have been relatively recent, which means that detailed analysis has yet to be undertaken. A 
case study of EU normative policy coherence for development provides further in-depth 
understanding of this phenomenon. In the trade-off between internal and external validity, 
the case study design is stronger on internal validity. External validity means that the outcomes 
of the study hold true across similar studies, but as cases are usually chosen because of the 
particularity, outcomes are not likely to be representative for other studies, i.e. most results are 
valid for one study. Case studies focus on "finding out the conditions under which specified 
outcomes occur and the mechanisms through which they occur [...]" (Bennett, 2004, p.43). 
Therefore, case studies are hardly ever generalizable; the results are frequently only applicable 
to the case under consideration and not fit to explain other relations. The Vietnamese context 
provides a very particular setting given its one-party socialist governance system, which limits the 
generalizability of this study. Putting this trade-off into context, external validity depends on the 
kinds of conclusions that are drawn. While specific results might be connected to the case at 
hand, broader arguments and conclusions might still be found in similar case studies. 
Nevertheless, generalizability is not the main aim of this study and the potential problem of 
trade-off does not cause major drawbacks to this research. 
This case analysis aims at getting a deep understanding of the “internal” cases (development 
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and trade) within the “main” case (normative policy coherence). In terms of this research, the 
interest lies with the exemplary case of transition of relations between the EU and Vietnam 
using a rationalist approach. This transition creates an environment, which in itself is worth 
studying. 
Whereas some argue that case studies are research designs that address causal mechanisms 
based on a realist understanding of conducting social science rather than a positivist 
understanding (Gerring, 2007), I aim to relate these two schools by applying the four 
characteristics of a case study while merging them with theory-infused research questions. It 
needs to be noted here that causal mechanisms and causal effects are to be distinguished in 
terms that causal mechanisms reflect the concrete path between cause and outcome and causal 
effects refer to the magnitude of change in a causal relationship (Gerring, 2007). Direct causal 
links between a cause and an outcome will not be sought, but instead links between the proxy 
factors (political commitment, policy networks, regional interests) and normative policy 
coherence for development will be established based on the analysis of the data set. As has 
been suggested elsewhere, “intensive reflection on the congruence/resemblance between 
concrete empirical observations and abstract theoretical concepts” (Blatter & Blume, 2008, 
p.317) is a major part of this case study analysis. While the real-life context is still given, it will 
be linked to concepts and theory related to European foreign policy. 
The congruence method is applied as a concrete method for this case study analysis. 
Layer 2: Congruence Method 
The congruence method is, next to comparative case studies and process tracing, a method that 
combines positivist and constructivist perspectives (Blatter & Blume, 2008). In other terms, 
the "logic of confirmation", which seeks to test existing hypotheses, is combined with the "logic 
of discovery", which implies the introduction and testing of new hypotheses (Bennett, 2004). 
Case study research designs tend to follow the logic of hypothesis-generating/logic of 
discovery/constructivism (Gerring, 2007). However, the congruence method allows for a 
divergence from this hypothesis-generating approach. On the one hand, analyzing the 
appropriateness of the concept of “Normative Power Europe” follows the logic of confirmation 
approach, whereas on the other hand, the introduction of normative coherence and its 
implementation follows the logic of discovery approach. Even though hypothesis-generating 
studies are generally based on a large data set, the results of this study can be used as a starting 
point for further research on generalizability. Generalizability does not necessarily imply 
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generalizability across all middle-income countries, as Vietnam’s cultural and political context 
is very particular, but patterns of norm implementation from the EU’s perspective might still 
be discovered. For example, a gap between political commitment and implementation might 
occur across several partner countries with various backgrounds. However, as already 
mentioned, further studies would have to be conducted to be able to make such claims. 
Some concerns regarding the congruence method are described in the following. First, in order 
to analyze normative policy coherence, the actual policies on policy coherence are not 
examined, but instead three factors that are used as proxies for normative policy coherence. 
The first factor is the legislative representation of norms across several policy documents. This 
analysis is meant to provide insights into the actor’s commitment to norms on a political 
level. Second, policy networks in the partner country are examined to examine how policy 
coherence translates from political commitment to implementation by the relevant actors in the 
field. These policy networks are comprised by various actors from the European delegations. 
The third factor is the regional context, which adds another governance layer to the initial EU-
partner country relationship. These three factors help identify how coherent EU policies are 
and uncover where some gaps might lead to incoherence. 
Second, to combine the nomothetic and idiographic approach to research, the congruence 
method has been selected as the research method, because it allows for an analysis that is 
situated between positivism on one end and constructivism on the other (Blatter & Blume, 
2008). By applying the congruence method, researchers have the possibility to use case-
specific patterns as a basis for making more generalized arguments about certain phenomena. 
“While a technique such as process tracing helps to trace events to unearth causal and 
micro-causal relationships to the eventual outcome, congruence analysis helps to analyze 
those relationships using the explanatory power of various theoretical lenses. In a way, 
congruence analysis helps to bridge the gap between the normative predictions and the positive 
observations” (Annamalai, 2012). 
Third, the congruence method is another adaptation of the process tracing method, which is 
applied to make links between political commitment and actual implementation within the 
policy sectors. In contrast to process tracing, which addresses causality, the congruence 
method aims at establishing a relationship between two variables disregarding causality. In 
other words, rather than tracing each link that leads from negotiations to policy formulation 
to implementation and analyzing the role of each position in the process, the goal of this 
54 
 
method is to show whether policy implementation reflects on policy guidelines. The 
congruence method can be based on deterministic claims aim to uncover relationships that 
show a regular pattern, i.e. relationships for which it is not possible to detect the degree to which 
a change in X causes change in Y. Congruence analysis offers a wide spectrum from positivist 
approaches to epistemological constructivism. In this research, I do not make positivist 
probabilistic claims – for example “The more power the EU has, the more norms are included 
in an agreement” – as this study does not intend to measure the degree of power the EU 
possesses, neither do I use deterministic claims in a positivist sense. Instead, I explore a 
hybrid method in which sub-questions derived from theory guide the exploration in a specific 
context, which in turn will feed back into the theory. Congruence analysis as a method allows 
for this hybridity between positivist nomothetic research aimed at generalization and 
idiographic analysis, which aims at in-depth understanding of a single case. 
Neither internal nor external acceptance of norms are analyzed in this study. Internally the EU 
has accepted a range of norms, which henceforth led to the understanding of the EU as a 
normative power. How these norms came into being, i.e. the internal conflicts and 
discussions that might relate to the norms, does not lie within the scope of this study. Instead, 
norms are represented by the Treaties of the European Union and will be understood as the 
guiding norms for the EU. In external relations after a policy has been formulated, the proxy 
factors for normative policy coherence are political commitment, policy networks and 
regional context. These factors are assumed to be correlated to normative policy coherence, 
which is why they are used as proxies. 
Choice of proxy factors. Political commitment, policy networks and inter-regional relations 
have been identified as relevant aspects influencing normative policy coherence for 
development. Coherence as such cannot be observed or measured directly, but rather the use 
of language or the exercise of particular actions, which in turn can be coherent or not. Similarly, 
normative policy coherence for development cannot be directly observed and, therefore, three 
“proxy factors” were selected to be analyzed. 
Figure 3 indicates how the selected proxy factors (political commitment to norms is analyzed 
in chapter four, policy networks are analyzed in chapter five and inter-regional relations in 
chapter six) relate to NPCD. These three proxy factors were selected in order to examine 
whether the EU implements its norms in its external relations and in order to identify potential 
causes of normative incoherence.  
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Figure 3: NPCD, Selected Proxy Factors and Observations 
 
Source: author’s own creation 
 
Political commitment to norms measured by the mention of norms in selected policy documents 
relevant for EU-Vietnam relations reflects the rhetorical commitment to norms. 
Implementation of norms will be compared to the normative rhetorical commitment to identify 
possible discrepancies between rhetoric and action. Comparing the mention of norms across 
policy documents reflects one layer of normative coherence, i.e. rhetorical coherence. In order 
to assess whether the rhetorical commitment is reflected in the political landscape of diplomats 
in the field, policy networks are analyzed. These networks shed light on the frequency and 
thematic scope of meetings between European representatives. The third proxy factor is the 
inter-regional relationship between the EU the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), because of the interconnectedness between inter-regional (EU-ASEAN) and 
bilateral (EU-Vietnam) relations. EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism is a selected proxy factor, 
because the EU has often adopted its bilateral strategies to its inter-regional relations, which 
shows that bilateral relations are influenced by inter-regional relations. How EU-ASEAN 
relations influence NPCD in EU-Vietnam relations is assessed by comparing the EU’s and 
ASEAN’s integration history, their institutional set-ups and the mention of norms in EU and 
ASEAN policy documents. In terms of normative policy coherence for development, inter-
regional interests are a third proxy factor, because inter-regional relations might overshadow 
bilateral relations.  
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institutions could have been chosen as the primary elements of analysis in this study, but the 
selection focuses on the three factors, which were deemed the most relevant in the analysis of 
NPCD in terms of policy implementation. 
Across the three proxy factors that will help identify normative policy coherence, 
interdependencies between norms in EU development cooperation and norms in EU trade 
policies will be assessed. Thus, even though this is a case study of normative policy coherence 
for development, within each analytical dimension both, the development and trade sector, will 
be examined. The examination of the three proxy factors will show where gaps can be found 
in norm implementation across (a) political commitment, (b) policy networks and (c) regional 
interests. Each empirical chapter, chapters four, five and six respectively, applies this approach. 
2.1.2 Data Collection: Policy Documents and Elite Interviews 
For the in-depth analysis of this case study, a variety of policy documents and elite interviews 
has been conducted. Figure 4  shows the data corresponding to the factor of analysis to 
determine normative policy coherence. 
The first round of the data collection consisted of choosing relevant policy documents. A 
non-exhaustive list of documents include the European Consensus on Development, the EU 
Aid for Trade Strategy, the Treaty on the European Union, the EU Agenda for Change, the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Vietnam, the EU Blue Book 
on Development Cooperation Activities in Vietnam published from 2007 to 2014, the 
Commission’s Annual Reports on Development Assistance from 2007, the Multiannual 
Indicative Program for Vietnam 2014-2020, and relevant documents regarding trade relations, 
such as publications from the EU institutions regarding the EU-VN free trade negotiations. 
A more detailed list can be found in appendix 1. These documents correspond to all three 
factors of analysis: political commitment, policy networks and regional interests. 
The European Union has set nine instruments that can be used for funding external 
assistance in third countries5. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
                                                          
 
5 The instruments are: European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Instrument contributing 
to Stability and Peace (IcSP); Partnership Instrument (PI), Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Cooperation 
(INSC), Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI), European Development Fund (EDF), Instrument for 
Pre-Accession Assistance 2 (IPA), European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI), and Instrument for Greenland 
(IfG). For details see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-programming/funding-
instruments_en 
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(EIDHR) and the Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI), which is split between 
geographical and thematic programs, fall under the premises of DG DEVCO and are, 
consequently used for quantitative data on aid allocation. OECD data on DAC members is 
used to complement the information regarding overall ODA commitments and disbursements. 
The general commitment to development cooperation can be found in the EU treaties and the 
general agreement between the EU and Vietnam, which is why those documents fall under 
the scope of political commitment, whereas the detailed disbursement plans and priority 
sectors are detailed in the multi-annual indicative framework and EU Blue Books fall under 
the scope of the policy network analysis, because the priorities have the capacity to shape 
who is part of which network. 
The second round of data collection was dedicated to conducting elite interviews with EU 
officials in Brussels and EU and member state officials in Vietnam. A qualitative approach 
was used here by targeting specific actors in accordance with the purposive sampling 
method, which fits the congruence method quite well, as it is an adapted version of process 
tracing, for which non-probability sampling of elite interviews has been argued to be a suitable 
combination (Tansey, 2007). In contrast to large scale interviewing rounds or 
questionnaires, this will ensure the gathering of relevant information that is needed for the 
study and feeds into answering the given questions. Random sampling is not a suitable tool 
here because of the qualitative character of the study and the small sample size. However, 
some flexibility as to the respondents was necessary given their availability/non-availability. 
Suitable alternative respondents had to be found in case of non-availability to ensure a sufficient 
number of respondents. As is the case with elite interviews, information regarding the political 
system might be biased, which is why treating the provided information carefully and keeping 
in mind the interviewees’ background and professional position is crucial. 
These three stages of data collection, as presented in figure 4, correspond with the three 
empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter, chapter four, analyzes the political 
commitment of the EU. Chapter five assesses the role of policy networks in policy 
implementation and in the third empirical chapter, chapter six, the relationship between the 
EU and ASEAN is examined. These three aspects influence policy implementation and 
consequently normative policy coherence. 
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Figure 4: Stages of Data Collection 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s own creation 
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On the one hand, bureaucrats based at the EU institutions in Brussels and on the other hand, 
embassy staff from European embassies in Vietnam were interviewed. In relation to that, it 
needs to be said that access to the political elite can sometimes proof to be complicated. Once 
an appointment is scheduled, the conditions are suitable for a professional research interview 
because most staff members have their own offices. In such a setting, the researcher is however 
exposed to the hierarchical structures within a given institution as well as potential hierarchical 
imbalances between the researcher and the respondent. This might relate to either age, gender 
or profession and needs to be kept in mind when conducting interviews in general. 
Language is another issue, which can arise when applying interviews as a method for data 
collection. In this case, the two sites are Belgium, Brussels in particular as it hosts the European 
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language. However, interviews with the political elite from Vietnam might require an 
interpreter due to the lack of a common language. 
A third issue that needs to be mentioned in relation to elite interviews is the particular role that 
political representatives play. Each interview is based on the expectations that the two parties 
involved have towards each other. While the researcher hopes to find an honest response, the 
respondents might either try to give a response that they think is what the researcher wants to 
hear or give a response according to the official political discourse. The second point, in 
particular, is a concern when conducting elite interviews as the respondents might try to be 
politically correct rather than stating the facts. This is not to say that they will not tell the truth; 
instead, the meaning of their answers might be obscured and, therefore, more difficult to 
interpret. 
Finally, a distinction is made here between experts and elites even though these two concepts 
are not mutually exclusive. The distinction might become clearer by specifying the terms to 
technical experts and political elite. A worker in a garment factory might be an expert on the 
decision-making processes within this factory but does not belong to the political elite. This 
expert might be consulted by the elite as part of their policy evaluation or formulation but is 
not formally part of the elite. The political elite within a country is largely concerned with 
broader processes rather than in-depth knowledge of particular cases. When it comes to 
national delegations to a third country, the situation is slightly different. Even though within 
the delegation there is a certain hierarchy, the status as a representative of a country per se 
tends to bring economic and social superiority over the local population. This is also the case 
for local staff employed by the embassies. While this might be less the case when posted in 
other European countries, in Vietnam this distinction becomes quite visible. That is to say, a 
project manager, who is the expert on a given project, would not be considered as political elite 
within a national context, but as an employee of an embassy, this project manager enters the 
political elite by being employed by the foreign government. 
The interviews were conducted in a single round of data collection. Semi-structured 
questionnaires provided a guideline for the interviews. On the one hand, this semi-structured 
approach made the interviews comparable and led the interviewee towards the topics of 
interest. Carefully selected questions addressed the research questions directly and indirectly, 
however if relevant related topics come up, these will not be excluded from the interview. The 
main focus remains on the prepared set of open-ended questions, nevertheless restricting the 
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interview to those questions alone might leave an important detail unexplored. The interview 
questions are divided into three parts. The first set of questions covers background information 
on the respondent’s position, experience and budget. The second set addresses EU-ASEAN 
relations and the third set, the main part of the interview, covers the type of relationship with 
colleagues, meeting patterns and the relevancy of norms in day-to-day work. Audio recordings 
were used during the interviews given the respondent’s consent, which I transcribed for the 
analysis. In interviews, for which I have not received consent for recording, note taking had to 
be sufficient. 
During the analysis of the interviews, certain aspects of information distortion need to be kept 
in mind. First, past events are reconstructed in the memory and, therefore, an interviewee’s 
impression of an event will most likely not comprise the full picture. Second, a respondent 
might try to make him- or herself or his/her organization look better and present the reality in 
a euphemistic light. Third, the interviewee might not be aware of certain patterns or behavior 
and, therefore, his answer will not represent actual happenings. Fourth, this research addresses 
norms, which are widely accepted in Europe but often not in other cultures. Thus, the 
understanding and interpretation of these norms can differ from the European understanding, 
or it is seen as a sensitive topic. In both cases, the responses do not exactly reflect the initial 
aim of a question. 
The data collection phase was based on the aim of increasing content and internal validity of 
this study. Content validity comprises the level to which a measure represents all facets of a 
concept and internal validity relates to the consistency of a respondent’s answers across similar 
topics. Therefore, the interview questions were designed and structured following the causal 
assumptions outlined below. First, in the trade sector most general agreements are negotiated 
on the international level, while development agreements are held in bilateral structures. The 
more actors are involved and the more influential these actors are, the less power the EU has to 
negotiate the inclusion of norms. This assumption relates to the research question on normative 
power, i.e. whether the EU is a normative power in development and/or in trade, which will be 
the primary topic in chapter four and chapter six. Figure 5 visualizes the path from power to 
norm representation to normative policy coherence. 
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Figure 5: From Power to NPCD 
Source: author’s own creation 
 
A second path to normative policy coherence leads via communication. Communication 
between various stakeholders can create awareness of norms and, as a result, could potentially 
lead to the implementation of norms, which leads to normative policy coherence. However, 
due to sectorization between the development and trade arena communication is likely to be 
lacking. Normative spill over can only take place if existing channels allow for it, i.e. without 
communication between the various actors in the field, normative statements remain 
universally represented only on a documentation level. Figure 6 provides a visualization of this 
relation, which is primarily examined in chapter five by analyzing policy networks. 
 
Figure 6: From Communication to NPCD 
Source: author’s own creation 
 
Not only do the two sectors have two sets of norms but, even if they do, the understanding of 
the same norms varies among the policy arenas. While both sides emphasize their commitment 
to norms, the interpretation of norms is not the same, which leads to incoherence and diverging 
norm implementation. Hence, the need for communication and exchange between all relevant 
actors is even more emphasized. In reverse, the lack of communication hinders normative policy 
coherence for development. This assumption will be re-assessed in chapter five analyzing 
various policy communities and their impact on normative policy coherence for development. 
In line with this structure, the interview questions posed to each individual were phrased as 
uniformly as possible to increase comparability between the responses. The set of questions to 
the Vietnamese officials differs from the questions to the European officials as they have 
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found in appendix 2. 
In total, 32 interviews were conducted. In appendix 3, a classification of the respondents along 
profession and European/national representation can be found. Due to confidentiality, any other 
respondent information cannot be provided here.  All interviews were carefully transcribed 
by the author using the software Atlas.ti, except in those cases when respondents did not give 
their approval for audio recording. In those cases, notes taken during the interview were used for 
analysis. Transcripts exist for 26 out of 32 interviews and the remaining six interviews are 
notes-only. One audio file was deleted after transcription as requested by the respondent. 
The entire data set, therefore, comprises 31 policy documents, 26 interview transcripts and 6 
interview notes6. These interviews represent European institutions in the widest sense and one 
Vietnamese NGO. It was not possible to interview the Luxembourgish development 
representative, because the office was closed due to the decision to focus development efforts 
on Laos, direct neighbor to Vietnam. 
As mentioned above, access to the political elite can sometimes be complicated. This has also 
been the case with the Vietnamese government. Despite the researcher’s affiliation to the 
Institute for Social Development Studies in Hanoi during the time of fieldwork, it was not 
possible to get access to a representative from the Vietnamese government. Consequently, this 
study exclusively focuses on the European side of the story. As a result, all interviews were 
conducted in English or German without the need of a translator. 
2.1.3 Data Analysis and Coding Scheme 
Given the congruence method, co-occurance of norms is the variable for analysis. 
Behavioral changes of individual respondents are not the target of this research. Rather, the 
representation of norms in the selected policy documents and the responses from elite 
respondents are used as indicators to make statements about the implementation of norms. 
The focus is not on the change of behavior on the Vietnamese side, or to measure the EU’s 
normative impact on the Vietnamese government, but on the translation of norms from 
commitments on paper to individual practice on the EU’s side. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
6 A list of policy documents can be found in appendix 1. Transcripts are not published in this study due to 
confidentiality commitments. More information can be provided upon request to the author provided the 
respondents written consent. 
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Table 2: Levels of Policy Analysis 
 
Level Primary Documents for Analysis* Empirical Data 
Policy guideline TEU 
TFEU 
European Consensus for Development 
Interviews 
Policy formulation Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
Free Trade Agreement 
Interviews 
Policy implementation 
- programs 
Multi-Annual Indicative Programs Interviews 
Policy implementation 
- projects 
EU Blue Books 
Project Descriptions 
Interviews 
Source: author’s own creation 
*this is an exemplary list. The full list of policy documents can be found in appendix 1. 
 
NPCD can be identified by the presence of norms on all levels of implementation. The degree 
of coherence can vary from level to level. To structure the measurement of NPCD, four 
levels of analysis have been defined reflecting the stages to be traced in the process-tracing 
‘light’ approach (see table 2). These four levels are defined by the level of precision they 
represent in the relationship between the EU and third countries. While this classification per 
se can be applied to various relationships between the EU and its partner countries, the 
selection of country specific documents and interview partners reflects the choice of Vietnam 
as a partner country in this study. 
The first level corresponds to the highest institutional level within the EU represented by the 
Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. As 
indicated above, this stage of the policy process reflects a rather rhetorical commitment 
regarding normative policy coherence for development. The TFEU lays out technical processes 
of policy-making such as voting rules and decision-making procedures, which could be 
understood as implementing mechanisms, but as there is no reference about how to 
implement coherence or how to promote norms, this will be taken solely as a guideline. These 
guidelines apply to all EU policies. 
The second level represents the major agreements between the EU and Vietnam. This level, 
called policy formulation, is characterized by the position between the guideline and the 
implementation. In other words, the agreements are more precise that the guidelines on the 
one hand and tailored to the contracting parties on the other hand. Nevertheless, these agreements 
leave room for interpretation and, therefore, for the exact implementation. 
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Multiannual Indicative Programs (MIPs) represent the first policy implementation stage, i.e. 
policy implementation on a program level. The MIPs apply to an entire country and cover a 
time span of five years on average. 
The fourth level is the project level. This stage is the final implementation stage in this 
study, because projects are the smallest institutionally organized unit of implementation. 
Projects often tend to be technical in nature, which reflects the highest level of precision 
regarding the objectives to be achieved. In contrast to the multiannual indicative programs, 
projects have a local focus. 
 
Within each level, the EU norms need to be identified, that is to say that a norm either occurs 
or does not occur in a given document or interview. Therefore, the issue of how norms 
will be identified when they are not mentioned explicitly remains, which is why the 
various coding techniques were applied in the data analysis. Norms can be named either 
directly through the concrete mention of a norm or indirectly by describing a situation without 
using the terminology. A coding scheme supports the analysis. This scheme evolved a 
number of coding techniques that were applied during the first cycle of coding. All coding 
was done using the software Atlas.ti, which was also used for the interview transcription. 
The coding scheme was split by four cycle-one coding methods: grammatical methods, 
elemental methods, affective methods, and exploratory methods (Saldaña, 2009). Cycle-two 
coding methods were not applied, because their purpose is to develop broader thematic 
categories, which are mainly used for theory building, which in turn is not aimed at in this 
study. 
One type of the first-cycle methods are grammatical methods whose names derive from the 
coding technique. Grammatical methods are attribute coding, which relates to the participant’s 
information such as age, gender, or job experience, simultaneous coding, which allows for 
several codes attributed to one string of words, and magnitude coding, which reflects an attitude 
towards something (Saldaña, 2009).  For example, the statement “I came in summer 2014” 
represents a string that was coded under the attribute coding method and was given the code 
“work experience less than 2 years”, which means that at the time of the interview the 
respondent had worked in the position the respondent held at that point for less than two years. 
This information is background information about the respondent, which might be relevant 
when a respondent seems uncertain of their responses. A respondent who has achieved their 
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position only recently tends to have less insight than someone who has been working in that 
position for several years. Simultaneous coding implies that one string, either a full sentence 
or a set of words, can have more than one code attributed to it. One piece of information can 
be used for different categories and codes are not mutually exclusive. When asking the question 
“Are your relations formal or informal?” and the respondent answers “both”, “both” would be 
coded as “formal” and “informal”. Magnitude coding is used to detect a country’s relationship 
with the EU and, in particular, whether that country would appreciate more coordination or 
collaboration with the EU or less. “Doing things jointly would be an advantage” is 
consequently coded as the country wanting more cooperation. Structural coding, one of the 
elemental coding methods that are used as an initial approach to qualitative data analysis, was 
applied to detect phrases which relate to the topic of inquiry (Saldaña, 2009). This method is a 
method which helps to identify passages that relate to normative policy coherence in EU 
development and trade policies broadly. Most of the codes were used to provide the context in 
which the EU operates, but some information is also more directly related to the topic as the 
example about policy coherence in table 3 below shows. In the example, the respondent directly 
addresses policy coherence, which is the topic of research. 
Value coding, a coding method that falls within the affective methods that address personal 
experiences and subjectivity, aims to detect the respondent’s values, beliefs or attitudes 
(Saldaña, 2009). This type of coding is particularly relevant for this study as it aims at 
normative representations across policy commitment and policy implementation. Even though 
this coding addresses subjectivity, a distinction between a respondent’s personal values or 
professional values is not made, because it is assumed that personal values translate into 
professional values. 
Taking the example given in table 3, the respondent stated that gender equality and human 
rights are substantial for the respondent’s country. This is not their personal point of view, but 
the country’s position, which in the case of delegation staff might merge. What is important is 
not whether that is a personal or professional statement, but whether or not norms occur in 
different settings. If the respondent claims that gender equality is important, then this would 
have to reflect in other settings as well, such as in the monthly meetings or projects. The mere 
statement of a norm is, thus, not sufficient to claim that norms are actually relevant in 
development or trade. Indirect statements of norms need to be evaluated carefully. Promoting 
“the idea of an open society” was coded as “freedom”, because of the freedoms a society were 
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to enjoy in a non-discriminatory environment. As is the case with coding, and with qualitative 
analysis in particular, all interpretations are subjective to the researcher’s understanding of 
what was said and what it is supposed to mean. Consequently, inferences and conclusions need 
to be expressed with great care. 
The last type of coding methods are exploratory methods, among which is hypothesis coding. 
Hypothesis coding is applying codes that are derived from theories to the data set to test given 
hypotheses (Saldaña, 2009). The analysis can be done either qualitatively or quantitatively but 
was done in a qualitative manner for this study. Sub-questions were used for this research 
instead of hypotheses to leave room to the data to reflect reality. The sub-questions, however, 
were phrased to reflect on the proxy factors (political commitment, policy networks, and 
regional interests) and to address the relationship between these proxy factors and NPCD. Thus, 
the questions were derived from theory and were guiding themes during the coding phase. 
Regarding policy networks, for example, the question is how they influence normative 
coherence. One of the respondents gave an answer that gives some insight about the sectoral 
divisions and overlaps: “as less and less member state are involved in development, it is the 
commercial/economic attachés who take that place”. This string was coded as “knowledge 
overlap”. 
Table 3 gives a summary of the coding methods with examples from the interviews. 
For the policy documents, value coding has been used to determine the occurrence of norms in 
those documents. Search strings were simplified in order to provide more flexibility. For 
example, in order to identify whether the norm “democracy” occurred in a document, the search 
string did not cover the exact word. Instead, the abbreviated term “demo” was utilized to allow 
for variation between the words “democracy” and “democratic”, which both represent the 
norms “democracy”. Similarly, for “gender equality” both “gender” and “equality” were used 
as separate search strings. This allowed the recognition of “equality between men and women”, 
which would have been excluded by using solely the precise wording “gender equality”. Table 
4 provides an overview of all twelve norms, the search string and positive and negative 
example, i.e. example that show commitment to norms and examples that do not. 
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Table 3: Applied Coding Methods and Examples from Interviews 
 
Coding 
Method 
Example from Date Code 
Attribute 
Coding 
“I came in summer 2014” RESPONDENT_work 
experience less than 2 years 
Simultaneous 
Coding 
Question: “Is your relationship formal or 
informal?” 
Respondent: “It is both.” 
REL-DEV_formal & 
REL-DEV_informal 
Magnitude 
Coding 
“So, doing things jointly would be an 
advantage. We also try to look for the 
coming year, the EU is planning a number 
of activities, where we could bring [our] 
experts.” 
REL-EU_country wants 
more cooperation with EU 
Structural 
Coding 
“Which means that the policy coherence 
improves in one direction. Probably it 
would improve better in the other direction 
if the development counsellors went to the 
economic counsellors meeting.” 
NORMS_Policy coherence 
Value 
Coding 
“To try to promote [our country] also with 
the values that we stand for: gender equality 
is very important for [us], human rights; 
trying through different means to promote 
the idea of an open society.” 
NORMS_Gender equality 
 
NORMS_Human rights 
 
NORMS_Freedom 
Hypothesis 
Coding 
Research question: 
Why might existing policy networks limit 
normative coherence between development 
and trade policies? 
 
Example: 
“What we see is that on the development 
counsellors meeting, as less and less 
member states are involved in 
development, it is the commercial attachés 
or economic attachés who take that place.” 
REL-DEV_knowledge 
overlap 
Source: author’s compilation based on Saldaña’s (2009) typology 
Creating the codes and revisiting the data set to ensure the rigorous application of those codes 
is already subject to the researcher’s precision and interpretation. All responses and search 
strings were evaluated based on the context. The sole appearance of a term did not suffice to 
be taken into account as a normative reference. Taking one example from table 4 “free from 
discrimination” could be a reference to trade rules, but in this case taken from the EU-Vietnam 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, it is under the labor, employment and social affairs 
heading making reference to non-discrimination at the work place based on nationality.  Thus, 
for each normative reference in both the interviews and policy documents, the context in which 
the reference was made was taken into account. 
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Table 4: Norm Search Strings and Examples from Policy Documents 
Norms Search strings Positive Example Negative Example 
Democracy “Democracy” 
“Demo” 
“Plural” 
Democratic values Demonstrate 
Freedom “Freedom” 
“Free” 
Religious freedom Free trade area 
Gender 
equality 
“Gender” 
“Equality” 
“Equal” 
Equality between men 
and women 
Equal access to markets 
Good 
governance 
“Good governance” 
“Governance” 
“Govern” 
Good governance Food security 
governance 
Human rights “Human rights” 
“Human” 
Human rights Human development 
Justice “Justice” 
“Just” 
Establishing cooperation 
in the area of justice 
International justice 
Liberty “Liberty” Liberty Liberal market economy 
Non-
discrimination 
“Discrimination” 
“Discrim” 
Free from any 
discrimination 
Non-discriminatory 
commercial rules 
Peace “Peace” Peace Peace mission 
Rule of law “Rule of law” Rule of law - 
Solidarity “Solid” Solidarity Consolidate 
Sustainability “Sustain” Sustainable 
development 
Sustained growth 
Source: author’s own creation 
Drawing conclusions from the codes and making generalizable deductions adds another layer 
of difficulty, which is why the coding results needs to be evaluated cautiously. Normative 
policy coherence for development is qualitatively analyzed via the proxy factors indicated 
above. Taking the example mentioned above, involving economic attachés in development 
counsellor meetings would indicate that existing structural divisions between the development 
network and the trade network are starting to diffuse, which in turn makes knowledge transfer 
more fluid. The potential of normative spill-over from one network into the other is higher given 
the closer contact, but the direction of the spill-over remains unclear. 
2.1.4 Country Selection 
In many comparative studies, this section would be called “case selection” as one country 
would represent one case; here, however, the cases of analysis are two EU policy sectors 
and not the recipient country per se. In order to evaluate the two cases, Vietnam has been 
defined as the addressee of these policies. Vietnam has been chosen as the example for this 
comparative study of EU policies, because it has recently moved up from the World Bank 
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classification as a low-income country to a state with the status of a lower middle-income 
country. With this new status, which was achieved in 2009 with a GNI per capita of USD 
1.120, Vietnam is now regarded as a country wealthy enough to support its own system and, 
thus, not dependent on development aid anymore7. Subsequently, the EU – among other 
donors – is currently in the process of pulling out aid and shifting the focus of its relationship 
with Vietnam on trade. While I will go into more detail about trade relations in chapter four, 
it needs to be pointed out here that the process of transition from development aid to trade is 
the crucial aspect of this study, which resulted from Vietnam’s economic growth. Thus, the 
attribute of being a lower middle-income country was a crucial aspect for the selection of an 
example case. The transition of relations implies that it is a process of change in which some 
donors phase out development assistance and turn towards other policy tools to be used in 
bilateral relations. Hence, development aid is not stopped instantly with the status of a middle-
income country. Vietnam, for example, still receives development assistance from the EU and 
its member states, but several member states have already terminated their programs or scaled 
down the financial support (EU Delegation to Vietnam, 2015). 
Out of the 51 lower middle-income countries and territories, six countries (Armenia, Egypt, 
Georgia, Moldova, Morocco and Ukraine) are eliminated from the selection as they fall under 
the European Neighborhood Policy and, therefore, benefit from a different development 
scheme. Second, Djibouti and Kosovo drop out of the selection process, because they are 
not backed up by recent World Bank data. The remaining 49 lower middle-income countries 
and their respective year of being classified as such are presented in table 5. 
Third, all countries that became middle-income countries before 2000 are eliminated, because 
in 2000 the approach to development cooperation changed with the introduction of the 
Millennium Development Goals. To be more precise, my focus is on the current state of 
normative policy coherence and, therefore, the country of analysis should have moved to 
middle-income status rather recently. Especially the time after in introduction of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009 leading to the creation of the European External Action Service is of particular 
importance. On the other hand, if the transformation to a lower middle-income country has 
taken place too recently, the time span under analysis would be too short to identify any 
                                                          
 
7 World Bank (2013). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries/VN-4E-
XN?display=graph; Note: World Bank classification: “middle-income economies are those with a GNI per 
capita of more than $1,045 but less than $12,746”, see: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-
groups 
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transition in political relations. 
Table 5: Lower Middle-income Countries (GNI per capita between USD 1.046 and 4.125) 
 
Before 2000 Cabo Verde, El Salvador, Egypt, Guatemala, Kiribati, Micronesia, 
Morocco, 
Philippines, Samoa, Swaziland, Vanuatu, West Bank and Gaza Since 2001 Syria 
Since 2002 Honduras 
Since 2004 Armenia,  Bhutan, Georgia, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Ukraine 
Since 2005 Guyana 
Since 2006 Bolivia, Congo, Timor-Leste 
Since 2007 Moldova 
Since 2008 Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, India, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria, 
Papua 
New Guinea, Sudan, Yemen Since 2009 Sao Tomé and Principe, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zambia 
Since 2010 Pakistan 
Since 2011 Lao, Solomon Islands 
Since 2012 Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic 
Since 2013 Senegal 
Since 2014 Bangladesh, Myanmar, Tajikistan 
Source: World Bank (2016). http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#Lower_middle_income 
 
Coinciding with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent change in the 
EU’s foreign relations, Sao Tomé and Principe, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Zambia attained the 
status of lower middle-income country. Out of these four states, Vietnam has been chosen for 
the study of normative policy coherence in the transition from EU development cooperation to 
trade relations, because of its location in a remarkably dynamic and fast-growing region. After 
the EU has failed in negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), it has to develop a new strategy for its trade relations in which 
Vietnam is playing a vital role. 
To sum up, the classification as lower-middle income country in 2009 and resulting from this 
ongoing development cooperation with and increased transition to trade relations, and its 
placement in a politically and economically interesting region for the EU make Vietnam a 
suitable exemplary case for the study of EU normative policy coherence for development. 
2.1.5 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical questions are inevitable in qualitative research. The interaction with interview 
partners poses several concerns, particularly the hierarchical asymmetry between the 
researcher and the respondents. In the case of elite interviews, which represent a major share 
of data for this research, the asymmetry can vary from case to case. On the one hand, 
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respondents have their professional rank, such as the position as an ambassador for example. 
On the other hand, the researcher poses questions, which the respondents might not be able to 
answer according to their own expectations. This kind of setting requires careful attention from 
the researcher in order to manage the hierarchical balance. 
Each respondent received the question form and consent form before the interview. Whereas 
this proceeding can have effects on the responses and thus bias the data, for ethical reasons I 
chose do inform the respondents beforehand in case they have any doubts about 
confidentiality. The respondents were asked to sign the consent form before the interview to 
be aware of their role in the study and the possibility to withdraw from the study at any given 
point. 
According to Vietnamese standards, some questions about norms would have been 
considered sensitive and would not have been asked during a meeting with a Vietnamese 
government official. Since it was not possible to meet any Vietnamese government officials, 
this did not turn out to be a problem. Apart from one Vietnamese NGO representative, all 
respondents were employees of Western organizations and, therefore, I did not see any 
potential threat in asking norm related questions, because in most Western societies freedom 
of thought and freedom of expression are not a sensitive issue. Some of the questions might 
nevertheless be perceived as sensitive, if they make the respondent feel incapable of answering 
according to their own expectations or according to what they believe the researchers’ 
expectations are. To avoid any unwanted tension between the researcher and the respondents, 
the respondents always had the opportunity to decline answering a question. 
 
Conducting the fieldwork interviews, both in Vietnam and in Brussels, has been approved by 
the Ethics Review Panel based at the University of Luxembourg. 
The publication of the results of the study are not expected to have any impact on the 
individual respondents due to anonymization and data aggregation. Anonymization has been 
applied through interview numbering according to the chronological order of interview 
conduction. 
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2.2 VIETNAM AS THE EMPIRICAL CASE FOR EU POLICY 
ANALYSIS 
The focus of the study remains on the policy analysis of EU policies, but Vietnam has been 
chosen as the addressee country of EU policies, due to the transition phase it is in, which leads 
to changing donor behavior. Concretely, the EU and EU member states are phasing out 
development aid and replacing the donor-recipient relation with a more mutual political and 
trade relationship. This section briefly describes the recent changes in ODA and trade flows 
between the EU and Vietnam to give an idea about this transition, which is the context for the 
NPCD study. 
The relationship between the EU and Vietnam started out with humanitarian aid, then moved 
on to development cooperation under the Framework Cooperation Agreement (FCA) in 1996 
and has now reached a stage where trade relations are increasingly important. Especially in 
middle-income countries, where development aid is usually being phased out because the 
country is perceived as having enough own resources (Embassy of Luxembourg in Bangkok, 
2017), other (donor-) policies are required to maintain the effort towards achieving freedom 
or abolishing unfreedom. Put differently, how can development as freedom be ensured if 
the primary channel for its implementation is terminated? 
In the case of middle-income countries, it is generally assumed that those countries have 
reached a level of income with which they can maintain themselves and, therefore, continued 
development aid is no longer required. The initial donor-recipient relationship subsequently 
undergoes a transformation to a more mutual trade and diplomatic relationship between the 
two partners in which the risk of prioritizing economic benefits over sustainability is high. 
In this scenario, previous results achieved through development cooperation are likely to be 
undermined by commercial interests and, hence, progress towards a sustainable future will be 
slowed down. To minimize this risk, other donor policies – particularly trade policies – 
should be aligned with development policies and strive towards achieving the SGDs even after 
development aid is phased out. This is not to say that trade generally has a negative effect on 
development. On the contrary, it can be supportive as it might generate economic growth 
in the developing country if combined with appropriate aid measures (Morrissey, 2006). One 
possibility would be the financial support for measures to create a more dynamic and diverse 
economy that enables the developing country to participate in the global market even after aid 
programs have ended. 
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As one of the major donor groups, the European Union institutions and the EU member states 
have started to address this challenge of coherence (European Commission, 2011, 2015b; 
European Union, 2017), which is particularly relevant in countries where the transition from 
development cooperation to trade takes place. The large ODA capacity brings advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of policy coherence. On the one hand, because of the EU’s large ODA 
and trade capacities, implementing normative policy coherence across development and 
trade policies could have positive effects on aid effectiveness by reducing negative impacts 
on development efforts. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the multitude of actors in the 
EU’s policy implementation makes coherence harder to achieve. 
Figure 7 indicates that ODA disbursements to Vietnam, which is a middle-income country 
since 20098, are slowly decreasing. France, Sweden and the UK have reached their 
highest disbursement level in 2009 with approximately EUR 208 million, EUR 17 million 
and EUR 55 million respectively, the EU and Finland in 2010 with EUR 81 million and 
EUR 39 million respectively. France has traditionally been the biggest ODA donor towards 
Vietnam out of the EU member states. This has historical roots given that Vietnam has been 
a French colony from the mid-1880s until the mid-1950s. Japan occupied Vietnam during 
World War II, but France regained its former territory after the end of the war. Thus, for 
roughly sixty years, France controlled Indochina, among which was Vietnam. Despite the 
persisting large share of ODA that France provides to Vietnam, there has been a gradual 
decrease from over EUR 200 million in 2009 to roughly EUR 140 million in 2015. 
The decline of ODA is merely one of the indicators for the shifting relationship between the 
European donors and Vietnam as a recipient of aid towards a more reciprocal relationship. 
Another indicator are the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the Free Trade 
Agreement that were negotiated between the two parties. All Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) member states apart from Brunei and Singapore are classified as middle-
income countries9 according to the World Bank categories, but not all of them are 
                                                          
 
8 The World Bank groups middle income countries into lower middle-income and upper-middle income 
countries. Vietnam has reached a GNI per capita of $1,120 in 2009, passing the GNI threshold of $1,045 to 
become a lower middle-income country. Source: World Bank data. 
9 Lower middle income: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Vietnam (Source: World Bank Data 
https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/lower-middle-income (last accessed on 07 February 2018)); Upper 
middle income: Malaysia, Thailand (Source: World Bank Data https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-
middle- income (last accessed on 07 February 2018)); High income: Brunei, Singapore (Source: World Bank 
Data https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/high-income (last accessed on 07 February 2018)) 
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experiencing a shift in their relationship with the EU towards reciprocity. In Laos, for 
example, the development efforts are being strengthened, i.e. the donor-recipient relationship 
maintained or even emphasized. The EU has pledged EUR 162 million for the period 2016-2020 
(Ambassadors to Laos, 2016, p.74), whereas from 1993 to 1999 the EU disbursed EUR 57 
million and from 2000 to 2006 EUR 43 million (European Community, 2007, p.32). 
Chapter six will give a more detailed overview of the EU-ASEAN relations, but the precise 
reasons for this particular divergence between Laos and Vietnam remain unclear. 
Figure 7: ODA Disbursements to Vietnam 
Source: author’s compilation based on EU Blue Books 2010-2015 
A final aspect are the trade volumes with Vietnam, which have steadily increased, as can be 
seen in figure 8. EU statistics show a fast increase in imports of goods from Vietnam to the 
EU internal market from EUR 5.58 million in 2009 to EUR 39.98 million in 2015 (DG 
TRADE, 2017). The value of exports in goods has grown at a slower pace from EUR 1.89 
million in 2009 to EUR 8.45 million in 2015 (DG TRADE, 2017). In other words, within 
seven years, the trade volume has changed to the extent that in 2015 the total trade was six 
times the trade volume of 2009. 
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Figure 8: EU-VN Trade in Goods 
Source: DG TRADE, 2017 
However, not only ODA and trade volumes indicate the strengthening of the trade 
relationship and decline of the donor-recipient relationship. Additionally, from a political 
perspective, i.e. a perspective that relates to security concerns and regional integration, the 
EU has put its focus on emphasizing economic tries and improving its economic 
relationships with several third countries. “Only through intensified ties and coordination 
with partners in Asia, the EU will be able to address major global issues such as security, trade, 
energy, nuclear safety, non-proliferation, cyber security, migration, marine pollution and 
climate change” (European Union, 2014b, p.1). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and Vietnam, in particular, are a main target area for the EU as, for example, 
represented in the EU’s Global Strategy (European Union, 2016a). 
As this transition from development cooperation to stronger trade relations takes place, the 
question of normative policy coherence for development becomes more important, because 
without policy coherence “development as freedom” is inclined to be addressed only partially, 
which would limit the approach’s full potential and, therefore, limit development efforts. 
Aspiring policy coherence for development as a goal in itself might distort attention from 
the actual goal of development as freedom. Focusing on the technicalities of achieving policy 
coherence, understanding PCD as an end in itself, can hardly lead to development as freedom 
when development as freedom is not the goal. Instead, policy coherence can be used as one 
of the tools to support the development as freedom approach and be understood as a process 
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that will lead to a goal which is shared by all policies involved (Carbone, 2008). The 
following chapter will provide a deeper explanation of policy coherence, normative policy 
coherence for development, EU norms, the role of normative power and the distinction 
between NPCD as a means or end in itself. 
  
77 
 
Chapter 3: Conceptualizing and 
Theorizing Normative Policy 
Coherence for Development (NPCD) 
This chapter gives an overview over conceptual and theoretical discussions related to policy 
coherence for development, norms and normative power to highlight this dissertation’s 
contribution to the PCD literature. Normative policy coherence for development is an 
understudied concept despite its increasing relevance in international development 
cooperation, which is presented in the first section. The second section provides a definition of 
EU norms and their distinctiveness from other international organizations’ norms, which forms 
the first component of NPCD. This is followed by a critical overview of terminology and 
conceptualizations of the second component of NPCD, namely policy coherence for 
development. Norms and PCD are the two conceptual components of NPCD. In terms of 
implementing NPCD, the fourth section relates NPCD and normative power Europe (NPE). 
NPE is one part of NPCD in terms of implementation highlighting the EU’s rhetorical self-
representation as a normative actor. This, however, needs to be complemented by normative 
actions to achieve normative policy coherence for development. 
3.1 RELEVANCE OF NPCD 
Normative coherence, coherence between policy-making in the development arena, non- 
development arenas and democratic norms, is recognized as a driver for transformative 
development (Koff, 2017b; Koff & Maganda, 2016). Legally speaking, the EU is bound to 
promote the norms of its own creation “in the wider world” (Art. 21 TEU). Thus, with the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU has reaffirmed its commitment to its founding 
values, i.e. democracy, freedom, gender equality, human rights, justice, non-discrimination, 
rule of law and solidarity (Art. 2 TEU), and actually created a legal obligation to advance 
those norms abroad (Art. 21 TEU). Additionally, political commitment to norms, particularly 
related to development policies, was reinforced by the EU through the European Consensus on 
Development (European Union, 2006) and the subsequent New Consensus on Development 
with which the EU showed its support for the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development 
(European Union, 2017). The post-2015 development agenda is considered to be an agenda 
of transformative development which calls for a normative approach to policy coherence for 
78 
 
development (Siitonen, 2016). 
How does this translate into policy practices? What happens when development cooperation is 
phased out? Do external policies still have to be coherent with the global development agenda? 
Through the normative lens of PCD, external policies would still have to be coherent after the 
phase-out of development policies in their support of developing countries. In lower-middle 
income countries development aid efforts are shifted to stronger trade ties (Carbone & Orbie, 
2014), which might imply that development norms are being lost. Due to the international 
paradigm shift towards normative development and the transformative development agenda, 
development efforts are not solely understood as technical development anymore but as 
individuals’ capacitation to make free choices (Fukuda-Parr, 2014; Sen, 1999; Uvin, 2007). 
With this broad understanding of normative development, other policy arenas are called upon 
to contribute to development. Therefore, also non-development policies need to be coherent 
with this normative approach if donor countries are sincerely committed to long-term 
development. 
The EU plays a crucial role in this discussion for several reasons. First, as already mentioned 
above, the EU has based its external actions on the values of its own creation (Art. 21 TEU). 
Consequently, all external policies, not solely development policies, are guided by those values 
according to the Lisbon Treaty. This can be described as the legal dimension of normative 
policy coherence for development. Second, an important shift in development cooperation has 
taken place at the global level. International cooperation guided by the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has shaped international relations since 2016. 
Contrary to the preceding Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the SDGs encourage 
responsibility of all to achieve sustainable development worldwide. Third, the EU acts and 
portrays itself as a norm-driven actor. In relation to the SDGs, for example, the EU has strongly 
shaped these goals and “will lead by example by implementing its commitments on sustainable 
development and climate action” (European Union, 2016, p.40). Because of these three 
reasons, the EU’s legal commitments, the sustainability agenda at the global level, and the 
EU’s self-portrayal as a moral actor, the EU is an important actor for implementing normative 
development. Normative policy coherence for development is more than just an initiative that 
demands attention while aid programs are in place. NPCD goes beyond the limits of 
development and should be understood as an underlying attitude/characteristic/position that 
affects the EU’s relationships with all countries. 
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However, who can and who should benefit from NPCD, the partner country or the EU? Some 
negative effects of policy coherence, as other forms of coordination, can be prolonged policy-
making processes, higher expenditures and complicated coordination mechanisms. Despite 
those bureaucratic complications, NPCD could nevertheless benefit the EU at a political level, 
because it can shape a more consistent picture of the EU vis-à-vis third countries. Since the EU 
is not a strong military power, but relies most on its economic resources, i.e. it’s civilian power 
(Bull, 1982; Duchêne, 1972), adding a stronger normative layer could strengthen its position 
in the international arena through greater legitimacy (Langan, 2012; Manners, 2002). For the 
partner country, NPCD could also have positive and negative impacts. On the one hand, partner 
countries that already have a democratic system might be able to create stronger links to the 
EU, which could result in closer relations both bilaterally but also in international negotiations. 
On the other hand, the EU would have to suspend its relations to countries that do not meet its 
normative standards. This has been the case with Myanmar, for example, with which the EU 
suspended most of its relations between 2010 and 2013 due to Myanmar’s human rights 
abuses10. 
In this research, normative policy coherence for development is defined as the implementation 
of European values within and across the EU’s external policies. Drawing from Manner’s 
(2002) categorization, normative policy coherence for development can be defined as internal 
and horizontal coherence regarding the implementation of values. Values, which are broad 
statements of ideas with low political commitment, can be turned into norms by implementing 
those values into practice. Consequently, the concept of normative policy coherence for 
development addresses the translation of values into norms, i.e. the translation of ideas into 
practice. In the EU’s case, normative policy coherence for development means the 
implementation of democracy, liberty, peace, good governance, sustainability, justice, non-
discrimination, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, and 
solidarity in its external policies. According to Art. 21 TEU on general provisions on the EU’s 
external actions, “the Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
                                                          
 
10 Restrictive measures were introduced in April 2010 by Council Decision 2010/232/CFSP and lifted (with the 
exception of military equipment) in April 2013 by Council Decision 2013/184/CFSP 
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and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law”. 
Before entering a more detailed discussion on normative policy coherence for development, 
the two main concepts comprised in the notion of normative policy coherence for development 
will be examined: norms on the one hand, and policy coherence for development on the other. 
3.2 NORMS 
This sub-section presents norms as one of the two components of NPCD. First, a semantic 
distinction between norms, principles and values is made to highlight this dissertation’s focus 
on implementation related to norms. Second, this is followed by a specification of the EU’s 
norms, which are under study here. Third, in order to place the EU’s norms into an international 
norm perspective, norms from other international organizations (WTO, UN, OECD) are 
presented. 
3.2.1 Defining the Difference between Norms, Principles and Values 
A set of characteristics (see Kelsen, 1990) will guide the identification of a norm. First, a norm 
indicates that something should be done or provides an understanding of how something should 
be done (Kelsen, 1990, p.2). Someone ‘should’ act according to a norm when a norm is set and 
instructs a certain behavior. Subsequently, a norm refers the duty to act accordingly (Kelsen, 
1990, p.108). In other words, the difference between a norm and any other kind of rule is its 
“oughtness” which attaches the dimension of proper behavior to a norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998, p.981). In the following, I present several features of what constitutes a norm and how 
these relate to the EU. 
In the EU’s case, the Lisbon Treaty provides norms, which refer to institutional behavior (see 
Art 2 and 21 TEU). The EU’s legal basis comprises a set of norms that stimulates the EU’s 
behavior as an institution and, consequently, all EU actions are expected to follow those norms. 
In addition, for this dissertation I assume that EU officials also follow this normative 
commitment due to their representative function. In the Treaty, EU officials are not directly 
addressed by those norms, but as they are embedded in the bureaucratic system of the EU, they 
are likely to act accordingly. Interviews have been conducted on an individual basis, but the 
aggregation of the responses reflects the institutional behavior, which is the level of analysis 
for this dissertation. Thus, the focus is on institutional norms. 
A second feature is a norm’s restriction of another norm. A trade-off between utilitarian norms, 
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aimed at maximizing utilities, and maxim norms, which are prescriptive moral norms (see 
Manners, 2013), can occur in cases where democratic principles, for example, increase 
financial and procedural burdens. Concerning NPCD, this feature plays an important role as it 
is likely that norms, which are promoted through EU development cooperation, may restrict 
desired trade deals between the EU and third countries and vice versa. 
Third, norms can arise either as a new stimulus for behavior or out of existing habits of behavior 
in society (Kelsen, 1990). In the case of the EU’s external policies, norms have been introduced 
formally in the form of guiding values enshrined in the EU Treaties that are to be implemented. 
In terms of institutional norms, they give a new stimulus for all subsequent agreements, 
programs and projects. This kind of actively set norm is called positive norm (Kelsen, 1990). 
Fourth, normal behavior does not equal normative behavior. “[S]omething is normal, because 
it is not objected or changed by anyone and subsequently can be defined as something that 
‘should’ happen” (Kelsen, 1990, p.3). Contrary to this, in this study, normal behavior is not 
automatically considered as something that ‘should’ happen, i.e. as normative behavior. A 
certain behavior that does not represent a specific set of prescribed norms cannot be defined as 
something that ‘should’ happen, because this behavior would disregard values and norms that 
were explicitly set as rules of behavior. For example, corruption might be a normal, but illegal, 
action in country A in which the EU conducts business. Participating in this kind of behavior 
would be normal according to local standards but would not reflect the EU’s value of rule of 
law and, thus, would not be normative behavior. However, normal behavior can be normative 
behavior and authors argue that the EU is a normative power because it can “define what passes 
as normal in world politics” (Manners, 2002, p.236). Furthermore, a norm does not always 
have to be desired. In order to achieve a certain objective, the right thing to do might not be 
suitable for achieving that objective. In trade agreements, for example, human rights notions 
might not be desirable as they complicate economic relationships due to the involvement of 
sensitive topics, and simultaneously increase the costs of production if human rights are 
effectively implemented. 
Last, implementation plays a crucial role. A crucial aspect of the effectiveness of a norm is the 
distinction between the mere existence of a norm and the actual implementation. On the one 
hand, legal norms, or laws, are implemented through punishment in case of norm adverse 
behavior. On the other hand, the implementation of moral norms, becomes visible through 
approval or disapproval of a certain behavior (Kelsen, 1990, p.3). In the political arena, 
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however, the morality of norms is sometimes undermined by the strategic use of norms for 
non-normative purposes (Pedersen, 2002), or the non-implementation of norms despite 
political commitments. How the EU can implement its norms is the topic of the next sub-
section. 
3.2.2 EU Core Norms and the EU’s Institutional Potential to Implement Them 
Following the outline of norms in general, specificities of EU norms in contrast to other 
Western norms will be addressed below. I want to highlight again that Western or EU norms 
are not considered to be the universal truth, but for this study EU norms are the focus. 
Often no distinction is being made between European norms and Western norms (see Leben, 
1999). However, I argue that norms promoted by the EU can be distinguished from norms 
promoted by other Western actors such as the US, but also from international organizations 
such as the UN or the OECD. Even though Leben (1999) equates European and Western 
norms, he concludes that the EU’s approach to the role of norms is certainly distinct from 
other Western countries. On the one hand, it takes over the position of a pioneer in the 
legalization and implementation of human rights and, on the other hand, the majority of 
European countries assumes a positive position towards the strengthening of human rights. 
Both features are uniquely represented in Europe (Leben, 1999). 
The origins of universal human rights lie in European nation states, from which they spread to 
the wider Western world. “It is not difficult to show […] how the invention of human rights, 
which was to lead to the publication of the Universal Declaration, is linked to the political, 
religious, and philosophical history of Europe […]” (Leben, 1999, p.73). The more general 
term of Western norms, however limited to human rights, can thus essentially be based on 
European norms. Since the peace of Westphalia, Europe was governed by the principles of 
sovereignty, non-interference, self-determination and balance of power. While these principles 
spread across the globe over the past centuries, Europe developed norms that go far beyond 
those initial principles determining peaceful co-existence of nation states. Democracy, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are among the most prominent 
norms that the EU currently embodies. Already in 1969, the European Court of Justice decided 
that fundamental human rights are included in the legal basis of the European Community 
(Lenaerts & de Smijter, 2001). 
Manners (2002) distinguishes between ‘core’ norms and ‘minor’ norms; the former 
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representing peace, liberty, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
democracy, and the latter social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and 
good governance. Peace and liberty came into play after the Second World War to prevent 
another war outbreak in Europe. In the preamble of the Treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community in 1951 the commitment to peace has been highlighted and transferred 
to the Treaty of the European Community in 1957. As a countermeasure to the Communist 
Bloc, democracy, the rule of law and human rights were promoted as a symbol of Western 
values. These values are still among the priorities of the European Union. The most recent 
Treaties on the European Union and the Functioning of the European Union implemented in 
2009, the so-called Lisbon Treaties, entail the before mentioned values as well as freedom (TEU 
Art. 2), which can be called ‘core’ norms. To keep up the distinction between ‘core’ and 
‘minor’ norms, the Lisbon Treaties also list solidarity and non-discrimination as minor norms 
(TEU Art. 2). These are the principles that each member state has incorporated, however the 
EU as such is not founded on those values. Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002), however, argue that 
European norms are inclusion, participation, transparency, tolerance and governance. 
In current international relations the EU largely uses a form of conditionality in order to 
promote human rights in contrast to many other actors in the global arena (Manners, 2002). 
Despite criticism that conditionality is used solely strategically, conditionality reflects the EU’s 
commitment to its founding values. This is not to say that the EU solely promotes its norms 
without having other interests. Even though other interests might be at stake, adding this 
normative layer goes beyond traditional interest-based negotiations. Several norms, principles 
and values have been suggested by the EU. In order to focus on the most important ones, the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU) as the legal basis of the EU, and the European Consensus 
on Development (ECD) and the Agenda for Change as development-specific legislation have 
been selected to identify the EU’s central norms. 
As shown in table 6, eight norms out of Manner’s core and minor norms are recurrent 
throughout the selected documents: freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights, peace, 
gender equality, solidarity and good governance. Sustainable development is a critical case, 
because this concept has only recently been adopted as a guideline for all policies. Thus, the 
TEU and the ECD refer to environmental sustainability rather than sustainable development. 
Applying those norms to Manner’s system, freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights and 
peace fall into the core norms category, while solidarity and good governance are minor norms. 
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Even though gender equality was not classified by Manners as one of the EU norms, it is 
included in the EU’s list of norms for this dissertation, because it occurs in all three texts and 
because gender equality has become a norm in international development (Elgström, 2000), 
which is a primary topic in this dissertation. Justice, which occurs in the Lisbon Treaty and the 
Consensus on Development, is also included in the list of norms, because those two texts are 
the guiding documents for EU development policy and the inclusion of justice in those two 
documents highlights its importance. In contrast, liberty, one of Manner’s core norms, and the 
minor norm anti-discrimination do not appear in the Agenda for Change. Nevertheless, they 
will remain part of the list of norms, which is used throughout this dissertation, because the 
Lisbon Treaty and the European Consensus as the major policy documents for EU development 
policies mention the two norms. 
To summarize, for the scope of this research, the focus lies on twelve norms: democracy, 
freedom, gender equality, good governance, human rights, justice, liberty, non-discrimination, 
peace, the rule of law, solidarity and sustainability. 
 
Table 6: Classification of Norms in the European Union Divided into Core, Minor and 
Additional Norms 
 
Manners (2002) TEU (2009) Consensus on 
Development (2006) 
Agenda for Change 
(2011) 
Democracy 
Freedom 
Human Rights 
Liberty 
Peace 
Rule of Law 
Democracy 
Freedom 
Human Rights 
Liberty 
Peace 
Rule of Law 
Democracy 
Freedom 
Human Rights 
Liberty 
Peace 
Rule of Law 
Democracy 
Freedom 
Human rights 
- 
Peace 
Rule of law 
Anti-discrimination 
Good governance  
Solidarity 
Sust. Development 
Non-discrimination 
Good governance 
Solidarity 
Environ. sust. 
Combat discrimination 
Good governance 
Solidarity 
Environ. Sust. 
- 
Good governance  
Solidarity 
Sust. Development 
 Gender Equality 
Justice 
Gender Equality 
Justice 
Gender Equality 
- 
Source: author’s compilation 
Norms take on an integral position in the analysis of normative policy coherence for 
development. However, as demonstrated earlier, development is not a universally agreed upon 
concept, and neither are EU norms. Therefore, while both concepts are contested, it is relevant 
to show the relationship between both concepts in order to determine to what extent norms 
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(democracy, freedom, gender equality, good governance, human rights, justice, liberty, non-
discrimination, peace, rule of law, solidarity, and sustainability) represent the content of 
development. The goals of development, as understood by the European Union, are manifold 
(for example poverty eradication, improving health, strengthening the economy, providing 
education, etc.). However, all of these goals are embedded in the neo-liberal understanding of 
perpetual economic growth and competition between markets, which indicates that 
development is subordinated to economic interests (Siles-Brügge, 2014). On a legal basis, 
however, a link between norms and all EU external relations exists. The EU Treaty claims 
freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights, and equality to be among the founding norms 
of the European Union (TEU Art.2). Furthermore, it provides for the EU’s external actions to 
be guided by its founding norms (TEU Art.21), including also its development policies. 
Whether the EU indeed implements its norms in external policies is assessed in this 
dissertation. 
In order to ensure norm implementation, the EU has put enforcement mechanisms in place. It 
has sanctioning mechanisms to ensure third countries’ implementation of norms, for example, 
through the suspension of trade in case of non-compliance (Hoang & Sicurelli, 2017). 
Sanctioning can also occur before concluding agreements by halting the negotiations in case 
of severe human rights violations (Camroux, 2010). Discontinuing negotiations or suspending 
trade relations does come at an economic cost both for the sanctioned party as well as for the 
EU. In these cases, the EU needs to decide whether to prioritize norms or economic interests. 
The EU-ASEAN agreement has been influenced by normative disagreements which finally led 
to the end of the inter-regional negotiations (Camroux, 2010), which will be further discussed 
in chapter six. 
It is important to recognize that the EU is limited in the extent to which it can implement its 
norms, particularly in non-democratic countries such as Vietnam. Implementation requires 
acceptance by the partner country, which always has to consent to the bilateral programs. Thus, 
programs that do not reflect the partner country’s normative position are likely to be rejected. 
According to its constitution, Vietnam is a socialist republic governed by the Communist Party 
of Vietnam, i.e. a socialist one-party state, “acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho 
Chi Minh’s thought” (Art.4) (Government of Vietnam, 2001). This underlying rationale of state 
governance does not correspond to the Western ideas of pluralism and democracy. 
Consequently, some political norms, particularly related to democracy, do not receive the same 
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recognition as in Europe. As a result of this divergence, the EU tends to face stronger challenges 
to its proposals when they include democratic notions. Despite Vietnam’s significant transition 
in terms of economic and political openness, it remains a socialist country governed by the 
Communist Party of Vietnam, which creates a barrier to EU norm promotion as Vietnam is by 
default not a like-minded state in certain areas such as democracy. As Hoang (2016) 
demonstrates, Vietnam is more open to adopt economic and social norms promoted by the EU, 
i.e. norms such as free trade, market economy, poverty reduction, and gender equality, and 
adapt those to the Vietnamese context rather than political norms such as democracy and 
human rights. However, it cannot be said that Vietnam is generally not in favor of political 
norms as promoted by the EU. For example, it tries to reduce corruption and appreciates the 
support in anti-corruption measures, which arguably attracts high sums of EU funding (Hoang, 
2014). Thus, Vietnam tends to be reluctant in implementing political norms in general, 
however, with some exceptions such as fighting corruption. 
Conversely, norms related to sustainability or gender equality, so-called social norms, are less 
likely to be challenged as Vietnam does not have a strongly opposing position towards these 
norms. Equality, including gender equality, is already enshrined in some Vietnamese 
legislation, such as the Vietnamese Constitution, and, therefore, does not pose major challenges 
to the EU’s promotion of gender equality. The extent to which the EU can promote gender 
equality in a country that has already introduced equality at a legal level is a different concern. 
On a societal level, awareness of gender equality might still require improvement (e.g. in terms 
of managing household budget, sharing responsibility for raising children, …), which the EU 
might be able to enhance through its programs.  Obviously, the Vietnamese identity and context 
plays a major role in Vietnam’s readiness to adopt European norms, which in turn limits the 
EU’s potential to successfully promote those norms in the first place. Similarly, the extent of 
openness towards EU norms also depends on the types of norms at the inter-regional level. In 
negotiations between Europe and Asia, tensions regarding political norms such as human rights 
persist (Manea, 2008). In the case of ASEAN, confrontations between ASEAN and the EU 
relating to human rights supported the creation of an ASEAN identity (Manea, 2008). Social, 
economic and cultural norms tend to create less tensions than political and civil norms. These 
tendencies assert Vietnam’s position towards EU norms as briefly laid out above. 
In addition to the partner country’s readiness to accept a norm depending on whether it is a 
social, economic or political norm, a general complication in terms of norm promotion is the 
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EU’s potentially imperialist character vis-à-vis the partner country. By promoting norms, the 
EU suggests that its norms are superior to Vietnam’s norms and, therefore, norm promotion 
can take on an imperialist character. However, Vietnam’s membership in the United Nations, 
its commitment to the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and its membership in the WTO 
suggest that Vietnam is generally open to adopt Western economic, social and political norms. 
Norm promotion by the EU could, therefore, be understood as supporting Vietnam in its norm 
implementation rather than imposing European norms on a former colony.  
To conclude this section, the income level, according to which Vietnam is a lower middle-
income country, is not the defining variable shaping the EU’s potential for norm 
implementation. Rather it is the partner country’s openness to Western norms. In this study, 
Vietnam’s lower middle-income status has been a major factor for choosing it as an EU partner 
country, because it provides a setting of transition, however, this does not imply that the level 
of income is the defining variable for the EU’s success or failure in implementing norms 
coherently. Each partner country has its own history, culture, political system, which shape its 
openness to external norms. Consequently, the results from this study, which are results shaped 
by a Vietnamese context, are not generalizable across all lower middle-income countries. 
Further studies need to be conducted in order to determine common variables and to be able to 
make claims about generalizability across lower middle-income countries. 
The EU norms, however, do not operate in a vacuum. As an international player, the EU is 
exposed to other organizations with their own set of norms to which the EU is a signatory. Thus, 
while the EU can be considered as a normative actor, other organizations have different 
backgrounds, which are presented in the next sub-section. 
3.2.3 Norms of Other International Organizations 
In the previous sub-section, it was established that the EU is a normative actor and as such its 
position towards other international organizations is vital in international relations given their 
interrelations. For example, the EU took the role as leader in global normative debates 
during the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Lightfoot & Burchell, 2004). This 
sub-section briefly outlines the normativity of other international organizations and their 
institutional capacity to implement them. 
In the global arena, the World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations (UN) and 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are important actors in 
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trade and development. The EU is both a member to those organizations but also acts outside 
the realm of these organizations, which has evolved into a complex set of relationships. As a 
result, the relationship between the norms, which the organizations adhere to, or aspire to 
adhere to, is complex. The organizations’ normative stances are taken into account here by 
reviewing their legal basis, institutional structure, and sanctioning mechanisms. The legal basis 
gives insight about the norms an organization is built on. The institutional structure and 
sanctioning mechanisms indicate how much power an institution has vis-à-vis its members and 
how much power an organization has towards third countries, which is crucial for the 
implementation. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
As a trade organization, the WTO’s normative basis is strongly trade-related: non-
discrimination of products, trade liberalization, openness and connectivity are among the main 
principles the WTO adheres to (WTO, 2018g). The primary objective for each new member to 
the WTO, regardless of whether it is a developed country or a developing country, is to 
liberalize its market (Wang & Winters, 2000). Due to the primacy of trade, these principles can 
also be called trade norms. Other non-trade principles, such as environmental protection and 
transparency, are also important principles for the WTO (WTO, 2018c). Thus, while the WTO 
favors open trade, it also recognizes that non-trade principles play an important role, and that 
developing countries require additional support when merging into the global trade system, 
even though this support system was changed during the Uruguay Round (Wang & Winters, 
2000). One problem arising with the free-trade rhetoric is that developed countries still protect 
their markets despite their commitment to open up (Stocchetti, 2016). Another problem which 
comes to the detriment of developing countries is that aid for trade commitments are often not 
implemented: “The Uruguay Round Agreement is replete with promises of technical assistance 
to developing countries to help them undertake the agreed reforms, but most of these promises 
were not binding and many have not been delivered” (Wang & Winters, 2000, p.15). 
In 2014, a Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) Facility was set up to support developing 
countries in their efforts to implement the Trade Facilitation Agreement, which in turn aims to 
bring disconnected countries onto the global market. In his speech at the launch of the TFA 
facility, WTO Director-General Azevêdo pointed out that this facility helps developing 
countries find donors to support their trade facilitation efforts, but funding for this facility 
remains on a voluntary basis (WTO, 2018a). Again, support for developing countries is 
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pledged, but implementation lacks behind. In terms of norms, this behavior implies that trade 
norms are prioritized over development norms. 
Another example for the WTO’s recognition of development processes is the publishing of 
joint reports with the OECD (WTO/OECD, 2017). The WTO and OECD jointly publish 
biennial reports on aid for trade, with the most recent publication dedicated to the interaction 
between trade, inclusiveness, connectivity and sustainable development (WTO/OECD, 2017). 
Physical and digital connectivity are important factors to reduce trade costs, which has been 
the primary topic in the last joint report (WTO/OECD, 2015). The scope of this dissertation 
does not allow for in-depth tracing of contributions either of the two organizations have made, 
that is to say that it remains unclear how themes and phrasing were decided and which 
organization contributed to which results, but nevertheless the reports seem to bring together 
two organizations that tend to be rather different. 
Regarding the sanction mechanisms, the WTO has set up a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
which can be used to sanction countries to ensure their compliance with their commitments 
(King, Keijzer, Spierings, & Matthews, 2012). Dispute settlement applies to trade rules and is 
a practice to find agreements between the disputing parties through consultation and are rarely 
referred to the Dispute Settlement Body, which serves as the last instance (WTO, 2018f). 
According to the WTO, a “dispute arises when one country adopts a trade policy measure or 
takes some action that one or more fellow-WTO members considers to be breaking the WTO 
agreements, or to be a failure to live up to obligations” (WTO, 2018f). Even though technical 
assistance for trade facilitation is an integral part of the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
(European Commission, 2017a), those commitments often remain merely a promise and lack 
enforcement (Wang & Winters, 2000). Overall, the WTO recognizes sustainability and 
inclusiveness as goals to be achieved, but their primary objective remains trade liberalization. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
The OECD originated from the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
which was founded in 1948 to implement the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction after 
World War II (OECD, 2018b). It was established with 18 European members, the United States 
and Canada (OECD, 2018d). After two destructive World Wars, economic cooperation was 
considered to ensure lasting peace. In 1961, the OEEC was reframed to continue on a global 
scale and with that the OECD was created. Currently, the OECD has 35 members and five key 
partners (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa) covering different world regions 
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(OECD, 2018d). Regarding development, the most relevant group within the OECD is the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In light of the Millennium Development Goals, 
improving aid effectiveness was one of the major goals for the DAC, which was highlighted 
by committing to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda adopted by the OECD in 2005 
and 2008 respectively (OECD, 2018c). The Paris Declaration emphasized ownership, 
alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability as the fundamental principles to 
increase the development impact. Ownership allows developing countries to determine their 
own strategies for development. Alignment implies that the donor countries support those 
strategies and use local systems to achieve them. Harmonization refers to donor coordination 
to avoid duplication. The focus is on development results and both donors and recipients are 
accountable for achieving those results. 
Referring to the comprehensive MDG development agenda, the Accra Agenda for Action 
highlighted ownership and result oriented development and added inclusive participation and 
capacity development to improve developing countries’ capacity to manage themselves in the 
future (OECD, 2008). The OECD seems to make a difference between development on a 
broader scale as the UN suggests and aid as one part of development: 
“We need to achieve much more if all countries are to meet the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Aid is only one part of the development picture. Democracy, economic growth, social 
progress, and care for the environment are the prime engines of development in all countries. 
Addressing inequalities of income and opportunity within countries and between states is 
essential to global progress. Gender equality, respect for human rights, and environmental 
sustainability are cornerstones for achieving enduring impact on the lives and potential of poor 
women, men, and children. It is vital that all our policies address these issues in a more 
systematic and coherent way” (OECD, 2008, underscore added). 
This quote shows that the OECD sets benchmarks for aid effectiveness, recognizing the wider 
sphere of development, but remains focused on the aid channel disconnecting it from other 
issues such as gender equality or human rights. Simultaneously, it also determines policy 
areas of action with governance and gender equality as key areas of development. This 
prioritization becomes particularly visible with the Social Institution and Gender Index, an 
index developed by the OECD Development Center, to measure discrimination against women 
in social institutions (OECD Development Center, 2018). 
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Policy coherence for development is also an important principle for the OECD. Since 2017, 
this principle was adapted to the UN SDGs and is now named policy coherence for sustainable 
development (OECD, 2017b). “The SDGs cannot […] be achieved through single-sector goals 
or approaches” (OECD, 2017b) and policy coherence for sustainable development provides a 
lens for inter-linkages between the goals (OECD, 2017b). 
The DAC does not have a sanctioning mechanisms for members that do not meet their 
commitments (King et al., 2012). DAC members have agreed to spend 0.7 percent of their GDP 
as ODA, for example, but only a minority of the countries tends to meet this target (Stocchetti, 
2016). In 2016, merely six members reached the 0.7 percent target: Denmark, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (DAC, 2017). Not meeting this target 
does not have any negative consequences for the DAC members. Thus, while the OECD and 
DAC might have an ambitious normative aspiration, implementation remains with the 
sovereign states and effective mechanisms to ensure implementation do not exist. The Paris 
Declaration set out commitments to be achieved by 2010 and a monitoring survey to monitor 
the countries’ progress. Signing up to the Paris Declaration is not limited to OECD members 
and currently 137 countries and approximately 30 multilateral development institutions 
committed to adhering to the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2018a). Three monitoring surveys were 
undertaken between 2006 and 2011 concluding that only one out of twelve commitments was 
fully achieved (OECD, 2012a). These monitoring surveys were conducted solely in the 
developing states, participation in the survey was voluntary, and yet 78 countries participated 
in the 2011 monitoring round (OECD, 2012a). A high level of participation despite the rather 
unsuccessful outcomes highlights that bad performance is not penalized. Rather, it seems to 
indicate that aspirations towards transparency are just as appreciated as good performance. 
In addition to the Paris Declaration monitoring, DAC peer reviews are conducted for each 
member roughly every five years to identify how a country could improve its aid effectiveness. 
The EU, for example, has been reviewed four times up to now with the next peer review 
foreseen in 2018 (OECD, 2018e). The latest peer review on the EU shows that streamlining 
efforts of financial instruments had a positive impact on the EU’s aid effectiveness, but the 
distribution of responsibilities between the EU institution remains unclear and, therefore, a 
challenge to aid effectiveness (OECD, 2012b). In both cases – the Paris Declaration monitoring 
survey and the DAC peer review – publishing the results is the official end goal of the exercise 
and as such do not insist on policy change. However, peer reviews have the potential to create 
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policy dialogue and transparency, share best practices and enhance compliance with the 
agreed-to measures (Pagani, 2002). 
To summarize, the OECD prioritizes aid effectiveness in terms of ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, results oriented management and mutual responsibility, which is applicable to 
all development fields including human rights or equality. The norms are, thus, more 
technical in nature and serve as procedural standards rather than promoting democratic values 
or fundamental rights. 
The United Nations (UN) 
The United Nations is a global organization with many institutions that cover a wide range of 
issues, such as security in the UN Security Council, development in the UN Development 
Program (UNDP), children’s issues in UNICEF, or humanitarian aid through the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The focus in this sub-section is on the 
general UN legislative framework, such as the UN Charter, and the UNDP, because of the 
development-trade focus in this dissertation. 
The primary purpose of the United Nations is to ensure peace, based on the respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and non-discrimination (United Nations, 1945, Art.1). A separate 
declaration on human rights was drafted to further enhance the UN’s commitment to human 
rights and emphasize the universality of those rights. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights set out human rights to be protected as a universal standard for the first time and since 
then has inspired “a rich body of legally binding international human rights treaties” (United 
Nations, 2018). The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are 
agreements applicable to all UN activities, which sets out a normative framework for the UN 
and presents a strong political commitment to peace and human rights. 
Shifting the focus to specific development interventions, the UNDP is the primary 
development actor within the UN and, therefore, the primary advocate of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Sustainable development, democratic governance, peace 
building, climate action, and gender equality comprise the UNDP’s key focus areas (UNDP, 
2018b). The UNDP shows a slightly different set of norms from the overall UN framework. 
Democratic values and environmental concerns are added to peace and human rights promoted 
under the UN umbrella. The development agency, therefore, can be considered a more 
normative actor than the UN as a whole. 
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Institutionally, the UN is based on the principle of sovereign equality between the member 
states (United Nations, 1945). The Security Council, however, can enforce economic 
sanctions, such as trade embargoes, and diplomatic restrictions, such as travel bans, in cases 
where peace is threatened and diplomatic efforts have failed (United Nations and the Security 
Council Affairs Division, 2018). Within this framework, special sanction committees have 
been set up for Libya, Yemen, Guinea-Bissau and South Sudan, for example (United Nations 
and the Security Council Affairs Division, 2018). Furthermore, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are two 
UN bodies dealing with the enforcement of justice related to war crimes. Another form of 
ensuring implementation is through peer review by creating peer pressure or sharing best 
practices (Pagani, 2002). Several bodies for evaluations and peer reviews in place at the 
different UN levels. The United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) is the overall evaluation 
agency for the UN, which reviews the evaluation functions of UN bodies such as UNDP 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2006). Within UNDP, the Independent Evaluation 
office has the responsibility to conduct thematic and programmatic evaluations and publish 
annual reports on evaluation standards (UNDP, 2018a). Evaluation and peer review prove to 
be the main mechanisms to ensure policy implementation and compliance with legal 
commitments. 
How are EU Norms Different from WTO, OECD and UN Norms? 
Given the threefold characteristic presented above, the EU’s difference from the WTO, OECD 
and UN can be determined by comparing the legal basis, institutional structure and 
sanctioning mechanism. 
The EU is an institutional arrangement that covers economic and political arena. Trade policies 
are both an economic and political issue, especially in cases where sanctioning a country is 
used as a tool to achieve other goals. The EU has the political power to take such decisions. 
The WTO, however, sets merely technical rules for trade related to trade barriers, it sets the 
trade norms, but it does not take political decisions about when to sanction a country. As such, 
the WTO sets the rules, but the political actions remain with individual nation states or the EU. 
This distinction makes the EU norms as defined above markedly different from the WTO 
norms. As a WTO member, the EU follows the WTO trade norms, but the political decisions 
related to human rights violations, which can lead to trade sanctions, are the responsibility of 
the EU. The OECD is an inter-governmental body with low implementation force. Its norms 
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are technical instead of value-driven. These two aspects make the EU different from the OECD. 
Democratic aspirations lack in the OECD approach and monitoring is the primary tool for 
implementation. The UN is another normative actor in terms of political commitment as 
represented by the UN Charter and the Human Rights Declaration. One notable difference 
between the EU and the UN is the lack of democratic norms in UN documents (overview given 
in table 7). Human rights, peace and freedom are recognized by both actors, but the EU adds 
more emphasis on democracy or democratic values as an additional norm by including it in 
the EU Treaties. In contrast, democratic values are not incorporated in the UN Charter. 
Table 7:  IOs, Their Norms, Institutional Structure and Sanctioning Mechanisms 
 
 Norms Institutional structure Sanctioning mechanism 
EU Democracy 
Freedom 
Human rights 
Liberty 
Peace 
Rule of law 
Supra-national, 
Inter-governmental 
Trade Sanctions, 
Isolation 
OECD Ownership 
Alignment 
Harmonization 
Managing results 
Mutual accountability 
PCSD 
Inter-governmental Monitoring, 
Peer Reviews 
UN Freedom 
Human rights 
Non-discrimination 
Peace 
Inter-governmental, 
“sovereign equality” 
Tribunals 
Evaluations/Peer Reviews 
Trade and diplomatic sanctions 
WTO Trade liberalization Inter-governmental Dispute Settlement 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
 
Not only are the EU’s norms different (to varying degrees) from the other organizations’ norms, 
but also the institutional structure and the sanctioning mechanisms are distinct as shown above 
and summarized in table 7. Taken together, these three factors make the EU a potentially 
stronger normative actor than the other organizations. First, the EU has a substantial normative 
basis. Second, its institutional structure is partially supra-national. Third, trade sanctions and 
political isolation are two mechanisms to ensure that third countries implement EU norms. 
Whether and how the EU implements its normative basis across its external policies will be 
analyzed in the following chapters. In terms of normative policy coherence for development, 
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policy coherence for development is the tool that links the various policy sectors with each 
other. 
3.3 POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
DEFINITIONS, TYPES, AND LIMITATIONS 
The second component of NPCD is policy coherence for development, which is dealt with in 
this sub-section. First, an overview of PCD in the political arena is presented, which is followed 
by a structured overview of PCD typologies. Finally, this sub-section is concluded with a 
discussion about PCD limitations and causes of incoherence. 
3.3.1 Policy Coherence for Development in the Political Arena 
Policy coherence for development was first brought onto the political agenda by the OECD in 
1991 as a measure for greater aid effectiveness (OECD, 2006). Despite continuous efforts by 
the EU and the OECD, a clearly defined understanding of policy coherence is still lacking. 
Broadly speaking, coherence exists where there is no incoherence – whether it be intentionally 
or unintentionally. To be more concrete, policy coherence is the “interaction of all policies that 
are relevant in the given context with a view to the achievement of overriding development 
objectives” (Ashoff, 2005, p.1). In other words, a policy should not undermine other policies 
in achieving a given development goal. Agreement on the exact definition of policy coherence 
for development, however, has not been reached. While development scholars debate whether 
development is a process or an outcome, which subsequently leads to the question of PCD 
being a process or outcome, giving the overall perspective for analysis, policy-makers might 
not even be interested in a clearer definition and precise indicators to measure their efforts 
towards PCD (Carbone & Keijzer, 2016). Other challenges to PCD range from the 
measurement issues due to the lack of data to wider discussions about the priority of 
development over other policy fields. I will consider each challenge in more detail in the 
following. 
Within the EU, the Commission, along with some member states (Denmark, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden), is one of the strongest advocates for PCD (Carbone & Keijzer, 2016). 
The Commission strongly advocates PCD with the result that the concept has been included 
in major EU policy documents, above all the Lisbon Treaty. Commitment to PCD, i.e. PCD as 
an end in itself, seems to be the current goal in EU policy-making. In contrast to using PCD as 
a means to reach an overarching goal in broader development perspectives, PCD as an outcome 
sets a different focus. As a means or a tool, PCD could be utilized to achieve the UN Sustainable 
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Development Goals (SDGs) which provide a global framework for action until 2030. Under 
this aspect, PCD has a wider scope than simply avoiding incoherence. If achieving sustainable 
development is the main goal, every policy that does not foster the transition to social, 
economic and environmental sustainability causes incoherence. Instead of aligning policies to 
each other, which would be the PCD-as-an-outcome approach, shaping all policies coherently 
under the umbrella of sustainability would be more effective in light of the SDGs. 
Consequently, the PCD-as-an-outcome approach has not been very successful in the quest for 
sustainable development. Initially, the Commission was to receive biennial reports from its 
member states on PCD according to the EU Consensus on Development (European Union, 
2006). Those reports, however, lost their significance due to their ineffectiveness on policy 
change. Already before this effort to effectively reintroduce PCD in the member states, the EU 
members did not show great interest in implementing PCD on a national level (Carbone & 
Keijzer, 2016). Consequently, some member states did not approve the EU’s and DAC’s 
initiatives to introduce PCD indicators to measure national progress that would publicly show 
the national government’s failure to implement PCD (King et al., 2012). 
On a technical level, the idea of indicators or measurement poses a different concern in itself 
(King et al., 2012). On the one hand, measuring progress requires a starting point. Progress, 
whether improvement or deterioration, can only be assessed if the follow-up results can be 
compared with to the initial setting. On the other hand, state-of-the-art reports can be used to 
determine the current policy setting at a national level. The Commission, for example, has tried 
to measure PCD with its impact assessments (IAs). These assessments are designed to capture 
the impact of one policy on other policy areas, but their quality remains low and the impact 
on developing country is considered solely in the minority of the reports (CONCORD, 2015). 
In addition, on the political level, the question of policy priorities remains. Why should 
development be the leading objective? Within the Commission, among member states and 
between the Commission and the Council, conflicting interests shape the political debate. In a 
democratic environment, this is a normal, and possibly a desirable, situation. Different actors 
represent different groups of interests. In the light, of sustainable development, the role of PCD 
could be strengthened, and other interests reconsidered. This, however, requires a shift from the 
PCD-as-an-outcome to a PCD-as-a-means approach, as already mentioned earlier. 
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3.3.2 A Literature Review of PCD Typology 
Since its emergence at the beginning of the 1990s, PCD has been discussed widely among 
academics and practitioners. Though many attempts have been made to organize the concept 
of PCD (see for example Hoebink, 1999b; Hydén, 1999; van den Hoven, 2004), three major 
contributions are considered here, which are summarized in table 8 below. 
Type 1: Coherence between aid and non-aid policies. Horizontal coherence (Carbone, 2008) 
refers to the relation between policy arenas. With regard to development policy, it is defined 
as coherence between aid and non-aid policy. As already mentioned above, a country’s trade 
interests might conflict with its own development interests leading to counter productivity. 
Existing literature often refers to horizontal coherence pointing out that this type of coherence 
becomes more difficult to achieve as more levels of governance are involved (Ashoff, 2005). 
In Picciotto’s (2005) work horizontal coherence is labeled intra-country coherence. In other 
terms, it’s the “coherence of donors’ policies towards the South, and of aid policy in particular” 
(Forster & Stokke, 1999). 
Type 2: Coherence between the EU and its member states’ development policies. Especially 
with growing globalization local, regional and international layers are introduced to the existing 
political system. The relationship between the EU and its member states is dealt with when 
analyzing vertical coherence (Carbone, 2008). Put differently, it refers to different policies 
across the member states with regard to their overall contribution to EU development. 
Type 3: Coherence of development policies across countries. This type of coherence refers to 
development policies from different nation states. “Coherence of donors’ aid policies towards 
the South” (Forster & Stokke, 1999), also called inter-country coherence (Picciotto, 2005), 
comprises one governance level between the donor states. In doing so, this type of coherence 
complements vertical coherence between national governments and the EU. 
Type 4: Internal coherence (Carbone, 2008; Picciotto, 2005) is a third type of coherence 
which refers to a policy’s different objectives. In the case of development policies, the focus is 
drawn to the purposes of this policy, the channels of aid (e.g. NGOs or state aid), and the 
functions of aid (e.g. supporting the private sector). Bilateral aid is the primary mechanism 
addressed by internal coherence, whereas state agencies, NGOs or private actors can be the 
implementing agencies. Forster and Stokke’s  (1999) definition also includes multilateral 
channels in internal coherence, as it is an additional channel to bilateral aid under the same 
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government policies. 
Type 5: Donor-recipient coherence refers to the interaction of policies that have been adopted 
in the donor country and those that have been adopted in the developing country (Carbone, 
2008; Forster & Stokke, 1999; Picciotto, 2005). 
Type 6: The last type of coherence is multilateral coherence, which is defined as the 
interaction between various international organizations (Carbone, 2008). International 
organizations, for example the UN or OECD, tend to pursue different goals, which negatively 
effects the level of policy coherence. Multilateral coherence cannot be found among neither 
Picciotto’s (2005) categories nor Forster & Stokke’s (1999) as a separate type, but is included 
in internal coherence in the latter’s categorization. Multilateral coherence is partly comparable 
to donors’ aid policies or inter-country coherence, because both address a variety of donors. 
The first, however, refers to international organizations whereas the latter refer to nation states. 
Table 8: Systematic Overview of Types of Policy Coherence for Development 
 
Terminology 
used by 
Carbone 
(2008) 
Terminology 
used by 
Picciotto 
(2005) 
Terminology used 
by 
Forster & Stokke 
(1999) 
Short description 
Horizontal 
coherence 
Intra-country 
coherence 
Coherence of 
policies towards the 
South 
Coherence between aid and non-
aid policies 
Vertical 
coherence 
- - Coherence between EU and 
member state development 
policies 
- Inter-country 
coherence 
Donors’ aid policies Coherence of development 
policies across countries 
Internal 
coherence 
Internal 
coherence 
Coherence of a 
donor’s aid policy 
Coherence between objectives 
and goals within development 
cooperation 
Donor- 
recipient 
coherence 
Donor- 
recipient 
coherence 
Donor-recipient 
coherence 
Coherence between policies in 
providing and receiving states 
Multilateral 
coherence 
- - Coherence of development 
policies/strategies 
among international 
organizations 
Source: author’s compilation  
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Table 8 gives an overview of the classifications of PCD, the different terminology used by 
various authors and a short definition of the type of PCD as described above. Coming back to 
the PCD-as-an-outcome or PCD-as-a-means debate, the different types of PCD as described 
above have different effects on policies depending on the approach taken. While policy 
coherence can be seen as a goal in itself, it is mostly used as a mechanism for achieving other 
objectives (Carbone, 2008). The NPCD approach goes beyond the PCD “as an outcome” and 
“as a means” debate by arguing that focusing on the technical aspects of development comes 
to the detriment of normative positions (Koff & Maganda, 2016). Normative coherence is, 
therefore, important for achieving transformative and sustainable development (Koff, 2017b, 
2017a; Koff & Maganda, 2016). However, in these studies of normative coherence, the black 
box of policy implementation has not been opened. This dissertation addresses NPCD in the 
framework of the policy cycle with particular focus on policy implementation. Analytically, 
NPCD is understood as the outcome of policy implementation. Conceptually, NPCD is 
understood as a means for transformative development. 
3.3.3 Conceptual and Practical Limitations of PCD 
The previous sub-sections might give the impression that PCD is an uncontested concept and 
policy tool. This, however, is not the case. A substantial critique arises from the fact that PCD 
is embedded in the dominant development structures, which are heavily criticized by 
proponents of post-developmentalism, degrowth, ecofeminism or buen vivir (Escobar, 1995, 
2015; Gudynas, 2011; Ranta, 2018; Rist, 2008; Salleh, 2017), to name but a few. While not 
criticizing PCD as such, the Western approach to development is challenged based on the 
arguments that development reinforces old colonial power imbalances, that development 
centralizes the economy but fails to acknowledge the human being as the central actor of 
society, and that development is a patriarchic system in which women, culture and nature are 
dominated by Western attitudes (ibid.). Therefore, PCD’s underlying idea of being more 
coherent in favor of development is challenged, given that development is considered to be a 
strategy in favor of wealthy nations. 
Notwithstanding the development critiques, with the Western approach to development 
governing the relations between the Global North and the Global South, PCD is a concept that 
is currently on global political and academic agendas. Why is policy coherence important 
when it comes to development aid? There are several reasons for this. First, the lack of 
coherence in the past has led to a lack of success in the development sector. Trade relations 
are often in contrast with necessary aid programs, but also other economic interests like the 
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production of cheap goods are a reason for the missing success even though development 
aid is provided. By applying policy coherence, trade relations could be shaped in a new way, 
which supports the development of poor regions actively. This can happen in two ways: either 
non-aid policies directly influence development policy by altering their objectives, or non-aid 
policies indirectly support development policies by ensuring that their policies are not 
conflicting the objectives set by the development policy. 
A second type of justification is called strategic justification. Here coherence is seen as a tool, 
which can be used to shape globalization. Substantive-programmatic justification is a way of 
reasoning which arose from the “demand for sustainable development as the supreme guiding 
concept of global governance” (Ashoff, 2005, p.1). Since there is increasing interaction among 
countries all over the world and, therefore, increasing risk of exploitation, it is necessary to 
support countries, which are not as well of as the Western states. This approach was laid 
out by the Millennium Development Goals in 2000. Even though, however, there is a legitimate 
argument to apply policy coherence, the problem remains that states’ economies are not 
driven by development aid but largely by economic interests. Another problem that arises is 
the question of defining when policies are coherent. There is no framework yet, which offers 
standards to make policies coherent and hence it is rather difficult to implement and evaluate. 
Regardless of the difficulties to measure PCD, the OECD considers PCD as a norm (OECD, 
2017b). This approach is not pursued in this dissertation. Rather PCD is a concept and a 
tool to assess and improve coherence of the norms outlined in section two of this chapter. 
A third point of critique arises with the argument that other policies might also require 
coherence. Health policies for example can be implemented changing the treatment of lung 
dysfunctions, but they would be much more efficient if industries would produce more 
environmentally friendly not causing those problems in the first place. If a new health care 
system is set up and a new factory built, it is a problematic task to keep everything coherent 
with sustainable development aid. 
Nevertheless, “policy coherence is considered desirable for government action because 
deficient coherence may lead to ineffectiveness (failure to achieve objectives), inefficiency 
(waste of scarce resources) and the loss of credibility of policies” (Ashoff, 2005, p.11). In order 
to improve development aid, it is, hence, necessary to increase coherence within one policy, 
but also among different policies involved in the policy process. 
Often incoherence can emerge even though it is tried to reduce incoherence, because there are 
101 
 
many actors involved which tend to pursue different goals and among which misunderstandings 
can occur. Policy incoherence can arise due to a large number of reasons which can be grouped 
into four categories (Ashoff, 2005): (1) societal and political norms, (2) political decision-
making/divergent interests between EU and national level, (3) policy formulation and 
coordination, and (4) increasing complexity of development conceptualization. Since 
incoherence can occur in each of these areas, it is particularly difficult to achieve a high level 
of coherence. According to Ashoff “perfect policy coherence is [...] possible neither in theory 
nor in practice” (Ashoff, 2005, p.3). As however already mentioned earlier, it is still desirable 
to make policies as coherent as possible, since on the one hand, costs for the donating country 
can be reduced, and on the other hand, effectiveness in the receiving country increased. As 
Carbone puts it: “The task for policy-makers is to avoid unnecessary incoherence, which 
implies that win-win solutions are possible, whereas necessary incoherence, which results from 
the aggregation of legitimate conflicting interests, is more acceptable” (Carbone, 2008, p.326). 
In this dissertation, several types of incoherence are taken into account: internal coherence within 
EU policies, horizontal coherence between development and trade policies, but vertical 
coherence between the EU and its member states and multilateral coherence between the EU 
and ASEAN. Together, these types of coherence shape the EU’s normative policy coherence 
for development. NPCD and normative power are closely related, as the following section will 
show. 
3.4 NORMATIVE POWER AND NPCD 
3.4.1 The Relevance of NPE for NPCD 
Policy coherence has been recognized as shaping a new phase in international power relations 
as it links policy arenas such as development and security (Thede, 2013). Traditionally, 
development and security were considered to be two distinct policy arenas, but particularly 
since the 9/11 incident, development has been utilized as a channel for security strategies 
and, as a consequence, development programs have been adapted to fit the new purpose 
(Thede, 2013). Expanding the argument that PCD re-shaping international power relations, 
this would also affect the EU’s normative power. For now, the Normative Power Europe 
discussions have largely evolved around the argument that the EU presents itself as a 
normative power, it creates a narrative around its normative role, but does not reflect this 
rhetoric in its policy practices (Nicolaïdis & Howse, 2002). Some scholars have argued that 
“inconsistency [between internal and external policies] does not inevitably lead to a loss of 
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credibility” or normative power (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007). While incoherence might not 
lead to a loss of normative power, I contend that coherence can strengthen normative power. 
Power dynamics are an inherent feature in the discussions around normative coherence and in 
particular the EU’s self-representation as a normative power gives impetus to assessing its 
normative coherence (Koff & Maganda, 2016). Normative incoherence between policies, 
regardless of internal-external or external-external, vertical or horizontal, does have a negative 
effect on policy implementation with regard to norms, and potentially undermines EU’s 
normative aspirations. On the contrary, normative coherence supports the EU’s normative 
self-representation by transferring norms from development into non-development arenas. 
Implementing normative policy coherence for development effectively requires the EU to 
exercise its powers over the partner country. If the partner country disregards the normative 
dimensions of the EU’s activities, NPCD cannot be achieved since NPCD requires the 
incorporation of norms from the inter-governmental level down to the project level. This 
dissertation assesses the norm representation in the implementation stage of the traditional 
policy cycle from the EU’s perspective and not from the partner country’s perspective. Whether 
the partner country implements the EU’s norms is, therefore, not in the scope of this 
research. However, given the selection of policy documents that were jointly agreed on 
between the EU and Vietnam, a certain acceptance from the Vietnam’s side can be assumed, 
but the extent to which the EU was able to exercise its power cannot be deducted from this 
analysis. The focus remains on norm implementation and normative policy coherence for 
development in the framework of the normative development phase from the EU’s perspective. 
Before turning to the EU’s role as a global actor, i.e. the EU as a normative power, the term 
power needs to be defined. The next sub-section presents the different types of power and 
how they are different from NPE. The following sub-section briefly describes the EU’s NPE 
position in the international arena. 
3.4.2 Traditional Perceptions of Power and the Evolution of NPE 
Traditional Perceptions of Power 
According to Max Weber (1946), power is “the chance of a man or a number of men to realize 
their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating 
in the action” (Weber, 1946, p.180). Many scholars provide different variations of power, 
however, reflecting the essence of Weber’s definition. One variation focuses on power and 
exchange, with power being defined as “the ability of persons or groups to impose their will 
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on others despite resistance or in the form of punishment, inasmuch as the former as well as 
the latter constitute, in effect, a negative sanction” (Blau, 1964, p.117). The concepts of 
exchange and power are kept apart despite the fact that exchange can lead to a certain type of 
power relation. Initially, exchange of services or goods is reciprocal and based on voluntary 
actions, while power is related to opposition. However, if a person is not able to provide equal 
services, he has to comply with the other person’s wishes to achieve the balance between the 
two traders. 
While for Blau this is part of the exchange, Baldwin argues that every exchange can be 
described by power relations (Baldwin, 1978). According to Baldwin’s example of person A 
buying bread at person B’s shop, even this exchange is based on power since person A had the 
choice between using violence, threatening person B or begging for bread. It was A’s choice 
to pay with money which makes it look like exchange, but essentially A influenced B in such 
a way that B does what A wants. Yet another definition relates power to change of behavior: 
‘A gets B to do what B would not have done without the influence of A’ (Dahl, 1957). Yet 
another definition adds the dimension of resistance and choice. In that sense, slavery does not 
show any power relation since the slave does not have any alternatives. Power becomes visible 
only in cases where a variety of options is available (Foucault, 1983). The reaction on the 
exercised power plays important roles and subsequently, the reversal of power becomes a 
possibility in power relations. While the examples above point out different facets of power, 
they all represent Weber’s core aspect of “realiz[ing] their own will in a communal action” 
(Weber, 1946, p.180). 
Evolution of Normative Power Europe 
Contrary to traditional definitions of power in which one actor tries to make another actor do 
what they otherwise would not do (Dahl, 1957), others consign more importance to an actor’s 
self-representation (Ringmar, 2012). “That is, what matters is not what A can make B do but 
instead how such arm-twisting is interpreted by other actors and by the members of the 
audience. Their reaction is far more important than the action itself and their reaction is what 
the exercise of power ultimately seeks to influence. To be powerful is less important than to 
appear to be powerful” (Ringmar, 2012, p.19). Self-representation is a prominent feature in 
Normative Power Europe debates as NPE is defined by “what the EU is” more than “what it 
does”  (Manners, 2002). 
“Normative Power Europe” has recently developed into a widely accepted term for the 
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European Union. Ian Manners (2002) provides an extensive analysis of the EU as a normative 
power, in which a normative power is an actor that can “shape what can be ‘normal’ in 
international life”. It could be argued that every state has its own norms and consequently can 
be labeled a normative power, however, to be considered a normative power a state or 
organization needs to have the position to influence others in a way that the other actors 
will consider these external habits as normal. In other words, a normative power is able to 
set the outline of what is acceptable in international and national arenas. Three aspects are 
linked to normative power. First, the underlying principles of the normative power should be 
legitimate. Second, every action taken by the normative power should be seen as convincing 
by the target state. Third, the effectiveness of the power should arise from socialization 
(Manners, 2010). 
The concept of normative power Europe arose from the discussions around whether Europe can 
be seen as a civilian or a military power (see Maull, 1990). Maull (1990) defines civilian power 
as a state that bases its foreign policies on certain values and principles, but uses special forms 
of influence and power. This distinction resembles Nye’s (1990) observation of soft power 
after the end of the Cold War vis-à-vis military power competitions between East and West 
during the Cold War. Both scholars bring forward a new type of power in contrast to military 
power, but Nye emphasizes economic traits such as technology and education (Nye, 1990), 
whereas Maull emphasizes values, such as solidarity, on which the economies are based (Maull, 
1990). 
Bull (1982) does not identify the Western European states as civilian powers due to their lack 
of military power. He argues that a state can have civilian power solely as long as other states 
with the capacity of military power do not use their power. Thus, once a third country decides 
to show its military power civilian power is non-existent. Therefore, civilian power can be 
exercised under the condition that the necessary military capacity is in place to back up the 
economic position. Specifically with regard to the Cold War and Europe’s dependence on the 
US after the Second World War, Bull outlines the importance of increasing Europe’s military 
power. In contrast, Maull suggests three features defining the EU as a civilian power: economic 
power, diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems, and the willingness to use supra-
national institutions. 
Similarly, a distinction can be made between economic power, military power and power over 
opinion (Carr, 1942). A state is generally built out of conflicting issues and acts upon those. 
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“Utopia and reality, the ideal and the institution, morality and power, are from the outset 
inextricably blended in” (Carr, 1942, p.124). “Morality and power” is the conflict most relevant 
to this thesis. Out of this conflict a state decides which actions to take and, therefore, which 
type of power to use. Put differently, “[p]olitical action must be based on a co-ordination of 
morality and power” (Carr, 1942, p.125). The actions that can be taken are of civilian, military 
or normative nature. Military power relates to the size of the military, military equipment and 
its effectiveness with the final goal of fighting and ultimately winning a war if necessary (Carr, 
1942). Consequently, a country’s foreign policy is largely dependent on its military capacity. 
Pushing the national agenda in international affairs becomes rather challenging without the 
supporting military capacity. As a result, throughout history, economic power and military 
power have been closely linked since wealthy states were able to finance a strong military. 
However, with the emergence of modern states industry and trade became a symbol of power. 
The so-called mercantilist approach defines power relations based on the assumption that 
increased national production and a low volume of imports would turn a country into a great 
power, which implies that economic power is just as important as military power. As a 
result, the government is expected to take on the role of a facilitator of wealth. Once 
prosperity is established, it can be used as an instrument in international policy-making through 
various mechanisms as foreign direct investment, regulation of the internal market or trade 
opportunities and embargos. 
The third type of power is the power over opinion. Rhetoric and persuasion are just as vital 
to political strength as the previous two types of power. Accordingly, an actor with strong 
power over opinion is able to spread specific opinions among politically relevant individuals 
as well as large numbers of people. Especially with the broadening of the electorate, the opinion 
of the masses becomes politically important. While democracies are assumed to take public 
opinion into account, totalitarian regimes set standards for society. 
However, as both systems use education and mass media for spreading ideas and opinions, 
this distinction cannot be upheld in reality. Regardless of the regime type, it is necessary 
for the government to shape general perceptions, because strong oppositions can lead to 
unwanted revolutions and, thus, to a loss of power. “The issue is no longer whether men shall 
be politically free to express their opinions, but whether freedom of opinion has, for large 
masses of people, any meaning but subjection to the influence of innumerable forms of 
propaganda directed by vested interests of one kind or another” (Carr, 1942, p.171). Table 9 
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summarizes the academic interpretations of three types of power: military, soft, civilian and 
normative power. 
Table 9: Different Types of Power 
 
Authors Hard/Military Power Other forms of power 
Nye 
(1990) 
Hard Power: 
arms/war 
Soft Power: 
technology, education, economic growth 
Maull 
(1990) 
Military Power Civilian Power: 
Foreign policies based on values 
Bull (1982) Military Power Civilian Power: 
Economic capacity with 
military backup 
 
- 
Carr (1942) Military Power: 
arms/war 
Economic Power Power over Opinion 
Manners 
(2002) 
Military Power: 
Ability to use 
military instruments 
Civilian Power: 
Ability to use civilian 
instruments 
Normative Power: 
Ability to shape 
conceptions of 
‘normal’ 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
As Tocci (2008) points out, normative power from a neutral point of view simply implies the 
ability to shape what is normal in the international arena, independent of any moral 
considerations. This in turn means that any country, especially regional hegemons, could be 
considered as normative powers (Tocci, 2008). However, in most of the literature, the NPE 
concept implies a normative dimension. Practically speaking normative power is the use and 
communication of ideas and opinions (Diez, 2005). This makes this type of power dependent 
on its context, thus the arena in which it can be used. The effectiveness of normative power 
strongly depends on the subjective understanding of the other actors involved in the 
relationship (Wolf, 2011). Respect and mutual trust relevant factors to establish cooperation 
between actors and this respect arises from virtues, qualities, rights, values and interests 
accepted by the actors involved (Wolf, 2011). Hence, “shaping what is normal”  (Manners, 
2002), the prerequisite for normative power, in international relations requires acceptance by 
other actors. Actors whose cultural background varies greatly from the EU’s will be less likely 
to simply accept the EU as a normative power. The costs of adaptation are too high in this 
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case. On the other hand, countries that are culturally close to the EU will have less resistance 
to EU ideas as the mindset resembles to a great extent. It is exactly this acceptance that a 
normative power seeks to achieve. 
The former Communist states in Eastern Europe are a prominent example of this 
interrelation. While the EU wanted to foster democratic rights and freedoms, the Eastern 
European countries were willing to adapt to EU standards in order to increase the chances for 
future accession to the EU. At the same time the unsuccessful Communist regime was 
something that needed to be changed. Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc created favoring 
circumstances for the EU to become a normative power. But is the EU also a normative power 
outside geographical Europe? Kavalski (2013) argues that “Brussels does not seem capable of 
formulating relations with countries beyond the realm of membership and privileged 
partnership that would sustain the socializing influence of its normative power” (p.251). While 
conditionality is the main policy tool for transferring norms and values to prospective member 
states, on a global scale the EU needs to build relations with third actors to be able to convey 
its ideas successfully. 
As can be seen, defining the EU exclusively as one of the three mentioned powers is 
practically impossible. While the EU intervenes in countries where human security is 
endangered, hence acts as a military power, it does not overemphasize its military capacity 
(Diez, 2013). In contrast, military intervention is rather limited (Youngs, 2004) and remains 
limited under the Lisbon Treaty. To overcome this divide between the EU’s different roles, 
normative policy coherence creates a link between the EU’s normative dimensions, i.e. its 
normative power, and other policy areas. This dissertation aims to contribute to a better 
understanding of the EU’s commitment to norms and its efforts to implement norms across 
policy areas. 
3.4.3 NPE in an International Context 
Normative Power Europe is a widely used concept in academic discussions about the 
EU’s international and global interests and strategies (Diez, 2013; Manners, 2002; Nicolaïdis 
& Howse, 2002; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007). In the assessment of normative policy 
coherence for development, the topic of this dissertation, normative power Europe plays a 
central role in the analysis of EU policies, because of the rhetorical character the NPE concept 
implies. In order to implement policies coherently with EU norms, the rhetoric has to be put 
into practice. Whether NPE is a narrative/rhetorical tool used by the EU or whether the EU 
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follows up on its normative commitment is analyzed in this dissertation. Consequently, NPCD 
can strengthen the EU’s normative power by introducing norms in other policy arenas. 
The normative bases for these four organizations are vastly divergent as was shown in 
the presentation above. The WTO’s main norms are trade related norms of liberalization; the 
OECD’s norms are also strongly efficiency driven. The UN, on the other hand, shows norms 
similar to the EU’s norms. Based on the legal basis, therefore, it could also be seen as a 
normative power. However, normative power is defined as “what it is” and “what it does” 
and in terms of “what it is” the UN does not apply the same normative rhetoric as the EU 
portraying itself as a normative actor. During the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
for example, the EU was the leading proponent of the sustainability agenda (Lightfoot & 
Burchell, 2004). Contrary to the EU’s goals, other UN members (Australia, Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, and the United States) were convinced  that economic development is the 
solution for environmental challenges (Lightfoot & Burchell, 2004). Given this diversity of 
actors, the UN is bound to be less able to be considered a normative actor, let alone a normative 
power. Rather, the EU can shape agreements at UN level, it “can shape conceptions of normal 
in international relations” (Manners, 2002), as it did to some extent during the WSSD 
(Lightfoot & Burchell, 2004). 
Despite the prominence of normative power in academic debates, military power has not ceased 
to exist. Up to now military power mainly lies with NATO and rarely any operations take place 
that are solely organized by the EU (Tocci, 2008). The European Security and Defense Policy 
has not gained greater importance with the Lisbon Treaty. Whereas the EU largely remains a 
non-military power, during the 2003 in the Democratic Republic in Congo and the 2004 
operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, military action was prioritized over economic or normative 
power (Manners, 2006). It is argued that this military intervention is expected to strengthen 
the EU’s political role in the target countries and foster security and political integration 
(Manners, 2006, p.191). Claims that military intervention or military capacity building is 
necessary to insure human security including the protection of human rights remain a weak 
link between military intervention and the EU’s normative role (Youngs, 2004). These 
developments highlight the EU’s significant status as a normative actor. Normative policy 
coherence for development supports the EU’s normative aspirations. The EU’s political 
commitment to norms will be assessed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4: The EU’s Political 
Commitment to Norms 
The previous chapter has outlined normative policy coherence for development from a 
conceptual and theoretical point of view. One aspect of tracing the implementation of 
norms across the different policy levels is the political commitment represented through 
official policy documents. A second aspect is the structural set-up of the entity, which is to 
implement norms. Both aspects are relevant indicators in the assessments of NPCD as they 
reflect the actor’s commitment on the one hand and structural capacity to implement this 
commitment on the other. 
The EU’s legislative framework has changed considerable since its creation in 1952 where it 
was established as a European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC). The ECSC established a 
community of six countries that favored cooperation in the coal and steel sector, but also 
envisioned a peaceful Europe based on mutual cooperation. Several years later, the European 
Economic Community was created which expanded cooperation in the steal and coals sector 
to a broader range of economic sectors (Treaty of Rome, 1957). The Treaty of Rome gave 
legal personality to the European Community (EC) for the first time, transferring political 
power from the member states to the EC institutions. Ever since, the community fostered 
further integration by deepening its relationship and widening the scope to include more 
European nation states. 
Another important milestone in the evolution of the EU’s legal basis is the creation of the 
European Union in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which succeeded the 
European Community and comprised three pillars of policy-making, which covered areas from 
economic cooperation as envisioned in the beginning phases of the European Community to 
judicial cooperation in unlawful matters. The first pillar of policy-making was the EEC and 
covered the single market, the common agricultural and fisheries policies, social policies, and 
immigration. The second pillar was the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which covered 
cooperation in areas such as foreign aid and promoting human rights and democracy, but also 
peacekeeping missions. The third pillar was the pillar on Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters, which covered cooperation in activities fighting drug trafficking, organized 
crime or terrorism. In comparison to the founding ECSC, the Maastricht Treaty’s scope had 
broadened extensively and covered not only economic issues but also political issues. Most 
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interestingly, a common foreign and security policy was introduced among which 
“develop[ing] and consolidat[ing] democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms” was one of the objectives in foreign policies of the newly 
established European Union (Art. 11 TEU-post-Maastricht). 
A European Constitution was rejected by several referenda in the member states, but an 
adapted version of the text remains in form of the Lisbon Treaty (Kostanyan, 2016). The effects 
of this new Treaty in terms of normative policy coherence will be assessed in the following sub-
section by first introducing the legal/administrative system and subsequently analyzing norms 
representation in EU policy documents and the EU’s institutional structure after Lisbon. 
4.1 INTRODUCING THE LEGAL/ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
The first steps towards NPCD are taken “within” each actor, i.e. an actor’s legal and 
administrative system. This legal and administrative framework consists of laws, treaties, 
agreements, regulations, directives as well as the institutions,  which  form the governing 
body. In the EU, this would be reflected by the institutional set-up and the division of 
competences between the EU institutions and member states, the EU Treaties, Commission 
Directives, and agreements with third countries. The second system refers to policy 
communities, which are considered in chapter five. Policy communities are a sub-set of 
political systems in which different like-minded actors come together for dialogue in a certain 
policy area to shape actions/activities. The third policy system is the inter-regional area as part 
of the international political area, as discussed in chapter six. These three normative policy 
coherence systems can be utilized to trace policy implementation and identify gaps in the 
system, which might lead to incoherence. 
Keeping the focus on the first system, the legal/administrative framework, the question 
arises whether the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty has had any effects on the EU institutions 
and legal arrangements with regard to NPCD. In other words, do the institutions, treaties and 
agreements show an increased commitment to norms across policy sectors compared to the 
legal/administrative framework under the Maastricht Treaty? The Maastricht Treaty is seen 
as the first Treaty that formally stated the EU’s emphasis on policy coherence for development. 
Taking this as the starting point for effectively implementing PCD, results or changes can be 
expected to occur consequently over time. With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, this 
commitment has been strengthened formally, but it remains unclear whether the legal 
111 
 
commitment has transgressed into administrative changes. Without administrative adaptation 
to NPCD and corresponding procedures to improve coherence, formal commitment will 
remain exactly that: formal commitment. 
 
The European Union (EU), i.e. the European Commission together with all EU member states, 
has become the biggest aid donor on a global level. The EU institutions alone, for example, 
show an increase of net Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements from USD 
7.8bn to USD 16.3bn in the years 1999 and 2014 respectively (OECD, 2016). Similar 
developments are seen in German ODA, British ODA and to a lesser degree French ODA (for 
exact data see OECD, 2016). Given this role as a strong donor community, and especially 
under the current Agenda 2030 strategy, the EU shares great responsibility for sustainable 
cooperation with its partner countries. 
To increase effectiveness of these development efforts, the EU introduced basic measures for 
closer cooperation between the development sector and other policy sectors in the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992. This initial effort has gradually evolved into the concept of policy coherence 
for development. Policy coherence for development (PCD) is a concept about drawing 
synergies between development and non-development policies that could otherwise lead to 
contradictory outcomes. Consequently, increasing PCD aims at reducing those discrepancies 
that would undermine the objectives and results of development policies. If PCD were 
implemented effectively, this would imply in return that other policies acknowledge the 
aspirations of the development initiatives and adopt measures to support or at least not to harm 
development strategies. One needs to mention here that each actor can strive towards more 
coherence, but PCD cannot be achieved perfectly. Nevertheless, in light of the recently agreed 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) PCD could be a useful tool in 
approaching these goals practically, and as an element of transformative development 
analytically (Siitonen, 2016). In this sense, the SDGs provide the umbrella setting development 
policies as the overarching priority over other policies can be justified on several levels. First, 
the SDGs call for responsibility amongst all actors. In contrast to the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs, the predecessor to the SDGs) which focused solely on the developing countries 
performance, under the SDGs, the developed nations need to take responsibility for sustainable 
growth as well. In other terms, providing aid to developing countries for sustainable farming 
but simultaneously protecting one’s own industry cannot be justified under the SDGs anymore. 
Second, the notion of sustainability accrues an expansive spectrum of policy fields that have 
112 
 
direct or indirect effects on sustainable development. The SDGs comprise 17 goals ranging 
from eradicating hunger, to quality education, to life below water, to gender equality, linking 
all aspects to achieving a better life for everyone. As such, development has become more than 
just technical aid to developing countries. It is the interconnection between policy sectors, 
between the private and public sector, between levels of governance, between sectoral and 
crosscutting issues, that define sustainable development and, thus, each sector has its share in 
either contributing to reaching the SDGs or at least limit negative externalities. Third, from a 
moral/humane perspective coherently implementing sustainable development would benefit 
developing countries. The EU is one of the largest aid donors in the world, but similarly it 
damages the economy of developing countries through its own agricultural or fishery policies. 
Subsidized food is exported to developing nations lowering the prices that local farmers cannot 
compete with, but coincidentally, the EU gives financial support for development. If those 
subsidized products were not exported, local farmers would have the opportunity to sell their 
own products and grow their own business. 
Normative policy coherence for development is the implementation of certain values across 
various policies. With the Lisbon Treaty in place for almost a decade, it is time to review its 
effects. As mentioned in chapter one, the guiding research question for this chapter on the 
EU’s political commitment to norms is the following: 
 
Is the EU’s commitment to norms coherent between the development and trade sectors? 
 
Research has suggested that lack of normative commitment has led to poor policy outcomes in 
the field of water management (Koff & Maganda, 2016). In other words, poor policies can be 
the result of poor commitment. Especially in the area of norms, such as human rights, formal 
commitment matters. Commitment does not subsequently lead to flawless implementation, 
but rather shows a step towards reaching the goals. Whether the EU has improved its normative 
commitment between policies can thus be seen as an indicator of the quality of the policy 
outcome. 
Policy coherence for development and the recently emerging concept normative policy 
coherence for development are broad concepts that cover a variety of topics from conceptual 
clarification to institutional reforms and political conflicts between the EU and its member 
states, sector analysis of development and trade, and policy evaluation of the EU’s 
commitment to the human right to water (Ashoff, 2005; Carbone & Keijzer, 2016; Forster & 
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Stokke, 1999; Koff & Maganda, 2016; Picciotto, 2005; Siitonen, 2016; Stocchetti, 2016). In 
this research, PCD is considered as a goal to be achieved. Despite formal reforms, commitment 
to PCD has remained at a rhetorical level lacking implementation efforts. To successfully 
promote PCD political willingness is required, i.e. the implementation of PCD needs to be 
transformed from a technicality to a political goal. 
Figure 9 below indicates a simplified overview of policy implementation. Policy guidelines, 
such as the European Treaty, give broad principles and a political vision for the future. This is 
followed by a second stage that I have termed policy formulation. This policy formulation 
takes place between the EU and Vietnam in bilateral negotiations. For example, the FTA 
negotiations have been led by DG TRADE and the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(MIT). 
Figure 9: Stages of Policy Implementation 
Source: author’s own creation 
 
These agreements cover key areas for cooperation and are broad frameworks that direct 
future relations specifically regarding the country in question. Thus, whereas the Treaties are 
applicable to all EU actions, the agreements are specifically designed for cooperation between 
the EU and a third country. The third stage is the “first” implementation stage in the sense that 
these documents are concrete plans for a short-term time-frame. Multi-annual indicative 
frameworks are programs that cover activities of the EU in Vietnam, and in accordance with 
Vietnamese priorities, for a time of four to seven years. In contrast to the first two stages, this 
stage is the first stage that could be called implementation due to the fact that clear goals are 
set for a defined time frame. Finally, clearly defined projects and the relationship between the 
actors in Vietnam that do the day-to-day work is the final implementation stage. Day-to-
day work here does not refer to the project implementers, which are often NGOs or local 
partners, but to the day-to-day work of EU/MS officials in the delegations. The first three 
stages are strongly related to policy documents, which is the focus of this chapter, whereas the 
Policy guidelines
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last stage covers both written documentation and interview material, which is further analyzed 
in the subsequent chapter in terms of policy networks. 
In the following sections, the normative dimension of the primary documents is assessed 
through their mention of norms. Mentioning norms is one indicator, which shows the EU’s 
commitment to them. Taking this indicator, several policy documents covering the four 
policy implementation stages are qualitatively assessed for their normativity. 
4.2 NPCD IN THE TREATIES AND POLICY DOCUMENTS 
The structure of this sub-section follows the implementation stages presented above. First, the 
norm representation in the policy guidelines such as the EU treaties, the EU Global Strategy 
and the European Consensus on Development are analyzed. This is followed by a section on 
the policy formulation and the first implementation stage represented by the governing 
agreements between the EU and Vietnam and the multi-annual programs. The second 
implementation stage is covered in a separate section. All results relating to norm 
representation in the policy documents are summarized in sub-section 4.2.4. 
4.2.1 Normative Reflections in the Policy Guideline Stage 
From the Maastricht Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty11 
With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has legally committed itself to policy 
coherence for development and the promotion of norms in all its policies. As the Lisbon Treaty 
is presented and viewed as the document that most closely resembles a European constitution, 
it is worth considering its effects on normative policy coherence for development. The 
Maastricht Treaty is the treaty that established the European Union, which was previously the 
European Communities, highlighting the European integration process. Therefore, Maastricht 
and Lisbon are the two Treaties under study here, leaving out the changes made in Amsterdam 
and Nice, because those two treaties had merely a minor impact on development policies, 
policy coherence and norm representation. Consequently, the Maastricht Treaty will be used 
as the first benchmark and the following period is, therefore, called post-Maastricht. This 
period is marked by early stage diplomatic relations between the EU and Vietnam as these 
were only established in 1990. During this time period Vietnam had the status of a low-income 
                                                          
 
11 The consolidated versions after the Maastricht Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty are used through the entire 
analysis. Source for Maastricht Treaty: EU Official Journal 97/C 340/02; Source for Lisbon Treaty: EU Official 
Journal 2010/C 83/01 
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country. On the contrary, since 2009, the year of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, Vietnam is 
a lower middle-income country12. Furthermore, during this second period the relations between 
the EU and Vietnam had time to develop and expand as represented by the recently signed free 
trade agreement. The second period is referred to as post-Lisbon and ends – for this research 
project – in July 2017. 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men 
prevail” (Art. 2 TEU-post-Lisbon). In comparison, the Maastricht Treaty stated: “The Union is 
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States” (Art. 6 
TEU-post-Maastricht). As can be seen, the Lisbon Treaty expanded on the foundational norms 
of the European Union, reinforcing the commitment to democracy, freedom, human rights, and 
the rule of law, and adding human dignity, equality, pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, and solidarity. Liberty, a norm brought forward in the Maastricht Treaty, was moved 
to the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty. In terms of external relations, the “Union's action on the 
international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, 
development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law” (Art. 21 TEU-post-Lisbon). 
Those two articles in the Lisbon Treaty clearly lay out the EU’s commitment to its founding 
norms and their applicability in foreign policies. 
With regard to human rights, in particular, the Lisbon Treaty is the first EU Treaty, which 
included a list of human rights to be adhered to by the EU and its member states. The 
Maastricht Treaty had already converted respect for human rights, which was previously a 
matter of case law under the auspices of the European Court of Justice, into treaty obligations 
for all EU members (Defeis, 2017). The Maastricht Treaty made reference to the European 
                                                          
 
12 The World Bank adapts the threshold for country classification each year. In 2009 Vietnam surpassed the 
threshold of USD 996 GNI per capita to become a lower middle-income country. (For details see “Historical 
classification by income” https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank- 
country-and-lending-groups ) 
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in terms of 
respecting this convention, but it did not comprise the legal basis for the EU. Since Lisbon, 
however, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is an integral part of the Treaty: “The Union 
recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties” (Art. 6 TEU-post-Lisbon). This change 
has a strong normative statement emphasizing the EU’s commitment to norms not only in a 
preamble to the Treaty, but by integrating the human rights charter into the legally binding 
foundation of the EU. It entitles EU citizens to bring the EU or individual member states to 
court for breaching human rights (Defeis, 2017). As a result, it is rather unlikely that the EU 
or a member state would be confronted with breaching human rights in development policies, 
because those policies are not addressed at EU citizens. Nevertheless, the Human Rights 
Charter and the EU’s commitment to norms in external relations are a strong sign of 
normativity. 
Table 10: Normative Change from Maastricht to Lisbon 
 
 Core Norms* Minor Norms* Other* 
 D RoL HR F P L S GG SD ND J GE 
Change from 
Maastricht to Lisbon 
0 0 + 0 0 - + + + + 0 + 
Source: author’s creation 
*Definition of norms (Manners, 2002): Core norms – Democracy, Rule of Law, Human Rights & Fundamental 
Freedoms, Peace, Liberty; Minor Norms – Solidarity, Good Governance, Sustainable Development, Non-
Discrimination; Other (not in Manners’ distinction) – Justice, Gender Equality 
 
Table 10 shows, that norms have increased from Maastricht to Lisbon. Three measurements 
are used: 0 indicates no change, + indicates strengthening or adding a norm, - indicates 
weakening or cutting back on a norm. Regarding the core norms, respect for human rights has 
been strengthened, most visibly by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Similarly, 
sustainable development was strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty. In Maastricht, sustainable 
development was limited to the EU’s internal market and its own citizens (Art. 2 TEU-post 
Maastricht), which was expanded to cover internal as well as external affairs in the Lisbon 
Treaty (Art. 3 and Art. 21 TEU-post-Lisbon). 
Liberty, on the other hand, has been less represented in the Lisbon Treaty. Democratic values, 
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the rule of law, peace, justice and freedoms are fundamental values in both treaties. Solidarity, 
good governance, non-discrimination, and gender equality were not mentioned in the 
Maastricht Treaty on the European Union but mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty. With regard 
to the EU’s normative power, which was brought up in 2002 (Manners, 2002) and, therefore, 
before the Lisbon Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty has overall strengthened the EU’s founding basis 
and consequently strengthened the NPE argument in highlighting “what the EU is”. 
Progress towards normative coherence can be witnessed in the change from Maastricht to 
Lisbon. The institutional changes to support policy coherence will be discussed below, but 
regardless of the institutional arrangements, the EU’s strengthened normative basis does 
already indicate the EU’s position towards norms and its commitment in internal and external 
matters. It can be argued that the paradigmatic shift from the global transitional phase of 
development to the normative development phase is being reflected by the changes from 
Maastricht to Lisbon. This is not to say that the new development paradigm has influenced the 
EU Treaties, but it underlines the relevance of normativity at both the international level and 
the European level. Whether other EU’s policy guidelines, which have a shorter-term character, 
reflect the normativity presented in the Treaties, will be assessed in the following. 
Policy Guidelines in the Normative Development Phase 
Next to the European Treaties as policy guidelines are the EU’s global policy strategies, such 
as the EU Global Strategy, the Agenda for Change, the EU Trade for All initiative, and the 
European Consensus on Development. These types of policy documents provide broad input 
on a variety of topics and give insight about the EU’s general position and aspirations in global 
affairs. As such, they provide a guiding basis and represent part of the first stage of policy 
implementation, namely policy guidelines. 
Five documents, the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the 2011 Agenda for Change, the 2006 
European Consensus of Development, the new European Consensus on Development entitled 
“Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future” (published in 2017), and the Commission’s 2015 
EU Trade for All proposal were analyzed through their mention of norms. The results show, 
that out of the core norms identified above, the rule of law, human rights, and peace are present 
in all five documents. Liberty is not present in any of these documents contrary to the 
commitment in the Lisbon Treaty. Peace is mentioned in the Global Strategy, the Agenda 
for Change and the two Consensus on Development, but not in the Trade for All document. 
Democracy/democratic values are present in four out of five documents with the exception 
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of the Trade for All proposal. Here, reference is made to internal processes of EU’s policy-
making ensuring democratic procedures. “As co-legislator alongside the Council, the 
European Parliament also has a central role in ensuring full democratic scrutiny and 
accountability of trade policy. The Parliament and the Commission have intensified their 
interaction, ensuring the close involvement of the Parliament at every step of the negotiations” 
(European Commission, 2015b, p.18). This statement does not reflect on the EU’s external 
relationship with third countries but rather reinforced the EU’s policy-making procedures and, 
thus, will not be considered here as a normative mention. 
These five documents are important guidelines for the EU’s external relations. As part of the 
EU’s normative rhetoric, including norms into these documents would support its normativity 
and provide normative guidelines for more specific policies. The rule of law, human rights 
and peace are incorporated in those guiding documents and this mention underlines the EU’s 
normative position. Freedom is mentioned in all five documents, however, again, in the trade 
policy paper, freedom does not refer to the fundamental freedoms, but to the freedom of 
association. Liberty, peace and democracy are not mentioned in either of the documents and this 
lack leads to first gaps in normative policy coherence. This normative presence reflects the 
EU’s commitment to norms as indicated in the Lisbon Treaty. With regard to the minor norms, 
good governance and sustainable development are mentioned in all five documents. Solidarity 
is not included in any of the documents. The presence of non-discrimination is subject to 
the definition of non-discrimination. Non-discrimination is used in the Trade for All paper as 
a reference to the labor standards, i.e. no discrimination at the work place, but also in relation 
with trade matters in terms of open access to other markets, for example. Overall, the minor 
norms are included in all five guiding policy papers. 
In the case of “other norms”, i.e. those not classified by Manners (2002), gender equality and 
justice can be found in the majority of documents. Justice occurs in all documents part from 
the Agenda for Change. Gender equality is present in all documents apart from the Trade for 
All document. Including the norms, which were not initially defined in the Normative Power 
Europe concept, into the analysis re-shapes the understanding of the EU’s normative position 
by highlighting norms that are included in the documents but were disregarded in the original 
NPE discussion. The majority of the documents regarded as policy guidelines mention all norms, 
with the exception of liberty. Thus, the policy guidelines stage can be said to be strongly infused 
with EU norms. 
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In terms of normative policy coherence, the policy documents are palpably coherent with the 
Lisbon Treaty. Justice and liberty are the sole two norms not represented across all four 
documents leading to incoherence between the Lisbon Treaty and the policy guidelines level. 
Thus, the loss of norms in the “translation” from the Treaty into policy guidelines is the first 
cause of normative policy incoherence. The loss is not substantial, because the rule of 
law, human rights, peace, solidarity, good governance, sustainable development, non-
discrimination, freedom and gender equality are present across the Treaty and the guiding 
policy documents. However, this tendency of drop-out could occur across the other 
implementation stages as well leading to gradual normative incoherence along the 
implementation process. 
The following sub-section addresses whether norms are also present at the policy formulation 
stage, which is the first stage in implementing policies at a bilateral level, and the actual first 
implementation stage as represented by bilateral multi-annual strategies and programs. 
4.2.2 Normative Reflections in Policy Formulation Stage and Implementation Stage I 
Given that the Treaties are the basis for norms, values, and principles, they were considered in 
the previous sub-section together with the EU’s broad strategies on a common future, which 
serve as the guiding basis for all sub-sequent policy documents. Having established this 
basis, this sub-section assesses the documents representing the following two stages of policy 
implementation: policy formulation, policy implementation I. 
As mentioned in chapter two, content analysis will be used for the analysis of selected 
policy documents, which comprise country-specific documents regarding EU-Vietnam 
bilateral agreements and programs. These documents refer to both development and trade 
related matters, which is why no separation is made between development-related documents 
and trade-related documents. Figure 10 below gives an overview of the documents and the 
generational classification into the global development phases. As can be seen, only the 
Framework Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Vietnam was ratified before the 
turn of the millennium, which marked the beginning of the normative development phase. 
However, paradigmatic shifts take place over a longer period and, therefore, it cannot be 
assumed that all policies after 2000 are boasting with norms. Similarly, relationships between 
two parties evolve over a period of time. The FCA remained the governing agreement of EU-
Vietnam relations until the implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 
2016 and, as a result, this agreement falls into the transition phase as well as the normative 
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phase. As the goal of this dissertation is not to show that the EU is more normative now than 
it was in the transitional development phase, these overlaps are of minor concern. 
Figure 10: Timeline of EU-Vietnam Policy Documents 
Source: author’s own creation 
 
The implementation of norms in EU policies is the focus of analysis in this dissertation and 
to identify gaps in the implementation process. Therefore, the split is made between policy 
formulation and the first implementation stage, to discover whether political commitments 
are translated from broad country related agreements into the multi-annual programs. The 
Framework Cooperation Agreement (FCA), Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) are the three documents representing the formulation stage. 
The FCA was replaced by the PCA and the FTA has not been implemented yet, but 
negotiations were concluded in 2015. Nevertheless, all three documents are assessed to in 
order to trace the EU’s normative tendencies in its relations with Vietnam overall. 
Two country strategy papers (CPSs) (2002-06 & 2007-13) and five multi-annual indicative 
programs (MIPs) (2002-04, 2005-06, 2007-10, 2011-13 & 2014-20) represent the first 
implementation stage. The latest MIP (2014-2020) functions as a country strategy paper 
and, therefore, was aligned with the country strategies in the visualization in figure 10. A list of 
all primary documents used in the analysis for this dissertation can be found in appendix 1. 
 
Norms in the EU-Vietnam Agreements (Policy Formulation) 
The Framework Cooperation Agreement, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the 
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Free Trade Agreement13 are the three documents under consideration here. The FCA was 
the first agreement between the EU and Vietnam to cover the bilateral relationship. This 
agreement was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1996. It lay down the core norms of 
democracy and human rights, but left out the rule of law, peace and liberty. In terms of 
minor norms, it addressed sustainable development and non-discrimination. Thus, out of nine 
norms categorized as core and minor norms, merely four were mentioned in this initial EU-
Vietnam agreement. With the implementation of the PCA, which is the follow-up agreement 
to govern all EU-Vietnam relations, the incorporation of norms has increased. Now, 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and peace, i.e. four “core norms” (Manners, 2002), 
are integrated, and good governance, sustainable development and non-discrimination are 
mentioned, which reflect the “minor norms” (Manners, 2002). 
The least normative out of the three agreements is the FTA, which makes only indirect 
references to human rights and peace agreements in terms of core norm. Direct obligations in 
the FTA per se are not included. For example, regarding peace, it is stated that “nothing in this 
agreement shall be construed […] to prevent either Party from taking any action in pursuance 
of its obligations under the UN Charter for the purpose of maintaining international peace 
and security” (European Commission, 2016b). Human rights are not directly mentioned in 
the actual agreement, but a reference to the UN Declaration of Human Rights is made in the 
preamble: 
 
“REAFFIRMING their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations signed in San 
Francisco on 26 June 1945 and having regard to the principles articulated in The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 
10 December 1948” (bold added) 
Furthermore, a mention is made to the commitment to ILO rules to abolish child labor. Thus, 
human rights values are somewhat integrated into the text, but only in the form of a reference 
to other commitments. While human rights and peace are mentioned, but not included as a 
direct political commitment for both parties, liberty, democracy or democratic values and the 
rule of law are not incorporated in the document at all. References to rules in general are 
                                                          
 
13 The text is the agreed text as of January 2016 but the final version is subject to legal revision. Source: 
European Commission http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 
122 
 
made in relation to WTO rules or rules of origin for certain products. 
Minor norms are slightly more represented, i.e. two out of for norms are incorporated in the 
document: sustainable development and non-discrimination. Solidarity and good governance 
are not mentioned, rather corporate governance and recognizing environmental governance 
are the two types of governance brought forward in the FTA. Sustainable development, for 
example, is an integral part of the free trade agreement while good governance is not explicitly 
mentioned. The preliminary text of the free trade agreement14 shows an entire chapter dedicated 
to trade and sustainable development. Article 1 of the sustainability chapter states: 
“The Parties recall the Agenda 21 on Environment and Development of 1992, the 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation on Sustainable Development of 2002, the Ministerial 
Declaration of the UN Economic and Social Council on Full Employment and Decent Work of 
2006, the ILO Decent Work Agenda, the Outcome Document of the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development of 2012 entitled "The Future We Want", and the outcome of the UN 
Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 entitled "Transforming Our World: the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development", and reaffirm their commitment to promote the 
development of international trade in such a way as to contribute to the objective of 
sustainable development, for the welfare of present and future generations, and will 
encourage the integration of this objective in their trade relationship”. (bold added) 
 
The sustainability chapter makes a clear link to the UN SDGs and sustainable development 
in general that international trade should contribute to integrating sustainable development and 
trade is the central argument in this excerpt. Incorporating a sustainability chapter in a trade 
agreement supports the paradigm shift towards global normative development as introduced at 
the beginning of this dissertation. This excerpt reflects the global development agenda, which 
implies that the norms are not strictly European. Nonetheless, as the EU has been the major 
promoter of sustainability, as shown above, the global norms have been infused with European 
norms. International relations are a web of relationships between different actors and the 
outcomes of agreements are a compromise between the different positions. Including 
sustainability into the global agenda even though it was not supported by everyone, as shown 
in the example of the World Summit for Sustainable Development, can in this case be 
considered as accepting European norms at the global level. The EU making reference to those 
global agreements is, thus, a reference to its own norms which it brought onto the global 
agenda. This norm driven behavior supports the need for the analysis of normative commitment 
                                                          
 
14 Ibid. 
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in policy implementation. 
The analysis of core and minor norms shows that the PCA is more normative than the FCA and 
the FTA, because it incorporates more of the norms previously defined as core and minor 
norms. Solidarity and non-discrimination play a minor role in the EU’s relation to Vietnam 
as based on the selected documents. Both are not mentioned in the country specific EU-VN 
agreements. Similar to liberty, this might indicate that solidarity is in internal principle between 
the EU member states, but not a norm that is sought for in external policies. 
To expand the picture on norms, for this analysis three norms were added to the original core 
and minor norms distinction (Manners, 2002). Manners (2002) defines core norms as the 
norms, which are part of the “acquis communautaire”, namely peace, liberty, democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law. In addition, Manners defines “minor norms” as norms which 
are “within the constitution and practices of the EU, although these are far more contested” 
(Manners, 2002). These are social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and 
good governance. The additional norms are to the core and minor norm categorization are 
gender equality, justice, and freedom. Gender quality is present in all three agreements. 
Justice is mentioned in the PCA and FTA with an entire chapter in the PCA dedicated to 
cooperation in the area of justice. Freedom is mentioned solely in the FTA in the form of 
freedom of association for workers as agreed to under the ILO conventions. Thus, on the one 
hand, freedom of association is recognized, but again only in the form of restating the 
commitments under the ILO regulations. This type of wording gives the impression that the 
EU has not added its own norms to the agreements and, therefore, failed to incorporate its 
norms in the agreement. Because it is unknown how the wording came about and who brought 
up the ILO and UN conventions, it is not possible to claim that the mere mention of those 
conventions is a representation of EU norms. The EU and Vietnam are both committed to 
those conventions regardless of their bilateral agreements and, therefore, those mentions do not 
add much to the EU’s normative character. 
As FTA will be an integral part of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement it could be 
argued that legally speaking the PCA rules also apply to the FTA, but from a critical point of 
view it might be an indication for trade-offs between economic interests and normative 
commitment based on the norms above. This is not to say that trade is not based on any norms, 
but rather that the sets of norms do not overlap and hence lead to incoherence. To what extent 
the norms are represented at the following implementation stage will be examined in the 
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following section. 
Norms in the Strategies and Programs (Policy Implementation I) 
The national indicative program 2002-04 set at the EU’s two focal points human development 
and Vietnam’s integration into the global trade system. The following excerpts of the EU-
Vietnam national indicative program 2002-2004 show a certain commitment to human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. However, it is merely a mention, which refers to general EU 
(formerly European Community - EC) policies, but not to the relations between the EU and 
Vietnam in particular: 
“Article 177 of the Treaty of the European Communities sets out the three broad objectives 
for Community development co-operation. These are: fostering of sustainable economic and 
social development; the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into 
the world economy; the fight against poverty. This article also states that Community policy 
should contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the 
rule of law and encouraging the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. (bold 
added) 
 
Further to the Commission's Communication on "The European Community's Development 
Policy" (1), the Joint Council and Commission Declaration on Development Co-operation 
of November 2000 states that Community development policy is grounded in the principle of 
sustainable, equitable and participatory human and social development. Promotion of 
human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance are integral elements of 
EC policy.” (bold added) 
 
The NIP 2005-2006 shows a similar pattern for the rule of law by including the EU’s Asia 
strategy as a reference point for Vietnam but leaving out clear initiatives as part of the NIP. 
Similarly, in the Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, a reference is made to the rule of law in the 
appendix to the CSP which lays out what the EU’s general policy objectives are according 
to the EU Treaties, Commission Communications and the EU-Vietnam FCA. Those 
references cannot be considered as normative mentions in the strategy, because they make 
reference to other documents which fall into the policy guidelines level of implementation. 
Peace and liberty are considered to be core norms but are rarely or not at all represented in 
the selected documents. They might comprise the acquis communautaire but not define the 
EU’s external policies towards third countries. 
An interesting outcome is the divergence between Country Strategy Papers and the 
National Indicative Programs. Country Strategy Papers are medium term strategies agreed 
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between the EU and Vietnam, which set out overall goals of cooperation. They range from 5 
years to 7 years. National Indicative Programs translate the medium-term strategies into more 
concrete tasks and assign budgets. NIPs cover two to four years. Under the CSP 2002-2006, 
for example, the NIP 2002-2004 covered the first four years while the NIP 2005-2006 covered 
the latter two. Both, across generations and across norm categories, the commitment to norms 
remains rather weak as the commitment tends to be formal and lacks implementation. For 
example, the NIP 2002-2004 refers to the EU’s commitment to fundamental freedoms, 
democracy and the rule of law, however, solely referring to the Treaty of the European 
Communities and a Commission Communication. This reference leaves out any practical effort 
to translate these commitments into action undermining their implementation. 
An exception is gender equality, which was initially not included in the core norm-minor 
norm distinction. Nevertheless, it is the norm that is mostly reflected in the documents, 
including in the free trade agreement. Gender equality appears in all policy document under 
analysis either as a cross-cutting theme or as an individual work package. 
While overall normative coherence across policy documents might be questionable, human 
rights, sustainable development and gender equality are the three norms that occur in all 
documents and for which the implementation seems to be rather coherent. The results, 
therefore, suggest mixed success in the implementation of normative policy coherence for 
development. 
4.2.3 Normative Reflections in the Implementation Stage II 
 
The EU Blue Books are a series of publications by the EU delegation in Hanoi to report on 
the development activities in a given year. The first Blue Book has been published in 2007 but 
covered the reporting period 2004 to 2006. Since then, annual Blue Books were published on 
the EU’s and member states’ development priorities in, and disbursements to Vietnam. 
Recently the Southeast Asian individual Blue Books have been merged into one common 
ASEAN Blue Book, the first of which was published by the EU Delegation in Jakarta in 2016, 
and which replaced among others the Blue Book on Vietnam. Similar publications, namely the 
Green Books were published by the European Commercial Counsellors in Vietnam. However, 
these Green Books do not give information about the EU’s trade and economic activities in 
Vietnam, but about the status of Vietnam’s economy. Therefore, they are not suitable for this 
analysis. Consequently, the results of this analysis will be biased towards development-related 
policies, programs and projects, as the analysis includes development activities but not trade 
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activities. Under the scope of this dissertation, which is to assess normative policy coherence 
for development, this bias does not compromise the study but rather reinforces the focus on 
“for development”.  
Having a look at the Blue Books gives an indication about policy implementation as the Blue 
Books are a retrospective compilation of aid disbursements by country and sector, thus, 
showing the EU member states’ individual sector priorities, but at the same time it shows 
the EU’s overall commitment in development. Strictly speaking, the Blue Books do not 
represent policy documents in the sense that they prescribe a new policy. Nevertheless, this 
section is a complementary analysis to the previous sections to the extent that it is at the 
implementation level. In terms of the analytical levels above, this would fall into the second 
implementation stage, even though the Blue Books represent aggregated data from various 
project in combination with budget support to the Vietnamese government. Policy 
implementation stage I, however, is understood as the multi-annual indicative programs, or 
long-term programs tailored to the Vietnamese interests. The second implementation stage is 
short term and more detailed. 
The annual compilation of normative priorities as shown in table 10 below visualized the 
EU’s preferential shift over the years. Each Blue Book starts with a general explanation of 
the EU’s development policies which are based on the “common values” that are “respect for 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, 
the rule of law, solidarity and justice” (EU Delegation to Vietnam, 2009). This commitment 
is taken from the European Consensus on Development and does not address EU-Vietnam 
specific relations. Nevertheless, it reflects some sort of commitment to the values, or norms as 
they are termed in this research, simply by incorporating and emphasizing the Consensus 
and its vision for the EU’s development policies. However, a vision is merely a rhetorical 
strategy, which does not suffice for implementation. Vietnam-specific commitments only are 
the basis for the discussion below. 
Within each Blue Book, the member states’ priorities are described in addition to the EU policy 
priorities in Vietnam. Taking a closer look at the EU’s policy priorities, excluding the 
individual member state’s priority sectors, shows that donor coordination, democratic 
governance, the rule of law, human rights, economic reforms, policy coherence, gender 
equality and economic sustainability were among the EU priorities from 2007 to 2009. An 
overview of the priorities from 2007 until 2015 is given in table 11. In the 2010 Blue Book, 
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gender equality was particularly emphasized as the theme for all European Union policies and, 
consequently, was integrated into the relations with Vietnam. Similarly, environmental 
protection was included, which remained a priority throughout the year 2011. 
Table 11: (Non-) Normative Evolution Represented by the EU Blue Books 2007-2015 
 
2007 – 2009 2010 & 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Democratic 
governance 
Good 
governance 
Governance Good 
governance 
Governance Governance 
Rule of law  Corruption Corruption Rule of law Rule of law 
Human rights Human rights Human 
rights 
Human rights Human rights Human 
rights 
Economic 
reforms 
 Trade FTA FTA 
aid for trade 
FTA 
aid for trade 
Gender 
equality 
Gender 
equality 
Inequality Inequality Ethnic 
minorities 
 
Environmental 
sustainability 
Environment 
& 
climate 
change 
Green 
growth 
Environment Environment Energy 
Source: author’s compilation based on the EU Blue Books 2007-2015 
Environmental considerations, despite varying key words, remained important throughout the 
entire sequence from 2007 to 2015. Gender equality was incorporated into the priorities to a 
large extent, but to different degrees. In the year on gender equality in 2010 special emphasis 
was put on the issue, whereas low formal commitment was voiced in 2009, where gender 
equality is mentioned on the sidelines to policy coherence. In 2012, green growth was the most 
prominent topic, and in 2013, the post-2015 agenda with sustainable development was at the 
center. As this overview has shown, the focus of the EU’s development agenda in Vietnam 
varied slightly from year to year by putting different emphasis on the individual norms (as 
during the year of gender equality), but the norms remained the same over the period from 
2007 to 2015. 
In addition to the development priorities examined above, inter-regionalism has gained prominence 
on the EU’s agenda. In 2012, special attention was paid to EU-ASEAN relations. Interestingly, 
peace, which had not been an EU priority according to the Blue Books before 2012, was 
brought to the agenda in relation with ASEAN integration. The Blue Books show that the EU 
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has tried to promote itself as an example of regional integration, which has already brought 
peace and stability to a regional grouping and, consequently, can support other regions in the 
integration process. More recently, wider inter-regional relations between the EU and ASEAN, 
in particular economic cooperation, have become more important. Broader relations outside 
the scope of traditional donor-recipient relations with actors the Southeast Asia region is also 
reflected by the EU-VN Partnership and Cooperation and the EU-VN Free Trade Agreement 
negotiations, which have formed a significant topic in EU-Vietnam dialogues according to the 
2013 Blue Book. Thus, development cooperation seems to have moved to the background, 
whereas political and economic relations have been strengthened. Similarly, the normative 
dimension seems to be of lesser importance. Human rights, equality, good governance, the 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are still being mentioned in the introductory part of 
the Blue Book in relation to general EU development cooperation but moves into the 
background in the EU-Vietnam specific parts of the Blue Book. In the 2013 Blue Book, for 
example, good governance is listed between other areas of cooperation such as technology and 
tourism: “[The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement] will further the scope of bilateral 
cooperation in areas such as trade, the environment, energy, science and technology, good 
governance, as well as tourism, culture, migration, counter terrorism and the fight against 
corruption and organized crime” (EU Delegation to Vietnam, 2013, p.32). This excerpt shows 
that cooperation between the EU and Vietnam aims at addressing one norm in particular, i.e. 
good governance. Fighting corruption can be interpreted as a form of implementing the rule of 
law and as such constitutes a second norm. Most of the areas of cooperation, however, reflect 
technical cooperation such as energy, science, technology, organized crime, and tourism. 
Another interesting aspect arising out of the timeline assessment of the Blue Books is the 
replacement of gender equality by ethnic minority concerns in 2014. Neither “gender 
inequality” nor “inequality between men and women” occurred in that report, i.e. in the EU-
Vietnam relations during that time. Instead, the focus was placed on ethnic minorities, which, 
is obviously an issue not to be ignored. Prioritizing ethnic priorities certainly also addresses 
inequality, however, not in the sense of gender equality. While normative aspirations play a 
role in the 2014 Blue Book, it is worth mentioning that economic inequality guides the 
discussion. Two observations need to be made in this regard. First, if the two policy areas ethnic 
minorities and economic inequalities have just been linked in 2014, it is likely that prior to the 
thematic inclusion of ethnic minorities, the “average” Vietnamese inhabitant had been 
addressed by initiatives to reduce economic inequality leaving out the minorities that live in 
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mountainous, hard to reach places. Second, the linkage between ethnic minorities and 
economic inequalities raises the question as to why economic aspects are addressed solely 
while raising their political stakes would be just as important in order to create long-term 
change. 
This brief analysis reflects the EU’s overall attitude towards Vietnam in as much as the 
assessment of EU Blue Books give an overview of the EU’s priorities in Vietnam. In contrast 
to broader policy strategies, the Blue Books are annual publications and as such can reflect 
changes in the political landscape faster than medium- or long-term strategies. Notwithstanding 
this potential flexibility, a trend towards prioritizing energy, environment and trade is 
noticeable. Simultaneously, gender equality, inequality and ethnic minorities have lost their 
priority status, which again highlights the economic superiority over norms. 
4.2.4 Translating Norms from Guidelines into Programs: Normative Coherence? 
The content analysis of the above-examined policy documents shows changing commitment 
to norms across the implementation stages as presented in table 12. The green color indicates 
that at least 71 percent of the number of documents per implementing stage refer to the norm 
in question. For example, human rights were mentioned in 100 percent of the policy documents 
at the guideline level. On the contrary, liberty occurred in only one out of six documents (16 
percent). The cut-off for the “traffic-light” visualization is 0-40 percent (red), 41-70 percent 
(orange), 71-100 percent (green). 
Based on the distinction between core norms, minor norms and norms that fall outside of these 
two categories, table 12 shows that the commitment to norms has changed across the 
implementation stages but independently from the norm category. Only one of the core norms, 
namely human rights, has been mentioned across all four implementing stages. In other words, 
human rights is present in at least in 71 percent of all documents at each implementation stage. 
Democracy is the core norm, which falls under the 71 percent cut-off only at the policy 
formulation stage. At the other three stages is it mentioned at least 71 percent. The freedom, 
rule of law and peace show mixed representation. Liberty is not mentioned at either stage. 
Regarding minor norms, sustainable development is the most present across all four stages. 
Good governance was barely mentioned at the policy formulation stage but occurred with over 
71 percent at the guideline stage and both implementation stages. Non-discrimination is only 
mentioned at the guidelines level and the formulation level but disappeared at the 
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implementation levels. Solidarity is not represented apart from at the guideline level. Out of 
the “other norms”, those not initially classified by Manners (Manners, 2002), gender equality 
is the more present than justice, but both are not constant across policy implementation levels. 
Gender equality is mentioned across most policy documents from the guidelines level to the first 
implementation stage (multi-annual strategies), but not that regularly in the second 
implementation stage (Blue Books). Thus, regardless of the norm classification, the mentions 
vary between the different norms. Overall, human rights, democracy, sustainable development, 
good governance and gender equality are the most present. 
Table 12: Norm Representation at Each Stage of Policy Implementation 
 Policy 
Guidelines 
Policy 
Formulation 
Policy 
Implementation 
Stage I 
Policy 
Implementation 
Stage II 
Democracy     
Freedom     
Human Rights     
Liberty     
Peace     
Rule of Law     
Good 
Governance 
    
Non- 
discrimination 
    
Solidarity     
Sustainable 
Development 
    
Gender 
equality 
    
Justice     
Source: author’s own creation 
Table 12 shows that translating norms from one policy implementation stage to the next 
does not function smoothly. The major loss of norms occurs between the policy guidelines 
and the policy formulation stages. Out of 11 norms mentioned at the policy guidelines stage, 
merely four are represented to the same extent at the policy formulation stage. However, the 
overview also shows that general conclusions about the correlation between the policy 
implementation stage and norm representation cannot be made. Norm representation does not 
decrease with increasing practicality of the document, except between policy guidelines and 
policy formulation. At the policy guideline level, all norms were mentioned in the majority of 
documents except for liberty. At the other three levels, norm representation is mixed. Thus, 
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norm representation tends to decline from guidelines to formulation, but then remains stable, 
i.e. mixed, across the implementation levels. 
Regarding policy coherence, already in the first Blue Book, the EU emphasized the aim 
to increase coherence between development and trade policies. A reason for this could be 
Vietnam’s selection as a pilot country for aid effectiveness, which was to be achieved through 
stronger coordination and harmonization between ODA donors. The theme remained 
prominent until 2015 but to varying degrees. Similar to the themes and norms represented in 
the table above, policy coherence takes different stances in the report. In some reports, entire 
sections are dedicated to policy coherence, while in others it is only a mention. Furthermore, 
the general development strategy by the EU tends to be norm driven, whereas the EU-Vietnam 
strategy in particular takes a turn towards trade cooperation and sectoral cooperation after 
2013 in particular. 
4.3 NPCD IN THE EU’S INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
4.3.1 The European External Action Service 
One of the major institutional changes in the Lisbon Treaty regarding policy coherence 
for development is, as already briefly mentioned earlier, the creation of the post of the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The High Representative, who is also 
one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, is the head of the newly created European 
External Action Service (EEAS). The HR could play a crucial role in implementing PCD 
and normative PCD for two reasons. First, the HR is one of the vice-presidents of the European 
Commission and as such the direct link between one of the major legislative institutions on the 
one hand and one of the major executive institutions in external relations on the other. 
Furthermore, the HR has been given the explicit task to ensure the consistency of EU external 
policies as well as coordinating the EU’s external actions: 
Lisbon Treaty Art. 18 
[…] 4. The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He 
shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the 
Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating 
other aspects of the Union's external action. […] 
While the Maastricht Treaty introduced policy coordination within the EU for the first time, 
the responsibilities for coherence have changed with the post of the HR. In Art. 3 TEU-post-
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Maastricht the following statement is made regarding policy coherence for development: “The 
Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the 
context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and 
the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to 
this end” (italics added). The “consistency of EU external policies” was taken up in the Lisbon 
Treaty as well, but the responsibilities for consistency were transferred from the Councils and 
the Commission to the high representative as shown in Art. 18 above. While the High 
Representative has the oversight over all external policies of the EU, the Commission remains 
the main legislative initiator in the development sector. Despite retaining the co-decision 
procedure (“ordinary legislative procedure” since Lisbon), which states that the Commission 
initiates legislation, the Council and the European Parliament revise and approve/disapprove, 
the creation of the EEAS seems to have had some influence on the Council’s perceived 
legislative powers (Interview 2). 
Criticism regarding the creation of the EEAS is not only voiced with regard to the creation of a 
new arena for competition of power, i.e. between the Council and the EEAS as well as between 
the Commission and the EEAS, but also regarding staff redistribution between the Council, the 
Commission, national diplomats and the EEAS (Gräßle, 2011). Administrative issues, i.e. 
budgetary oversight, have come up as the Commission used to be the budget manager. Since 
the creation of the EEAS, the EEAS can decide about part of the budget with the respective 
Commissioner in charge of the development budget, neighborhood budget and human rights 
budget (Gräßle, 2011). 
“The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate 
initiatives to that end. […] It shall execute the budget and manage programs. It shall exercise 
coordinating, executive and management functions, as laid down in the Treaties. With the 
exception of the common foreign and security policy, […] it shall ensure the Union's external 
representation. It shall initiate the Union's annual and multiannual programming with a view 
to achieving inter-institutional agreements” (Art. 17 TEU post-Lisbon). 
The Commission’s executive power in external affairs was reduced to budgetary issues as 
consequence of the introduction of Article 17 TEU. While the Commission could make 
political statements through its budget allocation prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS has 
started taking those political decisions since 2009. As a result, the Commission remains in 
charge of sole budget administration. 
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In addition to the competence struggles, issues related to normative debates have arisen due to 
the creation of the EEAS. The Commission is the actor within the EU initiating wider strategies 
and specific policies and in doing so brings in normative elements into the proposals (Hardacre 
& Smith, 2014). According to one of the respondents, however, the Commission’s perceived 
moral stance in development has been weakened ever since the creation of the EEAS (Interview 
2). While the actual legislative decision-making procedure has not changed, the role of the 
High Representative and the EEAS might influence the Commission’s proposals, in the least 
when it comes to the execution in terms of budgetary allocations. As a result, the role of DG 
DEVCO as the expert in development in being undermined by the EEAS and the roles of each 
actor become unclear (Interview 2). In other terms, the EEAS is claimed to bring more policy 
coherence into the EU system, but simultaneously it causes uncertainty. On the one hand, this 
might merely be a temporary state during which the institutions and member states need to 
adjust to new processes, but which might lead to more coherence in the long term. On the other 
hand, it could be a strategic measure from the member states to regain political power in EU 
affairs (Interview 2). The complications, uncertainties and struggles between the different 
EU institutions are aptly summarized by Kostanyan (2016, p.27): “The outcome of the 
compromise is evident in the EEAS’s sui generis nature of being neither a supranational nor an 
inter-governmental body: having unique linkages with the EU member states; being somewhat 
accountable to the European Parliament; and receiving a requirement to cooperate with the 
European Commission”. 
While the creation of the High Representative aims to ensure horizontal coherence 
between different policy arenas, despite existing difficulties, vertical coherence between the 
EU and its member states is covered in the Treaties as well: “In order to promote the 
complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the Member States shall 
coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their 
aid programs, including in international organizations and during international conferences 
[…]” (Art. 210 TFEU-post-Lisbon, italics added). The institutional structure to improve this 
type of coherence, however, is not given. 
In terms of normative coherence, the creation of the EEAS has for now not yet brought 
more coherence as issues over responsibilities still prevail. Linking all external actions via 
one service has the potential, though, to create horizontal coherence between policy arenas 
once the competences and responsibilities are clearer. Vertical coherence between the EU 
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and member states remains at consultation basis. Another institutional measure to increase 
coherence is monitoring implementation, which can be done in the form of impact assessments. 
When and how impact assessments are conducted in the EU is described in the following sub-
section. 
4.3.2 Impact Assessments: Improving Development, Sustainability or Human Rights? 
The Commission report on the EU’s and member states’ implementation of PCD covering 
the period 2013-2015 somewhat contradicts this impression of more policy coherence 
(European Commission, 2015b). The report focuses on the policy areas trade and finance, 
food security, climate change, migration, and security. In this report, the Commission points its 
efforts to conduct impact assessments for policies that might have major effects on 
economic, social and environmental aspects, but at the same time admits that assessing 
the impact on developing countries remains a challenge. The impact assessments of 
development policies are only one type of impact assessments. 
Another PCD initiative are the Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIA) designed for trade 
policies and their impact on economic, social and environmental aspects. These were already 
developed in and conducted since 1999, thus in terms of the above categorization “post-
Maastricht”. Impact assessments are a tool to be used to assess policies expected effects on a 
certain sector or group of people. Sustainability Impact Assessments and Human Rights Impact 
Assessments (HRIA) are two tools to ensure that negative externalities are kept at a minimum. 
Problematic, however, that the HRIA is not integrated in the EU policy-making procedure. 
According to the Commission, “[t]he Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) is a DG Trade-
specific tool for supporting major trade negotiations. SIAs provide the Commission with an in-
depth analysis of the potential economic, social, human rights, and environmental impacts of 
ongoing trade negotiations” (European Commission, 2018). 
The Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment has been conducted for the FTA between the EU 
and ASEAN and was published in 2009, the year in which negotiations were stopped. The 
assessment was led by ECORYS, a Dutch consulting company, and executed in cooperation 
with other independent institutions, but financed by the European Commission. According to 
the report, substantial positive impacts were expected for ASEAN but only minor impacts for 
the EU. Positive aspects for ASEAN were the expected trade growth due to trade liberalization, 
rise in GDP, and increased income due to the removal of non-tariff barriers. For the EU, the 
services sector and trade sector were expected to expand. Thus, the overall economic outcomes 
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for both regions were expected to be positive. 
With regard to the social impacts, issues such as poverty rate, income distribution, employment 
rate and household income were considered. Short-term poverty and unemployment were 
expected to occur due to more competition between the regions, but also expected to be 
overcome by retraining staff to meet new labor market demands. Health and education levels 
were expected to increase as a result to general economic growth. Equality was also dealt with 
in the assessment, but only related to labor force, income distribution and skills-dependent 
employment opportunities. These issues highlight that even the social impacts seem to have 
solely an economic dimension that is measured in the sustainability impact assessment. 
With regard to environmental impacts, the focus was placed on increased production and 
related pollution, land use and effects on biodiversity. The modelled results showed that minor 
negative effects were to be expected but could be mitigated by appropriate support from the 
EU. Illegal logging was listed as an area of particular concern that would have to be addressed 
with measures such as the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan 
(FLEGT). 
Overall, the Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment pointed out the limited negative effects 
on both regions and highlighted that positive effects would outweigh the negative effects. 
These results are not surprising for three reasons. First, the Commission as the issuer and 
financer of the assessment can define the terms and conditions for such an assessment. In light 
of the then ongoing negotiations, it probably would have been inappropriate to discourage the 
FTA. In the case of unemployment, for example, the emphasis is laid on retraining to 
overcome unemployment instead of the fact that unemployment would increase as a first result 
of fiercer competition under the FTA. This is not to say that the assessment is incorrect, but 
that terminology plays a role and negative implications can be reformulated according to 
needs. Second, most of the impacts were measured according to economic standards such as 
household income as previously mentioned. This measure, however, was used under the 
social impacts heading instead of the economics heading, which raises doubts as to how the 
social impact assessment indeed represents social aspects. Issues like, healthcare systems, 
pension funds, or unemployment benefits would be aspects that reflect the social dimension, 
but these are hardly predictable and highly political concerns and, as a result, difficult to 
measure, assess or model in such a consultation. Third, the human rights dimension has been 
left out in the impact assessment. Contrary to what the Commission states, the EU-ASEAN 
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SIA did not cover human rights aspects apart from a mention of the current critical state in 
ASEAN: “The migration flows are again related to the relatively high unemployment levels that 
remain in Philippines and Indonesia. Migrant workers in turn bring with them a host of social 
and human rights problems and issues, that need addressing in the wider context of sustainable 
economic and social development” (ECORYS, 2009, p.11). Not addressing sensitive topics is 
a way to emphasize positive effects over negative effects. For those reasons, highlighting 
expected positive results over negative ones is not surprising. No separate sustainable impact 
assessment has been undertaken for the EU-Vietnam FTA. 
This example illustrates how flexibly the impact assessments can be applied. In theory, it 
is a suitable tool to raise awareness about issues that would not be considered otherwise, such 
as social implications of a trade agreement, but the voluntary basis leaves too much room 
for tactical behavior. If it can be decided freely when to apply an impact assessment, many 
cases will go unnoticed and negative effects might occur which could have been prevented if 
the assessment had been conducted. In term of normative coherence, these assessments, both the 
SIA and HRIA, would make a contribution to greater coherence as they push for a commitment 
to certain standards. Those technical standards, in turn, are created to ensure a decent quality 
of life for humans and as such are a normative matter. 
4.3.3 Examining Aid for Trade with the Examples of EU-MUTRAP and EVBN 
A particularly interesting feature in the institutional set-up are two EU projects that aim to 
improve the economic landscape in Vietnam, but which are actually financed through 
development aid channels. Those two projects are the European Trade Policy and Investment 
Support Project (EU-MUTRAP) and the EU-Vietnam Business Network (EVBN). Strictly 
speaking, the EVBN is financed by the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialized 
Countries (ICI) and not by the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) as usual 
development projects, but because it is managed by the development section in the EU 
delegation, it is considered here as a project which widely represents aid for trade. EVBN 
clearly does not fall into the classical understanding of aid for trade as a particular program 
geared at certain countries to improve their trade capacities, but because it brings European 
companies into the country and, therefore, strengthens the economy and trade relations, it is 
still considered here. This contradiction is interesting by itself given that Vietnam received 
development assistance, which in turn would mean it is a developing country, but at the same 
time receives funds under an instrument, which is aimed at developed countries. Placing 
Vietnam among the developed countries while it is currently classified as middle-income 
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country reflects Vietnam’s expected economic role in the future. On the other hand, it also 
reflects that funds can be made available from different sources if the interest in a given 
country is strong enough, which seems to be the case here. This special treatment of Vietnam as 
an economically interesting country implies the EU’s prioritization of its economic interests over 
other commitments such as norm promotion. 
In its Aid for Trade Strategy, the EU has committed to support developing countries in 
integrating into the global trading system. Aid for Trade to Vietnam has fluctuated over the 
years. In 2015 the EU provided roughly EUR 50 million to Vietnam, mainly in “building 
productive capacity” (BPC), whereas in 2014, Vietnam received roughly EUR 330 million 
with the major share being “trade related infrastructure” (TRI), which is similar to 2013, when 
Vietnam received approximately EUR 260 million with the major share attributed to TRI 
(European Commission, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a). The share between the ASEAN countries seems 
to fluctuate notably between the years. Indonesia, for example, received roughly EUR 70 
million in 2014 and EUR 830 million in 2015. Figure 11 gives an example of the aid 
distribution from the EU to ASEAN countries. 
In general, Aid for Trade, i.e. funds, are allocated by category, which have been defined by the 
WTO. Category 1 is Trade Policy and Regulations (TPR), category 2 Trade Development (TD), 
category 3 Trade Related Infrastructure (TRI), category 4 Building Productive Capacity (BPC), 
category 5 is Trade Related Adjustment and the last category covers Other Trade Related Needs 
(OTRN). TPR and TD together are considered as trade related assistance, which is AfT in a 
narrower sense. Together, all categories cover AfT in a wider sense (Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2015). 
As figure 11 shows, in 2014, Vietnam has received the largest share of aid for trade 
disbursements with the majority of funds going to trade related infrastructure. Funds to 
Cambodia and Thailand were solely allocated to building productive capacity. Malaysia 
received the smallest share of aid for trade funds in 2014. 
From an economic development perspective, MUTRAP aligns perfectly with the aid for 
trade objective that aims at improving a country’s economic landscape and support the 
country’s integration into the global trade market. “The EU, through its bilateral "Multilateral 
Trade Assistance Program" MUTRAP II, supported Vietnam in its accession to the WTO 
and in implementing its WTO commitments. 
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Currently, MUTRAP III aims to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
to further implement and develop Vietnam's trade and economic integration strategy” 
(European Union, 2010). How, though, do the EVBN and EU-MUTRAP projects foster EU 
norms such as human rights, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, or gender equality? 
Figure 11: Aid for Trade from the EU to ASEAN Countries in 2014 
 
 
Source: European Commission aid for trade report 2016 
 
EU-MUTRAP 
EU-MUTRAP is a continuation project to finalize the previously implemented Multilateral 
Trade Policy Support (MUTRAP), which was in place from 2001 to 2012. In the 2010 Blue 
Book, the EU delegation announced the initiation of MUTRAP II to support Vietnam’s 
capacities to meet WTO requirements and implement trade related measures and 
simultaneously showing the EU’s role as a donor in Vietnam: 
“[…], the MUTRAP III project was conceived. It is a project, which is focused on 
strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) in its core 
responsibilities of trade policy-making, WTO coordination, negotiation of regional and free 
trade agreements and the implementation of integration commitments and enforcement of 
competition policy. It allows the EU to further consolidate its leading role among the donor 
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community in the trade-related assistance area” (EU Delegation to Vietnam, 2010). 
The MUTRAP project not only aims at supporting Vietnam in its process of integrating into 
the international trading system but is also a tool for the EU to strengthen its position in the 
Southeast Asian region. The current EU-MUTRAP phase is scheduled for the period 2012 to 
2018 with the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) as the implementing agency 
and aims to improve Vietnam’s capacity to enter the free trade agreement and to integrate 
Vietnam into the global trading system as well as into the ASEAN region. This project is 
heavily funded by the EU with EUR 15 million out of a total budget of EUR 16.5 million. 
Compared to the overall AfT funds that are allocated to Vietnam, the MUTRAP project is just 
a small project, which is nevertheless worth paying attention to. The following five goals are 
envisaged as the main results as presented on the project website15: 
1. EU-Vietnam trade and investment relations are strengthened through enhanced dialogue 
and co-operation, and the negotiation and implementation of a future EU-Vietnam FTA 
2. The institutional capacity for the negotiation and implementation of multilateral, regional 
and sub-regional trade commitments is strengthened; 
3. Investment policy frameworks are improved, with a particular focus on the environmental 
and social issues in trade and investment related policies and legislation; 
4. The access to information, regulations and market opportunities relative to Vietnam’s 
international trade and investment commitments is improved; with the increased 
stakeholders’ participation in the trade and investment policy development process; and 
enhanced capacity among SMEs to comply with European market access requirements; 
and 
5. EU-VN dialogue in economic areas of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Partnership and Cooperation (PCA) is supported; and flexible assistance is provided to 
address important urgent trade issues. (bold added) 
 
This project indicates that not only does the EU support Vietnam’s capacity building in 
the economic sector, but particularly with focus on the European market and the agreements 
between Vietnam and the EU. The aid for trade project seems to be strongly pushed by a 
European agenda aimed at stronger trade relations that focuses on the EU’s interests rather than 
Vietnam’s ambitions. Of course, the interests of both actors do not have to be mutually 
exclusive. On the contrary, they can overlap and be beneficial for both actors. A stronger 
Vietnamese economy is beneficial for Vietnam in the first place, but also for the trading 
                                                          
 
15 MUTRAP: http://mutrap.org.vn/index.php/en/about-eu-mutrap-2 Last accessed on November,08 2017 
140 
 
partners. Thus, supporting Vietnam in its negotiating powers or capacity building can be 
profitable for both the EU and Vietnam. Since AfT is part of the official ODA to Vietnam, 
development cooperation is strongly instilled by an economic scope rather than a normative 
scope. 
EU-Vietnam Business Network (EVBN) 
EVBN is a project that has been set up in 2014 to support small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) establish a network between European and Vietnamese companies to 
establish cooperation and foster exports to Vietnam. EVBN also provides physical space for 
European companies that have not yet opened an office in Vietnam but aim to do so. “The 
overall objective of EU-Vietnam Business Network (EVBN) is to increase exports and 
investments of the European Union (EU) to Vietnam in particular by Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) as well as strengthening the EU Business sector in Vietnam by facilitating 
market access. […]” (EVBN, 2018). 
 
Given this strong trade focus, the question arises why this project is co-funded through the 
EU development funds. The argument could be made that strengthening the Vietnamese 
economy supports economic growth and, therefore, development, however, the quote above 
clearly shows that the EVBN works in favor of European business and trade. 
4.3.4 Final Remark about the Institutional Structure 
Overall, the Commission remains hesitant about the success of PCD implementation. For 
example, within member states, institutional barriers remain towards the coordination of 
policies. Especially coordination between ministries can still be improved. The Commission 
lists several challenges for itself as well: improving mechanisms to identify implications on 
development objectives, increasingly integrating development objectives into other policies, 
systematic impact assessments and progress reports, and raising general awareness about the 
importance of PCD. A cause for hesitation could be the internal division of the Commission. 
The Commission is predominantly viewed as the promoter of PCD within the EU, but internally 
its Directorate Generals (DGs) do not always align (Carbone & Keijzer, 2016). Next to internal 
challenges, the relation between the EU institutions and the member states often shows 
political conflicts as well with the result that some member states are not in favor of the supra-
national nature of the EU and consequently blocking progress in some policy sectors (Carbone 
& Keijzer, 2016). 
The links between the EU’s institutional set-up and normative PCD remain fragile. Previous 
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studies have indicated that the Lisbon Treaty has not had the reformative character in PCD 
but rather reinforced traditional mechanisms (Keukeleire & Raube, 2013). While there are 
efforts by the Commission to increase PCD in the EU institutions and also in the member states, 
actual practices remain weak. This implies that normative policy coherence for development 
remains weak as well. The report does address the three main norms identified above (human 
rights, sustainable development, and gender equality), but with a lack of PCD implementing 
mechanisms the chance of norms remaining at the rhetorical/political level are high. On top 
of that, this report gives the impression that PCD is embedded in a general effort towards the 
SDGs, suggesting the conceptual understanding of PCD as a process, but the Commissions 
efforts point towards a PCD-as-an-outcome approach, which is likely to limit PCD to the 
commitment level but does not encourage PCD at the policy implementation stage. The results 
feed into the critical scholarship that recognizes that policy coherence for development still 
requires major efforts by various actors to implement the idea and move beyond the 
technical or managerial implementing procedures (Carbone & Keijzer, 2016; Keukeleire & 
Raube, 2013; Koff & Maganda, 2016). 
4.4 NPE, NPCD AND NORM REPRESENTATION 
This section links the above undertaken policy document analysis to the assumed path from 
normative power to normative policy coherence as presented in chapter two. As stated above, 
the mention of norms in documents is a first indicator for normative policy coherence. 
However, the mention of norms cannot be equated with normative power. 
 
The line of argumentation used in this analysis started out with normative power, which 
leads to norm implementation, which in turn leads to normative policy coherence for 
development. This line of argumentation presumed that normative power pre-exists norm 
implementation. As the analysis above shows, a hierarchical distinction can be made between 
the European Treaties, which represent policy guidelines, and the agreements/policy programs, 
which are two layers of implementation (formulation and implementation I). Taking the NPE 
approach, the EU gets its normative power from “what it is”, i.e. its creation and institutional 
arrangement (Manners, 2002). The creation and institutions are represented by the Treaties 
and, therefore, the Treaties are a representation of what the EU is and consequently its 
normative power. In this sense, normative power, as represented by the Treaties, precedes norm 
implementation in agreements, programs and projects. Critics have argued, though, that 
inconsistency between what the EU represents itself to be and what it actually practices has 
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negative implications on NPE (Diez, 2005). Therefore, “what the EU does” is equally relevant 
for normative power as “what the EU is”. “What the EU does” is represented by the remaining 
three stages of policy implementation, i.e. policy formulation, policy implementation through 
programs, and policy implementation through projects. Normative policy coherence is 
influenced by both aspects of normative power as visualized in figure 12. Policy guidelines 
(treaties/what it is) give the framework for agreements that the EU concludes with other 
countries and those agreements set the framework for any programs or projects developed 
under this bilateral relationship. At the same time those policy guidelines are guidelines on 
the normative basis and on policy coherence. Consequently, “what it is” shapes “what it does” 
and normative policy coherence. The treaties, however, are only considered as a guideline and 
not as putting rhetoric into practice. 
Thus, policy implementation is another factor which shapes normative policy coherence. NPCD 
is a result of both “what it is” and “what it does”. The relationship between NPCD and 
policy implementation is reciprocal. 
 
Figure 12: NPCD requires Rhetoric and Practice 
 
 
NPCD What it is What it does 
 
 
 
Source: author’s own creation 
 
Having this scheme in mind, norm representation falls within the scope of NPE at two levels. 
Norm representation at the “what it is” level remains the same for development and trade 
policies. The treaties set guidelines, which are applicable for all EU policies. A special section 
dedicated to external relations highlights the EU’s normative character in external affairs, as 
the previous analysis has shown. Norm representation at the “what it does” level becomes 
more complex, because two agreements are in place which disconnect trade from all other 
cooperation between the EU and Vietnam. 
Norm representation strongly remains at the guideline level. That is to say that having a look at 
the implementation levels, normative references are made in relation to the guiding policies 
and are not integrated into the actual 2-3-year programs or the projects. In many cases, norms 
are only referenced in relation to the EU Treaty and the general EU commitment to norms. In 
other terms, the EU presents itself as “what it is” and lacks behind with the implementation, 
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“what it does”. Thus, across the four implementation levels, norms are often not translated 
into action. This incoherence can decrease the EU’s normative power as it affects “what it 
does”, which is part of what constitutes normative power. Simultaneously, the EU’s actions 
lead to normative policy incoherence. 
The NPE-NPCD relationship differs between development and trade policies. Norm 
representation in trade is less at the policy guidelines level and the policy formulation 
level than it is in development. Comparing the Trade for All strategy to the New European 
Consensus on Development, the rule of law, human rights, good governance and sustainable 
development are the core and minor norms represented in both documents. On the contrary, 
democracy, peace and solidarity are only mentioned in the Consensus. Both documents do not 
refer to liberty. Interestingly, in the Trade for All proposal, gender equality, which is strongly 
represented across the policy implementation levels, is not included. A similar divergence can 
be noted at the formulation level, i.e. between the PCA and FTA. While the PCA, which 
governs the development relationship between the EU and Vietnam, already makes less 
reference to norms than the Lisbon Treaty and the European Consensus, the FTA only makes 
direct reference to sustainable development and non-discrimination. As already mentioned, 
peace and human rights are referred to by both parties’ commitment to UN conventions. 
Thus, the FTA includes comparatively less norms than the PCA. On the other hand, having a 
look at development practices, norms are not represented coherently. Human rights are 
represented throughout all Blue Books, but gender equality efforts were discontinued after 
2012. As a result, incoherence does not only occur between development and trade but also 
within development. 
Whether and how the EU utilizes the norms for strategic purposes is not examined in the scope 
of this research. It is worth mentioning though, that given the NPCD definition used in this 
research the strategic use of norms for other purposes would not lead to more incoherence or 
less NPCD. On the contrary, this practice might even enhance NPCD because it could 
potentially bring norms into areas that are not the commonly known to be strongly normative. 
NPCD and policy analysis are not tool to measure whether the EU is a strong or a weak 
normative power, neither how the EU sources or the quality of normative power. Instead, 
NPCD is a concept through with the EU’s policies mirror its rhetorical commitments. The EU 
is committed to human rights, for example, and not including human rights in its development 
and trade policies would result in normative policy incoherence. The underlying reasons why 
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norms are included or excluded a give policy is of minor importance in this case. It is certainly 
a relevant question to consider but falls outside the scope of the NPCD conceptualization 
applied here. 
Regarding the question “Does the EU represent itself as a normative power in the 
development sector?”, this chapter showed that the EU uses different strategies for 
expressing normative commitment. This is linked to the different levels of policy 
implementation and the policy arena. At the policy guidelines level, the EU uses a strong 
rhetoric continuously pointing out the shares principles and founding values,  which have 
led to the creation of the European Union and now guide all EU policies. At the policy 
formulation level, a distinction is made between the agreements that cover trade relations and 
the agreement that covers all other relations. In the EU-VN FTA a mention is made towards the 
PCA, which in turn refers to the EU Treaties and the Charter of Human Rights, but the distinction 
between the two is made clear, which gives some answers to the question “Does the EU 
represent itself as a normative power in the trade sector?”. Despite the seemingly universal 
character of the EU “values” and “principles”, they are not visibly relevant in trade policies. 
Neither at the policy formulation level, nor at the policy implementation level. In contrast, the 
more trade relations become prominent, the less do norms seems to play a crucial role. 
This interest divide is one of the causes of incoherence presented in chapter one. In 
external relations, coherence between different policies is important for policy effective and 
from a normative dimension, it is crucial to not undermine norm driven policies. As the 
previous section shows, normative PCD in EU policies with Vietnam is uneven in the EU’s 
legal/administrative framework. Various policy documents show that norms are integrated, 
but similarly the majority of norms is not clearly incorporated in the texts and, therefore, the 
representation of norms is mixed. Despite the fact that the lack of normative policy coherence 
for development might be intended or unintended (Picciotto, 2005), the Commission report 
shows that initiatives to improve coherence exist and that norms do play a role in policy 
implementation (European Commission, 2015b). The results of the suggested improvements 
remain to be seen. 
Placing the above analysis in the actor-intention model, the causes of incoherence become 
clear. Given the focus on the legal and institutional structure, the actor driven reasons for 
incoherence do not apply to this chapter. This will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
Unintentional structural incoherence arose through the rivalry between DG DEVCO and the 
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EEAS over budget allocations. This can also be seen as an unintentional institutional 
incoherence presented in figure 13. 
Figure 13: Applying the Framework of the Intention-Autonomy Model 
  
Autonomy   
Actor   
N/A N/A 
  
  
  
Intention Intentional Unintentional 
Inst.: Council/Com/EEAS 
Interests: Dev-Trade 
Information: N/A 
Rivalry/Institutions: 
DEVCO/EEAS  
  
  
  
  
Structure   
Source: author’s application of Hydén’s (1999) intention-autonomy model 
Intentional incoherence due to structural reasons are the divide between the European 
institutions (Council, Commission) and the new EU service EEAS, and within the institutions. 
In addition to this institutional incoherence, an interest-based separation between development 
and trade is made. The lack of information was another structural intentional cause placed in 
the bottom-right quadrant. However, given the impact assessments and the position of the High 
Representative, lack of information does not seem to be an intentional cause anymore. 
The following chapter will add the implementation layer to the preceding discussion and, 
furthermore, argue how sectoral separation between diplomatic, political, development and 
trade networks limit normative coherence. 
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Chapter 5: NPCD and Policy Networks 
– Empirical Evidence from Vietnam 
Normative policy coherence for development is a result of normative policy implementation, 
which in turn implies that norms are implemented at all levels, among which is the foreign 
community level in Vietnam. National delegations from European countries are represented 
in Vietnam to implement policies at the local level. In addition to the policy commitment to 
norms as shown in the previous chapter, policy networks that shape around a certain sector or 
around a certain issue play an important role in the NPCD study, because the diplomats are the 
links that connect policy documents to activities in the field. Therefore, this chapter addresses 
the following sub-questions: 
Do the EU and member state officials view the EU as a normative power in the development 
sector? 
This question aims to address how the EU is perceived in the development sector by the very 
people working in the development sector such as the development counselors at the 
embassies, the implementing agencies or national development organizations. It is expected 
that the EU presents itself as a normative actor, because development policies are a tool for 
external policies and due to its flexibility and minor economic relevance compared to trade, it 
would be a suitable measure for the EU to promote norms like human rights, democracy, 
freedom, or equality as part of their development strategy. 
 
Do the EU and member state officials view the EU as a normative power in the trade sector? 
In contrast to development, the EU aims to improve its trade relations with its partners 
and is dependent on imports and exports from third countries. As a result, imposing non-trade 
rules might hamper the trade relationship as these are conventionally not part of any trade 
agreement. Labor standards as brought forward by the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
have recently been included in trade agreements. Apart from those, it is unlikely that the 
EU initiates normative discussions, and as a result, it would not present itself and not be 
perceived as a normative actor in the trade sector. The actors that, for this research, are 
part of the trade sector are economic/trade/commercial counselors at the embassies and 
representatives from the chambers of commerce. Businesses have not been included here. 
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Why might existing policy networks limit normative coherence between development and 
trade policies? 
Linking the two prior inquiries, this last question addressed in this chapter inquires whether 
norms cross the two sectors or whether sectoral isolation exists. This could go both ways, but 
given the assumption that norms are apparent in development and not in trade, the spill-over 
should be unidirectional. However, chapter four has shown that the sectors operate separately, 
so normative spill-over from development to trade is likely to not take place. 
 
Before turning to the analysis, two remarks should be made. Diplomats are not the only 
actors implementing policies in the field. They are part of a wider group that comprises non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, individual action, grassroots 
activities and others, but the focus on diplomats draws attention to the official national and 
European approach as diplomats are expected to follow the formal guidelines included in 
the treaties, strategies and programs discussed in chapter four. The relationship between actors 
and systems is another aspect to consider as policy communities can either be actor driven or 
system driven. For example, sectoral networks are in place because the different sectors dictate 
the separation. That is, there might be a health sector, an education sector, an agriculture 
sector, as well as the development and trade sectors. These sectors are part of a larger 
political system that divides the tasks of a government into manageable areas. Whether 
there are smaller networks within each sector might then depend on the internal organization. 
In addition to these structural divisions, there are issue networks, which are more actor driven. 
Issue networks evolve around a group of people that share the same interest in a given topic, 
either inside a sector or crossing over several sectors. 
In the previous chapter, the normative power understood as normative commitment in the 
EU’s legal and administrative framework has been discussed and its relations to normative 
policy coherence examined. This chapter will add to that discussion by introducing the 
implementation stage to the analysis. Implementation is understood as the practice on the 
ground, i.e. in the embassies, development agencies and trade missions. This is to address the 
issue of normative policy coherence between development and trade being limited due to their 
sectoral isolation. Isolation is defined here as limited awareness about other policy sectors and 
separation of responsibilities between the sectors limited knowledge in one policy sector about 
other policy sectors. As this study only analyses the EU’s side of the relationship, all 
terminology used in this chapter only refers to European (EU + member states) networks, such 
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as the monthly meetings, or the European perception of inter-relational networks, such as the 
European narrative about meetings with the Vietnamese government. The Vietnamese 
government was not open to receive researchers. Researchers, so it was impossible to 
implement interviews with officials from that country during periods of field research. The 
findings presented below are based on the interviews conducted with EU and member state 
officials during field research in Hanoi and Brussels as detailed in chapter two. 
5.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICY NETWORKS AND 
NPCD 
For now, literature on policy communities and policy networks has largely focused on 
policy-making at the agenda setting and policy adoption level in a national, European and 
global setting (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992; Falkner, 2000; Kisby, 2007; Stone, 2008; Wray, 
2009). This chapter aims to contribute to this strand of literature on the policy cycle approach 
by examining the policy implementation level more closely, specifically through the lens of 
policy networks in relation to normative policy coherence for development. 
As stated in chapter one, policy communities are a sub-set of political systems in which 
different like-minded actors with a shared belief system come together for dialogue in a certain 
policy area to shape actions/activities. Policy networks are defined as groups of actors, which 
interact under a common theme. Sector networks are a form of policy network, which assemble 
actors from within an institutionally designed policy sector. Issue networks are groupings of 
actors who share an interest in a common topic, but of which the structure is not pre-defined. 
Theories of governance related to these approaches contend that actors in specific policy 
arenas establish a system of interest-representation through formal and informal interactions in 
which they work together to promote sectoral interests in political agendas (Rogowski, 
1989). This study examines how actors in development and trade pursue these sectoral 
agendas and how norms evolve based on sectoral understandings. 
5.1.1 Communication Can Improve Normative Policy Coherence 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that institutional settings in the EU undermine NPCD in 
many cases. However, individual actors have the possibility to act outside the institutional 
settings and create networks across sectoral or hierarchical boundaries. This chapter 
addresses the question: Why might existing policy networks limit normative coherence 
between development and trade policies? 
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Going back to Sen’s (1999) understanding of development as freedom, economic capabilities 
are not only as relevant as political and social capabilities, but they are mutually reinforcing each 
other. Thus, increasing economic capabilities in a country, i.e. strengthen trade relations, 
without simultaneously supporting political and social development does not fulfill the full 
potential of the capabilities available. That is to say that all five aspects of freedom (political 
freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective 
security), as defined by Sen (1999), are necessary to provide individual human beings with 
the possibility to exercise his capabilities. Focusing on only one aspect, for example the 
economic dimension, will limit the individual in terms of the other freedoms such as political 
and social freedom, transparency, and security. The importance of all five freedoms to 
achieve normative development highlights the interconnectivity between social, political 
economic, security and environmental concerns. Due to this interrelation, these five types of 
freedoms could become more important in trade policies, which usually tend to focus on 
trade related issues only, given the exchange between the development and trade networks. 
NPCD suggests strengthening the exchange and cooperation between the development and 
trade networks in the interest of development policies to improve coherence for development. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter though, the new trade agreements between the 
EU and third countries do include a chapter on sustainability, which shows a move beyond the 
traditional trade scope and towards an expanding trade agenda. Institutional commitment to 
norms and coherence is not sufficient though to improve NPCD throughout all levels of 
policy-making. Therefore, the role of policy networks needs to be examined to shed light on 
potential gaps in the implementation system. 
The analysis of policy networks in this case feeds into the study of underlying power 
relationships within the EU and the consequent decisions that are made regarding external 
relations. Policy coherence for development by definition prioritizes development over trade, 
for example, but EU policies do not always represent this conceptual understanding despite the 
EU’s strong commitment to PCD. Thus, a closer look to policy communities, networks, and 
their interaction can shed more light onto the gaps of PCD implementation. 
Coming back to the two-dimensional classification of causes of incoherence (as presented 
in chapter two, Figure 2), the analysis of policy networks can help identify some underlying 
factors that are related to these causes of incoherence. Autonomy, on the one hand, and 
intention, on the other hand, frame the distinction of four causes of incoherence: divergent 
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interests, lack of information, institutional arrangements, and unintentional rivalry. The policy 
networks are fit into divergent interests, lack of information and institutional arrangements. 
Institutional arrangements are the sectoral divisions between development and trade. This is a 
structural set-up, which has been created intentionally to divide tasks and responsibilities. Lack 
of information is a result of the institutional arrangement. I would not fully agree that lack of 
information is unintentional. The “intensity” of lack is a factor to be examined in further detail. 
For example, in this case there are monthly meetings for all the EU member state delegates on 
development, which are attended by the development counselors. They do share information, 
but it remains within the sector. How much of this information is later shared with the 
colleagues from their embassy depends on each actor and can often be an unintended act. The 
structural division foresee a lack of information though by creating those sector-specific 
meeting. Thus, lack of information can be intended and unintended. Last, divergent interests 
are sometimes a cause of incoherence. Each sector has its own interest in the sense that 
development is responsible for development programs such as educational initiatives or rural 
development, whereas trade is concerned with commercial or business-related activities. By 
definition, they have different interests, which are not actor driven though as suggested in 
Hydén’s (1999) classification. Interests can be actor driven, but this might be more within a 
sector network than between sectors. Unintentional rivalry is not considered a cause of 
incoherence related to networks, because it can be assumed that most competition happens 
intended. 
In addition to the sectoral networks, there are issue networks, which bring together individual 
actors outside the traditional sectors or within a sector but on an issue that is not systematically 
addressed within the sector. For example, the gender advocacy group in Vietnam was formed 
after a number of member states have phased out their development funds and, as a result, 
gender related projects could not be funded anymore. To overcome this gap, this gender 
advocacy group was formed to continue working on the issue and develop ways in which to 
address gender without the development sector’s official support. Given the lack of structural 
organization, the institutional arrangement and unintentional rivalry can be ruled out as 
cause of incoherence, which in turn means that issue networks are by default a tool that 
decreases incoherence. That is not to say that is increases coherence, but two causes of 
incoherence can be taken out of the equation. Competing interests and lack of information is 
also a concern with issue networks. Interests can compete with other issue networks as well as 
with the sector networks. While energy consumption might be the primary goals within the 
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development sector, gender issues are the main concern for the issue network. Similarly, 
actors in the trade networks are most likely not too concerned about gender issues, but instead 
work on establishing a network between the Vietnamese companies and the companies as 
home. The lack of information, again, can be intentional or unintentional. Intentional due to the 
deliberate separation of the issue network and other networks, and unintentional because 
individuals might not be able to attend a meeting, for example. 
The pattern on communication influences the presence of norms are in a given network and 
how important norms are in this network. Based on this, norms are present (or not present), 
which in turn alters norm implementation. If norms are not addressed or do not play a role 
within and across networks, norms will most likely not be implemented. This would cause 
normative incoherence with the policy statements, which were presented in the previous 
chapter, but also normative incoherence between the networks, e.g. the development and 
trade networks, which would reinforce the claim that structural arrangements are a cause of 
incoherence. 
5.1.2 Policy Communities or Policy Networks 
Before entering the policy network analysis, a conceptional border needs to be drawn between 
the two terms. Researchers are frequently prompted by the trade-off between generalizations 
and in-depth studies. In the study of policy processes, the emphasis tends to lie on 
generalizability of outcomes across various policy spheres, across different countries or policy 
systems (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). The study of policy processes has shown over time that 
policy-making varies greatly between policy domains and even within a political system 
different sectors have different policy-making procedures (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). The 
concepts of policy networks and communities allow some generalizations to be made across 
those variations, because both concepts are sufficiently broad to encompass the differences. 
Policy networks, a concept that originated in the sociological study of communication in 
small groups and large organizations, are widely understood loose relationships between 
actors. Frequent contact between the actors occur within one policy arena. As such, policy 
networks can also constitute an umbrella term, which also covers the narrower term of policy 
communities, which are characterized by a shared code of conduct, a belief system or 
certain pattern of behavior (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). Others have placed a range of 
types of policy networks on a continuum from highly integrated policy communities to loose 
issue networks (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). 
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The role of policy communities in the policy-making process is particular. Communities in a 
broad sense, disregarding the community-network distinction for a moment, reflect the 
following six qualities that make them distinct from other decision-making processes 
(Epstein, 1997). First, a community is limited to a certain number of actors within one sector 
limiting the access to actors from other sectors and the public. Second, a stable membership in 
this community supports this exclusivity and furthermore cultivates an environment of 
consensus decision-taking. Third, mutual cooperation and balance of power between the 
participants lead to an uninterrupted functioning of the policy process. Fourth, community 
participants favor policy programs around the status quo to maintain their position of power 
and avoid controversy. Related to this, the fifth quality is depoliticization. Politicized issues 
draw attention from actors outside the community and, therefore, will hamper the policy-
making process. On the other hand, technical debates remain largely within the sector. 
Consequently, the sixth quality is sectorization, which is the limitation of a policy program to 
strict sectoral boundaries including specialized experts but excluding related issues that spill 
over into other sectors and, therefore, cause a bigger debate. 
 
In the sub-sections below, the definitional aspects of networks and communities will be applied 
to sectoral groups and issue groups to classify them as networks, however, limiting this 
exercise to characteristics relevant to this analysis only. For example, the number of actors within 
a community or a network is not strictly defined. It is a continuum from a small community to a 
global network, and either extreme can be easily recognized, but where those two extremes 
approximate, they can hardly be distinguished. A description of characteristics of sectoral 
networks and issue networks will be given in the respective sub-sections. 
5.1.3 Policy Networks and NPCD 
Policy networks are a form of communication between the members within the networks but 
also between the network and non-members. In the case of normative policy coherence for 
development and the prioritization of development over other policies, particularly the relations 
among the actors within the development network and relations between the development and 
other networks are important. Merging or creating connections between policy networks could 
increase NPCD because the information flow between the development policy staff and trade 
policy staff could improve and awareness vis-à-vis the other sector strengthened. 
NPCD, by definition, involves at least two separate policy sectors, as horizontal coherence 
aims to connect aid and non-aid policies. More specifically, officials from both development 
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and trade policies come together under the umbrella of NPCD. In contrast, a policy community 
mostly unites actors that are active within one sector and create policy positions based on a 
win-win consensus seeking process, which is facilitated through a continuous and exclusive 
membership. As explained in the previous section, policy communities reflect a rage of distinct 
qualities that distinguish them from other policy-making processes. The last quality of 
sectorization – a flaw from the NPCD perspective – is of particular importance here as its 
effects contradict the NPCD approach. While NPCD is a tool to bring policy communities 
together, policy communities are eager to limit their sectoral boundaries and consequently do 
not allow external actors and issues to cross that boundary. 
In light of EU’s policy-making procedures some aspects need to be considered that have an 
impact on the shaping of policy communities or policy networks. First, the EU’s trade policies 
are under the sole competences of the EU, which is to say that the EU represents entire 
European single market during trade negotiations, for example, without having to consult the 
member states during those process. Negotiated agreement still need to pass a vote in the 
European Parliament, and thus are under a review procedure, but this takes places solely on 
EU level. Additional ratification by the member states is also not required. In contrast, 
development policies are a shared competence in which the EU has the right to form legislation, 
but in addition to that, each member state has its own development policies and strategies. 
This could be understood two parallel processes operating in the same field, with overlaps 
occurring, but the two processes remain relatively separated. 
Since these two processes are rather distinct. It is highly likely that structure of policy 
networks also varies across the two sectors. Since trade is a sole EU competence, it can be 
expected that a strong unified trade community exists that shapes policy outcomes. On the 
other hand, in the development sector it is more likely that loose issue-networks exist that 
form around certain temporary topics. These issue-networks are a web of relationships 
between the actors engaged in a certain issue that otherwise do not necessarily come together. 
In addition, stronger linked policies are likely to occur within the EU and within each member 
states given the institutional structure. In that sense, policy communities and issues-networks 
co-exist under a broader sector-specific development network. 
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5.2 SECTORAL POLICY NETWORKS 
As shown above, shared norms are most strongly represented in policy communities, as 
contrasted to the loose relationships that define policy networks. Consequently, different policy 
communities have different sets of norms, which define a community, and due to the closed 
character of policy communities, norms hardly travel across communities. Normative policy 
coherence for development, however, requires the exchange of actors within and across sectors, 
i.e. across policy communities and policy networks. The existence of policy communities 
limits the exchange between communities and hamper the spill-over of norms between the 
communities and, therefore, cause a gap in the process of norm implementation. 
Consequently, NPCD remains low. On the other hand, the formation of issue-networks around 
PCD and in particular NPCD, could foster the cross-cutting applicability of EU norms such as 
human rights, gender equality or rule of law. 
5.2.1 Sector Networks: Diplomacy, Politics, Development and Trade 
Sectors as Networks 
No agreement has, as yet, been found on a mutual definition of policy network and 
policy community (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). However, there are a few characteristics that 
emphasize that actors within a sector form a network rather than a community, which is 
particularly the case for the European diplomats from the EU and the member states who are 
posted in a third country. 
Maintaining stable relationships, for example, is a characteristic for policy communities 
(Epstein, 1997). In the case of delegation staff, these relationships are not stable, because each 
individual is posted for three to four years on average. There are exceptions when someone’s 
post is prolonged, but even in those cases, the period of being part of this group abroad is 
limited. This time span of roughly four years still allows for close contacts between the actors 
but it is broken as soon as the posting terminates and a new person takes this position. From 
an institutional point of view, the relationships are nevertheless stable, because the country 
itself does not withdraw its relations. If a German development counselor’s post is over, for 
example, someone else will take this position and as a result the German spot at the table will 
remain occupied, but the person that occupies that spot changes. From an actor point of view, 
the relationships are not stable because of this rotational system. From an institutional point of 
view, they are stable. Therefore, this characteristic strongly depends on whether the focus is on 
individual actors or on institutions. In the case of sectoral divisions, the institutional 
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arrangements prescribe who meets whom in what setting and the individual actors are not the 
driving forces. In this respect, sectors would fit the characteristic of policy communities 
according to Epstein (1997), but because these contacts are of a structural nature (Atkinson & 
Coleman, 1992, paraphrased from Benson, 1982), rather than based on a common belief, these 
relationships fit the definition of policy networks better. Despite institutionally stable 
relationships, the structural nature of the relationship characterizes sectors as a network. 
A common belief system is another criterion for a policy community, which actors within a 
policy sector do not meet. On the contrary, within policy sectors each actor represents their 
own national agenda, which might overlap with other national agendas, but which does not 
shape a common belief system. Cooperation in fields of joint interest among different 
delegations is not unlikely, but cooperation does not suffice to argue for a common belief 
system. It might be argued that the shared commitment to development and the responsibility 
to eradicate poverty might be sufficient to shape a community on development, but a common 
goal is not a belief system. A common goal or interest does not have the same depth and, 
therefore, is not considered a belief. Another aspect to define sector networks is compare its 
position to policy communities and professional networks, which are two classifications 
suggested by Rhodes and Marsh (1992). Policy communities are based on stable 
relationships, restrictive membership, insulation from other networks, vertical 
interdependence, and interested in the governments’ internal functioning. Similar groups 
with a territorial focus are called territorial communities. The other classification is that of 
professional networks which are primarily characterized by their profession, enjoy some 
degree of independence from the government, and insulate themselves from other networks 
(Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). Despite the political responsibility of delegation staff towards their 
home government, the sectoral groups resemble professional networks more than policy 
communities. They do enjoy some degree of independence and build their relationships 
around their shared profession such as economic counselors, for example. Territorial interests 
are inherent to the extent that all actors in the network are based in Vietnam and represent 
national activities in Vietnam, but their territorial interests are not the main driver for the 
creation of the networks. Given those characteristics, the sectoral groupings are defined as 
sector networks or sectoral networks and not as sector/al communities. 
Sectoral Isolation and Overlap 
In relation to that, it is questionable how isolated the different sectors are in reality. The 
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more exchange between the sectors, the more likely is it for coherence to occur. Given this 
study’s focus on normative policy coherence, particular attention is paid here to the normative 
dimension within each sector and whether this normative dimension crosses over to other 
sectors. This spill-over effect can take place between all four sectors shown in the figure 
below. A distinction is made between the diplomacy network, politics network, 
development network, and trade network. Despite the focus on development and trade. The 
diplomacy network and the politics networks are part of this analysis because of the structural 
organization encountered while doing field research. This classification (as shown in figure 
14) represents the structural organization of most European delegations in Vietnam. While most 
of the embassy staff are considered as “diplomatic core” due to their duty to represent their 
home country abroad, the diplomacy network defined here is meant to comprise ambassadors 
and deputy ambassadors only. It is their task to supervise the overall embassy activities and 
maintain the relationship with the host country. 
Figure 14: Sectoral Isolation of Policy Networks 
Source: author’s own creation 
The diplomatic sector is not a policy sector in the strict sense, but data showed that 
ambassadors, so-called Heads of Mission, gather monthly to exchange and inform each 
other about given developments in the country. These meetings are limited to Heads of 
Mission only, which keeps the number of participants low, but the topics that are discussed 
cover a wide range of issues. The second sector is the political sector, which are the political 
counselors at the different embassies. Similarly, the development sector comprises 
development counselors and the trade sector the economic counselors. In addition to these 
four sectors, counselors and officers for consular affairs, for example, can be part of the 
embassy staff. 
As figure 14 indicates, exchange takes place between the different sectors. This exchange 
does not follow the hierarchy or distance that might be indicated in the figure. Having 
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diplomacy and trade at two opposite ends does not indicate that these two sectors 
communicate the least. However, from a norm perspective this would be the channel that 
norms pass through. 
The interviews conducted with EU and member state officials in Vietnam indicate a 
strong distinction between the sectors, which does not mean that they are perfectly mutually 
exclusive, but rather separate. 
5.2.2 Structural Separation Leads to Normative Incoherence 
Structural separation takes various forms and as a result can lead to different causes of 
incoherence. As shown in figure 1 (chapter one) on incoherence, institutional arrangements 
and unintentional rivalries have been classified as the two causes of incoherence based on 
structural organization. To this, I have added competing interests and lack of information on 
the intentional side (bottom left corner) and institutional arrangement on the unintentional side 
(bottom right corner) (see figure 2, chapter one). In this section, I aim to show that several 
types of organization structure lead to those four reasons of incoherence. These causes are not 
definitive in the sense that they are not the only causes that lead to incoherence, within this 
structure-actor divide, they are most prominent. 
The different types of organizational divides are the following: (1) Separation of roles within 
an embassy understood as the split of tasks between delegation staff; (2) geographical and 
linked to that a political-technical divide of foreign staff between North and South Vietnam; 
and (3) a supra-national/inter-governmental divide between the EU and the member states. 
Separation of Roles: Ambassador, Political Counselor, Trade Counselor, Development 
Counselor 
Depending on the size of the countries, the first indication is the separation of tasks. In 
each embassy, the usual tasks correspond to diplomatic, political, economic, development 
and other affairs. In smaller embassies these tasks might overlap, whereas in bigger embassies 
there are often different departments. Each task usually handled by a so-called counselor or 
Head of Mission, who attends the monthly meetings organized by the EU delegation in Hanoi. 
The Heads of Mission, political counselors, trade counselors and development counselors 
each have monthly meetings whereas consular counselors meet once every quarter. In these 
meetings, participants exchange about recent developments in their field or changes in the 
Vietnamese legislation that might also be relevant for the other attendants. Sharing and 
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coordinating are the main objectives of these meetings, especially in situations where the EU 
and the member states share their interests. These meetings are not a platform for negotiation. 
As a result, a seemingly clear distinction is made between coordination and cooperation since 
larger cooperation projects being decided in the headquarters in the home country. Within 
the realm of coordination, financial resources are rarely fused (Interview 12). 
The interviews reflect a strong tendency to separate between the different kinds of 
counselors insofar as development is generally not considered a mechanism for any 
normative discussions. Instead, normative discussions are left to political counselors or 
ambassadors. Development counselors mostly work on the supervision of development 
projects. Responsibilities often overlap in smaller embassies and fewer staff, consequently 
political and development responsibilities are merged in one person. In embassies where this 
is not the case, each counselor has their distinct role. In the monthly development meetings 
organized by the EU, donor coordination is the main objective with particular focus on ensuring 
that projects are not being duplicated (Interview 9, 12). This highlights the technicality of 
development instead of its potentially normative character. Additional examples for the non-
normativity of the development sector are the multi-annual development programs. The EU’s 
2014-2020 multi-annual development program for Vietnam focuses on sustainable energy and 
governance/rule of law (European Union, 2014a). Promoting the rule of law and good 
governance are two of the norms the EU is committed to and that are comprised in the set of 
norms relevant to this research. The fact that the EU makes this one of their priority sectors 
indicates a normative dimension in development to a certain extent. However, the budgetary 
contribution via the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – the main development 
instrument next to thematic programs – shows how strongly sustainable energy is prioritized 
over governance and rule of law: out of the total commitment of EUR 400 million for the period 
2014-2020, 86.5 percent are estimated for sustainable energy and 12.5 percent for governance 
and rule of law (and one percent for “other measures”). Under the thematic programming, the 
two main areas are human rights & democracy and civil society & local authorities, but further 
initiatives are not specified in the MIP. 
Smaller programs are on environmental issues and sustainability (Interview 14). Smaller 
projects in cooperation with NGOs are along the thematic lines and can cover human rights 
concerns, minorities or illegal logging, whereas the big projects under the DCI are in 
cooperation with the Vietnamese authorities. To put the two instruments into perspective: 
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under the DCI EUR 400 million are allocated for seven years, which amounts to roughly 
EUR 57 million per year, whereas under the thematic instrument EUR 4 million were allocated 
for two years (Interview 14). Again, this reflects the EU’s priorities and indicates that non-
normative projects are emphasized. 
The separation between the sectors reflects the separation of responsibility towards norms 
promotion. Each sector has its own norms and those relevant for this research, most 
prominently human rights and freedom of speech, are under the premises of the political 
counselors or ambassadors (Interview 1, 12, 14). Reality, however, is a bit more complicated 
than this simplistic separation of responsibilities. There are quite a few “grey zones” where 
responsibilities do overlap to some extent. The Human Rights Dialogue (HRD) is a case in 
point for this blurred separation. The HRD is a political dialogue between the EU and the 
Vietnamese government to share views on human rights policies and discuss the 
implementation of human rights measures. Especially political freedoms, such as a multi-
party system, a fair chance to stand for elections16, a fair voting system, and freedom of speech 
and the press are a major concern. The HRD is held annually bringing together the EU 
Delegation under leadership from the EEAS and the Government of Vietnam. In addition 
to that, the EU and Vietnam have a Joint Commission with a sub-group on Cooperation in 
the Areas of Institutional Strengthening, Administrative Reform, Governance and Human 
Rights (EU Delegation to Vietnam, 2007). 
In terms of structure, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is the contact point 
for the HRD. For development relations, the Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment 
(MPI) is responsible (Interview 14). Thus, while there is not only a separation from the 
European side, the Vietnamese also make this distinction. Given this official separation, there 
are specific measure in place to ensure development projects do not entail any risks such as 
human rights violations. Every EU project needs to be validated by this measure, the so-called 
risk management framework, before any funds can be disbursed to the Vietnamese 
government. As can be noticed already, the language used for this procedure is rather technical 
and implies that there are certain standards that a project needs to meet, but apart from that 
there are no pro-active activities towards norm promotion in the field of development. 
However, it needs to be kept in mind that legislative changes do not always represent societal 
                                                          
 
16 Independent people, people that are not member of the Communist Party, can stand for elections, but the 
process favors party members are consequently the chances of a non-member to be elected are very low. 
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changes. The Human Rights Dialogue is a political tool with which formal changes might be 
achieved, but the actual implementation in the society needs to follow to accomplish real 
change. In recent years, for example, Vietnam has changed their legislation about lesbian 
and gay people decriminalizing being homosexual and by doing so following the Western 
example. The donor countries were satisfied about the success but in reality, a son of Vietnamese 
parents is not allowed to be gay but needs to marry a woman and have children (Interview 1). 
Another example of a grey zone of separation between the sectors relates to the phasing out 
of development programs, which lead to trade counselors attending the development meeting, 
because the delegation does not have a development counselor anymore (Interview 2). This is 
not the case for all the meetings, but important sessions are usually attended by a delegation 
representative other than the development counselor. 
The separation of sectors does make sense from an efficiency point of view, but in turn has 
negative effects on the coherence between the policies. Spill-over from one sector to another 
does not seem to be desired. Ambassadors and political representatives are in charge of 
diplomatic affairs among which are normative discussions, while development staff in 
responsible for technical tasks and trade representative manage business relations between 
their home country and Vietnam. Because of this separation, norms do not constitute a major 
concern in the development and trade sector. Of course, there are exception, but general 
tendencies point towards a conscious split between each sector’s responsibilities. 
As can be seen, development programs primarily emphasize technical support, leaving out 
the normative dimension that would cover human rights, equality, or democratic issues. With 
regard to the sub-question “Does the EU represent itself as a normative power in the 
development sector”, it can be said that this does not hold entirely true. Rather, development 
is a sector that focuses on economic development mainly, comprising all sectors from health 
to environment, but largely leaves our normative discussions. Instead, Heads of Mission and 
political counselors are in charge of normative exchange with Vietnam. 
Normative Coherence within Sectors 
The above discussion might indicate that there is no normative coherence between the sectors, 
but at least within each of the sectors given the fact that there are monthly coordination 
meetings between the EU and EU member state delegates. But how coherent are the positions 
within each sector network? Out of the interview respondents, only two have an official 
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double position combining a political sector with a technical sector (Interview 2, 3). The 
political sector is underrepresented in the available pool of data, which is why no general 
arguments can be made, but in this case, a strong normative dimension is inherent to this 
political post (Interview 1, 12). Regarding the diplomatic network, the common norms are 
the support for human rights, for example through support of dissidents or human rights 
lawyers, the rule of law in relation to the death penalty, gender equality, but also economic 
topics (Interview 4, 7, 17, 24). Norms can best be addressed at occasions such as the EU-
Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue, the German reunification celebrations or together with the 
United Nations, which are occasions that offer the space to discuss normative aspects, which 
are normally not observable in-day-to-day work (Interview 4, 17, 24). One respondent 
highlighted that human rights are a significant topic for all EU representations and plays a 
prominent role in the relations with Vietnam (Interview 24). 
For the development network, norms can have different meanings to the development actors in 
the networks depending on their professional position. Naturally, the Head of Development in 
a big embassy is in charge of tasks, which differ from the tasks a project manager is responsible 
for at a national development organization. In their daily work, their professional priorities 
strongly differ. Similarly, the national development banks operate on other terms as embassy 
officials or development organizations do, and as a result, they prioritize other norms such as 
cost norms (Interview 5, 8, 9, 13). Environmental and social norms do play a role nevertheless 
in the selection process of a potential project to be funded but are often undermined by the 
project plans. As one respondent explained, in cases of resettlement in order to build a 
hydropower dam it will be considered how to maintain the standard of living of the resettled 
persons (personal interview not identified numerically in order to ensure anonymity). This 
example poses a difficult scenario in which access to electricity is weighed against 
resettlement, and a certain set of norms are in incorporated in the project selection and 
project implementation even though the project is such does not promote norms, but cost 
norms seem to dominate the decisions. 
For economic representatives, i.e. in the trade network, the normative dimension is not 
observable. Instead, these issues are left to their colleagues at the embassy who are responsible 
for norm promotion (Interview 6, 11, 16). One respondent explained that the economic 
representatives’ task is “pure business”. In the trade network, norms as they are understood in 
this dissertation are not incorporated. Therefore, it cannot be said that the trade sector is 
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coherent in norm implementation. 
Geographical & Political-Technical Separation between Northern and Southern Vietnam 
The separation between northern Vietnam and southern Vietnam in terms of responsibilities 
between third country representatives reinforces the above-mentioned divide between sectors. 
More specifically, the separation of sectors strongly overlaps with the divide between 
representatives in Hanoi and representatives in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC). In general, HCMC 
is the city for business and Hanoi the city for politics. This is because all the Vietnamese 
ministries are located in the capital. 70-80 percent of the Vietnamese business is in the South 
(Interview 6). As a result, foreign representatives adapt to this internal distinction by placing 
the embassies in Hanoi and general consulates or commercial offices in HCMC. Germany, for 
example, has the embassy in Hanoi as well as an office of the Delegates of German Industry 
and Commerce in Vietnam (Außenhandelskammer AHK), and a consulate, the German 
Business Association and another AHK office in HCMC. Denmark and Finland have their 
embassies in Hanoi and commercial/trade offices in HCMC. As a result, political and economic 
processes are rather kept apart, which is also reflected by the interview responses. The majority 
of respondents based in HCMC indicate that their tasks are primarily non-political, i.e. either 
trade or development related (Interview 6, 7, 8). 
Interestingly, the EU does not have a separate office in HCMC. One of the respondents pointed 
out that this is one of the reasons why contact between the representatives in HCMC and 
the EU delegation in Hanoi is extremely rare (Interview 7). Similarly, visits from economic 
representatives based in HCMC might be just as rare and short, ranging from one day every 
couple of months to up to 5 days every month depending on the representative (Interview 2, 6, 
14, 16). 
Another issue to consider is that even development representatives HCMC are mainly focused 
on technical tasks and leave political tasks, such as the discussion around norms, to their 
colleagues in Hanoi (Interview 6, 8). Monitoring the implementation of infrastructure, 
education or environmental projects are among the daily concerns. 
Supra-national/Inter-governmental Separation between EU and Member States 
One of the major debates of European integration has been about supra-nationalism and 
inter-governmentalism. While the latter emphasizes national sovereignty, for former vouches 
for competences at the EU level. This debate does not materialize in those exact terms in EU 
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external relations, but in terms of member state’s support for the EU. A few member states are 
supportive of the EU, particularly of the EU delegation’s presence in Vietnam, whereas others 
did and still do not see the need for an additional delegation. 
Therefore, one further layer of separation is the distinction between the EU and its member 
states. Only in 1996 did the EU open a representative office in Vietnam. By that time, some of 
the member states had already established their relationship with Vietnam and deepened their 
cooperation with the host country. Bilateral relations have shaped and still shape politics 
between the donors and the recipient. For some, the EU was an additional burden in the 
development sector as many donors were already present in Vietnam. Yet another donor was 
not appreciated by all, and, as a consequence, not all of the member states were and still 
are fully supportive of EU activities in Vietnam. The monthly coordination meetings are aimed 
to share information and avoid duplication of projects especially in those sectors where long-
standing relations with Vietnam have already proofed to be successful. The meetings are based 
on consultation and consensus, and in some cases, certain member states have to be convinced 
of an EU project (Interview 9). It is unmistakable, that the member states do not follow any EU 
instructions, but that coordination takes place between equal negotiation partners. Member 
states report to their home countries and receive instructions from their headquarters. In that 
sense, any EU legislation or policy would make a detour via the member states’ government, 
which in turn would direct the delegations abroad. Some of the member states are more 
supportive of the EU delegation and the EU in general (Interview 3, 17), whereas others are 
more critical (Interview 2, 7). 
Under a member state’s umbrella, cooperation between the different sectors appears to be 
quite good in terms of regular exchange. On the one hand, there are regular meetings among 
different development representatives, and, on the other hand, there are regular meetings 
between the development, trade and political representatives (Interview 6, 7 & 9). 
Another measure that reflects on cooperation are the annual Blue Books that the EU 
delegation compiles. These Blue Books are documents that compile information about 
development activities pursued by the member states and the EU delegation and are publicly 
available since 2007. However, reporting mechanisms vary between the member states and, 
consequently, the data provided is hardly comparable. While the delegation has been working 
on a joint template, mechanisms to measure aid allocation and aid disbursements remain 
distinct (Interview 14). This practice illustrates the relationship between the EU and the 
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member states quite accurately: on the one hand, coordinating strategies are in place, but on 
the other hand, each member state adheres to its national rules and regulations. 
Power relations between the member states and the EU institutions as introduced in chapter 
three, are broadly reflected by the practices in Vietnam. Earlier, it was mentioned that the 
member states are seeking more influence in the EU policy-making through the newly created 
EEAS. This is not to say that the member states generally undermine EU policies, but that 
governments enjoy their sovereignty and might not want to give a large share of their 
responsibilities to the bureaucratic staff in the Commission. Similarly, the monthly meetings 
initiated by the EU are attended by most delegations in Hanoi, but simultaneously, each 
member state pursues its own national development program. There may be coordination on 
shared interests, but where interests do not overlap, each actor follows its national strategies. 
A common interest from a normative point of view, for example, is anti-corruption. 
Legislation still varies between member states (Interview 2), but anti-corruption seems to be 
of interest to all actors, including development and trade actors (Interview 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, 17). 
No Spill-over between Sectoral Policy Networks 
Spill-over from one sector network to another was not identifiable. Diplomatic and 
political counselors do deal with norms such as freedoms, rule of law, equality, but in 
development they are quite underrepresented. In trade, these norms were of no importance. 
This is due to the above-explained structural separation between counselors, between North 
and South Vietnam, and between the EU and the member states. All four causes of 
incoherence – diverging interests, institutional arrangement, lack of information, and rivalry 
– can be attributed to the organizational structure of EU-Vietnam relations. In terms of norm 
implementation, the structure seems to play a great role again. As already presented in the 
previous chapter, norms seem to be a political matter, to which less attention is paid to when 
policy guidelines are made more concrete. Policy networks reflect a similar pattern: norms 
are relevant at the political level, i.e. in the ambassadors’ and political counselors’ 
professional work, but less so for the development counselors and not of importance for 
trade representatives. Structurally, the EU is coherent in separating the various tasks, but 
incoherent in implementing its norms. As a result, normative coherence between the sector 
networks is quite low. 
Furthermore, norms are understood differently in the different sectors and the norms addressed 
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in this research are mostly represented by the ambassadors and political counselors. In addition 
to the disconnection between the four sectors on structural grounds, the interpretation of norms 
varies. In the diplomacy network, the political network and the mixed diplomacy-political 
network norms such as human rights are addressed (Interview 1, 4, 7, 12, 17). On the 
contrary, norms in development and trade were often understood standards of accounting or 
transparency issues, organizational structures, financial regulations, food safety or following 
Vietnamese legislation on labor law (Interview 2, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14). This might lead back to the 
training that development project managers receive. As project manager, the emphasis is on 
financial regulation and procedures and, consequently, these are the standards or “norms” that 
need to be adhered to (Interview 8, 13, 14). 
In line with the Vietnamese Green Growth Strategy, a lot of emphasis is put on 
environmental concerns and governance issues (Interview 2, 3, 14). Vietnam’s Green Growth 
Strategy 2011-2020 is a national program to incorporate sustainable growth and environmental 
protection into its plans for economic growth (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2012). Among 
the primary goals of this strategy are reducing greenhouse gas emissions and energy 
consumption, as well as improved waste and wastewater management and sustainable 
urbanization in terms of urban planning and transport. Some of the member states have taken 
up on those plans and support the Vietnamese in building a new metro line in HCMC and 
Hanoi, promoting renewable energy, and implement wastewater projects (Belgium, Denmark, 
EU, Finland, Germany, Sweden, UK). Governance and sustainable development are addressed 
in the wider sense, but in terms of project management, those issues do not come up. Corruption 
might come up as a normative issue to be addressed in the project implementation phase 
(Interview 2, 3, 7, 8 11, 14, 17), which could be interpreted as implementing the rule of law. 
Overall, reactions from the respondents about norms when asked by the researcher varied 
greatly from stating that norms are automatically integrated in everything, because norms are 
intrinsic to European actors (Interview 14, 24), to norms not being relevant in the day to day 
tasks (Interview 6, 11, 16). 
Contrary to the assumption that each sector has its own norms and, therefore, normative 
incoherence would be unavoidable, norms are not particularly prominent during daily working 
routines in either sector. Two gaps of incoherence can be identified. On the one hand, the lack 
of norms in daily practices highlights the incoherence between the political commitment as 
presented before and policy implementation according to the interviewed actors in the field.  
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Another gap is the separation of sectoral networks, which emphasized the division of labor 
causing incoherence between development and trade, but more significantly between the 
normative diplomatic and political sectors and the seemingly technical sectors development 
and trade. In both cases, normative incoherence is not absolute, but the tendency towards 
incoherence is visible. 
In addition to sectoral networks, issue networks around topics of importance exist. These are 
not as structurally fixed as the sector networks and are, therefore, considered separately in the 
following sub-section. 
5.3 ISSUE NETWORKS 
The previous sub-section has shown how sector networks constitute gaps in the implementation 
of normative policy coherence. This sub-section will follow up on the previous analysis by 
expanding to issue networks, which fall outside the scope of sectoral policy networks. Issue 
networks can be a mechanism to create coherence between various actors under the umbrella 
of a certain topic, but simultaneously they can create more incoherence by adding another 
network to the existing sector networks. How issue networks in Vietnam contribute to 
normative coherence in EU policy implementation is assessed in the following analysis. 
Issues networks do not follow the same structural set-up as sectoral networks do. Instead, they 
are organized around a joint theme or issue that is of temporary importance and as such requires 
particular attention. Some have defined issue networks as being composed of a large number 
or participants with a limited degree of interdependence (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). As already 
mentioned in the previous sub-sections, I consider the number of participants in order to define 
a network as a network not as a suitable feature to characterize a network. Rather, the shared 
interests are what brings issue networks together, which to some extent resembles the features 
presented as principal shared interests in the territorial communities or professional networks 
(Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). In contrast to sector networks, issue networks are defined here as 
being driven by the actors participating in the networks instead of the structures/systems that 
define the sector networks. Furthermore, issue networks can take different shapes in terms of 
membership stability, power relations, and longevity. What issue networks have in common is 
the actor driven character, which unites the actors under a joint theme. 
5.3.1 National Governments and Their Impact on Normative Coherence 
This section is dedicated to the role of governing parties’ ideologies and the consequences 
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these ideologies have on development and trade policies and consequently on the policy 
community formation abroad. Development and trade policies both can be used as a tool to 
execute power in foreign policies. As such, it is crucial to note how a government has used this 
tool. Furthermore, a government’s ideologies influence the working habits of its delegations 
abroad. Each delegation/embassy reports to its home government and is in constant contact 
with them. Briefings are undertaken in both directions and while the embassy reports on 
developments in the host country, the governments provide the overall strategy towards the 
recipient country. Host country and recipient country refer to the same country, however, host 
country relates to the role of the embassy in the given country whereas recipient country relates 
to the overall relation between the developed country (donor) and the developing country 
(recipient). As the embassy has to report to its home country, the donor, their projects are 
influenced by the home countries political strategies. In other words, if a developed country’s 
government has a strong focus on climate action and green energy, the development projects 
and the businesses undertaken abroad are likely to reflect this priority. Especially when it 
comes to the promotion of norms, a party’s ideologies play a crucial role. Conservative parties 
tend to be less favorable of LGBT rights, for example, as liberal parties might be. 
Consequently, the conservative party will not see the need to implement policies promoting 
LGBT rights either at home or abroad. While this is only one example, the relationship 
between a party’s ideology and its role in the formation of policies, issue focus and, as a result, 
issue networks becomes clear. A party in power in the donor country influences actions in 
the recipient country and, therefore, also the grouping around a topic, which in turn shapes the 
issue-related communities. These issue networks are different from sectoral networks as they 
shape around a certain topic, which can be an ad-hoc action. Sector networks are set by the 
existing policy sectors and leave little space for variation in topics or members. Issue networks 
are more flexible as they are created around an area of concern and can be dissolved once this 
concern disappears. 
To determine a party’s ideological stand, there are two distinctions to consider: the left-
right dimension of the governing parties and the center-extreme dimension. A party can be 
placed along the left-right dimension, but often the governing parties remain around the 
center. Thus, despite their left-right placement, compared to other parties that are placed 
more on the extreme, these centrist parties are not that different. What that means is that 
whether a center-left or a center-right party is in power will not have that much influence in 
foreign policies as a far-right or a far-left party would have. Therefore, combining the two 
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dimensions is necessary to draw some valuable conclusions. 
The timeframe considered for this part of the research is 2015 and 2016, during which time 
the fieldwork has been conducted. The interviews are used as a snapshot for this period 
and as a reflection on the governing parties at that particular moment, which was influenced 
by the Lisbon Treaty, which brought a strengthened set of norms to the EU, and by the 
global normative development approach under the Sustainable Development Goals. 
Table 13: Governing Parties in EU Member States in 2015 and 2016 
 
Country Governing Party: center/left Governing Party: center/right 
Austria 
(2013-2017) 
Social Democratic Party of 
Austria 
Austrian People’s Party 
Belgium 
(since 2014) 
 New Flemish Alliance 
Reformist Movement 
Christian-Democratic & Flemish 
Open Flemish Liberals and 
Democrats 
Czech Republic 
(Since 2014) 
 ANO 
Denmark until Nov 2016: 
Social Democratic 
Party Social Liberal 
Party Socialist 
People’s Party 
since Nov 2016: 
Liberal Party (c-r) 
Liberal Alliance 
Conservative Party 
(c-r) 
Finland 
(since May 2015) 
 Center Party 
Finns Party 
National Coalition Party 
France 
(until Dec 2016) 
Socialist Party 
Radical Party of the Left 
 
Germany 
(2013-2017) 
Social Democrat Party Christian Democrat Party 
Ireland Labour Party (until May 2016) 
Independent 
politicians (since May 
2016) 
Fine Gael (since 2011) 
Independent 
politicians (since 
May 2016) 
Luxembourg 
since 2013 
Luxembourg Socialist Worker’s 
Party 
The Greens 
Democratic Party 
Sweden 
(since 2014) 
Social Democrat Party 
Green Party 
 
United Kingdom 
(2015-2017) 
 Conservative Party 
Source: author’s own creation 
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As table 13 shows, some of the governments have had elections during the 2015-2016 
timeframe and,  therefore, the government constellations have changed. These countries are 
Denmark and Ireland. In the case of Ireland, the main party Fine Gael, which is a center-right 
party, remained in power. In Denmark, the governing parties have changed completely from 
the socialist parties to liberal-conservative parties. However, because the new government is 
in power since November 2016, it cannot be expected to observe major legislative changes 
during the remaining two months of the study period. Consequently, the previous government 
will be taken into consideration. This leaves four center-right, three center-left and four mixed 
governments for 2015-2016. In order not to create any problems with anonymity and 
confidentiality, the interviews will not be represented by numbers as in the other sections. 
Due to the small number of countries and small number of interviews, additional attention 
needs to be paid to this issue. 
Aggregating the data collected via interviews, it cannot be said that the governments’ 
placement on the left-right continuum has an impact on normativity. Both, right leaning and 
left leaning governments are supportive of human rights, for example. Similarly, mixed 
governments do not show any particular exceptions. As already shown earlier, though, 
normativity does not always transcend the political boundaries and, therefore, cannot always 
be found in development and even less in trade. Some countries are considered “pusher-
countries”, i.e. countries that push norms stronger than others, whereas other do not have a 
political role and consequently lack a normative dimension. This, however, seems to be 
independent from the party ideology and more dependent on a country’s traditional behavior 
which remains rather constant despite elections. 
The lack of influence of party coalitions on external policies can have several reasons. First, 
in terms of external relations, a stable relationship is the basis of cooperation between two 
countries. Therefore, despite changing governing the relationship to Vietnam would remain the 
same broadly speaking. Second, the like-mindedness of European delegates, as suggested by 
some respondents, could be another explanation. Even though there is competition between 
the member states and the member states and the EU, given the similarities in culture, the 
approach towards third countries does not vary greatly. Third, the delegations enjoy a degree 
of sovereignty from their national governments and given their local expertise, some policy 
proposals might be diverted, or revisions suggested by the delegation. As a result, the diplomatic 
core has some policy-making power in their home country and is, to some extent, able to 
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influence national positions if they are considered unfit (Interview 17). 
For the European Union, the situation differs from the member states, as policy-making and 
policy implementation strongly depends on all institutions. While the European Parliament, 
the only directly elected EU body, is part of the policy-making process and as such can be taken 
as a political barometer, the European Commission is the body to propose legislation and 
the corresponding Council needs to approve together with the Parliament. Thus, the 
Commission has its preferences depending on the Head of the Commission, the EP has its 
position due to the elected candidates and the Councils have their position depending on 
the national governments, which they are comprised of. Because of these intertwining 
positions, I would argue that as long as there is not a European mind-set that changes the 
direction of politics, the EU policies remain stable due to this intricate policy-making process. 
Thus, contrary to the expectations that a government’s new agendas directly influence 
relationships abroad, the priority is given to the overall relationship between the partner 
countries. 
A political decision that does have an impact on networks in the field is the decision to 
cut development funding and close the development offices. This was the case for 
Luxembourg and for the UK, for example, who were in the process of closing their offices 
during the field visit. Luxembourg’s office in Bangkok is now in charge of relations with 
Vietnam. Luxembourg ended its development cooperation with the 2011-2015 Indicative 
Program (Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 2017), under which some projects are 
currently still being finalized. Two new projects supporting Vietnam’s Green Growth strategy 
have been initiated in 2016, but these are not financed by Luxembourg’s development 
cooperation funds but by Luxembourg’s Fund for Climate and Energy (LUXDEV, 2017). 
Sweden has officially phased out its development cooperation in 2013 (personal interview 
not identified numerically in order to ensure anonymity), but started this process in 2007, 
when the government at that time decided to cut the number of partner countries with which 
Sweden would engage in development cooperation (McGillivray, Carpenter, & Norup, 2012). 
During this time, the Moderate Party, a center-right party in Sweden, held the majority of 
ministerial positions in the government (Regeringskansliet, 2008). 
As a result of these cut-offs, the financing capacity for development projects decreased and 
alternative channels needed to be found if activities in a given sector were to be continued 
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(personal interview not identified numerically in order to ensure anonymity). This has been 
the reason for creating the gender working group described below. 
5.3.2 Examples of Issue Networks in Vietnam 
Based on the fieldwork conducted in Vietnam, two examples of issue networks are most 
prominent. First, the Gender Working Group or Gender Advocacy Group is one example of an 
issue network of European actors in Vietnam. Second, EuroCham, the Chamber of Commerce 
of the European Union, is an example of a hybrid version between a sector network and an 
issue network. 
Normative Network: The Gender Working Group 
While democratic values, freedom of speech and freedom of press are sensitive topics in 
Vietnam and, consequently, in the relationship between the donor countries and Vietnam, gender 
equality is an area of relative openness. 
The Gender Working Group in Vietnam is an informal group of donors that created this format 
as a result of budget cuts in national development cooperation funds. This group brings 
together Ambassadors and Heads of Agencies to discuss women’s empowerment and 
domestic violence issues. Prior to the Gender Working Group, for example, the Swedish 
government had specific development projects in the Central Highlands of Vietnam designed 
to support equality measures with regard to female political involvement (Interview 17). 
However, after the governments phasing-out of development in Vietnam the development 
budget was not available anymore for these kinds of projects. Alternative tools had to be found 
to continue working on this issue and as a result several working groups were formed, one of 
which is focused on women’s empowerment and gender advocacy. This group is co-chaired 
by one Ambassador and the UN Resident Coordinator and meets every two months. As has 
been pointed out by one of the respondents (Interview 25), the demand for such a working 
group exists as shown by the high participation rate in the meetings. This demand highlights 
the importance of gender-related activities and the need/desire for coordination, especially 
because it is not a formal mechanism but based on voluntary participation. Similarly, due 
to the informality of this group, it could easily be resolved if the demand were to cease to exist. 
Business Network: EuroCham 
EuroCham is a good example for a hybrid version between a sectoral network and an issue 
network. EuroCham is the Chamber of Commerce of the European Union, which was 
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established to address the need of a Chamber of Commerce for all the businesses from 
countries that do not have their own chamber in Vietnam. EuroCham falls within the policy 
area of trade and economic affairs and can be seen as a sub-network within the sector. However, 
due to the creation of EuroCham to meet a specific need, I argue that EuroCham can also be 
considered an issue network around the topic of creating a platform for European businesses 
established in Vietnam. This is different from the EU-Vietnam Business Network (EVBN), a 
Commission funded project to help European companies establish their business in Vietnam. 
EuroCham is dedicated to already existing European companies in Vietnam. Thus, on the 
one hand, EuroCham is a more or less institutionalized entity within the trade sector and, 
therefore, shares traits of a sectoral network. On the other hand, it is structured around a 
distinctive topic and was set up to meet a particular need, which reflects characteristics of an 
issue network. As discussed above, issue networks reflect two types of causes of incoherence: 
diverging interests and lack of information. This also holds true for EuroCham. Taking both 
the Gender Working Group and EuroCham, they clearly do not represent any common interests. 
Furthermore, the GWG meets in Hanoi, whereas EuroCham is located in HCMC, reinforcing 
the political-technical divide of the country. 
Implementing Normative Policy Coherence via Civil Society 
Vietnamese NGOs are an interesting issue for consideration because of their limited 
independence in Vietnam. All Vietnamese NGOs are in some way connected to the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and, therefore, cannot be considered as non-governmental 
organizations per se. The term governmental-non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) is 
instead used to refer to those organizations to imply this connection to the government 
(Interview 1). Due to this oversight, it is often difficult to set up meetings without government 
involvement and, consequently, sensitive topics are unlikely to be discussed. Similarly, 
meetings with dissidents – despite being organized spontaneously – are generally attended 
by a government official. These procedures restrict normative discussions between European 
representatives and Vietnamese activists. As already mentioned, freedom of speech is rather 
limited in Vietnam and meeting with dissidents who might not agree with the Government 
of Vietnam’s (GoV’s) approach can face serious charges if they voice their criticism. 
From a donor perspective, NGOs are used to implement comparatively small projects. Major 
funds are usually allocated as budget support to the Vietnamese government (Interview 14). 
The limited funds to finance international NGOs and the limited independence of the so-
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called GONGOs are obstacles for the development work. Civil society nevertheless can be 
supported through exchange with dissidents, human rights lawyers, human rights activists or 
artists, which can be done on a smaller scale and, therefore, seems less invasive to the 
Vietnamese Government. This, however, is not part of development cooperation but is 
considered as political activities as they fall under the responsibilities of the political section. 
5.4 TYPE OF NETWORK SHAPES NPCD DIFFERENTLY 
This chapter showed the negative effects of sectoral networks and mixed effects of issue 
networks on normative policy coherence for development. Revisiting the questions guiding this 
chapter, the following can be said. 
Due to the sectoral separation, which takes different forms, EU and member state officials do 
not represent the EU as a normative power in the development sector. The normative role of 
delegations abroad is attributed to the diplomatic staff, i.e. ambassadors and vice-ambassadors 
and the heads of the political department. Development staff is mainly in charge of technical 
duties such as project management or calls for proposals. This normative separation becomes 
even more visible in comparison to the trade sector. Given the fact that the four sectors 
(diplomacy, politics, development, and trade) are kept separate on purpose, I argue that the 
willingness to integrate a normative dimension into the trade arena is low. Improved 
communication between the sectors might be a first step towards spill-over of information, but 
at the moment this is kept at a minimum at most of the delegations interviewed. This split 
between the sectors is reinforced by the geographical divide between Northern and Southern 
Vietnam and as such supports the claim of lacking willingness. It can be argued that the 
delegations respond to the existing split within the country in which Hanoi is the political 
capital and Ho Chi Minh City the business capital. 
Nevertheless, within the delegations the responsibilities are clear and tend to be sectoral, 
which leads to the final question “Why might existing policy networks limit normative coherence 
between development and trade policies? 
This last question needs to be answered very carefully. On the one hand, data shows that sectoral 
isolation form part of the cause of incoherence, but on the other hand, it also shows that 
reducing sectoral isolation would not increase normative policy coherence. That is to say, 
normative policy coherence between development and trade would not be increased through 
intertwining the two sectors, because both sectors do not carry the political responsibility of 
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promoting norms. Thus, sectoral isolation can be observed, as already mentioned earlier, but 
this cannot be understood as the reason for normative incoherence. Instead, the sectoral 
isolation between the diplomatic-political sector and the development sector seems to be one 
of the causes of normative incoherence between the political objectives and implementation. 
Similarly, a link between the diplomatic-political sector and the trade sector could initiate a 
spill-over of norms into the trade sector. Restructuring the responsibilities would require 
major changes in the current diplomatic services and, therefore, is highly unlikely. In addition, 
the EU and the member states do have a trade agenda, which might be undermined by the 
strengthening of a normative dimension in trade affairs. Whether such a shift would be desired 
can be questioned given the EU’s wider interest in global affairs, which is the focus of the 
following chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Empirical Study of the 
Relationship between EU-ASEAN 
Inter-regionalism and NPCD 
The previous chapter has shown that policy networks have varying impacts on normative policy 
coherence for development. Institutional structures create divides between regional sectoral 
policy networks and, consequently, limit communication between actors. The lack of 
communication and exchange undermine NPCD by limiting norm exchange and norm spill-
over. Analyzing policy networks from an NPCD perspective provides insights into the internal 
processes of EU policy implementation abroad. However, EU-Vietnam relations do not take 
place in a vacuum. On the contrary, the EU engages in inter-regional relations with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Vietnam is a member, and for this 
reason, a chapter on EU-ASEAN relations is required. 
This chapter analyzes the inter-regional relationship between the European Union and ASEAN 
in order to understand how inter-regionalism affects the normative relationship between the 
EU and Vietnam. This inter-regional level of governance plays an important role for NPCD for 
two reasons. The relations between the EU and ASEAN affect the bilateral policies between 
the EU and ASEAN member states, such as Vietnam, because the EU has often adapted its 
bilateral policies with ASEAN member states according to the progress in EU-ASEAN inter-
regional relations. For example, after the free trade negotiations with ASEAN stagnated, the 
EU turned to bilateral negotiations with Vietnam. Conversely, these bilateral relationships have 
an impact on EU-ASEAN relations, because the EU can get access to the region “through the 
back door” and political disagreement on a bilateral level can create a hostile atmosphere at the 
regional level. Therefore, the research question for this chapter is the following: 
Do EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations affect normative policy coherence between 
development and trade in EU-Vietnam bilateral relations and if so, how? 
Inter-regional relations are often presented as being inherently different from traditional state-
centered international relations as a new form of politics (Hänggi, 2003). Conversely, critics 
argue that inter-regionalism merely introduces new actors to a realist political world (Camroux, 
2010; Gilson, 2005; Roloff, 2006) by assigning actorness – the capacity to act – to regional 
organizations. Actorness presupposes a certain degree of autonomy to act in inter-regional 
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relations, and the capacity to set and achieve goals (Hänggi, 2006). This approach highlights 
regions as polities unto themselves, which are more than the aggregation of member states and 
their interests. Obviously, the existence of regional norms, discussed in previous chapters, is a 
key element to this actorness. Furthermore, the transmission of norms in inter-regional relations 
includes two dimensions. The internal dimension of actorness, identified as agency, refers to a 
regions ability to transmit norms. It is a region’s integration process, the institutional set-up 
and supra-nationalism, which shapes a region’s norms and the capability to act according to 
those norms. The external dimension of actorness reflects on how third countries or regions 
receive and shape these norms for their own internal purposes (Hänggi, 2007). Inter-regional 
relations are shaped by both the internal and external dimensions. In this chapter, the internal 
dimension is reflected by the EU’s self-portrayal as a normative actor and the external 
dimension by ASEAN’s public reception of norms transmitted by the EU. Does the EU 
promote norms in its EU-ASEAN relations and does ASEAN accept EU norms? If so, how? 
To be able to answer these questions it is helpful to consider why regions engage in inter-
regionalism in the first place. 
Research on inter-regionalism has often addressed the relevance of inter-regional relations and 
regions’ incentives to engage in inter-regionalism. Hänggi (2000) makes a useful distinction 
between three forms of inter-regionalism. Relations between regional groupings are the 
traditional form of inter-regionalism shaped by institutionalized regional organizations, such 
as EU-ASEAN relations. These relations are often marked by an interest to justify the existence 
of regional actors in the global arena and norm reinforcement plays the role of shaping the 
identities of these actors. Bi-regional and trans-regional arrangements are arrangements in 
which membership exceeds the traditional regional groupings to include states from other 
regions. Actors often engage in such arrangements for policy purposes, in order to pursue more 
effective policy strategies in response to inter-regional or trans-regional threats. The relevance 
of norms in these groups is subdued compared to the inter-organizational relations. Hybrid 
relations between regional groupings and single powers characterize asymmetric regionalism 
between a regional actor and a regional hegemon. Even though power relations underlie these 
arrangements, norms are often utilized as foreign policy tools in order to maximize strategic 
bargaining positions. In terms of international relations theories, inter-regionalism can be 
articulated in the following ways. A realist explanation for inter-regionalism is the need to 
counterbalance other regional powers. The liberal institutionalist approach identifies inter-
regionalism as a response to increasing globalization by way of creating new forms of 
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managing interdependencies. Constructivists highlight identity-formation through inter-
regional relations. 
These complex inter-regional relations create further challenges to policy coherence for 
development by adding another layer of governance. For this reason, the literature on PCD 
does not sufficiently address inter-regionalism even though the development relationships 
impacted by incoherences are inter-regional in nature. This chapter aims to contribute to the 
research on inter-regionalism by adopting a PCD lens and examining the influence of EU-
ASEAN relations on normative policy coherence for development in EU-Vietnam relations. 
EU-Vietnam bilateral relations can be understood as a gateway for the EU to the ASEAN 
region. Depending on Vietnam’s standing in the region, it can serve as an entry point for EU 
norm promotion in ASEAN. In 1998 and 2010, for example, Vietnam was the chair of ASEAN 
and as such had the possibility to shape ASEAN’s visions and position. With the regular 
rotation of the ASEAN chair, Vietnam will take on this position again and could engage in 
discussions that are of interest for the EU, Vietnam, as well as ASEAN. This is not to say that 
Vietnam executes the EU’s demands, but instead Vietnam might have reached an agreement 
with the EU (or any other third country), for which it might be useful to discuss related issue 
at an intra-regional level. Of course, Vietnam is a sovereign nation state and operates according 
to its own set of norms, but issues such as corruption, for example, are a concern of the EU, of 
Vietnam and of ASEAN alike. 
Figure 15 illustrates the system-driven interactions between inter-regionalism, bilateralism and 
regional membership. The separation of arrows indicates that influence can take place through 
different channels such as development and trade. ASEAN membership influences EU-
ASEAN relations not only by shaping an ASEAN position vis-à-vis the EU, but also through 
a member state’s behavior that the EU does not support. For example, political tensions 
between the EU and ASEAN arose out of the political and human rights situation in Myanmar 
in the early 2000s (Camroux, 2010; Yeo, 2009). As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam can 
function as a gateway for the EU to the ASEAN region through its political standing in cases 
such as the ASEAN chair and as a member of the ASEAN internal market, which provides low 
tariffs to intra-ASEAN trade. It is expected that norms in inter-regionalism affect bilateral 
relations directly and indirectly. Direct impact refers to the EU’s adaptations in response to 
ASEAN behavior, such as the EU’s changing strategy after EU-ASEAN trade negotiations 
came to a halt, which led the EU to conduct bilateral relations with Vietnam. Indirect impact 
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is expected from the ongoing inter-regional dialogues, which can lead to joint communications 
that serve as reference documents for the regional institutions and member states. ASEAN 
membership serves as an interlocutor in this scenario. 
 
Figure 15: Triangular Relations between the Inter-regionalism, Bilateralism, and 
Regional Membership 
 
Source: author’s own creation 
EU-ASEAN relations are strongly focused on economic issues, which undermine the 
normative dimension of inter-regional relations and consequently undermine normative policy 
coherence for development. This chapter will show that ASEAN has resisted the EU’s 
normative power, and that the EU negotiates with ASEAN members bilaterally to circumvent 
this resistance. The analysis of EU and ASEAN inter-regionalism is important for normative 
policy coherence for development, because the prioritization of economic interests in EU-
ASEAN relations not only undermines norm-driven inter-regionalism but can also undermine 
normative coherence in EU-Vietnam policies. 
This dissertation focuses on NPCD in EU policies towards Vietnam, and this chapter examines 
how EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations affect NPCD in EU-Vietnam bilateralism. By doing 
so, this chapter adds to the study of inter-regionalism by placing attention on norms in inter-
regional relations, which is as of now still an underexplored area (Rüland, 2014) and by 
adopting a NPCD perspective towards inter-regionalism. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The first section introduces different 
approaches to norm transmission in inter-regional relations, such as norm reinforcement, norm 
diffusion and cooperative hegemony. The second section provides a brief introduction of 
ASEAN’s evolution, its relationship with its member states, the political, economic and 
EU-ASEAN
inter-regionalism
ASEAN-Vietnam 
regional 
membership
EU-Vietnam
bilateralism
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religious diversity of ASEAN members. In the third section, EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism is 
examined in terms of political, economic and development relations. This is strengthened, first, 
by an analysis of Vietnam’s position as a gateway to ASEAN, and second, by a normative 
comparison of the two regions using historical evolution, legislative frameworks and 
negotiation strategies as indicators for institutional commitment to norms. Last, the conclusion 
highlights how this inter-regional relationship affects NPCD in bilateralism. 
6.1 NORM TRANSMISSION IN INTER-REGIONALISM 
This section introduces the relationship between inter-regionalism, norm transmission and 
normative policy coherence for development. As stated above, NPCD is the implementation of 
norms in development and non-development policies. As inter-regional relations affect 
bilateral relations, norms in inter-regionalism affect NPCD at the bilateral level. In order to 
analyze the relationship between norms in inter-regionalism and NPCD, conceptual 
clarifications regarding inter-regionalism and norm transmission are required, which are 
presented in turn in the following sub-sections. 
6.1.1 Conceptual Discussion of Inter-regionalism 
As stated above, inter-regionalism is defined as the interaction of (at least) two institutionalized 
regional actors. The international political economy (IPE) debate considers the role of regions 
located governmentally between the nation state levels and global economic and capital 
markets and studies regions in view of ongoing globalization processes (Hettne, 2005; Robles, 
2004). Similarly, inter-regionalism is “a means of managing relations in a globalizing world” 
(Gilson, 2005). From an international relations perspective, the creation of inter-regional 
relations and the underlying reasons for inter-regional activities are questioned (Rüland, 
2014). (Re-) Balancing power is one reason for inter-regionalism and it is understood as a 
reaction to changes in global power relations, whereas identity building aims to specify a 
regions character in relation with other regions, and institution-building aims to create a new 
governance level in the global multi-level system (Rüland, 2014). Norms are not prioritized in 
this vision, which focuses on exchanges and negotiating positions. 
This inter-regionalism includes political, trade and development relations (Hardacre & Smith, 
2014). These three pillars are also reflected in the sectoral divisions between policy networks 
presented in the previous chapter. Because of this rather comprehensive inter-regional 
relationship, some consider EU-ASEAN relations to be “the model of inter-regional cooperation” 
(Hänggi, 2006). Within this comprehensive framework, however, the EU is more active in 
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economic and development cooperation than as a political actor. This undermines the EU’s 
normative power, because norms are a political concern managed by political representatives 
instead of economic or development representatives (see chapter five). Moreover, the economic 
pillar has currently also experienced a setback. The EU has arrived at a stage where its inter-
regional strategy has not played out as envisioned with the region-to-region free trade 
negotiations, which is why the EU has moved on to bilateral relations with some of the ASEAN 
member states, including Vietnam. Despite the recent setback in the EU-ASEAN negotiations, 
the regionalism rhetoric is continuously deployed by the EU as part of the wider external 
policy strategies (Hardacre & Smith, 2014). This dissertation examines NPCD in policies, 
which are already in place and, therefore, the inter-regional (EU-ASEAN) policy-making 
procedure falls outside the scope of this study. 
Despite different approaches to inter-regionalism, research has strongly focused on the 
European Union. EU centered inter-regionalism, i.e. the relationship between the EU and other 
regional organizations, for which the EU-ASEAN relations are a good example (Camroux, 
2010; Murray, 2015; Rüland, 2014), features most prominently in the academic literature. The 
role of norms in inter-regionalism, however, is an understudied topic to which this chapter aims 
to contribute. 
Table 14 shows the triangular relationships presented above in terms of inter-regional 
conceptualization. EU-Vietnam bilateral relations can be understood as hybrid inter-
regionalism as one region engages with a single state. EU-ASEAN relations are termed inter-
regionalism or occasionally asymmetric inter-regionalism, which is characterized by economic 
divergence between the regions. Last, Vietnam’s regional membership in ASEAN can be 
categorized as regionalism, i.e. regional integration, or asymmetric regionalism (Beeson, 
2010), which highlights the economic diversity between the states involved in the regional 
integration process. Strictly speaking, regionalism is not a form of inter-regionalism, but 
Vietnam membership in ASEAN plays an important role in terms of providing access for the 
EU to the ASEAN market. Because of this interplay between the three actors, Vietnam-ASEAN 
regionalism is included in the wider inter-regional dynamics between the EU and ASEAN. 
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Table 14: Types of Inter-regionalism in EU-ASEAN-Vietnam Relations 
Actor A Actor B Form of inter-regionalism Example 
Regional 
organization 
Third country Hybrid inter-regionalism 
EU-
Vietnam 
Regional 
organization 
Regional organization (Asymmetric) Inter-regionalism 
EU-
ASEAN 
Regional 
organization 
Regional member (Asymmetric) Regionalism 
Vietnam in 
ASEAN 
Source: author’s compilation based on Baert et al., 2014, Beeson, 2010, and Hänggi, 2006  
 
This brief overview shows the complexity of inter-regionalism and academic aspirations for 
enhanced understanding of inter-regionalism and actors’ underlying rationales to engage in 
inter-regionalism. Norm promotion is one feature of EU external relations, which is 
understudied in inter-regional research, despite its political prominence in EU external 
relations: the Treaty of Lisbon emphasizes EU norm promotion in EU external policies, 
including inter-regional relations. The following sub-section presents various approaches to 
norm transmission in order to conceptualize EU-ASEAN normative dynamics. 
 
6.1.2 Approaches to Norm Transmission in Inter-regional Relations 
Norm transmission plays an important role in normative policy coherence for development, 
because it reflects the EU’s normative power vis-à-vis other regional actors and because inter-
regionalism affects EU bilateral relations. The normative dimension of inter-regionalism 
remains understudied, but three approaches to norm transmission in inter-regionalism can be 
distinguished: norm reinforcement, norm diffusion and cooperative hegemony (Rüland, 2014). 
Norm Reinforcement 
Norm reinforcement draws on social constructivism arguing for regional identity-building 
based on self-reflection in the process of exposure to or interacting with other regional actors 
(Gilson, 2005). To enhance bargaining power, the regional actor needs to speak with one voice, 
which creates greater international recognition and simultaneously shapes regional identity. 
Norm reinforcement does not equal norm transmission or acceptance, but rather can take shape 
in differentiation, which Gilson (2005) demonstrates with the example of the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) in which East Asia responded with their Asian values to the EU’s normative 
power. Similar to this example, EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism does not lead to EU normative 
dominance but can actually strengthen ASEAN’s own identity. 
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Norm Diffusion 
The norm diffusion debate adds the argument that the EU uses inter-regionalism to promote its 
norms through normative power (Manners, 2002, 2013). Most prominently it argues that inter-
regionalism advances regional integration infused with EU values in geographical areas outside 
of Europe (Murray, 2015), however, the internalization of norms in other regions, i.e. a region 
as the recipient of EU norms, is understudied (Acharya, 2016).  
Among international relations and EU scholars, three mechanisms for norm diffusion (with the 
end goal of norm internalization) within regions have been considered: strategic calculation, 
role playing and normative suasion (Checkel, 2005). Strategic calculation is a rationalist 
approach to norm diffusion, which utilizes incentives and rewards as tools for changing an 
actor’s behavior. Conscious role-playing is an instrumental tool an actor adapts to meet certain 
norms that are accepted in a given setting. Normative suasion corresponds to communicative 
action, which in turn refers to norm sharing through repeated interactions. 
Similarly, three inter-regional forms of norms diffusion can be identified (Rüland, 2014). 
Rationalist scholars claim that norms can be advanced through economic incentives or 
sanctions. Structuralist scholars claim that other regional organizations adapt the EU’s 
organizational structure, norms and integration rhetoric through imitation. Communicative 
action theory examines how regional actors persuade each other through interaction to change 
regional interests and identities (see Manea, 2008). Both the structuralist and the 
communicative action approach form part of the constructivist approach to norm diffusion. 
The constructivist approach considers norms to be shared standards of appropriate behavior in 
a group of actors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Constructivists highlight norm reproduction 
as a form of norm diffusion characterized by imitation, and accelerated through persuasion or 
information sharing (Checkel, 1997). Norms entrepreneurs play an important role in these 
approaches as they are the actors which actively promote norms and persuade resisting actors 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). During the phase of norm emergence, norm entrepreneurs try to 
bring norms onto the policy-making agenda. Once they are established in the bureaucratic 
system, norms have reached a ‘prescriptive status’ (Risse-Kappen, 1996). Elgström (2000) 
contends that “new norms have to fight their way into institutional thinking” (p.458), because 
of the difficulty of changing existing norms and, therefore, this process would be better 
understood as a negotiation process rather than an imitation process. Finally, a norm is 
institutionalized in an organization when it is referred to continually and it forms part of routine 
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behavior (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). 
Rationalist approaches and instrumental approaches to norm diffusion most often do not lead 
to norm internalization, because strategic calculations determine actor behavior (Checkel, 
2005). Instead, norm internalization is closely related to the logic of communicative action, i.e. 
argumentative processes lead to consensual ideas and consequently to shared norms (Elgström, 
2000; Rüland, 2014). 
 
Cooperative Hegemony 
The cooperative hegemony approach combines realist, political economy, institutionalism and 
constructivism in what is termed ideational-institutional realism (Pedersen, 2002). As such, the 
cooperative hegemony approach argues for the use of soft power in cooperative arrangements, 
which in turn are linked to long-term strategies (Pedersen, 2002). This theory was developed 
to explain regionalism and cooperation between nation states and, therefore, research on 
cooperative hegemony in inter-regionalism is quite limited. However, Farrell (2004) argues 
that the EU seeks to maintain its position in the global arena through its economic strength and 
uses inter-regionalism as one way of achieving its economic interests. To do so, the EU uses 
soft power. In normative terms, it is argued that the EU promotes its norms abroad to foster 
regional integration and inter-regional relations to gain economic benefits. This form of norm 
transmission is particularly interesting for this dissertation, as the preceding two chapters have 
already shown that the EU often only promotes norms when they do not undermine the EU’s 
economic interests. 
Even though critics have questioned the suitability of creating the concept of a regional 
hegemon distinct from a nation-state centered hegemon (Rüland, 2014), the interplay between 
norms and economic interests in the EU’s inter-regional relations forms an argument which 
requires further analysis. 
 
Resistance to Inter-regional Norm Transmission 
Norms are shared values by a group of actors and norm diffusion refers to the negotiation 
process related to creating shared values in a given group of actors. Agreeing on shared norms 
is less difficult when actors share similar normative positions at the beginning of the norm 
negotiation process. Conversely, diverging actors can be more resistant to new norms. 
Resistance to new norms in inter-regional relations has a variety of reasons. For one, changing 
existing behavior, and subsequently changing existing norms, is challenging (Elgström, 2000). 
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Furthermore, in inter-regional relations, the difficulty of changing norms is augmented by the 
bureaucrats’ training to resist norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Once different actors agree 
on a set of norms, the next steps include text negotiation and implementation negotiation 
(Elgström, 2000). Text negotiation is characterized by formulating and reformulating a given 
text to define a norm, which is followed by negotiations about implementing the formalized 
norm (Elgström, 2000). 
In EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations, the results of text and implementation negotiations can 
be found in joint documents such as joint agreements, joint statements or joint programs. These 
documents will be used to analyze whether inter-regional documents are normatively coherent 
with EU norms. This analysis will show if there is a gap between norm implementation in 
formalized EU-ASEAN relations and norm implementation in EU-Vietnam relations. 
6.2 INTRODUCING THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN NATIONS 
The preceding section introduced the conceptual discussions around inter-regionalism and 
norm diffusion. Given this chapter’s focus on EU-ASEAN relations, this section introduces the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations in terms of its historical evolution and its diversity 
among member states to help understand the regional differences, which complicate norm 
transmission and consequently normative policy coherence for development. 
6.2.1 Brief History of the Institutionalization of ASEAN 
The history of ASEAN shows slow but continuous integration despite persisting reluctance by 
the member states to give up national sovereignty. For a better understanding of the relationship 
between the ASEAN institutions and its member states, a brief historical overview of the 
creation of ASEAN and its institutional evolution is given here. 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 as a group of 
five Asian states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Since then, 
this group has expanded to ten member states including Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam. 
The ASEAN Declaration, also known as the Bangkok Declaration, is the founding document 
of this regional organization, and spells out cooperation between the member states in the 
fields of economy, social matters, culture, technology, education and stability in the region 
(ASEAN, 1967). Thailand initiated talks between Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, which 
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led to the Bangkok Declaration on a new regional association replacing the first regional 
association for cooperation in Southeast Asia called Association for Southeast Asia (ASA), 
whose members were Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines (ASEAN, 2018a; Khoman, 1992). 
Singapore also showed interest in this regional cooperation and was added as a fifth member 
two ASEAN. With the driving force of Thailand, this new regional association ended years of 
separation under the colonial powers, political struggles and territorial disputes, which brought 
previous attempts of regional cooperation to a halt, as was the case with ASA (Khoman, 1992).  
Several stages of deepening and widening integration have taken place since ASEAN’s 
initiation in the 1960s. Brunei was the first state to join the founding five ASEAN states in 
1984. During the period of the Cold War, ASEAN experienced a phase of deepening in 
response to expanding Communism in the region (China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). 
Political and security cooperation came to be the two major components of ASEAN during this 
time (Gates & Than, 2001). Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 was one of the crises 
which strengthened ASEAN cooperation and “compelled ASEAN member states to cohere 
politically, enhance interaction and deepen political dialogue with each other to form a united 
front” (Maier-Knapp, 2016, p.97). Despite this political discord between ASEAN and Vietnam 
during the Cold War, Vietnam was the first country out of the remaining four Southeast Asian 
states to join ASEAN. It joined ASEAN in 1995, shortly after fall of the Communist bloc, 
widening regional integration. Laos and Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, whereas 
Cambodia’s accession was postponed to 1999 due to political instability (Gates & Than, 2001). 
Economic integration has shaped ASEAN from the beginning, but political security was a 
priority until the end of the Cold War. Opening up trade and cooperating on industrial, 
technological and infrastructure development shaped the early stages of economic cooperation. 
Since then, ASEAN has strengthened its role in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) and its member states joined the World Trade Organization, both of which show 
ASEAN’s openness to integrate in to the global economic market (Gates & Than, 2001). One 
of the key changes to economic cooperation was the initiation of the ASEAN free trade area 
(AFTA) in the early 1990s, which aimed at reducing tariffs for a wide range of manufactured 
and agricultural goods. 
Economic integration did not result in deeper institutionalization. Decisions are taken at the 
ASEAN summits, which bring together the Heads of States. The annual Foreign Ministers 
Meeting is a platform to discuss regional integration. A joint communiqué is produced at each 
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meeting to present future visions, but these communications do not have any legally binding 
character, thus reducing their normative impact. The most recent joint communiqué, for 
example, emphasized the member states’ commitment to finalize the implementation of the 
ASEAN Community Vision 2025 (ASEAN, 2018b) The ASEAN Secretariat plays a 
coordinating role between ASEAN stakeholders. This institutional arrangement shows that 
ASEAN policy-making remains inter-governmental despite the recent creation of the ASEAN 
communities. The three “traditional” areas of ASEAN cooperation (political, security and 
economic cooperation), have been transformed institutionally into the ASEAN Political-
Security Community and the ASEAN Economic Community. In addition, the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community was created. These three communities form the pillars of the ASEAN 
Community, which was established in 2015. 
Deepening and widening regional integration in Southeast Asia has been a slow process. Great 
disparity between political systems and economic development can be considered as the main 
reasons for paced regional integration and low institutionalization, which is presented in the 
following sub-section. 
6.2.2 Diversity of ASEAN Member States 
This sub-section addresses the diversity of ASEAN member states, because as the discussion above 
indicates, regional membership affects the emergence of regional norms. Consequently, diversity 
between ASEAN members contributes to the shaping of ASEAN institutions and ASEAN norms, 
which in turn affect EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations.  
ASEAN members strongly emphasize their right to self-determination and non-interference. 
Sovereignty and diversity are two priorities within regional cooperation in South-East Asia, 
which is largely due to the substantial heterogeneity between the ten member states. 
Particularly visible is the difference between ASEAN-6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and the four member states that joined in the 1990s 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) (Gates & Than, 2001).  
Religion and political systems are two characteristics, which shape the diversity between 
ASEAN member states. From a religious point of view, differences lie between Muslim 
countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, and Buddhist countries, such as Thailand and 
Myanmar, for example. Politically speaking, ASEAN countries represent a variety of different 
government types. Brunei, a small country on the island of Borneo with 423,196 inhabitants 
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is governed by an absolute monarchy. Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand, on the other hand 
are constitutional monarchies in which the monarch serves as the Head of State and the 
parliament takes legislative decisions. Thailand, however, is currently under military rule 
since the coup in 2014. Singapore is a parliamentary republic; Indonesia and the Philippines 
are presidential republics. Neighboring countries Laos and Vietnam are both one-party 
socialist republics governed by the Communist Party of the respective country. Obviously, 
diverse forms of government affect the definition and implementation of norms and political 
identities. 
In addition to political and religious differences, economic diversity ranges from lower middle-
income countries such as Myanmar with a GNI per capita of 1,190 USD and Laos with a GNI 
per capita of 2,150 USD to high-income countries such as Brunei with a GNI of 32,860 USD 
and Singapore with a GNI per capita of 51,880 USD. Vietnam, with a GNI per capita of 
2,100 USD in 2016 Again, these numbers only represent an average that the World Bank 
uses to classify a country according to its income scheme. Income distribution or the quality 
of public services is not regarded here. As one respondent claimed, Vietnam would not be 
classified as a middle-income country if those measures were taken into account (Interview 
9). Based on World Bank data, eight out of the ten ASEAN member states have reached middle-
income status as per the 2016 figures shown in figure 16, but even within this group income 
differences amount to up to approximately 8,000 USD in GNI per capita per year.  
Malaysia is the country with the highest GNI per capita since 1996 reaching roughly 10,000 
USD in 2016, and Cambodia and Myanmar are situated at the bottom with 1,140 and 1,190 
USD respectively in 2016. Laos and Vietnam can be grouped together at around 2,000 USD in 
2016 and Indonesia and Philippines at 3,500 USD. Thailand is situated between Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Malaysia with 5,640 USD. Brunei and Singapore are classified as high-income 
countries. Brunei shows a GNI per capita of almost 32,860 USD and Singapore 51,880 USD 
(World Bank, 2018a). In total, the divergence in gross national income between the poorest 
ASEAN member state Cambodia and the richest member state Singapore amount to 50,000 
USD per person per year. 
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Figure 16: GNI per Capita in Middle-income ASEAN Members (in 1,000USD) 
Source: World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2016&locations=VN-LA-
MM-KH-ID-TH-MY-PH&start=1996  
The diversity between the member states highlights the difficulty to find a shared normative 
vision within ASEAN and underlines potential reasons for the slow pace of integration and 
institutionalization. “The political diversity of member states underpins their disparate 
interpretations and visions of ASEAN’s role and mandate” (Poole, 2015, p.153). Internal 
complications shape ASEAN’s position towards external actors and, therefore, affect inter-regional 
relations between ASEAN and the EU. Despite this political, cultural and economic divergence 
between the ASEAN members, regional integration and cooperation has taken place since the 
1960s, nevertheless. In the following sections, the relations with the EU are further examined. 
6.3 EU-ASEAN RELATIONS 
After having shown how diverse the ASEAN member states are and under what principles 
they operate, I will now turn to EU-ASEAN relations in order to examine which areas of 
cooperation could function as a platform for EU norm promotion in the EU-ASEAN inter-
regional relationship. Scholars of EU-ASEAN relations have explored various aspects of this 
relationship by focusing on norm promotion from the European perspective (see Murray, 
2015). Murray (2015) argues that the EU often fails to break the “fourth wall”, i.e. fails to 
bridge the distance between itself and other actors. In actorness terms, the external dimension 
is challenged. The EU presents itself as a norm promoter (internal dimension of actorness), but 
Malaysia 
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Philippines Indonesia 
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189 
 
other regions do not follow this lead (external dimension). Murray shows that EU-ASEAN 
inter-regionalism is mainly regulatory economic regionalism with some agreement on trade 
norms, but reconciliation, trust, good governance and human rights are not shared norms 
between the two regions. This economic priority is also emphasized by the EU delegation in 
Jakarta: “The concept of connectivity is central to EU-ASEAN cooperation, with the overall 
objective of bringing businesses, people and institutions closer together to boost trade, 
investment, and to promote smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (EU Mission to ASEAN, 
2016). Because of the differing regional norms, the fourth wall might not be possible to 
overcome (Murray, 2015), which creates normative incoherence between the regions. Trying 
to overcome EU-centrism, Acharya (2016) shows how EU regionalism does not fit non-
Western regions and calls for new approaches to include a normative constructivist perspective. 
He highlights the differences in regionalism between the EU and other regions and criticizes 
the assumption of universality of EU regionalism.  
Approaches to EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism might vary, but one prominent commonality 
regards the structural dissimilarities between the EU and ASEAN. The political, development 
and economic pillars of EU-ASEAN relations are further examined in this section in order to 
explore how the EU and ASEAN shape their relations, especially in normative terms. As the 
previous chapter on policy networks showed, norms are a task under the political or diplomatic 
sector in EU-Vietnam relations. Examining inter-regional political, development and trade 
relations will show which sector the EU prioritizes and, hence, how much focus is put on norm 
promotion. 
6.3.1 Political Relations 
EU relations with the ASEAN countries are strongly influenced by Europe’s former 
colonization of ASEAN countries (with the exception of Thailand) (Camroux, 2010). This 
heritage still shows repercussions in current relations, however in different forms. French-
Vietnamese and British-Malaysian political and economic relations have benefitted from 
previous colonial relations, whereas in the Dutch-Indonesian relationship or the British-
Burmese relationship this is not the case (Camroux, 2010). The strong relationship between 
France and Vietnam is shaped by France’s political activities, which have led to the 
Vietnamese authoritarian regime’s “constructive engagement” in human rights related issues, 
particularly since Vietnam’s economic reforms that started in the 1980s (Camroux, 2010). 
Thus, France was a main driver of Vietnam’s engagement in human rights dialogues. On the 
contrary, the British government has supported Burmese isolation sought for by the (formerly) 
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governing military junta (Camroux, 2010). While this type of normative pressure is based on 
isolation rather than support, the UK showed its disapproval of the military regime. Both 
France and the UK, despite using different strategies, showed their normative stance towards 
the two Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam and Myanmar joined ASEAN only in the 1990s, 
but bilateral relations still influence the EU’s policy-making towards ASEAN as some 
member states lobby more strongly for policies towards one country than to another (Camroux, 
2010). 
Informal ties between the EU and ASEAN were established in 1972. The EU (then European 
Economic Community, EEC) signed the first inter-regional agreement with ASEAN (with then 
five member states) in 1980, which formalized relations between the two regional 
organizations. The 1980 ASEAN-EEC Cooperation Agreement aimed at developing 
commercial, economic and development cooperation between the regions (EEC & ASEAN, 
1980). Thus, it was a strictly technical agreement regarding development and trade rules, but 
without any political aspiration. A political dimension, which is used to promote norms as the 
previous chapter has shown, lacks in this initial agreement. Consequently, normative 
commitment lacks in this agreement. One normative mention is made in the preamble by stating 
the international economic cooperation is desired “on the basis of freedom, equality and 
justice”. Non-discrimination is mentioned in relation to foreign investment, i.e. as an economic 
technicality instead of a person-centered quality. Thus, at the beginning of EU-ASEAN inter-
regionalism, political relations including norms did not play a role in the relationship as 
economic growth and trade cooperation were prioritized instead. 
The EU has followed an inter-regional agenda to broaden the relations from trade cooperation 
to political dialogues by supporting regionalization processes in ASEAN (Yeo, 2009). As a 
sign of growing inter-regionalism, the EU has opened a delegation to ASEAN in Jakarta, 
Indonesia, the main seat for ASEAN, in addition to the EU delegation to Indonesia. However, 
some scholars have challenged the process of further inter-regionalism claiming that the EU is 
moving away from inter-regionalism to bilateral relations in Asia (Hardacre & Smith, 2014). 
As I presented above, the EU-ASEAN inter-regional relationship and EU-Vietnam bilateral 
relations are not mutually exclusive. Rather, the EU could potentially promote norms through 
political dialogues with both actors highlighting a rather successful integration process based on 
peace and democracy. The 2012 Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action for enhanced 
cooperation highlights the ambition to continue the relationship between ASEAN and the 
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EU, but political cooperation remains limited (EU & ASEAN, 2012). In normative terms, the 
inter-regional relationship is kept at a technical level, leaving political issues such as norms on 
the sideline. Regarding the political dialogue between the regions, the following is stated in the 
Plan of Actions: 
“Continue to hold biennial ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings (AEMM) and the annual ASEAN 
Post Ministerial Conference with the EU (PMC)+1, supported by regular meetings of the 
ASEAN-EU Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and the ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation 
Committee (JCC)” (Section 1.1, Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action). 
Norms do show up in the Plan of Action to a strikingly limited extent. The EU and ASEAN 
plan to cooperate to maintain peace (one of the EU core norms) in the region by initiatives such 
as enhancing ASEAN’s mediating capacities and supporting the implementation of ASEAN’s 
Counter Terrorism Convention. Cooperation on human rights is also in the Plan of Action: 
“Support the work of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), 
as the overarching body for the promotion and protection of human rights in ASEAN through 
regional dialogues, seminars, awareness raising activities, exchange of best practices and 
other capacity building initiatives aimed at enhancing the promotion and protection of human 
rights through technical cooperation programs as well as giving support to the ASEAN 
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC)” 
(Section 1.3.1, Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action). 
The exchange of best practices is also suggested in relation to gender equality. The 2012 Plan 
of Action refers to peace, human rights, gender equality, and sustainability, but not to freedom, 
rule of law, solidarity, democracy, justice, non-discrimination, good governance, or liberty. 
Continuous effort is made to advance the relations between ASEAN and the EU. While 
scholars have argued that the cooperation process between the two regions has not evolved 
significantly until recently (Yeo, 2009), the EU presented its accession to the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2012 as a major success in the relationship between 
ASEAN and the EU giving impetus to wider dialogues and cooperation (EU Mission to 
ASEAN, 2016). This accession might constitute one of the reasons why the 2017 Plan of Action 
shows some more commitment to norms (EU & ASEAN, 2017). In the 2017 Plan of Action, 
peace and gender equality are integrated as was done previously, but the section on human 
rights has become more comprehensive: 
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“1.7. Promote Cooperation on human rights and good governance 
(a) Enhance the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
accordance with relevant international and regional human rights instruments to which all 
ASEAN and EU Member States are parties; 
(b) Continue to hold ASEAN-EU Policy Dialogues on Human Rights; 
(c) Strengthen the cooperation between the EU and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission 
on Human Rights (AICHR) through training, regional dialogues, awareness raising activities, 
exchange of best practices and other capacity building initiatives to enhance the promotion 
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
(d) Promote cooperation between ASEAN and the EU to implement relevant UN conventions 
and instruments on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
which all ASEAN Member States are parties to, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
(AHRD) and the Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the AHRD; 
(e) Promote capacity building for and support ASEAN’s efforts in strengthening democracy, 
good governance, rule of law, and judiciary systems, through sharing of experiences and best 
practices;[…].” (EU & ASEAN, 2017) 
The commitment to sustainability and sustainable development, reflecting the shift towards 
sustainable development at the global level, has been strengthened as well throughout the 
action plan. Thus, an increase in normativity can be witnessed from 2012 to 2017. This 
highlights the increased political nature of EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism. However, in terms 
of implementation, the action plans are not legally binding and proposed actions are often 
rhetorical in nature, e.g. sharing of best practices, dialogues or cooperation are proposed as 
actions without providing specific means to do so. As a result, a political dimension is slowly 
integrated into EU-ASEAN relations, but it is limited by economic interests and the lack of 
implementing mechanisms. 
A factor that challenges cooperation between the EU and ASEAN is their way to react to 
crises. As Blizkovsky (2012) describes, ASEAN’s reaction on the economic crisis 1997-99 was 
widening, whereas the EU’s reaction to the financial crisis 2008 was deepening. ASEAN 
established the ASEAN+3 together with China, Japan and South Korea which provides a 
platform for greater regional cooperation representing the desire to widen the regional 
cooperation, while the EU, on the other hand, tried to improve its fiscal and monetary policies 
to prevent future shocks as a deepening measure (Blizkovsky, 2012). A limited number of 
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deepening processes also took place in ASEAN as shows the common emergency fund for 
ASEAN+3 members. The extent of this type of cooperation is however by far not reaching 
the regional integration level that the EU has achieved. 
Cooperation among the ASEAN member states is based on an inter-governmental approach 
with a strong focus on sovereignty and the principle of non-interference, which is enshrined in 
the ASEAN Charter. As a result, national legislation of the sovereign state prevails and is 
protected from external interventions without the state’s prior agreement. As such, ASEAN’s 
political power over the member states is stifled. Despite dialogues between the EU and 
ASEAN, these might not show effects in ASEAN member states due to their sovereignty 
clause. ASEAN and ASEAN+3 are mainly based on political will, while the EU has 
legislative ground. ASEAN members are, therefore, not legally bound to implement measures 
that have been decided on ASEAN level whereas the EU member states can be held liable 
before the European Court of Justice for not putting measures into practice. These 
differences in approach towards regionalism in terms of sovereignty slows downs the 
cooperation between the two regions (Yeo, 2009). 
Economic cooperation does not seem to be challenged by the differences between the regions, 
as the next sub-section will show. 
6.3.2 Economic Relations 
The starting point for EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism was economic cooperation, as presented 
in the previous sub-section. Critics argue that cooperation between the two regions has not 
moved far beyond economic ties despite roughly five decades of inter-regional cooperation 
(Yeo, 2009). Thus, economic interests still dominate inter-regional relations, undermining the 
political dimension, which can be utilized as a channel for norm transmission, and consequently 
undermining normative coherence. 
EU-ASEAN economic relations were formally initiated by the EEC-ASEAN cooperation 
agreement, which called for diversification of trading products (Art.2) and increased 
investment and expanding markets (Art.3). Currently, ASEAN is the seventh largest economy 
in the world (EU Mission to ASEAN, 2017) and the fourth largest in Asia after China with a 
GDP of 11,199bn USD, Japan with a GDP of 4,940bn USD and India with a GDP of 2,263bn 
USD in 2016 (World Bank, 2017). Not only the size of the ASEAN market, but also the 
increased trade volume between the EU and ASEAN highlight ASEAN’s economic potential. 
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Trade in goods between the two regions has increased from 134,39bn€ in 2007 to 227,39bn€ 
in 2017 (DG TRADE, 2018). 
An attempt towards further cooperation and a strengthened relationship has been made with 
the launch of free trade negotiations initiated in 2007. However, after only two years of 
negotiations, the process came to a halt in 2009, with reasons that have been kept vague by the 
EU. According to the European Commission, negotiations were paused “to give way to 
bilateral FTAs negotiations, conceived as building blocks towards a future region-to-region 
agreement” (European Commission, 2017b). Underlying reasons for the shift from an inter-
regional agreement to various bilateral agreements, however, is not commented on further. The 
so-called “new generation FTAs” (Garcia & Masselot, 2015a; Orbie, 2011; Young, 2017) 
include a standard clause linking the FTA with a norm-infused Political Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA). ASEAN’s resistance against EU norms might have been one of the reasons 
for failed inter-regional negotiations.  
The region-to-region rhetoric is being maintained despite the recent failure to negotiate the EU-
ASEAN free trade agreement (European Commission, 2017b). Even though the EU’s inter-
regional efforts were strong in economic affairs, the trade agreement might have been too 
ambitious. The “natural partners” argument (EU Mission to ASEAN, 2017) sounds like a 
captivating notion to make diplomatic statements and to maintain a friendly relationship 
with ASEAN, but in fact, ASEAN has found its own way of regionalism and as a result does 
not meet the EU’s desired objectives. 
Instead of a regional free trade agreement, the EU has since then been negotiating bilateral 
FTAs with several ASEAN member states. New generation FTAs with Singapore and with 
Vietnam have already been concluded and signed. Negotiations with Malaysia, Indonesia 
and the Philippines are still ongoing. Due to ASEAN’s diversity, some member states are 
more in favor of FTAs with the EU than others are. Bilateral negotiations, however, might give 
more leverage to the EU in terms of negotiating norms due to its economic size. From an 
economic perspective, the failure of the EU-ASEAN agreement might not be favorable. From 
a normative perspective, bilateral negotiations could be more beneficial for norm promotion 
due to EU leverage, and consequently serve as a backdoor to promote norms at a regional level 
since new generation FTA negotiations are linked to political agreements such as the 
partnership and cooperation agreements. A study of new generation trade agreements showed 
that the weaker partner tends to converge towards the EU’s position (Young, 2017). Thus, in 
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terms of norms the failed regional agreement could serve as an opportunity for the EU to 
enhance normative policy coherence for development. Hardacre and Smith (2014) have 
identified the strategy of circumventing stagnated inter-regionalism with bilateralism as the 
fifth stage of inter-regionalism. 
The third pillar of EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations is development cooperation, which will 
be presented in the following sub-section. 
6.3.3 Development Cooperation 
Development cooperation between the EU and ASEAN has formed a substantial pillar in EU-
ASEAN relations since the beginning by incorporating it into the first cooperation agreement 
between the EEC and the five ASEAN members. Both regions acknowledged the economic 
gap between them and the need to address this imbalance. Article 4, which is dedicated to 
development cooperation, primarily covers the EU’s support for regional integration and 
economic development in ASEAN.  
The EU has set out its most recent development cooperation initiatives in ASEAN in its Asia 
Regional Multi-Annual Indicative Program 2014-2020 (European Union, 2014b). Various 
cooperation programs under the Regional MIP cover 19 countries in Asia but highlight regional 
integration with the example of ASEAN. It is considered “one of the most successful 
integration initiatives” and a “natural and reliable partner” for the EU (European Union, 
2014b). Continuous integration initiatives in ASEAN are supported by the EU’s Development 
and Cooperation Instrument (DCI), while simultaneously funding for other regional 
cooperation initiatives such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) are scaled down (European Union, 2014b). In total, EUR 196 million are allocated 
to developing regional cooperation in ASEAN in the period 2014 until 2020 (EU Mission to 
ASEAN, 2016). Prioritizing ASEAN integration by allocating development funds to the region 
emphasizes the EU’s interest in the region once more. 
The EU’s development interests in ASEAN are further highlighted by the publication of the 
first EU Blue Book covering the entire ASEAN region. Previously, the annual Blue Books 
were published by country (e.g. annual Blue Books for Vietnam, which were analyzed in 
chapter four), but since 2016, the EU has merged efforts into one regional publication. Aid 
efforts in 2015 and 2016, as presented in the EU Blue Book 2016 and 2017 respectively, 
show the strategic incentives of EU development cooperation to increase trade and 
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investment, as the section entitled “EU-ASEAN Development Cooperation –  A Modern 
Partnership with a Strategic Purpose” (EU Mission to ASEAN, 2017) most prominently 
shows. The EU’s development aspirations presented in the 2016 Blue Book have a strong 
economic character: “Connectivity is central, with the overall objective of bringing businesses, 
people and institutions closer together to boost trade, investment and exchanges” (EU Mission 
to ASEAN, 2017, p.10). However, the interplay between economic benefits and sustainability 
plays a prominent role. Fifty percent of the 2014-2020 regional budget, for example, is 
allocated to connectivity through sustainable and inclusive economic integration and trade (EU 
Mission to ASEAN, 2017). Three thematic ASEAN programs cover the areas of agriculture, 
biodiversity and urban development combining economic incentives with environmental 
issues. Which share out of the regional and thematic funds goes to each individual country is 
difficult to estimate, because the funds are not allocated by country (Interview 14). The 
regional program, however, emphasizes economic gains combined with environmental 
concerns. This reflects a minimum amount of normativity, i.e. the EU’s development 
cooperation does not strongly promote EU norms at a regional level based on the 2016 Blue 
Book. At the beginning of the document, the EU presents itself as an actor who “actively 
promotes human rights and democracy”, but any further mention of these two norms is credited 
to the Dutch–Indonesian initiative to organize public debates under the ASEAN Inter-
governmental Commission on Human Rights (see EU Blue Book 2016). This again highlights 
the normative gap between EU’s political rhetoric and its actions as was presented in the 
preceding chapters. 
The 2017 Blue Book, similar to the previous one, highlights economic interests in regional 
cooperation, political and security cooperation, but also puts special emphasis on sustainability 
(EU Mission to ASEAN, 2017). In addition to EU-ASEAN cooperation, the Blue Book 
demonstrates the EU’s bilateral interests with each individual ASEAN member state as a 
manner to achieve a more resilient EU-ASEAN development cooperation. Health and trade 
are the two sectors singled out for Vietnam (EU Mission to ASEAN, 2017). Both regional and 
bilateral development cooperation are not norm-driven. 
In fact, this section has shown that normative coherence is most present in the political 
cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. However, this sector is the least influential as this 
section has shown that norms are less influential in the economic and development domains 
which are the priorities for EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism. The relative absence or presence of 
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norms in a political domain can be considered the outcome of the behavior of political actors. 
The following section will examine EU-Vietnam relations within the context of inter-
regionalism. It will show how EU actions undermine normative inter-regional PCD through 
the establishment of bilateral relations. 
6.4 VIETNAM AS A GATEWAY TO ASEAN 
The EU has started distancing itself from the “classical” inter-regional approach. Classical in 
the sense that the EU used to export its model to other areas and set an example of how 
regionalism should play out. In the recent global strategy, however, the tone has been different: 
“We will not strive to export our model, but rather seek reciprocal inspiration from different 
regional experiences. Cooperative regional orders, however, are not created only by 
organizations. They comprise a mix of bilateral, sub-regional, regional and inter-regional 
relations” (European Union, 2016). This fits the fifth stage of inter-regionalism (Hardacre & 
Smith, 2014), in which inter-regional ambitions are withdrawn and bilateral relations 
prioritized. In turn, this means that the EU can maintain bilateral and regional opportunities 
simultaneously, which would not be possible without this flexible approach. 
Vietnam takes a special role in the relations between the EU and ASEAN, because it is 
considered one of the fastest growing economies in the world with comparatively low labor 
costs and a stable political environment. This makes Vietnam particularly attractive for the EU 
and European businesses. As such, Vietnam could potentially serve as an economic gateway 
for the EU to the ASEAN market. As the preceding chapters have shown, Vietnam’s economic 
strength undermines normative policy coherence for development in EU-Vietnam relations 
because the EU prioritizes trade and economic growth over promoting democratic norms in 
both the development and trade sector. 
6.4.1 Economic Gateway 
Vietnam seems to be a particularly interesting partner country for European donors in terms of 
economic cooperation, because of its recent ‘promotion’ to a middle-income country 
(Interview 11, 17, 24). Economic growth is steadily evolving, yet labor costs are still low, even 
lower than in China. The role of Vietnam in a wider ASEAN dimension, however, does not 
seem to be important for EU member state delegations in Vietnam. Whenever asked about their 
opinion on EU-ASEAN relations and Vietnam’s role in it, the general response from the 
member states was rather hesitant, pointing out their lack of expertise on those matters, or a 
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response was declined (Interview 1, 3, 4, 12, 13). This reflects the lack of information sharing 
between EU actors despite monthly meetings of the EU delegation with the member states. 
Consequently, the information in this section is mostly derived from documents. 
One of the indicators that the EU has a clear economic interest in Vietnam is its early prognosis 
about Vietnam moving up into the middle-income category and its changing relationship as a 
result of this. Already in 2007, the EU voiced its vision of Vietnam and the EU-Vietnam 
relationship: 
“Vietnam has a good chance to advance to the level of a Middle-Income Country within the 
next few years. This would change the nature of our development co-operation in favor of 
other forms of partnership and increased international trade and investment. The road towards 
future should be such that prosperity is not endangered by economic insecurity, social 
problems or environmental problems, or emerging health risks, such as avian influenza. In the 
words of national leaders, the current and future policies strive to improve the ‘quality of 
growth’. Modern Vietnam has a diversity of people and successful economic development 
should include all of them: young and old people, different ethnic groups and people with 
different personal talents” (EU Delegation to Vietnam, 2007). 
In this example from the Blue Book 2007, which was published two years before Vietnam 
was classified as a middle-income country, the impression of economic interests outweighing 
the EU’s normative interests is underlined. Already then, it was stated that the nature of the 
relationship will change and future economic growth should be inclusive. This statement alone 
does not show that the EU prioritized economic interest over other matters, but it demonstrates 
its strong economic interests in the country by emphasizing “trade and investment”, 
“prosperity”, “economic insecurity”, “growth”, and “economic development”, while social, 
environmental and health problems seem to be mentioned on the sideline. The EU manages to 
navigate through the different interests and bring them together but at the same time economic 
aspects take the forefront. 
A second, more recent, indicator is the EU’s financial distribution between energy and 
governance as laid out in the 2014-2020 multi-annual indicative program. Eighty percent of 
the budget is allocated to energy while only twenty percent are allocated to governance 
(European Union, 2014a). Economic, demographic and geographical indicators make 
Vietnam a country with high potential for economic growth and, therefore, high returns for 
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the investors and businesses. However, as a self-proclaimed normative actor, the EU should 
move beyond these economic interests and take a political role as well. That is to say, instead 
of an 80:20 ratio between energy and governance as indicated in the 2014-2020 multi-
annual indicative program for Vietnam, the ratio could actually reflect the EU’s normative 
position more strongly by shifting the weight. Hence, economic interests are clearly prioritized 
by the current budget allocation. 
Another indicator for Vietnam’s favorable role in ASEAN is the existence of policy networks 
such as the EU-Vietnam Business Network (EVBN). Vietnam’s prominent economic role in 
ASEAN is highlighted by the EVBN project, which shows interest in the ASEAN region and 
emphasis of trade with ASEAN. The EU-Vietnam Business Network is a project, which was 
established in December 2013 (and planned until October 2018) and which focuses on 
European companies’ access to the Vietnamese market. The project is primarily funded by the 
EU who provides eighty percent of the overall budget. The financial coverage by the EU 
shows the EU’s interest in the Vietnamese economy and in the ASEAN market. Curiously, the 
budget allocated to the EVBN comes from the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialized 
Countries (ICI), and not from the Development Cooperation Instrument. Nevertheless, it is 
managed by the development cooperation section in the EU delegation. The ICI normally 
aims at industrialized countries such as Brunei, Singapore, South Korea, or Hong-Kong in 
Asia, as well as the United States, Canada or Australia (European Commission, 2013). The 
financial and organizational complexity of the EVBN does not serve the enhancement of 
normative policy coherence for development. Furthermore, it is questionable whether norm 
promotion under the ICI as a non-development instrument takes a normative development 
stance. 
“EVBN will promote Vietnam as a high-potential trade and investment market to assure that 
EU companies, in particular SMEs, are better able to exploit the growing opportunities in 
Vietnam and Vietnam as a gateway to the SEA regional market. EVBN seeks to contribute to 
a more coherent and effective EU strategy for supporting European businesses, specifically 
SMEs with their endeavor in and to Vietnam. ASEAN in general and Vietnam in particular are 
considered to offer significant potential for European businesses. Trade statistics from 2013 
underline that the EU has become the major exporting market for Vietnam (21.3 billion EUR) 
whereas exports from the EU to Vietnam only amounted to 5.8 billion EUR in 2013 underlining 
the rational for establishing the EVBN.” (EVBN, 2018). A curious detail of this project is the 
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handling of funds. On the one hand, the EVBN budget is managed by the development 
cooperation section in the EU delegation in Hanoi. On the other hand, after an additional 
inquiry, it was confirmed that the EVBN budget comes from ICI, which is an instrument for 
developed countries. The ICI has been renamed Partnership Instrument (PI). 
For now, it remains unclear, why a developing country receives funds under the instrument for 
industrialized countries. Regardless of the (probably technical) reasons for funding under the 
ICI/PI, it is also interesting to note that the PI is considered one of the instruments for “shaping 
global change and promot[ing] its core values” (EEAS, 2017). Given that fact, the EVBN 
would be a project that shapes global change or promotes the EU norms. Cynically speaking, 
the project does initiate change to the extent that it supports European companies in Vietnam 
and, therefore, changes the companies’ opportunities abroad. However, given the idealistic 
notion of that statement, the EVBN does lack those goals. A document that was handed over 
during the fieldwork interview substantiates the EVBN’s business approach (see appendix 4). 
The information leaflet about a green technologies trade mission to Vietnam organized by the 
EVBN strongly points out Vietnam’s promising economic market. Furthermore, Vietnam is 
portrayed as the “gateway to ASEAN”. While this might be a marketing strategy for EVBN to 
call for more businesses, the viewpoint that Vietnam enjoys a favorable strategic location has 
also been expressed in some of the interviews (Interview 6, 11, 12 14). As a result, from a 
European perspective, Vietnam seems to have a special role in the region with regard to 
economic, geographical and political attributes. 
Early economic visions, budget allocation and the economic policy network are three indicators 
for the EU’s understanding of Vietnam as a strong actor in ASEAN. Particularly the EVBN 
strategy shows that the overarching goal for the EU is access to the ASEAN market, which 
seems to take precedent for norm diffusion. This is discussed in the following sub-section. 
6.4.2 Normative Doormat? 
Three pillars (political, development, trade relations) form the EU-Vietnam as well as the EU-
ASEAN relationship. Can one of these pillars serve as a normative gateway for the EU to 
transmit norms to ASEAN via EU-Vietnam bilateral relations?  
Political Pillar 
In EU external relations, norms are considered to be a political concern, as the previous 
chapters have shown. As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam is part of the annually rotating 
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chairmanship of the regional organization. The ASEAN chair hosts and presides the ASEAN 
Summit of all member states’ Heads of State, which is the highest policy-making institution in 
ASEAN. One of the chair’s functions is to “actively promote and enhance the interests and 
well-being of ASEAN, including efforts to build an ASEAN Community through policy 
initiatives, coordination, consensus and cooperation” (ASEAN Charter, Art.32). Under this 
heading, each chair has the opportunity to bring in its own vision of ASEAN to be developed, 
however, in close communication with the other ASEAN members. Vietnam used its 
chairmanship in 2010 to promote further action towards establishing the ASEAN communities. 
Nguyen Tan Dung, Vietnam’s prime minister and ASEAN chair in 2010, presented Vietnam’s 
contribution as a chair: 
“Therefore, based on extensive consultation and broad consensus of all ASEAN Member 
Countries, Viet Nam has come up with the theme of the ASEAN Year 2010 as “Towards the 
ASEAN Community: From Vision to Action”. […] Along that line, the priorities Viet Nam has 
set for its ASEAN Chairmanship Year are to strengthen ASEAN solidarity and integration, 
effectively implement the ASEAN Charter and Roadmap for building the ASEAN Community, 
further expand and deepen the cooperation between ASEAN and its partners, and work actively 
to promote the profile and enhance the role and position of the Association on the global stage. 
We will also work hard to deepen cooperation within ASEAN and between ASEAN and its 
partners to tackle the global challenges, including the consequences of the global economic 
and financial crisis, food and energy security, climate change, natural disasters and pandemic 
diseases” (Nguyen Tan Dung, 2010). 
This excerpt shows on the one hand that the ASEAN chair does not have sole decision-making 
power, but consults with all the other ASEAN members, and on the other hand, that Vietnam 
has focused on economic and environmental issues. Both aspects do not contribute to 
Vietnam’s potential position as a channel for European norms. 
Development Pillar 
EU-ASEAN development cooperation is rather insignificant in EU-Vietnam bilateral relations. 
For the development work in Vietnam, ASEAN in general seems to play a minor role for the 
various European delegations (Interview 2, 13, 28). Their tasks are largely focused on the 
relationship between their home country and Vietnam and developments in Vietnam. In turn, 
development relations with ASEAN are not part of their responsibilities, and consequently, the 
broader relations between the EU and ASEAN do play a minor role. This is different for the 
202 
 
EU delegation in Vietnam, which also monitors EU relations with ASEAN (personal interview 
not identified numerically in order to ensure anonymity). However, a large part of the 
respondents agrees that Vietnam has a strategic position in the South East Asian region and 
has, economically speaking, a lot of potential. From a political point of view, Vietnam is an 
interesting country because it has some influence on the neighboring countries Laos and 
Cambodia (Interview 9). Therefore, not all donors chose to phase out their development aid to 
Vietnam. Some argue that only smaller countries are phasing out due to their limited budget 
and their need to focus on the most vulnerable. This, however, is not always the case, as the 
closing of the British aid agency in Vietnam in 2016 shows (Government of the United 
Kingdom, n.d.). 
Overall, interviews with European delegates in Vietnam showed that EU-ASEAN relations are 
not prominent in bilateral EU positions. EU-ASEAN development cooperation is not pertinent 
to EU-Vietnam relations and, therefore, neither favorable nor detrimental to normative policy 
coherence for development in EU-Vietnam relations. Conversely, NPCD could be enhanced 
through a spill-over from EU-Vietnam bilateral relations to the regional level because of 
Vietnam’s membership is ASEAN. EU-Vietnam relations are based on a free trade agreement 
as well as a partnership and cooperation agreement, which is strongly infused by norms, as was 
shown in chapter four. Norm implementation lacks behind the political commitment. 
Nevertheless, EU-Vietnam relations are more normative than EU-ASEAN relations because of 
the PCA, which does not exist between the EU and ASEAN. With this prominent position in 
the region, the EU-Vietnam relations could have the potential to set an example for other 
bilateral agreements with other Asian countries in transition from a donor-recipient relationship 
to a mutual relationship. In terms of Normative Power Europe and normative policy coherence 
for development, the importance to implement norms in EU policies towards Vietnam gains 
a higher momentum with this special status of Vietnam. If Vietnam is considered a gateway to 
ASEAN, the relations between the EU and Vietnam mark the EU’s approach to other ASEAN 
members, and can set a benchmark for other relations. Therefore, not implementing norms 
coherently in this relationship might not only affect the EU’s normative position vis-à-vis 
Vietnam but ASEAN as a whole. 
Trade Pillar 
Vietnam and the EU have concluded a new generation free trade agreement, which includes a 
chapter on sustainability and a clause to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which 
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allows for trade suspension in case of significant human rights violations. Thus, the EU-
Vietnam relations are to some extent infused with norms. It is unlikely, though, that these 
norms would spill over to ASEAN, because ASEAN has its own regional strategies based on 
sovereignty and non-interference, and in addition, the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations failed. 
Thus, normative differences between the regions prevail and given the non-normativity of trade 
per se, EU-Vietnam trade relations do not provide suitable conditions for norm spill-over from 
a bilateral to an inter-regional level. Moreover, the negative reinforcement of norms through 
trade sanctions when norms, such as human rights are not implemented, could counter World 
Trade Organization rules on free trade, thus undermining inter-regional NPCD. 
6.5 INTER-REGIONAL NORMATIVE POLICY COHERENCE? 
Normative policy coherence for development is viewed in this dissertation as “what the EU is” 
(its institutional character) and “what the EU does” (its policy implementation). This chapter 
analyzes the inter-regional relationship between the EU and ASEAN to examine its influence 
on NPCD in EU-Vietnam bilateral relations. While the preceding sections showed the 
economic character of EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism, this section adds to the analysis by 
examining the normative coherence between the regions. Three regional characteristics will be 
taken into account: regional integration processes, institutional arrangements, and global 
aspirations/inter-regional negotiations. The regional integration processes and institutional set-
up both show the region’s institutional character, i.e. “what the regions is”, whereas global 
aspirations and inter-regional negotiations form part of the policy implementation, i.e. “what 
the region does”. This section examines not only the normative character of the two regions, 
but also their susceptibility to inter-regional norm diffusion. 
6.5.1 Historical Comparison of the Integration Processes 
The historical comparison of both regional integration processes shows whether both regions 
have evolved around shared norms and how prominent those norms currently are. The 
relevance of norms in a region does not only define the normative character of a region, but 
also its susceptibility to new norms. Norm diffusion requires adaptation by the “receiving” 
actor. The more similar the actors, the easier it is to promote norms (see Elgström, 2000). A 
historical comparison will demonstrate how strongly norms are rooted within the regional 
actors. 
The EU’s integration process started in the 1950s as an economic community between six 
European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). 
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During this time, moral aspirations to ensure peace after the two preceding World Wars were 
heightened, and in order to maintain peace economic cooperation was seen as an appropriate 
tool. Ever since, the EU has expanded (widened and deepened) integration, now comprising 
28 members and competences ranging from economic affairs to political affairs. 
ASEAN started its official integration process in 1967 after some failed attempts since 
the beginning of the 1960s, which was only shortly after the European Economic Community 
was created. As the former Foreign Ministry of Thailand Thanat Khoman (1992) describes: 
“The fact that the Western powers, France and Britain, reneged on their pacts with Poland 
and Czechoslovakia promising protection against external aggression, was instrumental in 
drawing the attention of many countries to the credibility of assurances advanced by larger 
powers to smaller partners. The lesson drawn from such events encouraged weak nations to 
rely more on neighborly mutual support than on stronger states that serve their own national 
interests rather than those of smaller partners”. Poland and Czechoslovakia were not members 
of the EEC at this point, but the creation of a regional grouping and the favorable conditions 
for weaker states seemed to have supported the creation of ASEAN. Given this timeline, the 
EU could have served as an example for cooperation in a region that experienced violent 
conflicts and political struggles. However, since then, ASEAN has made comparatively few 
efforts to shift competences to the supra-national ASEAN level. Nevertheless, also ASEAN 
has expanded its membership since its creation. Thus, both the EU and ASEAN aimed for 
widening processes in terms of regional integration. 
The objectives for both regional organizations are laid down in their respective charters or 
treaties. Having a closer look at the ASEAN Charter and the Lisbon Treaty, which are the most 
recent documents on the founding elements and objectives for both regions, shows that the EU 
and ASEAN approaches to integration vary quite significantly. Table 15 indicates that national 
sovereignty, non-interference and diversity are among the key elements of regional cooperation 
in ASEAN. “Unity in diversity” (ASEAN Charter, Art. 2) is used as the slogan for ASEAN 
bringing together the wish to create a peaceful region while at the same time maintain authority 
over national affairs. Diversity, sovereignty, and independence are among the primary 
principles for ASEAN, while on the contrary, the EU highlights further integration. This is a 
fundamental normative cleavage between the two regions as the EU is committed to the 
emergence of “regional norms” whereas ASEAN does not necessarily do so. 
Despite the fact that the EU member states have decided to keep some policy matters in their 
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jurisdiction, i.e. maintaining sovereignty over certain policy areas, many competences no 
longer require member state approval, having been passed to the EU level. In article 1 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU emphasizes becoming an “ever closer union” with an internal market, 
open borders for EU citizens, and a shared currency. While far from an internal market, ASEAN 
is currently striving towards less restrictive trade in goods by eliminating tariffs among the 
member states (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). Notwithstanding these apparent divergent positions 
towards integration with ASEAN focused on sovereignty and the EU on closer integration, 
ASEAN has adopted some steps towards further integration as well, notably the creation of the 
three communities mentioned previously in this section. In 2015, ASEAN created a political-
security community, an economic community and a socio-cultural community. 
Even though ASEAN members seem to be reluctant towards further integration, rhetoric seems 
to suggest that their aim is nevertheless to strengthen the region and in doing so increasing 
cooperation between the states. The first EU-ASEAN agreement in 1980 was actually made 
“between the European Economic Community and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand – member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations”, 
rather than between the EEC and ASEAN as representative institutions. This shows that 
ASEAN integration had not reached the same level of integration as the EU (then EEC). 
Currently, however, widening integration is pursued. Partnerships are envisioned with third 
countries in the region are being continued, such as, for example, Timor-Leste’s participation 
in several ASEAN activities (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). This vision reflects that ASEAN 
indeed has a regional vision and it recognizes its regional potential. As with the EU as well, 
regional integration does take time and needs to happen at a pace that is acceptable to all 
members. Streamlining and coordination are key to ASEAN’s integration measures under its 
current vision. 
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Table 15: Integration in the ASEAN Charter and EU Treaty 
 
ASEAN Charter EU Treaty 
Art. 2 
ASEAN and its Member States shall act in 
accordance with the following Principles: 
a) respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all ASEAN Member 
States; 
 
b) shared commitment and collective 
responsibility in enhancing regional peace, 
security and prosperity; […] 
 
e) non-interference in the internal affairs 
of ASEAN Member States 
 
f) respect for the right of every Member 
State to lead its national existence free 
from external interference, subversion and 
coercion; 
 
g) enhanced consultations on matters 
seriously affecting the common interests of 
ASEAN; […] 
 
l) respect for the different cultures, 
languages and religions of the peoples of 
ASEAN, while emphasizing their common 
values in the spirit of unity in diversity; 
[…] 
 
Art. 1 
By this Treaty, the high contracting parties 
establish among themselves a European 
Union, hereinafter called "the Union", on 
which the Member States confer 
competences to attain objectives they 
have in common. 
 
This Treaty marks a new stage in the 
process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe, in which 
decisions are taken as openly as possible 
and as closely as possible to the citizen. […] 
 
Art. 3 […] 
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area 
of freedom, security and justice without 
internal frontiers, […] 
 
3. The Union shall establish an internal 
market. […] It shall respect its rich 
cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall 
ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is 
safeguarded and enhanced. 
 
4. The Union shall establish an economic 
and monetary union whose currency is the 
euro. […] 
Note: emphasis added by author 
 
Economically speaking, ASEAN has already undertaken some initiatives to create an economic 
community, for example, some trade tariffs have been cut and labor mobility between the 
member states has been encouraged. However, not all member states have implemented the 
measures under the 2015 vision to create the three communities. In the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC), several countries are directly addressed in terms of implementing the 
ASEAN Community: “The immediate priority is to complete the implementation of 
measures unfinished under the AEC Blueprint 2015 by end-2016. The continuing 
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commitments of Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam 
(CLMV) under the AEC Blueprint 2015 up to 2018 are also incorporated under the AEC 
Blueprint 2025” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015, p.59).  
The 2025 vision is on the one hand a strategy for further integration and greater visibility of 
ASEAN, but simultaneously there is no mechanism to hold member states accountable and, 
therefore, implementation can lag behind. Whether this lag is a political matter, or an issue 
of capacity is unclear. Non-implementation is also an issue in the EU, but the Commission 
has the capacity for follow up on implementation and propose sanctions, and in case of non-
compliance the European Court of Justice can intervene. 
In both regions, integration is on the political agenda, but the terms of integration vary. ASEAN 
focuses on deepening and strengthening while maintaining partnership with third countries, 
whereas the EU continues to negotiate neighboring countries’ accession to the EU. At the same 
time, deeper integration has been hampered by the United Kingdom, which is negotiating its 
exit from the EU and as a result has put the EU integration project into question. Despite 
apparent differences in the integration processes, the EU emphasized EU-ASEAN 
compatibility: “Both are committed to addressing issues through a multilateral approach, and 
both see regional integration as the most effective way to foster stability, build prosperity and 
address global challenges. The EU and ASEAN are, therefore, natural partners, which share the 
same goals for their citizens” (EU Mission to ASEAN, 2017). 
This mixture of similarity and difference between the two regions reflects the relationship 
between the EU and ASEAN in terms of integration rather accurately. “The EU also effectively 
has a form of hierarchy of regional integration, where it has privileged its own experience of 
integration above other regions. Although this view has become more nuanced over time, the 
legacy of that view had meant that ASEAN interlocutors are reluctant to accord recognition to 
many of the EU’s achievements” (Murray, 2015, p.244). The two regions have rather different 
perceptions of regional integration, which creates barriers to norm diffusion. While the 
integration process determines the normativity of a region and its openness to new norms, the 
institutional and legislative arrangements are also relevant factors. This is discussed below. 
6.5.2 Diverging Legislative Frameworks 
A region’s institutional set-up and legislation determines its decision-making procedure and 
commitment to norms. Norms can be found in the Lisbon Treaty as well as the ASEAN Charter 
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showing a region’s formal commitment to them, but the institutional arrangements determine 
to what extent regional institutions have the capacity to implement those norms. 
ASEAN is a group of ten highly diverse countries, which came to agree on regional 
cooperation based on terms of sovereignty and non-interference. Cooperation rather than 
integration seems to guide intra-regional relations. In its founding declaration, no institutional 
structure was foreseen. Instead, annual meetings of foreign ministers were to guide 
cooperation aided by the Standing Committee operating under the hosting chairmanship and 
leaving implementation to the national governments (ASEAN, 1967). 
Since the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, ASEAN is based on three pillars, as the EU 
was before the Lisbon Treaty, which are economic, social and political affairs. The highest 
representative organs are the ASEAN chair and the EU presidency. ASEAN has one chair that 
rotates every year, and which is responsible for the organization of the ASEAN summits 
(ASEAN Charter, Art.31 & 32). The ASEAN Summit is the highest organ in ASEAN bringing 
together the Heads of State, which corresponds to the European Council in the EU, which is 
comprised of the Heads of State and the President of the European Commission. The president 
of the European Council is elected for a term of 2.5 years and “the President of the European 
Council shall not hold a national office” (Art. 15 TEU), whereas in ASEAN the Prime Minister 
of the country holding the chair is the ASEAN chair (e.g. Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen 
Tan Dung in 2010 and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in 2018). 
The ASEAN Coordinating Council brings together the foreign ministers of the ASEAN 
member states at least on a bi-annual basis to prepare for the ASEAN summits (Art.8 ASEAN 
Charter). The Foreign Affairs Council in the EU, which brings foreign ministers together, is 
chaired by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also the 
Vice-President of the European Commission (Art.18 TEU). On behalf on the EU, the High 
Representative can engage in political dialogue with third parties. The competences transferred 
to the ASEAN bodies and the EU bodies are very distinctive as already presented earlier, 
because the ASEAN member states highly value sovereignty. Nonetheless, the institutional 
arrangements per se are comparable. 
There are three ASEAN Community Councils corresponding to the three aforementioned 
communities that were created in 2015 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015): the political-security 
community, the economic community and the socio-cultural community. The communities aim 
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to strengthen cooperation within ASEAN and between ASEAN and third countries, but 
institutionally the inter-governmental set-up remains. In fact, the inter-governmental character 
is enshrined in the ASEAN Charter (Art. 3). Nevertheless, ASEAN has shown interest in 
strengthening the ASEAN secretariat (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). The EU component 
resembling the Community Councils the most would be the different Councils of Ministers, 
which bring together the ministers in charge for a given topic. 
From an institutional point of view, the EU and ASEAN are similar to each other to a certain 
extent (ASEAN Summit/EU Council or the Coordinating Council/Foreign Affairs Council), 
but also very different in other respects. For example, in contrast to the EU, ASEAN does not 
have a judicial body that ensures policy implementation. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
is the highest instance in the European Union to decide on legal matters. ASEAN has not set 
up any institution comparable to the ECJ, but has shown steps towards creating a joint 
supervisory body in the form of an Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights, which, 
however, is merely a consultative body (ASEAN, 2009). Annual assessments regarding the 
implementation of the Community Blueprints are presented to the ASEAN summit following 
a monitoring mechanism. A statement in the Blueprint for the Economic Community highlights 
the lack of policy enforcement mechanisms: “The immediate priority is to complete the 
implementation of measures unfinished under the AEC Blueprint 2015 by end-2016. The 
continuing commitments of Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and 
Viet Nam (CLMV) under the AEC Blueprint 2015 up to 2018 are also incorporated under the 
AEC Blueprint 2025” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). With this statement, the lack of 
implementation is acknowledged and reintegrated into the new ASEAN strategy, i.e. no 
enforcement mechanism is in place to ensure implementation and, therefore, the goal is simply 
postponed. These two examples show that ASEAN’s means to enforce implementation are far 
from the role of an independent court such as the ECJ. Similarly, there is no ASEAN 
parliament. The European Parliament is elected by European citizens and forms an integral part 
of EU policy-making. Such institutions are not part of ASEAN’s current agenda and are not 
planned for the future. During Singapore’s chairmanship of ASEAN, Singapore’s Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong made clear that ASEAN does not follow the EU’s model and does 
not aspire to create supra-national institutions such as the EU’s: 
“However, ASEAN will not become an ASEAN Union, on the model of the EU. It is less 
ambitious than the EU in terms of scope, membership, and integration. ASEAN does not aim 
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to have an ASEAN Parliament, an ASEAN Court of Justice, an ASEAN currency, or an ASEAN 
Central Bank, not even in the very long term. ASEAN is too diverse to aim for a European-style 
union. Our countries have different histories and cultures, diverse political and economic 
systems, contrasting views of the world. Where our interests align, we work together. Where 
we are not ready to cooperate, we put matters aside for the time being, to take up perhaps later 
when conditions are riper” (Lee Hsien Loong, 2018). 
To summarize the integration approach and the institutional arrangements, both similarities 
and differences can be found. The integration process in ASEAN is comparatively slower than 
in the EU, the institutions do not have a supra-national character and further institutional 
integration is not aimed at. Normative coherence builds on norm transmission, which is done 
through interaction and enhanced through persuasion/communicative action (Manea, 2008; 
Rüland, 2014). In the case of EU-ASEAN relations, persuasion remains a challenge as both 
regions share little commonalities and, therefore, norm transmission is challenged. New norms 
need to be translated into the existing institutional arrangements (Elgström, 2000), which 
implies that institutional differences complicate the process of “translation” due to the inherent 
tendency to resist changing the status quo. The institutional architecture emphasizes the 
structural differences between the regions, which impede norm transmission and consequently 
normative policy coherence. 
6.5.3 Regional Norms in Global Strategies  
Normative policy coherence for development is the sum of what an actor is and does. The 
previous two sub-sections have shown what the EU and ASEAN are in terms of the integration 
and levels of institutionalization. This sub-section focuses on what both regions do. Actorness, 
i.e. the capacity to set and achieve goals, is a crucial aspect because it represents what a region 
does (which in turn is influenced by what it is, as shown above). Assessing the EU’s and 
ASEAN’s global strategies with regard to norms will show whether both regions have the 
capacity (and willingness) to set a normative agenda for themselves as actors in the global 
arena. 
Corresponding to the rather loose level of integration, ASEAN is currently still at a stage at 
which it strives for more recognition as a regional actor (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). ASEAN’s 
strategy is to follow the idea of “one vision, one identity, one community” according to its 
ambitions set until 2025 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). It aims to increase its presence in 
international fora and strengthen the ASEAN communities to create a more resilient region 
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internally and against external threats, in particular from an economic perspective. ASEAN’s 
ambitions abound with normative aspirations. ASEAN has voiced the goal to “consolidate our 
Community, building upon and deepening the integration process to realize a rules-based, 
people-oriented, people-centered ASEAN Community, where our peoples enjoy human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, higher quality of life and the benefits of community building, 
reinforcing our sense of togetherness and common identity, guided by the purposes and 
principles of the ASEAN Charter” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). Furthermore, under the 
political-security community one of the goals is to “strengthen democracy, good 
governance, the rule of law, promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as well as combat corruption” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). 
From a normative point of view, this declaration is auspicious, because it addresses human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, rule of law and a people-centered approach to governance and 
development. Given that at least three ASEAN members (Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam) are not 
established democracies in which the fundamental freedoms are constantly undermined, 
these aspirations have a rather hollow connotation. In other words, it is questionable how 
ASEAN can and will make sure that these goals are implemented despite the lack of binding 
implementing mechanisms, as was presented in the previous sub-sections.  
While ASEAN is still emerging in its quest to become a recognized regional actor, the EU has 
become an established regional actor in the global arena, and consequently can pursue other – 
more politically inspired – goals such as those related to security issues (European Union, 
2016b). The EU’s global strategy, one of the EU’s policy papers to place itself in the global 
arena, reflects its own perception and aspirations regarding its role abroad (European Union, 
2016b). According to the global strategy, security of the Union, state and societal resilience, 
exercising an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, global governance, and cooperative 
regional orders are the priorities. Inter-regionalism is part of a broader agenda, albeit an all-
encompassing strategy with internal and external arenas and not a sole external policy approach. 
As part of the global strategy, the EU considers regions as a form of governance that can support 
nations to achieve security, economic growth and higher leverage in the global arena. Because 
of this understanding, the EU commits to supporting regional initiatives when they meet the 
EU’s interests (European Union, 2016b). 
In addition to creating a resilient and security-driven organization, one of the EU’s major 
objectives is to become the most competitive market in the world and a widely recognized 
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trade partner. These aspirations were presented in the Commission Communication “Global 
Europe competing in the World” (European Commission, 2006). Under the premises of this 
competitiveness agenda, the EU has tried to approach ASEAN and negotiate a region-to-region 
free trade agreement but turned to bilateral agreements after the inter-regional negotiations 
were stopped. Economic competitiveness and a strong trade profile seem to be the key 
aspirations of the EU in the future. Particularly interesting in terms of balancing political 
interests is the interconnectivity between economic goals and the EU’s creational values: “Our 
interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. 
At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests” (European Union, 
2016b, p.13). While the EU claims that at a global level, it aims to promote its values while 
simultaneously following its other interests, critics have argued that normative considerations 
are undermined by economic interests (Siles-Brügge, 2014). “Principled pragmatism” is called 
for in the EU Global Strategy, a term that accurately captures the EU’s flexibility in promoting 
norms. Global aspirations are predominantly similar between the two regions. Both emphasize 
creating a more resilient region and more competitive economies based on regional 
cooperation. 
6.6 INTER-REGIONAL RELATIONS AFFECT NPCD 
This concluding section responds to this chapter’s research question “Do EU-ASEAN inter-
regional relations affect normative policy coherence between development and trade in 
bilateral relations with Vietnam and if so, how?” to highlight how the EU-ASEAN relationship 
affects NPCD in EU-Vietnam relations. As presented throughout this chapter, EU-ASEAN 
relations are not driven by norms, such as democracy, and consequently they lack normative 
coherence. Instead, economic interests shape the inter-regional relationship. The EU’s 
normativity is undermined by its economic interests in ASEAN, i.e. “what the EU does” is not 
norm driven. Normative policy coherence, defined as the sum of what the EU is and what 
the EU does, is hardly identifiable at the inter-regional level due to the lack of norm 
implementation. 
As presented in figure 15, EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism, EU-Vietnam bilateralism and 
Vietnam-ASEAN membership mutually affect each other. Consequently, norms (or the lack 
thereof) in one relationship can strengthen (or restrict) norms in another. Even though EU-
ASEAN relations are strongly driven by economic interests, norms are present at several policy 
stages in EU-Vietnam relations (see chapter four). However, chapter four and five have also 
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shown that norms lack at the implementation level. Consequently, at the guideline and 
formulation stage in EU-Vietnam relations, norms do not seem to be affected by the lack of 
norms in inter-regionalism. Conversely, the lack of norm implementation is and indicator for 
the EU’s non-normative priorities. Particularly the EU-Vietnam Business Network shows that 
access to the ASEAN market is the underlying goal at an implementation stage.  
The preceding analysis has also shown that ASEAN membership does not affect NPCD in EU-
Vietnam relations. Due to the inter-governmental nature of ASEAN, norm spill-over between 
ASEAN members and ASEAN institutions is hampered. ASEAN reinforces its own distinctive 
regional norms in response to EU norm promotion emphasizing national sovereignty and inter-
governmentalism, which in turn restricts norm spill-over. Moreover, ASEAN integration is 
also driven by economic interests. Thus, ASEAN membership cannot be considered as a norm-
interlocutor between EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism and EU-Vietnam bilateralism. 
Consequently, the EU would potentially be the main diver for norms in this triangular 
relationship. However, this potential is weakened by the EU’s economic interests. This 
approach suggests that the EU follows realist goals, which are infused with norms – albeit at a 
rhetorical level – but which ultimately set the tone for EU external relations.  
In terms of inter-regionalism theory and norm transmission, the different levels of regional 
development mentioned above affect regional behavior. As an emerging region, ASEAN is in 
the process of regional consolidation and identity-formation, i.e. norm reinforcement. The EU 
is an established regional actor in the global arena, and consequently, its global ambitions 
reflect cooperative hegemony utilizing norms as strategic tools in inter-regional relationships 
(Farrell, 2004; Pedersen, 2002). 
Three causes of normative incoherence can be identified based on this chapter’s analysis. First, 
the EU and ASEAN are two distinct regional actors with their own regional norms. In reference 
to the concept of “actorness” introduced above, the EU is characterized by regional agency as 
it promotes norms, which are defined at the regional level. Conversely, ASEAN does not 
display significant levels of normative actorness because of the commitment to the non-
infringement of the sovereignty of member states. It remains a regional entity that reflects the 
aggregated interests of member states. Consequently, ASEAN has its own pursuit of a 
distinctive form of regionalism, which has not and will not follow the EU’s footsteps (Lee 
Hsien Loong, 2018). ASEAN regional integration has historically not called for more supra-
nationalism, especially in normative terms. Instead, the inter-governmental character of 
214 
 
ASEAN paired with significant diversity among member states, makes ASEAN as a regional 
actor less susceptive to norms. The above analysis supports the observation of ASEAN’s 
resistance against EU norms (Garcia & Masselot, 2015a; Poole, 2015). ASEAN’s identity is 
not shaped around norms comparable to the EU’s norms and several ASEAN member states 
are still actively compromising norms, most visibly democracy, freedom, human rights, peace, 
or the rule of law. As a result, a normative dialogue between the regions does exist, but is a 
rare exercise and lacks implementation, as has been shown above. 
Another cause of incoherence is the EU’s principled pragmatism, i.e. the option to prioritize 
EU economic interests over norms. The EU’s formal regional strategy prioritizes economic 
growth and inter-regional trade relations. Not only does the EU consider ASEAN as one of the 
fastest growing regions, but it also highlights the importance of the ASEAN market in its 
national projects in Vietnam. This further undermines inter-regional norm transmission. The 
EU’s strong economic interests have been present since the first EEC-ASEAN agreement and, 
therefore, it cannot be argued that they exist only because of ASEAN’s resistance to norms. 
Since the beginning of inter-regional relations in the 1970s, the EU has had economic interests 
in ASEAN, which have subsequently shaped inter-regionalism. 
Indeed, scholars have argued that the EU’s economic interests in combination with ASEAN’s 
resistance to include norms in Free Trade Agreements has created “a double barrier” for EU 
norm transmission (Garcia & Masselot, 2015a, 2015b). EU-ASEAN relations are asymmetric 
in terms of the economic weight that each organization has, but regardless of this asymmetry, 
ASEAN follows  its  own  path  according  to  the  ASEAN  way (Katsumata, 2003). In free 
trade agreements, the inclusion of norms promoted by the EU is often seen as a form of market 
protectionism from the Asian states’ perspective (Elgström, 2007; Garcia & Masselot, 2015a). 
Furthermore, Asian governments are reluctant to discuss non-trade matters under the scope of 
trade negotiations (Garcia & Masselot, 2015a). As a result, this type of norm transmission 
strengthens ASEAN’s distinctiveness (also termed ASEANness or “the ASEAN way”) (Garcia 
& Masselot, 2015a, 2015b; Manea, 2008) and as such is another cause of normative 
incoherence, albeit unintended incoherence. Based on these three causes of incoherence, I 
would argue that a triple barrier, rather than a double barrier, exists between the regions: 
difference in nature (levels of integration, institutional set-up), ASEANness/ASEAN norm 
resistance, and EU economic interests. This triple barrier to norm transmission is also a barrier 
to EU-ASEAN inter-regional normative coherence. 
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Both relationships, EU-ASEAN and EU-Vietnam, are guided by economic interests, but 
EU-Vietnam relations have moved past the economic dimension and incorporate other 
areas of cooperation included in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. EU-Vietnam 
bilateral relations are, therefore, “stronger” than inter-regional relations with ASEAN. One 
of the reasons for stronger relations with Vietnam might be the French ties to Vietnam, which 
support the EU-Vietnam relationship, as mentioned above. This kind of support cannot be 
found at the ASEAN level. Based on the observation that EU-Vietnam relations are more 
integrated than EU-ASEAN relations and the primacy of trade-related matters, it is unlikely 
that the EU’s interests in ASEAN have a positive effect on normative policy coherence in the 
EU’s Vietnam policies. Vietnam might be reluctant to make agreements that conflict ASEAN 
regulations, but due to the inter-governmental nature of ASEAN, weak enforcement 
mechanisms and the low institutionalization of ASEAN, ASEAN strategies are very vague and 
do not undermine Vietnam’s policy-making powers. Therefore, it can be argued that 
challenging EU-ASEAN relations do not have a negative impact on normative policy 
coherence for development either. EU-ASEAN and EU-Vietnam relations are quite 
independent from each other and ASEAN does not constitute a governance layer between 
the EU and Vietnam. As such, it does not have major impacts on EU policies in Vietnam and 
consequently neither on the EU’s (lack of) norm implementation. 
Neither ASEAN nor Vietnam are normative actors in terms of the norms identified for this 
dissertation (democracy, freedom, gender equality, good governance, human rights, justice, 
liberty, non-discrimination, peace, rule of law, solidarity, sustainability). Thus, the EU is the 
primary normative actor in the relationship between inter-regionalism, bilateralism and 
ASEAN membership. In this position, the EU could create the normative link between inter-
regionalism and bilateralism, but instead its relationships overshadowed by its focus on 
economic growth. 
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Conclusions  
The era of transformative development requires global development actors to include a 
normative dimension into their policies. As a normative actor (Manners, 2002) and an 
important global development actor, the EU should take seriously its responsibility to promote 
norms such as human rights, gender equality or the rule of law abroad. Even more so, because 
the promotion of EU norms abroad is mandated by the Lisbon Treaty. Simultaneously, the 
Lisbon Treaty calls for policy coherence for development (PCD): to support development 
strategies, non-development (e.g. trade) policies should not undermine development policies. 
Based on the two notions norms and PCD, the concept of normative policy coherence for 
development (NPCD) was utilized throughout this dissertation to assess whether development 
actors, such as the EU, implement norms in their development and non-development policies. 
For this purpose, twelve norms were identified based on the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the Agenda 
for Change (2011) and the European Consensus on Development (2006): democracy, freedom, 
gender equality, good governance, human rights, justice, liberty, non-discrimination, peace, 
rule of law, solidarity, and sustainability. Two main research questions guided the analysis: 
Are the EU’s development and trade policies coherent in implementing norms; 
And if not, why are they incoherent? 
A conceptual chapter introduced the concept normative policy coherence for development 
(NPCD) defined as the coherent implementation of norms in development and trade policies 
(see chapter three). NPCD is based on the Normative Power Europe concept, which argues that 
the EU’s normative power arises out if what it is. In this dissertation, I have argued though that 
NPCD requires both what the EU is and what the EU does, which integrates norm content and 
norm implementation. Using the conceptual and methodological considerations presented in 
chapters two and three, norm representation, policy networks and inter-regional relations were 
analyzed as proxy factors for normative policy coherence in the empirical chapters (chapters 
four, five and six). Several sub-questions helped structuring the examination of this complex 
topic and simultaneously guided the analytical layers. 
The analysis comprised three layers. The first layer was the legislative framework of the EU, 
which shows the EU’s commitment to norms across four stages of policy implementation. The 
mention of norms in several policy documents was examined to determine whether those policy 
documents show commitment to norms (see chapter two for methodological details and 
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appendix 1 for a complete list of policy documents). Results show that the EU’s commitment 
to norms is rather strong at the rhetorical stages “policy guidelines” and “policy formulation”, 
whereas norms lack at the two policy implementation stages. Chapter four dealt with the 
questions “Does the EU present itself as a normative power in development?” and “Does the 
EU present itself as a normative power in trade?” by assessing the EU’s institutional set-up 
and EU-Vietnam specific documents as to their norm representation in relation to policy 
definition and policy implementation levels. Both aspects are part of the Normative Power 
Europe definition: “what it is” is represented by the EU’s institutional arrangement, and 
“what it does” by its policy statements. Normative power is regarded as one element to 
foster normative policy coherence for development and, therefore, is regarded as an 
important feature when studying NPCD. Concerning the institutional structure, the results 
show that the creation of the European External Action Service and the post of the High 
Representative has not brought the desired coherence but instead more competition between EU 
actors. Institutionally, more efforts towards policy coherence would be possible and 
particularly towards normative coherence. PCD, for the moment, is a goal to be achieved by 
the European Commission, which has its own sub-unit on “policy and coherence” (DG 
DEVCO Unit A1) to work on awareness raising of PCD, but the wider implications PCD could 
have for sustainable development are disregarded. 
For the assessment of policy documents, four implementation levels were defined: policy 
guidelines, policy formulation, policy implementation I and policy implementation II. The 
results show that the most normative stage is the policy guideline stage, whereas the other three 
levels show mixed results. Previous studies have shown that norms have entered the 
development agenda within the EU (Elgström, 2000). For this reason, it was expected that EU 
norms are more visible in development than in trade policy documents. Furthermore, it was 
expected that the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the EU’s commitment to norms and the EU’s 
commitment to policy coherence for development. Political commitment to norms is necessary 
condition but not sufficient for their implementation. As chapter four shows, the EU’s 
commitment to norms in development is more prominent than its commitment to norms in 
trade; however, no change towards more normative commitment could be identified since the 
entry into force of Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Political commitment is a requirement for normative 
policy coherence as it is the first stage of the implementing process, but political commitment 
alone is not enough for NPCD. The document analysis has shown that norm implementation 
lacks at the lower implementation levels (program and project formulation), i.e. at the levels of 
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actual implementation. This result feeds into the discussions about PCD as a technical 
approach, but also into the development as freedom debate. Actual political commitment to 
policy coherence as a technical tool is a starting point to address incoherence and raise 
awareness about this issue, but the mere statement of being committed to PCD does not lead 
to any results unless measures are implemented. While there are PCD awareness campaigns 
within the European Commission, the exact goal of PCD remains unclear. Some researchers 
contend that PCD is actually utilized to further the EU’s own foreign policy objectives 
(Thede, 2013). Following this suggestion, PCD could be understood as a tool to meet the EU’s 
economic interests by providing largely technical support to developing countries to achieve 
economic growth and become new trading partners for the EU. 
Policy networks form the second layer of analysis in this dissertation. To go beyond the EU’s 
institutional and legal arrangements affecting norm implementation, chapter five addressed 
European policy networks in Vietnam. This chapter dealt with the question “Why might 
existing policy networks limit normative coherence between development and trade policies?” 
showing that sector networks create boundaries between actors in development and actors in 
trade. Interview data conducted at the European delegations in Vietnam was primarily used for 
this part of the NPCD analysis. The interview analysis has shown that the structure within the 
European delegations as well as the monthly meetings of delegation staff leads to a separation 
along professional lines, i.e. development staff meets as a group and trade staff meets as a 
separate group. Interaction between the two groups is inanimate, with the exception of small 
embassies in which individuals can occupy several roles. Coherence between development and 
trade might improve because commercial/economic counsellors take over the responsibilities 
of the development resort during the phase-out of development cooperation and consequently 
improve communication between the two fields. In PCD, “for development” is the crucial 
aspect, which gets lost because of the development phase-out. Based on better communication 
in the transition phase, coherence might improve; however, due to the “missing D” coherence 
does not improve “for development”. 
In addition to sector networks, issue networks have been created around shared interests. The 
EU-Vietnam Business Network is an issue network, which connects European companies that 
plan to establish themselves in Vietnam. A more normative example is the informal gender-
working group, which was set up because of budget cuts to gender-focused development 
projects. As a result, interested individuals meet on an informal basis to discuss gender-related 
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themes outside the scope of development. Issue networks reinforce the thematic divides 
between development and trade actors. However, norm-inspired networks such as the gender-
working group could potentially make a more normative impact because all actors in this 
network are particularly norm-interested and willing to promote those norms despite budgetary 
complications. Thus, norm-driven issue networks could enhance NPCD even though they do 
not form part of the EU’s official policy implementation. 
Chapter six addressed the question “Do EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations affect normative 
policy coherence between development and trade in bilateral relations with Vietnam and if 
so, how?” referring to the EU’s wider regional interests that influence its bilateral relations. 
The analysis suggests that EU-ASEAN relations do not directly undermine EU-Vietnam 
NPCD, but the EU’s economic aspirations in ASEAN indirectly affect the bilateral 
relationship. This conclusion is based on the loose relationship between ASEAN and Vietnam, 
which does not create an additional governance layer between the EU and Vietnam, and on 
Vietnam’s advanced relations with the EU compared to the EU-ASEAN relations. EU-Vietnam 
relations are governed by a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement as well as a Free Trade 
Agreement, which cover a wide range of cooperation such as trade, poverty eradication, 
sustainable development, security and justice, communication, and human rights. Conversely, 
EU-ASEAN relations are still governed by the 1980 Cooperation Agreement, which only 
covers economic and development cooperation. Furthermore, interview partners in Vietnam 
suggested that ASEAN and EU-ASEAN relations do not play an important role in their work 
in Vietnam. Consequently, it can be concluded that the EU interests in ASEAN do not greatly 
shape its norm implementation in Vietnam. 
This dissertation has shown that EU normativity lacks implementation. “Principled 
pragmatism” (European Union, 2016b) accurately reflects the EU’s external policy strategies. 
Despite its normative rhetoric, EU policy practices are interest-driven, and hence, the EU 
undermines normative policy coherence for development. 
This concluding chapter offers some final remarks to this dissertation. It is structured as 
follows. The next section recalls the causes if incoherence identified in this dissertation, which 
resulted from the empirical chapters four, five and six. The following section places this 
dissertation in a wider academic context by highlighting the contributions to literature on policy 
coherence for development, policy networks and inter-regionalism. The final two sub-sections 
provide suggestions for further research on normative policy coherence for development and 
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call for normative reconsiderations throughout the policy cycle. 
i. Intended Causes of Incoherence 
Causes of Normative Incoherence 
Norms are a political matter. The goal of this research was to assess the EU’s norm 
implementation in its development and trade policies. In the global political arenas, the EU has 
adopted the “development as freedom” perspective that is linked to the UN human and 
sustainable development agendas. However, EU development and trade strategies include 
growth-based objectives as discussed in throughout this dissertation. The EU as a normative 
actor should be expected to implement norms in development and in trade policies. Contrary 
to those expectations, neither development nor trade clearly reflect the normative dimension 
that is enshrined in the EU Treaties or the EU’s global political commitments. Norms are 
considered a political matter and as such are included in political rhetoric, broad programs and 
vague statements, but are not actively addressed in concrete projects. The EU-Vietnam free 
trade agreement does make an explicit reference to the EU-Vietnam partnership and 
cooperation agreement, which includes references to the EU Treaties and the UN Charter of 
Human Rights, but as a trade agreement, it is not meant to incorporate any other matters. 
Nonetheless, sustainability is covered in one chapter, which reflects a new aspect that has been 
included during the negotiations of new generation trade agreements. The normative divide 
between development and trade is not as explicit as expected, because a certain commitment 
to norms can be traced in both arenas, but at simultaneously the actual commitment to norms 
remains at the political level. Both, the document analysis and the policy network analysis 
indicate that norms are a political matter. Consequently, norms are less relevant in development 
and trade affairs. This result also holds for the EU-ASEAN relationship. Scholars have argued 
that the main priority in EU-ASEAN relations lies on economic affairs (Camroux, 2010). This 
dissertation supports this claim as shown in the analysis of chapter six. Political affairs are kept 
strictly separate from economic affairs and the economic affairs often outweigh political 
tensions between the regions. 
In accordance with the rhetoric-practice argument separating rhetorical claims from action 
(Picciotto, 2005), the first main finding can be summarized as norms being a political concern 
at the multi-lateral level. These normative concerns are not translated into bilateral 
development or trade practices, which consequently leads to normative incoherence. 
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PCD is a technical tool. The second finding relates to the EU’s internal struggles over 
competences, which highlight that PCD remains a technical issue in the European Union. PCD 
is integrated in various policy documents and awareness measures are undertaken to limit 
incoherence, but this technical approach to PCD is subject to political and administrative 
competition between the EU institutions and within the institutions. Despite some efforts to 
reduce policy incoherence, such as the Commission’s impact assessments or the creation of the 
position of the High Representative for External Relations, intended and unintended 
incoherence at the institutional level remain. Causes of incoherence can be attributed to 
competing interests between development and trade (most prominently DG DEVCO and DG 
TRADE), institutional structures dividing responsibility between the Commission and the 
Council, and rivalry between DEVCO and EEAS regarding certain budgets. At the national 
level, a variety of mechanisms to increase PCD have already been identified, among which 
there are the annual reporting to the EU institutions, a consultation mechanism between 
European and ACP church ministers, or the establishment of complaint procedures (for a more 
extensive list see: Hoebink, 1999). These suggestions might also be valuable for normative 
policy coherence for development at the EU level. Annual reports and consultations between 
non-political actors could increase general awareness of normative PCD within the EU 
institutions and the member states. The introduction of complaint mechanisms has the potential 
to support norm enforcement across policy arenas. As long as PCD remains merely a technical 
tool instead of a means to an end, i.e. a means to achieve sustainable development, it does not 
create greater coherence, and consequently undermines normative coherence. 
Networks do not foster NPCD. The third main finding highlights the EU’s necessity to 
improve relations between the EU as an institution and its member states to create better 
normative policy coherence. As presented elsewhere (Carbone & Keijzer, 2016; Hoebink, 
1999b), diverging interests between the EU and EU member states is not a new phenomenon. 
This dissertation confirms those previous findings based on the results of the policy network 
analysis. Existing policy networks reinforce technical divides between the EU and the member 
states in terms of distributing areas of competence in development, and even more so 
reinforce the structural separation between the development and trade sector reducing 
communication. Reduced communication between development and trade actors restricts norm 
spill-over and consequently NPCD. 
One of the causes of incoherence is the multi-level governance structure that the EU has 
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created by adding a regional level of policy-making. At the EU level, horizontal coherence 
between EU policies is not sufficient to achieve normative development. As mentioned in the 
previous section, various types of PCD are necessary as tools towards this overarching goal. 
Normative coherence could be considered a utopia (Carbone, 2008; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 
2007), because it addresses horizontal, vertical, internal, multilateral, and donor-recipient 
coherence, which form an integral part in achieving normative policy coherence, particularly 
in EU policies due to its multi-level governance set-up. However, institutionalized norms are 
transversal in nature. Reinforcing them aims to establish internal coherence, above all within 
the development sector, and this can be considered the foundation for spill-over to the other 
coherence frameworks. 
With regard to horizontal coherence, the EU emphasized already it its Blue Book 2007 “to 
increase coherence between different policy areas, and in particular between development 
cooperation, trade policy and political dialogue with the Government of Vietnam” (EU 
Delegation to Vietnam, 2007, p.38), referring to horizontal and donor-recipient coherence. In 
this case, the EU is an actor with its own policies and strategies, but on the other hand, the EU 
member states follow their own policies and strategies. As a result, incoherence arises due to 
competing interests between the EU and the member states and due to the lack of information, 
which can be intended or unintended. Despite monthly meetings of the sectorial counsellors 
from all European delegations in Vietnam, i.e. development counselors, political counselors or 
trade counselors, not all information is shared with the other delegations. Even though, 
according to the interviews, the countries’ diplomatic goals largely overlap, disagreements 
naturally occur in some cases, which leads to the formulation of different national strategies. 
In those cases, an intended withholding of information can cause incoherence within a policy 
arena. Obviously, not all member states have the same attitude towards the EU delegation 
or towards each other, but generally, the delegations are supportive of the EU. Subliminal 
competition, national strategies and diverging interests between the EU and its member states 
can lead to withholding of information and insufficient exchange. Sector networks, therefore, 
create a double-barrier to normative policy coherence. First, they reinforce the structural 
separation of sectors and, second, actors within the networks are not always open to sharing 
information. Therefore, it can be concluded that existing policy networks do not support 
NPCD. 
 
223 
 
Structural causes reinforce the normative-technical divide. Based on the previous three 
findings, one observation can be made with regard to the structural basis for incoherence. Given 
that norms are considered by the EU to be a political matter, they do not translate into the 
technical approach for PCD promoted in the EU. They also do not spill over from one sector 
network into another, because the political counselors are in charge of political (and normative) 
affairs, and not the development and trade counselors. Thus, having norms as a political matter 
and PCD as a technical matter does create a divide, which does not support normative 
coherence. Consequently, norms are not transversal in nature as they are supposed to be, and 
the normative basis of policy-making in general is undermined, because the EU’s normative 
power is not implemented in the development or economic spheres due to its restriction to 
political affairs. There is a mismatch between global commitments and the structural 
arrangements to enforce those commitments. The SDGs call for human rights and equality, but 
in terms of implementation, these norms are a political matter and not a development matter. 
Similarly, they are not a trade matter. Structural divisions between the sectors reinforce the 
divide between politics and technicalities, which are not only visible in the institutional 
struggles within the EU institutions, but also in the separation of policy networks and the 
divergence between globalized policy guidelines and bilateral agreements and strategies. 
The results of this dissertation show that normative incoherence not only occurs between 
development and trade policies, but also across the governance levels ranging from the global 
level to the policy network level. Because of this inherent complexity, achieving NPCD 
remains a challenge. Perfect coherence can never be achieved (Carbone, 2008), it should 
nevertheless be aspired. Normative coherence should be aspired, because norms in external 
policies are a crucial factor in transformative development. In this dissertation, normative 
policy coherence included horizontal coherence, vertical coherence, multi-lateral coherence 
and internal coherence, not addressing donor-recipient coherence. Thus, while the causes of 
incoherence are already manifold, as shown above, adding another type of coherence would 
only make it more difficult to achieve normative coherence. Having said this, the results also 
show that efforts towards greater policy coherence exist as. For example, the Commission’s 
report of policy coherence for development (European Commission, 2015b), the policy and 
coherence unit in DG DEVCO, and the counselors’ meetings in Vietnam are initiatives to 
implement policy coherence for development in practice. While these efforts are positive 
contributions to reaching PCD, their disconnectedness from EU norms remains a challenge. As 
mentioned above, this is due to the EU’s structural arrangements in which norms are considered 
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political and consequently are not incorporated in technical interventions, such as development 
and trade projects. 
Intended Incoherence to Support Trade? 
The causes of normative incoherence in EU-Vietnam relations are intended and system-driven. 
What is the function of presenting the EU as a normative actor if its structure does not support 
the implementation of its norms? Could the EU be reduced to a mere trade organization? It is 
necessary to reflect critically on those questions in this conclusion given that the results of the 
preceding analyses strongly imply exactly that. 
Indeed, the internal structure of the European Union does not support the implementation of 
EU norms, as the analysis of policy networks in chapter five has shown. In addition to the 
structural separation between policy sectors and their corresponding sectoral policy networks 
in third countries, policy-making structures in Brussels (and Strasbourg) do not support norm 
implementation either. The European Commission has the power to negotiate and conclude 
trade negotiations and sign the final trade agreements after authorization by the Council. The 
European Parliament can only either approve or reject the final agreement but cannot propose 
amendments. It can negotiate trade agreements on behalf of the European Union and the 
implementation of these trade agreements do not require implementation at the MS level due 
to the EU competences. Thus, the organizational structures in Brussels underline the EU’s 
competences in trade, whereas the EU member states implement their national strategies in 
other areas such as development. As one of the consequences of the internal structures that 
transfer economic powers to the EU institutions, the EU prioritizes economic interests in its 
bilateral and inter-regional relations. 
The EU is a successful economic region and it could even be claimed that economic integration 
is one of its major successes. In order to maintain this success, it is important for the EU to 
remain an active global player in the globalizing world. Thus, the primacy of economic 
interests can be justified in terms of remaining competitive, expanding the market and 
increasing trade volumes. However, since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, policy 
coherence for development is one of the EU’s objective. Given that PCD is not clearly defined 
by the European Union, measures to implement it are at the mercy of EU-internal actors, 
including non-development actors. Adopting a “low-expectations approach”, policy coherence 
implies that economic interests do not undermine development interests. As the EU supports 
economic development, the introduction of PCD does not create any major challenges. 
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Adopting a “high-expectations approach”, the introduction of PCD could have resulted in a 
prioritization of development objectives over economic objectives. Obviously, the NPCD 
approach promoted in this dissertation is based on “high expectations”, because it analyzes EU 
policies and strategies based on normative development goals and the EU’s commitment to 
norms. Economic objectives are part of the EU’s development agenda, but under the umbrella 
of transformative development, non-economic normative goals should be at least as important 
as economic goals since they are mentioned in EU treaties and the EU has made global 
commitments to them. 
One of the major normative actors within the EU is the European Parliament (EP). The 
European Parliament has gained more decision-making power throughout the EU integration 
process – most recently with the Lisbon Treaty – and has used this strengthened role to push 
for the inclusion of norms. However, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) primarily 
resort to non-legislative resolutions, a mechanism to establish dialogues with other institutions, 
but also to create joint committees with third countries in the area of foreign affairs (Costa & 
Dri, 2014). As a result of this, the EP is recognized as an actor, which promotes European 
norms under the umbrella of addressing bigger crises such as poverty eradication, ending armed 
conflicts and addressing gender issues, even though other EU institutions have often opposed 
the EP’s involvement (Costa & Dri, 2014). “Over the years, MEPs have developed an 
ambitious discourse on the role the EP as the ‘largest democratic assembly of the world', ought 
to play, particularly in promoting human rights, democracy, development and peace in former 
colonies and globally” (Costa & Dri, 2014, p.133). Thus, the EP has found its way into policy-
making even though its formal powers are still comparatively low compared to the Commission 
and the Council. 
Due to all the above-mentioned factors, the inclusion of norms might be an EU-internal solution 
to give voice to the European Parliament more than a sign of normative actorness. Normative 
Power Europe (NPE) is defined as “what the EU is” (Manners, 2002), i.e. a peaceful region 
with stable institutions. What this approach fails to include are internal struggles that lead to 
the image of a normative power, which in turn fails to be implemented due to the internal 
struggles. The value attached to norms in external relations shows parallels to the MEP’s 
resources in foreign policy making; they are legal, functional, and rhetorical (Costa & Dri, 
2014). Norms are in the agreements, because the Lisbon Treaty mandates norm promotion 
abroad. As such, they have a legal value in terms of respecting the Lisbon Treaty. Norms are 
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also in the agreements because the EP uses various strategies to promote norms in foreign 
affairs and in doing so manages to push norms where the Commission and the Council would 
not have done so. As such, they have a functional role as a sign of democratic decision-making 
and hence as an effort to overcome the democratic deficit. Last, norms have a rhetorical value 
in the agreements to the extent to which they can be referred and can be used as verbal pressure 
against third countries. The trade-suspension clause in case of human rights breaches is one 
example. Even though this clause suggests trade suspension, it has not yet been invoked, thus 
it acts as a rhetorical tool at present. 
The complexity of the policy-making processes in foreign policies shows that the EU is not 
merely a trade organization. Particularly the European Parliament contributes a normative 
voice. Nevertheless, economic interests and trade relations tend to overshadow non-trade goals, 
and as a result, it remains questionable how normative “Normative Power Europe” actually is. 
ii. Relations to Wider Literature 
This dissertation aimed to contribute to the public policy literature, literature on policy 
coherence for development and normative power Europe, and literature on regionalism. 
It adds to the existing literature on PCD and public policy literature by taking the traditional 
policy cycle (agenda setting, adoption, implementation, evaluation) (Jann & Wegrich, 2007) 
and specifically examining the implementation in terms of normative policy coherence. The 
goal of this research was to identify gaps the policy definition and implementation that lead to 
normative incoherence. Previous research suggests that PCD could be improved by creating an 
international development regime, increased donor coordination in international fora, 
introducing guiding policy strategies and budget plans for national governments by national 
governments, or facilitating inter-ministerial and intra-ministerial coordination (Forster & 
Stokke, 1999). These suggestions are strongly related to the agenda setting and policy adoption 
stage, but less so on the policy implementation stage. 
This dissertation adds to the study of gaps in PCD and feeds into the literature addressing 
the sources of incoherence. Informed by the autonomy-intention model (Hydén, 1999), the 
structural arrangements, different interests, budgetary concerns and lack of information were 
addressed in the form of normativity in the political commitment, in policy networks and in 
regional relations, giving more insight into the EU’s normative policy coherence. Normative 
coherence studies (Koff, 2017b, 2017a; Koff & Maganda, 2016) have not addressed norm 
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implementation to this extent and, thus, this dissertation addressed a gap hitherto underexplored 
in the literature. It also reinforces the argument about the EU-MS divide regarding further 
development of PCD (King et al., 2012), by examining policy networks on the ground. 
With the analysis of normative policy coherence for development, this dissertation also 
contributes to the study of normative power Europe (Manners, 2002). NPCD is the result of 
“what the EU is”, its creation and institutional set-up, and “what the EU does”, i.e. its policy 
practices. By having examined the EU’s policy implementation, this research project adds to 
the understanding of what the EU does and how this corresponds to what the EU is. 
Last, this dissertation builds on inter-regionalism literature by introducing normative 
coherence to inter-regional relations. As chapter six has shown, EU norm transmission to 
ASEAN is characterized by the divergence between the two regions, which restricts norms 
transmission and even enhances ASEANness. From a normative perspective, both regions have 
their own normative basis that shape their actorness. ASEAN is built on national sovereignty 
and limited regional integration. As a result, ASEAN is still in a phase of identity-formation. 
Conversely, the EU tries to export its normative identity to other regions, which is met by 
reluctance though. With this dissertation, I aimed to draw from this field of research and 
complement it with a normative angle on policy implementation that goes beyond 
institution-building. The analysis has shown that the EU meets major challenges to promoting its 
norms in EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations based on the diverging levels of integration, 
institutional structures and economic priorities. 
iii. Propositions for Follow-Up Studies 
The preceding sections have highlighted this dissertation’s ambitious goals and aspired 
contributions to various fields of academic literature. Based on this, future research could build 
on this dissertation by enhancing some of the methodological limitations of this study or by 
applying different theoretical frameworks. Both possibilities are in turn explored in the 
following. 
Methodological Improvements 
Purposive sampling was chosen as the sampling strategy for this study to target relevant actors 
explicitly in the development and trade arenas. While this strategy supports the scope of the 
study and allows for effective information gathering, simultaneously it limits openness to 
information, which was not anticipated in the study.  The viewpoint provided by non- 
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governmental organizations or information regarding the relationship between development, 
trade and agricultural policies are just two examples, which were excluded from this study. 
The choice of purposive sampling was undertaken carefully but resulted as the most suitable 
method aiming for information that was deemed relevant to the study. As a result, the number 
of respondents remained quite small and the distribution of respondents across sectors was 
uneven. The fact that the time permitted to conclude the Ph.D. was limited to four years did 
not permit more extensive interviewing. 
Increasing the number of respondents could have been done in two ways: either by recruiting 
more people that directly fall within the scope of the study or by expanding the purposive 
sampling strategy to include respondents that are not directly addressed by the study. Regarding 
the former, it would have been useful to include one development and one trade counselor per 
embassy, but this was not always possible because of respondents’ non-availability and the 
researcher’s limited time of four months in Vietnam. Regarding the latter, respondents from 
the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and Directorate-
General for Environment (DG ENV) in the European Commission could have been included. 
One of the respondents from the EEAS (personal interview not identified numerically in order 
to ensure anonymity) suggested that exchange with DG ENV is oftentimes more intense than 
with DG TRADE, because of the new sustainability emphasis. This implies that DG DEVCO 
and DG ENV might be closer connected than DG DEVCO and DG TRADE. Neither 
environmental nor agricultural policies are not part of this study, which is why no interviews 
were conducted with either of these two DGs. Nevertheless, interviewing DG ENV and/or DG 
AGRI could have brought more contextual information about the relationship between the 
different directorates-general and their relevance in a given policy proposal. Future research 
could, therefore, include a broader number of respondents to expand on the development-trade 
discussions to include environmental and agricultural aspects as well. 
Another methodological advancement that could potentially arise out if this dissertation is 
the examination of a causal relation between policy-making and policy implementation, for 
example, by undertaking in-depth process tracing. As mentioned in the methodology chapter 
(chapter two), this study is not a study of causality, particularly not of causal mechanisms. 
Causal mechanisms show the path between the cause and the outcome, which has not been 
done here. Causal effects, however, can be inferred from the correlation between norms in 
political commitment, norms in policy networks and norms in regional interests as the 
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independent variables and normative policy coherence as the dependent variable. As the 
previous chapters show, norms in the EU’s legislative framework have not changed across the 
temporal dimension, i.e. before and after the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
A third inspiration for further research arises from the focus on the EU’s normative policy 
coherence with Vietnam as the partner country for the EU’s development and trade policies. 
This distinction between the EU as a prominent actor and Vietnam as a “silent” addressee of 
these policies was made because the aim was to discover the coherence between the EU policies 
and not, for example, coherence between the EU policies and Vietnamese policies. However, 
the Vietnamese context was relevant to the extent that it is a socialist one-party state where 
talks about norms might be more difficult to pursue than in a pluralist and open society. Having 
said that, the lack of the Vietnamese perspective on EU policies remains a weakness of this 
research. Even when excluding the Vietnamese perspective on purpose, the EU’s policies are 
a result of negotiations with the Vietnamese counterpart. The EU does not operate in isolation 
and has no legitimacy to undermine the Vietnamese agenda. Leaving out the Vietnamese 
interests and strategies results in a relatively one-sided analysis and understanding of policy 
implementation. Nevertheless, the EU focus provides one part of the picture to which the study 
of the Vietnamese side would contribute. In terms of including the Vietnamese side, some 
efforts have been undertaken to include Vietnamese considerations, but only one respondent 
agreed to be interviewed. Even though Vietnam is not the main case of this study, the initial 
goal was to use interviews with Vietnamese government officials to place the EU’s actions into 
a local context provided by locals. As a result of this low response rate, this study does not 
accurately capture the Vietnamese perspective. Further research could thus include the 
Vietnamese perspective more strongly to address donor-recipient coherence and norm 
diffusion more explicitly. 
 
Alternative Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation used the EU foreign policy literature to assess the overall EU policies. 
Foreign policy theory suggests that policies are not only interest driven but are also a result of 
the EU’s wider political implications. Emphasizing rational choice models, other theories, such 
as those suggested by the political economy literature or international relations literature, 
could provide different angles towards explaining the EU’s behavior. 
 
Political economy theory would also have been a suitable theory for this study but was not 
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chosen as the primary theory because it prioritizes economic reasoning of decision-making, 
which does not fit the dissertation’s focus on norms. Scholars of political economy argue that 
political choices are driven by economic interests, thus subordinating, for example, 
development policies to economic benefits (Siles-Brügge, 2014). In a study that is strongly 
driven by normative aspirations and focuses on the implementation of norms, political 
economy did not strike at the suitable theory. However, this theory may account for some of 
the results of this study, particularly those related to regional interests as shown in chapter six. 
Data suggests that economic interests drive the EU’s regional strategy to some extent. 
Especially the move from a regional EU-ASEAN free trade agreement to bilateral free trade 
agreements emphasizes the economic rationale the EU pursues in the area. Therefore, a 
political economy perspective could add another explanatory layer to the EU’s rationale on 
norm implementation. In the study of policy networks, political economy theory could 
highlight the divergence between economic and other interests. The focus here was on 
communication between the different actors and their involvement in norm promotion. The 
difference to the efforts towards economic promotion, however, is not highlighted in this 
dissertation. Therefore, the political economy approach could be a valuable contribution to 
further examine the role of norms in policy implementation. Thus, while this dissertation 
generally argues that structural arrangements and the norm-technical divide are drivers for 
normative incoherence, prioritizing economic interests could be explored as the underlying 
rationale for normative incoherence as well. 
 
Alternatively, international relations (IR) theory could be applied to emphasize the EU’s 
negotiation strategies more strongly to EU relations with ASEAN in particular but also to the 
EU’s ambitions at the global level. IR theory highlights the competitive nature of self-interested 
nation states and different bargaining techniques in international relations such as coercion or 
persuasion (Johnston, 2005). One example shows how the EU-ASEAN relations are merely 
the fourth level of policy-making, behind the national level, the EU level and the global level 
(Camroux, 2010). In this regard, the EU’s behavior is examined as bargaining at different 
policy levels. While international negotiations are definitely part of the policy-making process, 
they are not under the scope of this research. Extending the scope to include the negotiation 
process would not have been feasible for this project due to time constraints but could have 
brought some insights on the power dynamics between the EU, ASEAN, China, Japan and the 
United States. Comparing the negotiation processes of the (failed) EU-ASEAN free trade 
agreement and the (concluded) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement would feed into 
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the discussion about regional hegemony. 
This analysis only represents a small part of a bigger policy implementing system. That is to 
say that international organizations and treaties have an impact on actor behavior, which can 
influence the implementation of NPCD as both a process and an outcome. The United Nations, 
the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) are global fora that shape the international political landscape to which 
individual actors such as the EU are bound despite the fact that they are creators of this 
landscape at the same time. Within different systems, the actors play different roles, and thus, 
adding the global policy level as a level of analysis to the existing EU-focused analysis would 
add to the understanding of how normative policy coherence for development is, and can or 
cannot, be implemented. Within this global setting of development actors, how much leverage 
does the EU have to strengthen its (still controversial) normative power (Birchfield, 2013; Diez, 
2005; Manners, 2002)? Applying game theory, for example, would highlight the EU’s choice 
between cooperation and blockage in multilateral settings (Caporaso, 1992). In relation to this, 
it could be examined to what extent the EU has gained (or lost) normative power as a result of 
successful or failed cooperation. The EU-ASEAN free trade negotiations could serve as a 
relevant case study of failed cooperation. 
An entirely different analysis could be undertaken based on the literature on alternatives to 
development, which criticize the dominance of Western approaches over any alternative forms 
of society and living (Escobar, 1995; Gudynas, 2011; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1998; Ranta, 2018; 
Rist, 2008; Salleh, 2017). This dissertation does not question the EU’s approach to 
development per se, but rather examines its normativity and assesses normative coherence 
within the system of “transformative development”, which has been declared the normative 
guide for development cooperation since the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals 
in 2015. Thus, given the new normative/transformative approach to development, EU policies 
have been examined as to their norm implementation. Taking a step away from the within-
system analysis, a different study could be undertaken on how PCD contributes to reinforcing 
the development structures and, consequently, the power relations between “the West and the 
rest” (see for example Amsden, 2001). Particularly by linking up development with other 
policies, the strategic character of development cannot be ignored. Therefore, the argument 
could be made that more coherence plays into the hands of the developed states, as they will 
use this tool to force their approach in all policy fields. While this kind of criticism was already 
232 
 
voiced (Thede, 2013), it still accepts the development discourse. Thus, a development-critical 
approach could add an entirely new perspective on the concepts of PCD and NPCD. Of course, 
this approach challenges the very fundamentals of the PCD, which are embedded in the 
international system criticized by alternative movements. While the value of an alternative 
perspective is beyond doubt, it is a highly ambitious objective and certainly out of the scope of 
the current study, which focuses on normative coherence within the predominant global order. 
This dissertation offers ample ground for further studies. It contributes to the existing fields of 
PCD, public policy and regionalism, but further research could be undertaken as suggested in 
this sub-section. Moving from academic advancement towards a more personal statement, the 
next sub-section, the final part of this dissertation, lays out again the general necessity of norms 
in the current global system, or in other terms, the need for normative policy coherence. 
iv. Critical Reflections on Norms and Development 
The EU’s actions do not correspond with the normative development paradigm at the global 
level in that the EU and a number of its member states separate norms as a political 
undertaking from development as a technical undertaking. Traditionally, development 
cooperation was meant to be non-political as it was not to interfere with internal politics of a 
sovereign state. As a result, it is not surprising that current development programs and projects 
do not include a normative dimension, which is designated to be a political task. However, 
since the initiation of the Millennium Development Goals, all UN members have agreed on a 
certain set of norms in development and, consequently, opened the development sector to a 
more political dimension. Now, 18 years after the first call for a universal effort to fight for the 
empowerment of women, for example, the fact that development is still considered a 
technicality is rather questionable. If the MDGs and SDGs call for human rights, why do 
development policies not reflect this call for change? Even though development is supposed to 
be non-political, it is nevertheless a strong tool to exercise power over the partner countries 
based on financial investments, and as such can function as a political instrument. Similarly, 
trade policies can be utilized as a political tool to put pressure on a partner country. Thus, while 
development and trade policies might not officially be qualified as political fields, they actually 
are – or at least have the potential to be used as – political tools. Even more so under the 
assumption that economic development will lead to democratization through urbanization, 
higher education levels or higher life expectancy, which in turn are expected to change public 
behavior towards a more politically active society (see for example Inglehart & Welzel, 2009). 
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Thus, the line between the political and non-political remains blurry, and it is the development 
actor’s responsibility to determine the political functions of its development and trade policies. 
In authoritarian contexts, the non-political strategy is often a more successful route to trigger 
economic reforms, which are expected to lead to political reforms in the long term. 
Based on the normative development paradigm applied in this dissertation, the underlying 
assumption for development was very optimistic expecting development to have a normative 
dimension, whereas the underlying assumption for trade did not show expectations for a 
normative dimension. “Development is optimistic and utopian. Development means changing 
the world for the better” (Peet & Hartwick, 2009, p.2). The analysis showed that in practice, 
development is not as utopian as assumed, but influenced by interests and technical processes. 
The optimistic potential to make the world a better place is lost by leaving normative discussion 
to the political arena. To make a more critical comment, making the world better under the 
development umbrella is limited to financial contributions and economic predictions from 
which both the donor and the recipient can benefit. The utopian vision is clear at the global 
level, where the sustainable development goals of the 2030 Agenda aspire for inclusive and 
universal development and emphasize all 193 UN member states’ commitment to improve 
lives worldwide. 
As shown in this dissertation, based on the analysis of EU-Vietnam development and trade 
policies, norm implementation lacks behind the rhetorical commitment. The next sub-section 
places this outcome in a wider context of current affairs.  
Realist Limitations to Idealism 
In a globalized world, several states compete for influence across different countries and 
regions. The EU not only competes with like-minded countries such as Australia and Canada 
in terms of providing development cooperation to Vietnam, but also with less normative 
countries such as the United States and China, which only attach few normative conditions to 
providing development aid or negotiating trade agreements. Given that other international 
actors have the capacity to provide sustainable amounts of development aid as well as offering 
access to a large economic market, such as the Chinese market, it is questionable whether the 
EU can remain an attractive partner or whether its expectations from a recipient country are 
too high and consequently make it an unfavorable partner. The role of the United States in 
international relations has been unpredictable since the election of President Trump in 2016. 
Since then, President Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
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the Paris climate accord and the nuclear arrangement with Iran, and started a “trade war” with 
China. Thus, on several occasions did the US retract from hitherto negotiated international 
agreements. For this reason, the United States is likely to be considered an unreliable partner 
given its President’s ad-hoc decisions and might currently not be a major competitor to EU in 
terms of development cooperation or trade. These actions might even have opposite effects, 
namely highlighting the reliability of other international actors such as the EU, as well as China. 
China has evolved into one of the most influential actors, if not the most influential actor, in 
the Southeast Asia region based on its economic strength and military capacities. Some would 
even argue that China has become a normative power in the region, albeit with a different set 
of norms (Kavalski, 2013). It has grown into a donor country providing financial incentives 
without attaching normative conditionality clauses as the EU tends to do. Simultaneously, 
economic ties between China and Vietnam have grown with many Chinese firms relocating to 
Vietnam due to lower labor costs (Renwick, 2016). By relocating companies, China support 
economic growth twofold, first by the relocation itself and second by growing consumption in 
China. In addition, contrary to the EU, China has managed to set up a China-ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement first signed in 2002 and ever since expanded with the most recent amendment 
signed in 2015 (ASEAN, 2012). However, relations between Vietnam and China remain tense 
over claims of territory regarding the Spratly islands in the South China Sea. Indeed, Vietnam 
has signed an agreement with the Philippines and China to jointly exploit gas an oil resources 
around the Spratly islands, but only after the Philippines and China had already agreed on doing 
so bilaterally (Dosch & Vuving, 2008). China has indeed succeeded in building its hegemonic 
power in the region and is regarded as such by many ASEAN states (Dosch & Vuving, 2008), 
but despite this evolution, China-Vietnam relations remain complex: 
“Derived from China’s grand strategy, its Vietnam policy has two major goals. The first is to 
keep Hanoi close to the Chinese orbit. The second is to cement China’s control of the South 
China Sea. Given the dispute between the two countries over territories in the South China 
Sea, China’s policy toward Vietnam cannot be a straightforward course of action. The 
seemingly contradictory objectives of this policy thus demand a delicate balance in the conduct 
of China’s relations with Vietnam. This in turn requires a fine combination of reward and 
punishment in the implementation of that policy” (Dosch & Vuving, 2008, p.17). 
Thus, despite China’s growing prominence in the global as well as regional arena, it is currently 
still a challenging actor for Vietnam. As a result, the EU seems to remain an attractive partner 
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for Vietnam both in terms of development cooperation as well as trade arrangements, and could 
use this position to promote its norms abroad. 
However, two questions need to be asked here. First, how realistic are the EU’s goals in terms 
of norm promotion? While the EU’s official commitment to norms is strong, its actual potential 
to implement those norms is limited given the partner country’s readiness to adopt these norms. 
As stated above, Vietnam tends to be more reluctant towards political norms, whereas it is more 
open to economic and social norms. In this context, the EU might use a bargaining strategy 
setting high expectations assuming that norm implementation will be challenging, but minor 
results can be spurred by setting high standards. This strategy is certainly possible but was not 
explored in this dissertation. Nevertheless, based on the interviews I have conducted, I would 
argue that the EU’s hands are tied to a certain extent. It might adopt a bargaining position in 
more general negotiations on a governmental level, i.e. regarding the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, the Free Trade Agreement and even the Multi-Annual Programs, but 
the individual projects and the day-to-day work is based on very realistic views of what can be 
expected and the awareness that asking for too much might hamper the relationship. The 
interviewees in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City seemed very knowledgeable about the limits of 
their work and the opportunities in which to push the usual normative boundaries. 
The second question relates to the first by addressing the EU’s normative credibility in times 
of internal political uncertainty. Can the EU still be a normative actor in a time of the so-called 
migrant crisis, negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EU regarding the UK’s exit 
from the union, and a growing number of right-wing parties entering national governments in 
several EU member states? These three recent examples of internal conflicts highlight that the 
EU faces severe difficulties in applying its own norms when put under pressure by internal and 
external development. The influx of large groups of immigrants from war-torn countries 
challenged the solidarity between the member states as well as the EU’s commitment to human 
rights, which are nevertheless promoted abroad. Similarly, the EU promotes regional 
integration, while negotiating exit strategies with the United Kingdom, which has decided to 
leave the EU after a public referendum. Both examples are probably related to the rise of right-
wing parties leading populist campaigns in favor of nationalism and xenophobia across 
member states such as France, Germany, Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, the UK, Austria and 
Finland. Despite these disruptions, most political parties across the member states as well as 
the majority of people do not stand in favor of these developments. There have been several 
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disruptions to the usual EU business-as-usual but compared to the success it has achieved since 
its creation in the 1950s in terms of economic, political and social integration, maintaining 
peace, opening borders between the nation states, it is unlikely that a few years of political 
difficulties will change the EU’s international reputation. Undoubtably, this might change in 
the future if the member states will not be able to find a consensus on how to deal will common 
challenges. However, for the moment, it is a difficult phase, which might be overcome if the 
EU stuck to its own norms. 
These evolutions, i.e. the rise of non-normative development actors and internally contested 
norms in the EU, might have different effects on the EU’s norms in development. As this 
dissertation has shown, development is already considered a technical sector rather than a 
political/normative sector. Based on this, from an internal perspective, three scenarios are 
possible. First, if the EU is going through a difficult phase shaped by political conflicts 
undermining its own norm, but finally overcoming this phase, it is unlikely that this phase will 
significantly change the norms in development. As a result, development would continue being 
a rather technical field instead of a strongly normatively infused policy arena. A second 
scenario arising from the assumption that the EU is going through a phase might be the 
strengthening of EU norms. While this scenario currently seems unlikely, it might be possible 
that citizens and politicians urge for more togetherness, openness. Some grassroot movements 
and individual politicians have already called for a more inclusive society, but populist 
movements are nevertheless increasing. As a result of a more normative society internally, 
external policies might adopt this approach and be used more effectively to promote EU norms. 
Third, if the EU faces a more long-term development towards disintegration and nationalism, 
its norms might fade over time and it would not be a credible normative actor in the 
international arena any longer. 
From an external perspective, the emergence of non-normative development actors, such as 
China, could pose a threat to the EU’s position as a normative actor, which might force the EU 
to lower its normative expectations from the partner countries in a long-term perspective. 
However, as already mentioned above, the EU is currently still a valuable partner for Vietnam, 
and Vietnam-China relations in particular remain challenging. This, combined with the global 
efforts to achieve transformative development, enhances the EU’s potential as a normative 
actor. 
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Making Globalization more Normative 
The EU’s commitment to policy coherence for development, on the one hand, and its 
commitment to its founding values on the other hand, led to the idealist view of normative 
policy coherence for development and the normative dimension as a reference point for policy 
assessment. Norms did not guide this research solely for idealistic purposes, or to hold the EU 
accountable for its actions, but also to highlight the importance of norms in current international 
politics, particularly in the seemingly inevitable process of continuous globalization. With this 
dissertation I do not aim to suggest that developing countries need to follow the European 
model, or adopt a European system of policy making, even though this approach is often 
implied in development practices. Rather, I would like to raise awareness for the necessity of 
norms to divert current development practices from the goal of economic growth towards a 
holistic human-centered approach that leaves space for various local practices. 
The UN Charter of Human Rights is only one example of so-called universal norms. As such, 
these norms should be integrated in international politics while letting developing countries 
determine their own paths. In the transition from a globally isolated state towards a globally 
integrated state, each country needs to take decisions as to which path it aims to follow. 
The following two scenarios help demonstrate the importance of norms, despite the rather 
simplistic illustration. Obviously, reality is more heterogeneous. Nevertheless, economic growth 
remains one of main goals for most states and is thus used as the basis for the two scenarios 
(visualized in figure 17). In the first scenario, the country has become a wealthy state in terms 
of average growth numbers, however, wealth is accumulated among the few oligarchs that 
govern the country and the majority of its citizens live in disadvantaged conditions. In the 
second scenario, wealth is distributed more equally among the citizens of this country, the 
majority of people receives quality education and decisions can be taken collectively by the 
citizens of this state rather than the ruling business owners. The difference between those two 
scenarios is the human approach to development, which places individual needs and wishes 
rather than national economic growth at the center. Without norms that allow individuals to 
pursue their own paths, such as human rights or pluralism, the first scenario is very likely to 
take place in a globalizing world. In both scenarios, the point of departure is a situation of 
internal conflict, which does not always mean violent conflict, but can be a struggle for 
recognition both at the global level as well as the individual level, economic stagnation and 
isolation from the global system. Taking this as a point of departure, one possible route leads 
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to an outcome which combines globalization and conflicts, i.e. in terms of conflict no major 
changes have occurred, but economic growth can be witnessed by the upper class (this is 
represented by the first quadrant in the top left corner). The other possible route leads to 
globalization combined with peace in the top right corner of figure 17. Norms can function as 
a tool to divert the route from the within-conflict globalization track to the from-conflict-to-
peace globalization track. Again, this is just a simplified illustration of reality, and does not 
aim to imply that developing countries do not have or apply norms as long as the are not part 
of the globalized system. On the contrary, each society is built around a set of norms, but those 
norms obviously differ between societies. Nevertheless, the underlying rationale remains that 
implementation of those norms is a prerequisite to guide globalization processes towards a 
peaceful and inclusive outcome.  
Figure 17: Two-dimensional Grid of Isolation-Globalization and Conflict-Peace 
 
Source: author’s own creation 
Th guiding norms for human/transformative/normative development do not necessarily have 
to be a copy of the EU norms as examined in this dissertation. Each country operates in its own 
specific context with its own set of norms and, consequently, globally agreed norms, such as 
human rights, should be adapted to the local context. At the same time, certain norms are indeed 
global norms and as such should be implemented. Thus, I do not aim to prescribe the EU model 
as a model for development, but nevertheless I would like to highlight the importance of EU 
norms in development. Personally, I consider issues such as genital mutilation, imprisoning 
journalists when they report about an internationally unacceptable situation, or religious 
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persecution unacceptable. Contributing to warfare, as some of the EU member states do, is just 
as unacceptable and as already mentioned earlier, the EU currently faces a lot of challenges to 
its normative framework, which certainly does not make it a perfect example for normative 
actorness. This is why it is all the more important to call for political actions that correspond 
to the – to date mostly rhetorical – normative commitments by regional actors and nation states. 
I would like to conclude this dissertation by highlighting – once more – the importance of 
development as freedom (Sen, 1999), the need for norms, for human rights and democratic 
values, for equity and equality, for freedom and solidarity in international relations, and their 
active implementation in policies to ensure a better life for individuals in this globalization-
driven world. In the context of norms as a necessity in the globalization process, the question 
arises as to the moral rationale underlying norms. To phrase it in realist terms: Do norms 
function as a tool to exert more power over the partner countries and if so, does this undermine 
the morality of norms? In an idealist world, I would argue in favor of the morality of norms in 
general, not necessarily the primacy of all EU norms over other norms, because the EU system 
certainly does not suit each context. If norms are used solely as a strategic tool in external 
relations, they are not primarily meant to improve people’s lives but to serve underlying 
rational purposes. As such, they should not be called norms, because they lack a normative 
character. However, regardless of the underlying rationale, those norms would still improve 
individual lives even though they might function overall as a tool for one actor to exercise more 
control over the other. This is not to justify EU norms as a means of exercising power. Rather, 
taking a realist approach, power balances between self-interested actors shape the global arena 
regardless of the (non-)inclusion of norms. As globalization is primarily an economic process, 
power does not have to take the form of armed conflict (military power) but manifests itself in 
economic superiority. Thus, on the path to peaceful globalization as presented in figure 17, 
economic power relationships determine the outcome. Within this economy-driven process, 
norms can take the role of stabilizing regions. In a peaceful and free society, production is not 
restricted by violence and, consequently, a normative vision enhances economic production. 
The economy of warfare obviously shows an entirely different picture. Having said this, does 
the underlying rationale of norm promotion play a role? It would be too idealistic to expect 
moral behavior from global actors in the competition over economic strength. Therefore, I 
would conclude that – in realist terms – the underlying rationale for norm promotion is not the 
decisive factor, but rather the fact that norms are actually being promoted – albeit to a limited 
extent as this dissertation has shown – and as a result, living conditions can be improved.  
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Taking this thought of improving living conditions a step further, pondering upon idealist 
notions and alternatives to development, I would like to conclude this dissertation with some 
reflections on norms and development. In this dissertation, I have argued that norms are 
relevant for development in order to improve lives. As mentioned earlier, this argument is 
embedded in the Western approach to development, which is in turn embedded in global 
capitalism, which, however, does not mean that the Western system is the appropriate system 
of each country. Nevertheless, considering the current state of global affairs, the EU plays a 
crucial role in implementing norms as a measure to introduce the centrality of people into 
development practices, albeit at a political/rhetorical level. 
Integrated approaches to development see people as part of their surroundings in which each 
part has its role. Critical movements against traditional growth-centered development have 
existed since the 1960s (see Fanon, 1963; Frank, 1967) and particularly since the 1990s, 
alternative voices have gained momentum in academic debates (Escobar, 1995; Esteva &  
Prakash, 1998; Rahnema & Bawtree; 1998). Most recently, the notion of the pluriverse has 
been utilized to call for “a world where many worlds fit” (Demaria & Kothari, 2017). The 
“pluriversal perspective” (Escobar, 2015) offers a new viewpoint arguing for the acceptance of 
various epistemologies and ontologies. As Escobar (2015) accurately states in this context, 
“globalization can be described as a mono-ontological occupation of the planet”. With this in 
mind, it would be worth considering whether and how the Western frame of development and 
global governance could be overcome allowing for a multitude of life designs. Under the 
current global system, however, integrating norms into realist politics in the form of normative 
policy coherence for development is a step towards a more humane version of international 
relations. 
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Appendix 1: List of Policy Documents 
 
 
Level Primary Documents for Analysis 
Policy Guideline Maastricht Treaty 
Lisbon Treaty 
European Consensus for Development 
New European Consensus for Development 
Agenda for Change 
EU Global Strategy 
Trade for All 
 Vietnam Specific  ASEAN Specific 
Policy Guideline   ASEAN Charter 
Policy Formulation Framework and Cooperation 
Agreement 
Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement 
Free Trade Agreement 
  ASEAN Blueprint 2025 
Policy Implementation 
- programs 
Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 
Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 
Multiannual Indicative Program 
2007-2010 
Multiannual Indicative Program 
2011-2013 
Multiannual Indicative Program 
2014-2020 
Asia Regional Multi-
Annual 
Indicative Program 2014-
2020 
Policy Implementation 
- projects 
 
EU-ASEAN Blue Book 2016 
EU-ASEAN Blue Book 2017 
 EU Blue Book 2007 
 EU Blue Book 2008 
 EU Blue Book 2009 
 EU Blue Book 2010 
 EU Blue Book 2011 
 EU Blue Book 2012 
 EU Blue Book 2013 
 EU Blue Book 2014 
 EU Blue Book 2015 
 EVBN Project Description 
 MUTRAP Project Description 
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
Appendix 2A: Interview Questions for DG DEVCO 
Institutional Background 
1. What is your position and what are your responsibilities? 
2. How long have you been in this position? 
3. What is your budget? 
EU-ASEAN Relations 
1. In your opinion, what are the defining characteristics of EU-ASEAN relations? 
2. What are the priorities on both sides? 
3. What role does Vietnam play in EU-ASEAN relations? 
4. In your opinion, how coherent are the EU’s policies towards Vietnam? 
DG DEVCO 
1. How often do you meet with colleagues from other units of DG DEVCO? 
2. Which unit do you work most with? 
3. Is your relationship formal/informal/financial? 
4. What are the sectors that you collaborate on? 
5. Do you discuss norms? 
EEAS 
1. How often do you meet with your EEAS colleagues in Brussels? 
2. Is your relationship formal, informal and/or financial? 
3. Can you describe how a meeting is structured? 
4. Who defines the agenda? 
5. What topics are usually covered during the meetings? 
6. Do you discuss norms? 
DG TRADE 
1. How do you communicate with your colleagues in DG TRADE? 
2. How often do you meet? 
3. Are your communications formal or informal? 
4. What topics are usually covered during a meeting? 
5. Do you discuss norms? 
EU Representatives in Vietnam 
1. Do you communicate with EU representatives in Vietnam? 
2. Are your communications formal or informal? 
3. Can you describe how a meeting is structured? 
4. What topics are usually covered during a meeting? 
5. Do you discuss norms? 
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Appendix 2B: Interview Questions for EEAS 
 
Institutional Background 
1. What is your position and what are your responsibilities? 
2. How long have you been in this position? 
3. What is your budget? 
EU-ASEAN Relations 
1. In your opinion, what are the defining characteristics of EU-ASEAN relations? 
2. What are the priorities on both sides? 
3. What role does Vietnam play in EU-ASEAN relations? 
4. In your opinion, how coherent are the EU’s policies towards Vietnam? 
EEAS Vietnam Desk 
1. How often do you meet with your colleagues from the EEAS GLOABL? 
2. Which department do you work most with? 
3. How would you describe your relationship? 
4. Can you describe how a meeting is structured? 
5. How do you agree on the agenda? 
6. Can you tell me about the topics that you usually cover during the meetings? 
7. Do you get the opportunity to discuss norms? 
DG DEVCO 
1. How often do you meet with colleagues from of DG DEVCO? 
2. Which unit do you work most with? 
3. How would you describe your relationship? 
4. What sectors do you collaborate on? 
5. Do you get the opportunity to discuss norms? 
DG TRADE 
1. How do you communicate with your colleagues in DG TRADE? 
2. What kind of communication channels do you use? 
3. How often do you meet? 
4. How do you agree on the agenda? 
5. What topics do you usually cover during a meeting? 
6. Do you get the opportunity to discuss norms? 
EU Representatives in Vietnam 
1. Do you communicate with EU representatives in Vietnam? 
2. What kind of communication channels do you use? 
3. Can you describe how a meeting is structured? 
4. What topics do you usually discuss during a meeting? 
5. Do you get the opportunity to discuss norms? 
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Appendix 2C: Questions for EU Delegation 
 
Institutional Background 
1. What is your position and what are your responsibilities? 
2. How long have you been in this position? How long have you been working in Vietnam? 
3. How long has your agency/office existed in Vietnam? 
4. What is your budget? 
EU-ASEAN Relations 
1. In your opinion, what are the defining characteristics of EU-ASEAN relations? 
2. What are the priorities on both sides? 
3. What role does Vietnam play in EU-ASEAN relations? 
Vietnamese Government 
1. With whom do you meet from the Vietnamese government (people or offices)? 
2. How often do you meet representatives from the Vietnamese government? 
3. Is your relationship formal, informal and/or financial? 
4. Can you describe how a meeting is structured? 
5. Who defines the agenda? 
6. What topics are usually covered during the meetings? 
7. Do you discuss norms? If so, how and how often? (regularly, irregular, never) 
Vietnamese Civil Society 
1. How often do you meet with the Vietnamese civil society? 
2. Is your relationship formal, informal and/or financial? 
3. Can you describe how a meeting is structured? 
4. Who defines the agenda? 
5. What topics are usually covered during the meetings? 
6. Do you discuss norms? If so, how and how often? (regularly, irregularly, never) 
Other EU representatives 
1. How do you communicate with EU representatives in Brussels and/or Vietnam?  
2. Are your communications formal or informal? 
3. Can you describe how a meeting is structured? 
4. What topics are usually covered during a meeting? 
5. Do you discuss norms? If so, what norms? 
6. What kind of instructions do you get? How much is left to your discretion? 
Trade 
1. Do you communicate with your colleagues in Trade? 
2. How often do you meet? 
3. Are your communications formal or informal or solely financial? 
4. Do you discuss norms? If so, what norms? 
Additional Questions 
1. Why is Vietnam the first country (after Singapore) to conclude an FTA with the EU? 
2. Who participated in the negotiation rounds? 
3. Did you consult NGO in Vietnam on their position towards an FTA? 
4. If yes, what kind of NGOs? 
5. How do you assess the impact of trade agreements on human rights? 
6. How are human rights taken into account if not through an HRIA? 
7. What can be done to improve the commitment to norms? 
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Appendix 2D: Interview Questions for Member State Officials 
 
Institutional Background 
1. What is your position and what are your responsibilities? 
2. How long have you been in this position? How long have you been working in Vietnam? 
3. How long has your agency/office existed in Vietnam? 
4. What is your budget? 
EU-ASEAN Relations 
1. In your opinion, what are the defining characteristics of EU-ASEAN relations? 
2. What are the priorities on both sides? 
3. What role does Viet Nam play in EU-ASEAN relations? 
4. 2015 marks the 25th anniversary of EU-VN diplomatic relations. Can you summarize 
the main success stories and challenges? 
Vietnamese Government 
1. With whom do you meet from the Vietnamese government? 
2. How often do you meet representatives from the Vietnamese government? 
3. Is your relationship formal, informal and/or financial? 
4. Can you describe how a meeting is structured? 
5. Who defines the agenda? 
6. What topics are usually covered during the meetings? 
7. Do you discuss norms? If so, how and how often? (regularly, irregular, never) 
Vietnamese Civil Society 
1. How often do you meet with the Vietnamese civil society? 
2. Is your relationship formal, informal and/or financial? 
3. Can you describe how a meeting is structured? 
4. Who defines the agenda? 
5. What topics are usually covered during the meetings? 
6. Do you discuss norms? If so, how and how often? 
EU Representatives 
1. How do you communicate with EU representatives in Brussels and/or Vietnam? 
2. Are your communications formal or informal? 
3. Can you describe how a meeting is structured? 
4. What topics are usually covered during a meeting? 
5. Do you discuss norms? If so, what norms? 
6. What kind of instructions do you get? How much is left to your discretion? 
Local Colleagues 
1. Do you communicate with your colleagues in Trade/Development? 
2. How often do you meet? 
3. Are your communications formal or informal or solely financial? 
4. Do you discuss norms? If so, what norms? 
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Appendix 3: List of 32 Respondents 
 
Area of Responsibility Location of Interview Affiliation 
High Level Development Cooperation Staff Vietnam EU 
Director Vietnam EU 
Team Leader Vietnam EU 
Project Director Vietnam EU 
Team Leader & Policy Officer (2 interviewees) Belgium EU 
Development Cooperation Staff Belgium EU 
Management Staff Belgium EU 
Management Staff Belgium EU 
Support Staff Vietnam EU 
High Level Management Staff Vietnam International 
Researcher Vietnam Asia 
Senior Aid Coordination Advisor Vietnam Asia 
High Level Political Staff Vietnam National 
High Level Development Cooperation Staff Vietnam National 
Head of Political and Economic Cooperation Vietnam National 
High Level Political Staff Vietnam National 
Country Director Vietnam National 
Head of Trade Center Vietnam National 
High Level Political Staff Vietnam National 
Project Coordinator Vietnam National 
Director Vietnam National 
Trade Staff Vietnam National 
High Level Trade Staff Vietnam National 
Trade Staff Vietnam National 
High Level Development Cooperation Staff Vietnam National 
High Level Political Staff Vietnam National 
Country Director Vietnam National 
Trade Staff Vietnam National 
High Level Development Cooperation Staff Vietnam National 
High Level Political Staff Vietnam  National 
High Level Development Cooperation Staff Vietnam National 
Policy Coordinator Vietnam Vietnam 
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Appendix 4: EVBN Leaflet 
 
 
 
 
